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This thesis takes a dynamic approach to the treatment of energy in international trade law. It 
traces the development of energy rules from the inception of the 1947 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations today. The thesis is divided in two main parts: (I) Regulation and (II) 
Challenges. 
 
The first part of the thesis discusses the controversies surrounding the coverage of energy in 
the GATT/WTO forum. It continues by providing an overview of WTO Agreements relevant 
for the treatment of energy. Finally, this part of the thesis looks at the crystallization of new 
rules in energy trade: what developments do we observe in WTO accession commitments 
and, beyond the WTO, in preferential trade agreements? 
 
In the second part, the thesis focuses on three major challenges in WTO law with respect to 
energy. It starts off with a comparative study of the WTO and the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT), scrutinizing their overlap and potential conflict. Then, using law and economics 
methodology, the thesis takes a closer look at restrictive practices in energy trade, such as 
those maintained by Members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). Third, this part discusses the ‘subsidies paradox’ in WTO law through which fossil 
fuel subsidies arguably escape the disciplines of the WTO. Subsidies for clean energy and 
renewables, on the other hand, are an easy target for WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
 
By way of conclusion, the thesis considers policy options for enhanced energy governance. 
It, amongst others, discusses possible future scenarios and the role of the WTO and Energy 
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1. Introduction and Objectives 
 
 
Energy is all around us. It comes in many forms and is as much as the air we breathe and the 
water we drink essential for our survival. Energy is also ever-changing and in transition: Up 
until the end of the 19
th
 century, we were burning wood and peat as the main fuels to keep 
our houses warm and our economies going.
1
 Industrialisation transported us into the age of 
coal, which lasted until the middle of the 20
th
 century. This energy transition was soon 
followed by yet another one: Oil overtook coal as our primary fuel after large discoveries of 






 The ensuing establishment of vast 
multinationals extracting oil caused a steep increase in its global consumption and trade.
3
 The 
age of oil caused us to be under the spell of ‘black gold’ from the second half of the 20
th
 
century onwards. The 1970s oil crises, moreover, made it painfully clear how dependent the 
world is on oil and what turmoil follows if our supplies are hampered with.  
 
At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, large shale gas discoveries, especially in North America, 
heralded the dawn of the natural gas era into which we are venturing today.
4
 However, we 
have also come to realise that the fossil fuels we were so eager to burn over the past century 
brought along a negative externality: climate change.
5
 Our collective ambitions are therefore 
to transition once more into an era of clean energy and to provide for our needs in a 
sustainable and CO2 neutral way.
6
 The last two decades have indeed brought along 
revolutionary advancements in renewable and clean energy. For instance, China is now the 
                                                 
1 V Smil, Energy Transitions – History, Requirements, Prospects (Praeger, Denver 2010) 25ff; See also by 
means of illustration, e.g., the overview of the United States Energy Information Administration, ‘Energy 
sources have changed throughout the history of the United States’ 3 July 2013   
<http://www.eia.gov> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
2 See ‘Chapter 6: The Oil Wars: The Rise of Royal Dutch, the Fall of Imperial Russia’ in: D Yergin, The Prize: 
The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (Free Press, New York 2008) 338. 
3 See e.g. United States Energy Information Administration, ‘US Imports of Crude Oil 1920 - 2016’ 
<www.eia.gov> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
4 See ‘Chapter 16: The Natural Gas Revolution’ in D Yergin, The Quest: Energy Security and the Remaking of 
the Modern World (The Penguin Press, New York 2011) 1066 ff. 
5 See Preamble to the COP21 Paris Agreement: United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 




world’s biggest producer of solar panels.
7
 Furthermore, wind farms are on the rise and the 
equipment necessary for their construction is traded globally on an ever larger scale and has 




With these energy transitions, our stance towards energy has changed as well. During the 
area of Industrialisation, we were primarily focused on ever growing production and 
consumption. By 2016, we can no long ignore the necessity to move away from this and 
reorient towards sustainable development and climate change mitigation. Yet, paradoxically, 
with a rise in global population, our energy consumption keeps on increasing.
9
 What is more, 
through the process of globalisation, our international trade in energy it will grow 
accordingly.
10
 These developments are accompanied by the need to provide for a secure 
supply of our energy. It is here that the rules of international trade come into play.  
 
The relevance of the rules of the multilateral trading system for energy was long overlooked, 
downplayed and underestimated.
11
 The fact that energy was long traded almost exclusively 
by international, vertically integrated and often state-owned companies may offer one 
explanation for this. However, the energy transitions mentioned above have changed the 
global energy trading landscape significantly. Energy trade is no longer confined to oil 
tankers, transporting barrels from the Gulf; Trade in wind mill equipment and solar panels 
fall into this category as well. Moreover, an increasing amount of major energy producing, 
exporting and transporting countries are acceding to the WTO and/or concluding Preferential 
Trade Agreements (PTAs) that include provisions relevant for energy. And with a rise in 
international trade disputes pertaining to both renewable and non-renewable energy, the 




                                                 
7 Earth Policy Institute, ‘Annual Solar Photovoltaics Production by Country, 1995-2012’ (31 July 2013) 
<www.earth-policy.org> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
8 The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on 1 January 1995 <www.wto.org>; See WTO, 
Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program: Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in 
Tariff Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, DSR 2013:I, p. 7; Panel Reports, 
Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating 
to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/R and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and Add.1, adopted 24 May 2013, as 
modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, DSR 2013:I, p. 237. 
9 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2015 (EIA, Paris 2015) 21. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See infra Chapter 2 section 2. 
12 See infra Chapter 2, section 2.2.3. 
 
 3 
This study therefore aims to situate the treatment of energy in international trade law in the 
wider context of the developments discussed above. It investigates the regulation of energy in 
international trade law from the dawn of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947 
(GATT 1947), until negotiations in the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership today.
13
 How is energy regulated in international trade? What are the challenges? 
The study takes a dynamic approach to the treatment of energy in international trade law and 
aims to understand the debate in a cross-cutting manner.  
 
So far, there has been no comprehensive study by a single author on the regulation of energy 
in international trade law. The edited volume on energy trade law published by Yulia 
Selivanova with chapters on selected topics comes closest to this.
14
 However, Selivanova’s 
volume approaches issues in energy trade solely thematically, rather than situating them in 
the wider context. This book aims to fill this gap in international legal literature and attempts 
to provide an overview of the issues, while understanding them from the viewpoint of the 
evolution of energy and trade law simultaneously.  The book is divided in two main parts: (I) 
Regulation and (II) Challenges. 
 
Part I, in Chapter 2, first studies the treatment of energy from the inception of the GATT in 
1947 until the establishment of the WTO in 1995. It dismantles the claim that there was a 
gentlemen’s agreement excluding energy from the coverage by the rules of the multilateral 
trading system.
15
 Chapter 3 continues by discussing the current legal framework of the WTO, 
providing an overview of WTO Agreements relevant for energy. It is here that we expose 
some challenges, which will be elaborated upon further in part II of this book, such as export 
restrictions and the regulation of subsidies.
16
   
 
Finally, this part of the thesis looks at the crystallization of new rules in energy trade in 
Chapter 4: what developments do we observe in WTO accession commitments and, beyond 
                                                 
13 GATT 1947: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 and European Commission, DG Trade, ‘In focus: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/index_en.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016) and United States 
Trade Representative, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership <https://ustr.gov/ttip> (accessed 27 
March 2016). 
14 Y Selivanova (ed), Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter 
(Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 2011). 
15 See infra Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
16 See infra Chapter 3, section 3.3.4 and section 3.8. 
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the WTO, in Preferential Trade Agreements? As trade negotiations in the WTO are stalling, 
regulation by means of PTAs is taking over.
17
 The chapter looks into a select amount of 
relevant PTAs. It discusses the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has 
been in place for over two decades.
 18
 The Chapter also looks to two recently concluded 
agreements containing substantial provisions on energy, namely the EU-Singapore FTA and 
EU-Ukraine DCFTA.
19
 Finally, Chapter 4 looks into energy negotiations in the TTIP.
20
 The 
goal of this exercise is to assess what commitments in energy trade parties are seeking and to 
what extent they go beyond what is provided for in WTO law. 
 
The second part of the thesis addresses several challenges in international energy trade 
regulation. Chapter 5 continues on the note of Chapter 4 and looks into energy commitments 
beyond the WTO, namely in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). By means of a comparative 
study, the chapter scrutinizes the nexus between the WTO and the ECT. It looks at the 




Chapter 6 and 7 take a law and economics approach to the challenges addressed in them. 
First, Chapter 6 takes a closer look at restrictive practices in energy trade.
22
 It lays bare the 
difficulties WTO law has with respect to strategic, unevenly distributed natural resources and 
cartels maintained by states. It does so by taking the practices of the most well-known energy 
cartel in the world, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as an 
example.
23
 The chapter investigates whether the economic rationales underlying the WTO 
and the OPEC are compatible. Then, it continues by exploring whether WTO law can ‘catch’ 





                                                 
17 See infra Chapter 4, section 3. 
18 NAFTA: The North American Free Trade Agreement, 1 January 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 14;  
19 EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Authentic text as of May 2015, Chapter 7: Non-Tariff Barriers to 
Trade and Investment in Renewable Energy Generation (not yet in force); EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: 
European Commission, ‘Association Agreement between the European Union and Its Member States, of the one 
part, and Ukraine, of the other part’ L161/3 (29 May 2014) (not yet in force) 
20 See supra text to note 13. 
21 The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), 18 April 1998, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100 
22 See infra Chapter 6. 
23 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries <www.opec.org> (hereafter: OPEC). 
24 See infra Chapter 6 section 5. 
 
 5 
Chapter 7 addressed policy choices and market failures with respect to energy subsidies. As 
the market has failed to address negative externalities such as CO2 emissions, a scale up of 
clean and renewable energies is necessary. Often, governmental policies create such markets 
by means of subsidization.
25
 The chapters seeks to understand the economic rationales of 
subsidies disciplines in the WTO. Then, the chapter proceeds to uncover a ‘subsidies 
paradox’ in WTO law.
26
 This paradox causes harmful subsidies on fossil fuels to arguably 
escape the rules of the WTO. Vice versa, much needed subsidies for renewable energy are 
easy targets for WTO dispute settlement. 
 
It should be mentioned that apart from its discussion in Chapters 3 and 5, thesis will not 
address energy transit in international trade law in great depth. One reason for this is that 




By way of conclusion, the thesis considers policy options for enhanced energy governance. It   
discusses possible future scenarios for energy regulation by means of Preferential Trade 
Agreement and sector specific developments. Last but not least, it looks into avenues of 
future interaction between the WTO and Energy Charter Treaty. 
 
We can genuinely say that almost 80 years of international trade regulation by means of the 
GATT 1947, and later by the WTO, have brought 80 years of challenges in the field of 
international energy regulation. Some of these issues are institutional by nature, and concern 
the actors that set the rules in on the global energy stage. One example hereof is how the rules 
of the WTO interact with the rules set out in the Energy Charter Treaty. Other concerns are 
inherent to the fact that fossil fuels and natural resources are unevenly distributed around the 
globe. This study aims to provide some clarity in this respect. 
 
 
                                                 
25 See infra Chapter 7, section 7.3.3. 
26 See infra Chapter 7, section 3. 
27 Transit of Energy in WTO and public international law has been written on extensively, and for this reason is 
not the focus of this book, see e.g. D Azaria, Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines and Countermeasures 
(OUP, Oxford 2015); L Ehring and Y Selivanova, ‘Energy Transit’ in: Y Selivanova (ed), Regualtion of Energy 
in International Trade Law – WTO, Nafta and Energy Charter (Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 2011); M 
Cossy, ‘Energy Transport and Transit in the WTO’, in: J Pauwelyn (ed), Global Challenges at the Intersection of 
Trade, Energy and Environment (Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, the Graduate Institute, Geneva 









































































Part I – Regulation:  
 
Energy in GATT/WTO History, the Current WTO Framework for Energy  










Energy, petroleum in particular, is the single most traded commodity in the world.
1
 Energy 
regulation in the GATT/WTO system has never been a straightforward matter, however; it 
has either been perceived as excluded from its purview altogether, included but legally dealt 
with as an exception to regular GATT treatment by invoking Article XX (g) relating to the 
conservation of natural resources or the Article XXI security exception, or regarded as 
included on paper but with few tariff commitments and little actual relevance.
2
 One thing that 
is certain is that the treatment of energy in the multilateral trading system has been politically 




To better comprehend why energy was and continues to be a controversial topic in the World 
Trade Organization (hereafter: WTO), one has to first look at the historical legal context.
4
 
This chapter will discuss how energy matters were originally largely ignored and seemingly 
excluded from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947) altogether. 
Over time, however, a gradual shift took place and issues relating to energy did make their 
way onto the GATT/WTO agenda, only to be considered as fully covered by WTO 
Agreements today. This chapter will discuss the roots of this initial disregard and dismantle 
the alleged gentlemen’s agreement excluding energy from the GATT/WTO forum, in Section 
2.1. Section 2.2 will subsequently proceed to explain the turnaround in the awareness and the 
inclusion of energy issues in the GATT/WTO forum by the time the World Trade 
                                                 
1 Petroleum and fossil fuels are the largest primary commodity of international trade in terms of both volume 
and value, see WTO, International Trade Statistics 2011 (Geneva 2011) 61; Also see Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), International Energy Agency (IEA) and Eurostat joint 
report, Energy Statistics Manual (OECD/IEA 2005) 13; NB the latter report on page 17 states that ‘The term 
energy, when used accurately in energy statistics, refers only to heat and power but it is loosely used by many 
persons to include the fuels.’ For the sake of clarity, this paper will follow this interpretation when referring to 
energy. 
2 Article Art XX (g) (General Exceptions) and Article Art XXI (Security Exceptions) of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Geneva, 21 November 1947, entered into force 29 July 1948, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
3 See UNCTAD, Trade Agreements, Petroleum and Energy Policies, UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/9, (United Nations, 
New York and Geneva 2000)15 (hereafter: the UNCTAD report).  
4 The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on 1 January 1995 <www.wto.org>. 
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Organization (hereafter: WTO) was established in 1995. The end of this chapter recaps the 
conclusions. 
 
2.2. Energy: In or Out of the GATT/WTO? A Historical Perspective  
2.2.1. Factors Contributing to the Perceived Exclusion of Energy in the GATT/WTO 
 
In the advent of the GATT 1947, traded energy was practically limited to the fossil fuels of 
coal, petroleum and gasoline. It is widely believed that trade in energy for a long time was, at 
least de facto, excluded from GATT/WTO coverage. The misunderstanding that the 
GATT/WTO legal framework would not apply to trade in energy can be traced all the way 
back to the initial negotiations of the GATT 1947. There seemed to be a generally accepted 
conviction that the founding Members negotiated a gentlemen’s agreement to keep petrol 
trade outside of the scope of the GATT.
5
 This was the result of a combination of several 
factors: 
 
1) First of all, the main petroleum producing and exporting countries such as such as Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), China, the Russian Federation and Venezuela, 
were not original parties to GATT 1947.
6
 Although several significant energy producing 
countries, such as Indonesia, Kuwait and Nigeria were GATT Members since 1947, other 
core energy trading countries were not included. Consequently, the GATT did not regulate 
their trade with other nations, including their trade in energy.  
 
                                                 
5 SL Sakmar, ‘Bringing Energy Trade into the WTO: The Historical Context, Current Status, and Potential 
Implications for the Middle East Region’ (2008) 18 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 89; 
Also see M Gibbs, ‘Energy Services, Energy Policies and the Doha Agenda, in: United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Energy and Environmental Service: Negotiating Objectives and 
Development Priorities, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2003/3 (United Nations, New York and Geneva 2003) 4: 
‘Issues related to petroleum and energy were not discussed in the GATT forum. It is said that a ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’ existed among the major trading countries not to discuss petroleum issues in the GATT, for fear that 
the strategic nature of petroleum trade and the importance of security concerns in respect of petroleum 
products would ‘politicize’ the debate; Desta in his article states that ‘The role of the multilateral trading system 
on international trade in petroleum products has not always been clear’ […] ‘However, there is not any GATT 
provision which exempts petroleum trade from its coverage. In principle, trade in petroleum products among 
GATT/WTO Members is governed by the rules of the trading system just like other products. But, de facto, there 
was a virtual exclusion of petroleum trade.’; See MG Desta, ‘The Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, the World Trade Organization, and Regional Trade Agreements’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 
523, 529 (hereafter: Desta, ‘The OPEC/WTO’). 
6 Some of these countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, would later become Members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries <www.opec.org> (hereafter: OPEC). 
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2) In the early stages of GATT negotiations after the Second World War, the world’s major 
petroleum fields were located in the Middle East, North America and South East Asia, and 
were controlled by a handful of transnational (often state-owned) corporations, originating in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France.
7
 These corporations 
were – and still are – known as the Seven Sisters (Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon, Gulf, Texaco, 
BP, Mobil, and Standard Oil of California (Chevron)). This reigning ‘Seven Sisters’ oil 
company cartel dominated the petroleum industry from the 1940’s until the 1970’s and 
generally preferred to settle its business outside the global trading system.
8
 For the greater 
part, these were state-run and vertically integrated companies, dealing with everything from 
producing, shipping, refining and marketing to selling petroleum products all over the world.
9
 
Trade in energy did occur, but mainly between public entities. The existing energy cartel 
eliminated competition on petrol, and therefore energy trade liberalisation was not much of 
an issue. In practice, most petroleum fields were located in colonies or former colonies, and 
because of the sensitivity connected with control over natural resources, the home countries 
of these transnational corporations wanted to avoid any political tensions.  
 
3) The third point ties onto the previous one: as a strategic commodity, energy was a 
particularly sensitive topic in (post-colonial) international trade, a view poignantly reflected 
in the 1962 UNGA Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.
 10
 
This resolution reiterates that it is up to resource-owning States to decide how to deplete their 
natural resources and at what rate. It was adopted at a time when many resource-endowed 
States started the renationalisation of their energy resources but seems no less relevant 
today.
11
 This also explains why it remains hard for some countries to open up their markets in 
the energy sector entirely, if at all. There are certain advantages for a government in stepping 
back from the energy sector and allow for international competition and access to natural 
                                                 
7 The UNCTAD report (n 3) 14.  
8 The ‘Seven Sisters’ were originally comprised of: Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon, Gulf, Texaco, BP, Mobil, and 
Standard Oil of California (today’s Chevron), see for a background on this D Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest 
for Oil, Money and Power (Free Press, New York 2008), ‘Chapter 21: The Postwar Petroleum Order’ 1810. 
9 Sakmar (n 5) 91. 
10 UNGA Res 1803 (XVII) (18 December 1962) ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’. 
11 See on the international law principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the history of the UNGA 
Resolution generally NJ Schrijver, ‘Natural Resources, Permanent Sovereignty over’ (June 2008) in: R 
Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008-, 
online edition, <www.mpepil.com>; See also infra Chapter 6, discussing this issue more in depth; See moreover 
L Wernar, Blood Oil – Tyrants, Violence and the Rules that Run the World (OUP, Oxford 2016) 194 ff, 





 One could think of importing foreign expertise in certain energy sectors and 
benefitting financially from competition. Yet governments may have an interest in retaining 




4) Another reason for excluding energy talks from the GATT might have been that energy 
was considered a scarce product to which the GATT was in principle not supposed to apply. 
This can be explained by the traditional focus of the GATT; trade rules seem to have been 
tailored to deal with manufactured products of which there is an unlimited supply, while 
fossil fuels are by definition a strategic finite commodity.
14
 Consequently, the GATT 
intended to restrain import barriers, while it is mostly export barriers that are problematic in 
energy trade. This is what is commonly called the ‘market access bias’ of the GATT and will 
be elaborated upon  in Chapter 6 of this book.  
 
With all this in mind, one can conclude that there was a state practice in place in which 
energy issues were largely ignored in the GATT/WTO forum for some decades. This led to 
the perception that energy was explicitly excluded from GATT/WTO coverage by means of 
an illusive gentlemen’s agreement to keep energy ‘out’ of the scope of the GATT.
15
 Scholars 
and reports questioned the extent to which GATT/WTO rules applied to energy goods and 
services, if they applied at all.
16
 A 1998 Background note by the WTO Secretariat strikingly 
concluded that ‘energy goods have been treated for a long time as being outside the scope of 
the reach of GATT rules, by relying on the general exception relating to the conservation of 




                                                 
12 See infra Chapter 6. 
13 Energy Charter Secretariat, Trade in Energy: WTO Rules Applying under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECS, 
Brussels 2001) 12. 
14 Y Selivanova, ‘Managing the Patchwork of Agreements in Trade and Investment’ in: A Goldthau and JM 
Witte (eds), Global Energy Governance – The New Rules of the Game (Brookings Institution Press, Washington 
DC 2010) 53. 
15 See UNCTAD report (n 3) 15. 
16 Desta (n 5). 
17 WTO, Council for Trade in Services, ‘Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat’, Doc 





2.2.2. An Illusive Gentlemen’s Agreement Excluding Energy from the GATT? 
 
In sum, the aforementioned factors made it easier to avoid politically sensitive energy talks 
(in that time limited to non-renewable fossil fuels) from the GATT. This assumption lead to 
the rash conclusion (for some) that there must have been a gentlemen’s agreement excluding 




Yet, no written proof of such an agreement exists, even when investigated thoroughly.
19
 In 
fact, surprisingly little or no literature exists about the gentlemen’s agreement’s contents or 
the circumstances under which it was negotiated, which is remarkable considering the 
importance of global energy trade. Even works that discuss the diplomatic aspects and 
negotiating history of the GATT do not mention this apparent agreement to keep energy 
‘out’.
20
 This makes one the more curious about the form and intentions of the agreement. 
How many Members were there present when it was agreed? And what did they decide on 
exactly, what was the scope of the agreement? These questions unfortunately remain largely 
unanswered. Scholars and reports simply conclude that there was an agreement to ‘keep 
petrol trade out of the GATT’.
21
 An extensive UNCTAD report issued on energy trade and 
the GATT/WTO in 2000 also concluded  that ‘Issues related to petroleum and energy were 
not discussed in the GATT forum.’
22
 Some even argue that the agreement stipulated ‘to 
continue excluding issues relating to trade and price of crude oil from the GATT framework’, 
but no proof of this seems to exist either.
23
  
                                                 
18 See supra note 5 
19 While many authors and reports refer to this agreement, no written proof of this gentlemen’s agreement 
seems to exist whatsoever. The UNCTAD Report (n 3) 15 e.g. states ‘Because of the very nature of this 
agreement, it does not appear to be set out in any written documents’; Also see Sakmar (n 5) 96; Extensive 
searches through the negotiating history and verbatim in the Stanford University GATT Digital Library 1947-
1994 <http://gatt.stanford.edu/page/home> do not point to any evidence discussing the gentlemen’s agreement 
either. 
20 See for instance A Sykes, PC Mavroidis and DA Irwin, The Genesis of the GATT (CUP, Cambridge 2008); 
RE Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (Praeger Publishers, New York 1975) and 2nd 
edition 1990 (Butterworth Publishers, Salem 1990); RE Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law – The 
Evolution of the Modern Legal GATT System (Butterworth Legal Publishers 1993) and TW Zeiler, Free Trade, 
Free World – The Advent of the GATT (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 1999). 
None of these works mention anything about the historical circumstances of the gentlemen’s agreement to 
exclude energy trade from the GATT. 
21 See generally Sakmar and Gibss (n 5).  
22 UNCTAD report (n 3) 4. 
23 W-C Shih, ‘Energy Security, GATT/WTO, and Regional Agreements’ (2009) 49 Natural Resources Law 




Moreover, gentlemen’s agreements have an undefined place in international law. First and 
foremost, they are not considered a binding source of international law as stipulated by 
Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute.
24
  Rather, they are informal ‘bona fide’ agreements, often 
connected to some kind of accepted practice, a sort of tacit consent, so to say.
25
 An often 
quoted, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, characterization is attributed to High Court judge Harry 
Vaisey:  
 
‘A gentlemen’s agreement is an agreement which is not an agreement, made between 
two persons neither of whom is a gentleman, whereby each expects the other to be 




As a part of soft law, gentlemen’s agreements are non-binding and therefore non-enforceable 
agreements, and should be considered as containing political and moral commitments, often 
based on existing practice and relying on the good faith of the parties.
27
 Important also is the 
intention of the parties when concluding the agreement – there is no reason to consider an 
agreement legally binding if the parties did not intended it to create enforceable rights and 
obligations.
28
 Reasons for States to prefer a gentlemen’s agreement to binding commitments 
may be that the field in question is not predictable enough or is too politically sensitive to 
enable hard legal commitments, which precisely seems the case in the volatile world of 
energy trade.
29
 That being said, even when the gentlemen’s agreement in question is not 
                                                 
24 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute); Additionally, see R Wolfrum, 
‘Sources of International Law’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2008-, online edition, <www.mpepil.com>. 
25 P Gautier, ‘Non-Binding Agreements’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008-, online edition, <www.mpepil.com>. 
26 See BA Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage (OUP, Oxford 2011) 389, under ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’; The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law groups gentlemen’s agreements under 
non-binding agreements: No legal rights and obligations can be obtained from them. They are non-legally 
enforceable agreements, ‘secured by the good faith and honour of the parties’, MPEPIL (n 24); Conversely, the 
Encyclopaedia of the United Nations and International Agreements defines them as ‘an international term for an 
agreement made orally rather than in writing, yet fully legally valid,’ see EJ Osmańczyk and A Mango (ed), 
Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements: G to M. – Part II (Third edn) (Routledge, 
New York 2003) 792; This is assumption is highly questionable, however, since it is unclear under what 
international legal regime such an agreement would be legally valid, not to mention enforceable. Lauterpacht 
explains that the elementary textbooks on the law of contract stipulate that gentlemen’s agreements are binding 
‘in honour only’ and not intended to ‘create legal obligations,’ see E Lauterpacht ‘Gentleman's Agreements’, in 
W Flume (ed) International Law and Economic Order – Essays in Honour of FA Mann on the Occasion of his 
70th Birthday on August 11, 1977 (Beck, München 1977) 381, 381.  
27 Gautier (n 25). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Gautier (n 25) mentions that gentlemen’s agreements have been described in legal writings since the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  
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intended to be legally binding, this does not mean it does not have its effect in practice, for it 




This might explain the unwritten nature of the alleged gentlemen’s agreement to keep trade in 
petroleum from being covered by the GATT. In all probability, the topic of energy trade in 
the GATT was considered a politically sensitive issue not relevant for ‘normal trade’ and 
parties thought it better not to make hard, binding commitments in the energy field.
31
 One 
might claim that if there was such a thing as a tacit gentlemen’s agreement excluding energy 
from the GATT, it was a mere expression of the state practice already in place with respect 
to global petrol trade. Given the already established Seven Sister oligopoly it was deemed 
better if the new rules of international trade did not interfere. For obvious reasons, energy 
importing countries already used a zero per cent import tariff on petrol and could not 
negotiate on its price much even if they wanted. Though, to return to the argument above, the 
actually legal validity of the gentlemen’s agreement to keep petrol trade ‘out’ should be 
challenged nevertheless: (a) There is no proof of its existence nor content in the GATT/WTO 
legal framework, general international law or contract law, ergo no hard rule follows from 
this agreement to exclude petrol trade from the GATT/WTO in any way. And, (b) there is in 
fact no legal obstacle in any of the provisions of the GATT or other WTO Agreements for the 
application of GATT/WTO rules to energy.  
2.2.3. Tariffs on Petrol Taken up in Members’ Schedules since GATT 1947 
 
We can conclude that while energy trade was mostly dealt with outside of the multilateral 
trading system, nothing in the provisions of the GATT 1947 or WTO Agreements stipulates 
that trade in energy is excluded from its scope. Quite to the contrary: tariffs on fossil fuels, 
such as crude oil, have been present in Members’ Schedules of Concessions (Article II(a) 
GATT 1947) from the start and ever since. Though in various degrees, most founding 
Members of the GATT committed themselves one way or another from the start with respect 
to trade in fossil fuels.
32
 The implications thereof will be elaborated upon in more detail in 
the section below, but one can argue that the mere fact that categories of fossil fuels were 
taken up in Member’s Schedules is in stark contrast with the ‘illusive’ gentlemen’s 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 See generally MG Desta, ‘The GATT/WTO System and International Trade in Petroleum: an Overview’ 
(2003) 21 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 385.  
32 See infra Section 3.2. 
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agreement. Although it is inherent to the nature of gentlemen’s agreements that they need not 
necessarily be in written form, the fact that negotiated tariffs have been present black on 
white in Members’ Schedules from the start certainly adds to proving that energy was 




2.2.3.1. Tariffs and Schedules of Concessions 
In fact, tariffs on energy products were present in Member’s Schedules of Concessions to the 
GATT from the very beginning. But what does this exactly mean? The core aim of the 
GATT/WTO system is to secure non-discrimination in trade, which is reflected in Article I 
GATT Most-Favoured Nation treatment (MFN) and Article III GATT National Treatment 
(NT).
34
 MFN stipulates that a Member cannot discriminate between foreign products, while 
NT prescribes that once a foreign product has entered the domestic market it is subject to the 
same treatment and the domestic ‘like product’.
35
 Under the GATT, import tariffs on foreign 
products are the only allowed form of protection in trade.
36
 Thus, tariffs are not illegal under 
WTO law, but they are nevertheless considered a serious obstacle to trade, and it is therefore 
the long-term objective of the WTO to guarantee tariffs that are as low as possible, or 
preferably, to eliminate them altogether.
37
 Once a Member has agreed to a particular tariff for 
market access on a product, it must grant all other Members the same tariff, i.e. they have to 
be applied to the foreign ‘like product’ imported onto the domestic market on a non-
discriminatory basis (the essence of the MFN principle).
38
 Article II of the GATT (Schedules 
of Concessions) stipulates that Members ‘shall accord to the commerce of the other 
contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate 
Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement’.
39
 Member’s Schedules of 
                                                 
33 Gautier (n 25). 
34 Most Favored Nation treatment (MFN) is embedded in GATT Article I, National Treatment (NT) is 
embedded in GATT Article III; Also see B Hoekman and PC Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization – Law, 
Economics and Politics (Routledge, New York 2007) 16.  
35 Ibid. 
36 The GATT 1947 (n 2) preamble States with respect to tariffs: ‘Being desirous of contributing to these 
objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce […]’; Additionally, see Hoekman and Mavroidis (n 34) 15. 
37 Ibid; Also see L Ehring and CF Chianale, ‘Export Restrictions in the Field of Energy’ in Y Selivanova (ed), 
Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (Wolters Kluwer, 
Alphen a/d Rijn 2011) 109.  
38 Article I GATT (MFN) (n 2).  
39 See Article II.1 (a) GATT (n 2).  
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Concessions lay down specific tariff commitments for a particular product.
40
 Each Schedule 
consists of four parts, subsequently dealing with MFN tariffs (Part I), preferential 
concessions (Part II), concessions on non-tariff measures (Part III) and specific commitments 
on agricultural products (Part IV).
41
 Every Member has its own national schedule; it is either 
annexed to the result of every round of trade negotiations, or to their respective Protocols of 
Accession.
42




Tariffs lines may be bound or unbound (free).
44
 If they are bound, this means a Member is 
not allowed to apply ad valorem  (specific or composite) duties above the agreed level in the 
Schedules (the so-called ‘tariff ceiling’).
45
 Members may use ‘applied rates’, i.e. lower duties 
than the bound rates, if they wish.
46
 If a tariff is free or unbound, it means that the Member 
did not take on any commitment to bind its tariff in the earlier round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, either because it concerned a sensitive issue and/or because other Members did 
not request any bindings on them.
47
 In theory this means that a Member can apply as high a 
custom duty as it pleases on the imported good. This does not alter the fact that WTO 
Members in their Schedules are not allowed to agree on treatment that is inconsistent with the 
basic GATT obligations; Article I  (Most Favoured Nation) and Article III (National 
Treatment) applies to bound as well as unbound items (except for Article III.8).
48
 The same 
                                                 
40 See WTO, ‘Goods Schedules – Member’s Commitments’ 
 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
41  Ibid; NB: the number of parts in the schedule depends on the negotiation Round in question. 
42 See A Hoda, Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations Under the GATT and the WTO – Procedures and 
Practices (CUP, Cambridge 2002) 111. 
43 Article II.7 GATT; NB Except when a Member is part of a customs union, in which case the Member has a 
common schedule with other Members of the union; See P van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World 
Trade Organization – 2nd Edition (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 418. 
44 See C Mavroidis, G Bermann and M Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization (WEST Publishing, 
New York 2010) 85 ff.  
45 Ibid; Also see page 89: ad valorem duties imply that a certain percentage of the product’s value is levied.  
46 Ibid. 
47 MJ Trebilcock and R Howse, The Regulation of International Trade - 3 edn (Routledge, New York 2002) 
679.   
48 This was first touched upon in US – Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua (L/5607 – 31S/67) (Report of the 
Panel Adopted on 13 March 1984) and later confirmed in WTO WT/DS27, EC – Bananas III Appellate Body 
Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591; Panel Report, European Communities – 
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Mexico, WT/DS27/R/MEX, 
adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 803; 
Additionally, see Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 44) 101 and Van den Bossche (n 43) 418. 
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accounts for goods that are not scheduled altogether, meaning goods that are traded in but do 




Virtually all goods that are globally traded are registered and classified in the HS Convention 
(Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System), managed by the World Customs 
Organization (WCO).
50
 Products are classified as raw materials, semi-finished goods or 
finished products. For instance, mineral fuels and oils are grouped under Chapter 27.
51
 Then, 
a more detailed division in various types of oils and fuels (e.g. crude versus not crude) can be 
found in subcategories 2701 – 2716.
52
 Subsequently, all derivative products are classified 




Concerning trade in energy, it is generally in importing Members’ interest to keep import 
tariffs as low as possible, as it is a means to secure their national energy supplies. For this 
reason, import tariffs are actually not the biggest concern as a barrier for trade in energy. 
Rather, the opposite is true: Export duties are a much bigger concern and one of the 
peculiarities that accompany international energy trade (the so-called market access bias of 
the GATT discussed earlier). Desta argues that the tariff schedules of GATT Members hardly 
contained tariff reductions and binding commitments with regard to petroleum trade 
                                                 
49 As Desta stated in ‘The GATT/WTO System’ (n 31) this is contradictory, since if petroleum products are not 
included in the schedules of concessions, a country would have been free to impose tariffs on these products at 
any level without violating its GATT obligations. A parallel can be drawn with the treatments of agricultural 
products: at least, this was touched upon by the Appellate Body in United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign 
Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, DSR 2000:III, p. 1619, see conclusions and 
recommendations, para 15.1. ‘With respect to unscheduled agricultural products, Members are prohibited 
under Article 3.3 from providing any export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1. Article 10.1 prevents the 
application of export subsidies which ‘results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention’ of that 
prohibition. Members would certainly have ‘found a way round’, a way to ‘evade’, this prohibition if they could 
transfer, through tax exemptions, the very same economic resources that they are prohibited from providing in 
other forms under Articles 3.3 and 9.1. Thus, with respect to the prohibition against providing subsidies listed in 
Article 9.1 on unscheduled agricultural products, we believe that the FSC measure involves the application of 
export subsidies, not listed in Article 9.1, in a manner that, at the very least, ‘threatens to lead to circumvention’ 
of that ‘export subsidy commitment’ in Article 3.3.’ 
50 The Harmonised System Convention: (Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System), 14 June 
1983, 1503   U.N.T.S.   167 is the system according to which all schedules are structured, See World Customs 
Organisation,  <http://www.wcoomd.org/home.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
51 HS Convention (n 50), Chapter 27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances; mineral waxes; See  
<http://www.wcoomd.org/home_hsnomenclaturetable2012.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
52 Ibid. See HS Codes under Heading 2710: Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other 
than crude; preparations not elsewhere specified or included, containing by weight 70 per cent or more of 




throughout the decades, because all Members applied zero duties to begin with.
54
 Applied 
tariffs on petroleum generally remain low until today; countries may raise them to any level if 
they are unbound (which is the case for instance for the United States and Japan, who have 
kept their tariffs unbound).
55
 However, in order to show that fossil fuels were included on 
Members’ Schedules from the start and the implications thereof, historic GATT import tariffs 
on fossils fuels will be briefly discussed below.  
 
2.2.3.2. Historical Energy Tariffs in 1947 Geneva Schedules 
During the establishment of the GATT in 1947, Members negotiated tariffs for their 
schedules for the first time, which resulted in the ‘1947 Geneva Schedules’, annexed to the 
GATT 1947, and, as mentioned above, forming an integral part of the agreement.
56
 The 
Geneva Schedules predated the codifications of the HS Convention as that convention only 
entered into force in 1988, after being transformed from the Customs Union Council.
57
 




What is interesting is that there were categories on fossil fuels rights from the start in Part I 
and Part II of many of the Member’s Geneva Schedules.
59
 This is striking, especially in view 
of the apparent gentlemen’s agreement excluding petrol talks from the GATT. What is more, 
several founding Members of GATT 1947 even committed themselves to binding tariffs on 
energy products and fossil fuels: France, for instance, had quite detailed Schedules on (crude) 
petroleum and gasoline with respective tariff bindings.
60
 The country made even more 
meticulous tariff bindings on behalf of all of its African Protectorates (the French Union) at 
                                                 
54 Desta,‘The OPEC/WTO’ (n 5) 531-32. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Note that these products were included since GATT was first negotiated and can be found in Schedules 
attached to the GATT 1947, the so-called ‘Geneva 1947’ Schedules (hereafter: The Geneva Schedules). The 
Geneva Schedules contain the tariff bindings of the 23 founding Members of the GATT. Their respective 1947 
Geneva Schedules are recorded in the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) volumes 56 – 61 (1950); See for an 
overview of separate Members’ Schedules (1950) 55   U.N.T.S.  306; Also see Hoda (n 42) 111.  
57 See World Customs Organization History,  
<http://www.wcoomd.org/home_about_us_auhistory.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
58 See the use national classification schedules e.g. in the Geneva Schedules (n 56). 
59 Ibid. 
60 France committed itself as follows with respect to fossil fuels: ‘Natural Petroleum, crude, and assimilated 
products, French Tariff Item No. 332A’, a tariff of 18 per cent; On petroleum gas, 3 per cent, French Tariff Item 
333; On gasoline, 18 per cent, French Tariff Item 334A; With respect to French Equatorial Africa, Petroleum 
tariffs were usually around 10 per cent; See Gabon Tariff Item number 146, 59 U.N.T.S. 217-219 (1950); 
French West Africa, Tariff Item Number 201, Refined and extra refined petroleum, 10 per cent (59 U.N.T.S.  
220 (1950); Somalia: French Somali Coast Tariff Item Number ex 196 (Petroleum), Free (unbound); See 
Schedule XI – France to the GATT 1947, 59 U.N.T.S. 39-41 (1950).  
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the time, grouped under French Equatorial Africa in the Schedule.
61
 Generally speaking, 
France’s tariffs on petroleum were in the range of 5 per cent – 20 per cent in the Geneva 
Schedules.
62
 Originial GATT 1947 Members Chile, Cuba and Canada also committed 
themselves to tariffs on crude petroleum: Chile set a tariff of 6.56 per cent for petroleum.
63
 
Cuba bound its tariff at 0.31 per cent for petroleum and 0.96 per cent for gasoline.
64
 Canada 
set its tariff on crude petroleum on 1 per cent.
65
   
 
Subsequently, there were Members who decided to keep their petrol tariffs ‘unbound’, 
categorised as ‘free’ in their Schedule, meaning they could impose as high a tariff they 
wished on fossil fuels. These were countries like the United States (unbound until today), 
Burma,
66
 Brazil, the Benelux countries and Australia.
67
 Yet, these countries did acknowledge 
and classify the fossil fuel categories in their respective Schedules. The United States, 
according to the 1930 Tariff Act, listed a category under number 1733 ‘Oils, mineral: 
Petroleum, topped crude, fuel, or refined, and all distillates obtained from petroleum, 
including kerosene, benzine, naphtha, gasoline, paraffin, and paraffin oil.’
68
 Finally, with 
respect to fossil fuels, there was a third category of GATT founding Members: the countries 
that omitted the categorization of fossil fuels from their respective Schedules altogether. 
These were Great Britain and its former colonies, India, China (one of the original Members 




The 1947 Geneva Schedules reveal several noteworthy facts. First, we can derive from them 
that with respect to tariff bindings on fossil fuels, there were essentially three categories of 
GATT Members: 
 
a) Those who scheduled fossil fuels and actually made tariff bindings on them; 
b) Those who scheduled fossil fuels in their protocols, but left the tariffs on these products 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See Schedule VII – Chile, Part I, MFN Tariff, Chilean Tariff Item No. 43 I: ‘Petroleum: crude, for furnace 
or boilers, metric ton G’, in 58 U.N.T.S. 17 (1950).  
64 See Schedule IX – Cuba, Part II Preferential Tariff, Cuban Tariff Number 6-A and 7-A, 58 U.N.T.S. 49 
(1950). 
65 See Schedule V – Canada, Part I, Canadian Tariff Number 267b, 57 U.N.T.S. 132 (1950). 
66 Burma had a tariff of 25 per cent on ‘all sorts of mineral oils’, See Schedule IV – Burma, Tariff Item No. 
158, 57 U.N.T.S. 92 (1950).  
67 See Schedule II – Benelux, Part I, 56 U.N.T.S. 128-129 (1950). 
68 See e.g. 1947 Schedule of the United States to the GATT, 61 U.N.T.S. 183 (1950).  
69 See the Geneva Schedules for these respective Members (n 56). 
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free and unbound; and  





About half of the Members who did schedule fossil fuels in their Concessions, left tariffs on 
these products unbound.  The fact remains, however, that the majority of these Members did 
take up fossil fuels as a category in their schedules in the first place. This means that they did 
not exclude trade in fossil fuels from the GATT altogether, because they acknowledged their 
significance in international trade and even listed them in their schedules in detail, potentially 
with a view on future developments in the field. More importantly, several Members indeed 
made tariff bindings on fossil fuels.
71
 These might have more been of a ‘symbolic value’, as 





2.2.4. De jure, De facto: Tariffs on Petrol Dismantle the Illusive Gentlemen’s Agreement 
 
The findings in this section expose that the existence and legal validity of the gentlemen’s 
agreement was questionable. Based on the arguments, one wonders what those writing so 
convincingly on the existence of the gentlemen’s agreement based themselves on in the first 
place. One scenario that comes to mind is that the state practice of avoiding complicated 
energy issues in the GATT during that period was confused with or seen as identical to the 
existence of an explicit gentlemen’s agreement excluding energy from the scope of the 
GATT. This, however, is a dangerous mistake to make. Energy, fossil fuels in particular, 
were not ‘out’, not completely at least, for Members did make commitments on them.  
 
The sole evidence for the potential existence of a gentlemen’s agreement excluding energy 
from the GATT could be derived from the fact that there were several prominent countries, 
namely Great Britain, who omitted the category of fossil fuels from their Schedules 
completely. Admittedly, this leads to the conclusion that for these GATT founding Members, 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 France, Canada, Cuba and Chile, see text to notes 59 – 64.  
72 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 5 and 15. 
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energy trade indeed took place outside of the GATT legal framework.
73
 One assumes that 
Great Britain, host country of two of the Seven Sisters (BP and Royal Dutch Shell – half 
British), obviously did not want to commit in any way to trade on fossil fuels within the 
GATT. Additionally, when looking at Members’ practices throughout the years, no major 
energy disputes were brought under dispute settlement under the GATT, though global trade 
conflicts in the energy sector did exist (e.g. the 1970s oil crisis).
74
 Generally, such disputes 
were solved outside of the GATT/WTO framework. 
 
However, the US and the Netherlands (as part of the Benelux countries), the host States of 
the remaining five of the Seven Sisters (Esso, Exxon, Gulf, Chevron and Texaco) did list the 
category in their respective Schedules, even when tariffs were left unbound. The fact that 
around half of the Members maintained unbound tariffs is an indicator the issue was too 
sensitive to make ‘hard’ commitments in and it can be assumed that other Members did not 
request any bindings on fossil fuels from these countries. On the other hand, a substantial 
amount of GATT founding Members did agree on actual binding tariffs on fossil fuels and 
this fact should not be underappreciated.  
 
This leads to the conclusion that energy trade was de jure covered from the inception of the 
multilateral trading system.
75
 But de facto, energy trade has been treated as mostly outside of 
the GATT for several decades. An important contributing factor to this is that the primary 
focus of the GATT was about eliminating trade barriers, not about dealing comprehensively 
with cartels or abuse of dominant position.
76
 For this reason, difficult questions concerning 
the relation between energy and the legal provisions of the GATT were ducked out in the 
forum for a fairly long time.  
                                                 
73 It should be mentioned, however, that WTO Members still could not escape the disciplines of GATT Article 
I, III and XI. The only thing Members could do was to avoid making tariff concessions.  
74 Yergin (n 8) ‘Chapter 29: The Oil Weapon’; An interesting observation in this respect is that one the first 
trade disputes in the GATT did actually deal with an energy product, although not petrol: In 1954, the United 
States complained against Belgium and claimed that intensification of quota restrictions in imported coal 
violated Article XI GATT (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions). However, the case was withdrawn 
before the discussion – it was settled on the basis of increased quota (SR. 9/42 (Mar. 4, 1955)). Coal has been 
classified in GATT Schedules from the beginning (1947) and is still the most used energy product today; See 
Belgian Import Restrictions on Coal, US, L/258 (Oct 26, 1954), as mentioned in Hudec (n 20) 285.   
75 Desta, ‘The GATT/WTO System’ (n 31) 391-392. 




2.3. From Tokyo to Doha: The Gradual Shift to Inclusion of Energy    
 
The previous section discussed the dubious status of the gentlemen’s agreement allegedly 
excluding petrol trade from the GATT and challenged its validity. But how did the 
misconception that energy was not covered by the GATT/WTO transform into an acceptance 
of the topic in the forum? There seem to be two main explanations for this. First of all, from 
the Tokyo Round to the Doha Round, there was a rising awareness of up and coming green 
energy entering the global market (eventually leading up to the green energy disputes , such 
as the Canada-Renewable Energy/Feed-in Tariffs Case).
77
 Second, restrictive business 
practices by WTO Members in possession strategic natural resources, especially form the 
1970s oil crises onwards, became hard to ignore. It seems that over time, GATT Members 
acknowledged that some matters pertaining energy, and fossil fuel trade more in particular 
(such as dual pricing, briefly explained below), were too important and needed clarification. 
It is during this period that the seeds for the WTO’s challenges on energy regulation to be 
discussed in Chapter 6 and 7 of this book (restrictive practices and energy subsidies), were 
planted. The topic of energy regulation started gradually resurfacing in the GATT/WTO 
during that time and it is safe to say that this contributed to a shift in perceiving energy as 
mainly ‘out’ of to predominantly ‘in’ the multilateral trading system by the time the Doha 
Round began (DDA 2001-).  
 
To better understand how the shift from energy trade in principle ‘out’ to in principle ‘in’ has 
developed in the GATT/WTO, this section will address several factors that have contributed 
to the change in the debate and discuss the extent of their effect. Broadly speaking, these are: 
 
- The evolution in tariff negotiations on energy products and related services in the 
respective main Rounds of Trade Negotiations;
78
 
                                                 
77 Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program: Appellate Body Reports, Canada – 
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the 
Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, DSR 2013:I, p. 7; Panel 
Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures 
Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/R and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and Add.1, adopted 24 May 
2013, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, DSR 2013:I, p. 237. 
78 These are in chronological order: conclusion of GATT 1947, the Kennedy Round (1964-67), the Tokyo 
Round (1973-79), the Uruguay Round (1986-94) and the Doha Round (2011-present) (the ‘minor’ rounds 
between the conclusion of the GATT and the Kennedy Round are not included in this list). 
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- Selected Member’s concessions in the energy field in their respective GATT/WTO 
accessions; 
- External factors that contributed to the fuelling of the energy debate (such as the 
establishment of OPEC, oil producing and exporting countries joining the 
GATT/WTO, the 1970s oil crisis that resulted in dual pricing practices, and the 
climate change debate); and 
- GATT/WTO case law relevant for energy and natural resources. 
 
2.3.1. OPEC and the Oil Crisis - Fuelling Concerns in the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) 
 
One possible way to understand the development and evolution in the energy debate, is to 
look at tariff reductions and commitments in Member’s concessions. There was no clear 
evaluation of tariff reductions and other commitments during the first five GATT rounds of 
trade negotiations (the Geneva Tariff Conference (1947), Annecy Tariff Conference (1949), 
Torquay Tariff Conference (1950-51), Geneva Tariff Conference (1956) and Dillion Round 
(Geneva II) (1960-61)).
79
 The GATT Secretariat only started to conduct studies on tariff lines 
from the Kennedy Round (1964-67) onwards.
80
 However, no significant new developments 
in the energy field occurred during that round and energy trade only started to fuel concerns 




The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) brought an end to the more or less complete avoidance of 
complex energy questions in the GATT system. In the 1960’s, the major oil exporting 
countries formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (hereafter: OPEC), 
which initially was not very influential. However, the 1970’s oil crisis changed the course of 
history when most energy producing countries had taken control over their natural resources 
production and nationalized their petroleum industries. Only then did it become evident how 
powerful the OPEC was and how vulnerable and dependent some countries were on the 
                                                 
79 Hoda (n 42) 25 and 70. NB: One would have to scrutinize all the schedules of Members, present and 
acceding, to see what commitments were made on fossil fuel tariffs. This is outside the scope of this chapter, but 
will be touched upon in a later stage of the thesis.  
80 The WTO secretariat did also conduct studies on the Tokyo Round (1973-79) and the Uruguay Round (1986-
94), see Hoda (n 42) 70.  
81 T Cottier, G Malumfashi, S Matteotti-Berkutova, O Nartova, J de Sepibus and SZ Bigdeli, ‘Energy in WTO 
Law and Policy’ in T Cottier and P Delimatsis (eds), The Prospects of International Trade Regulation – From 
Fragmentation to Coherence (CUP, Cambridge 2011) (hereafter: Cottier et al) 212, 214; On the Tokyo Round 
see: UNCTAD Report (n 3) 15. 
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import of natural resources from abroad.
82
 Industrialized countries such as the United States 
had to resort to importing petrol from overseas for the first time and petroleum talks, namely 




During the 1970s oil crisis, petrol producing and exporting countries either curtailed their 
exports or levied high export taxes on petrol sold abroad. The practice of imposing export 
taxes or high export prices on fossil fuels, while keeping domestic prices low is also known 
as energy ‘dual pricing’.
84
 Simply put, dual pricing entails that natural resources, mainly oil 
and gas, are exported and sold on the world market for (much) higher prices than they are 
sold on the domestic market, where the prices are kept artificially low.
 85
 This way, 
governments provide incentives to the downstream petroleum industry. Article XI of the 
GATT prohibits export restrictions, but there are no rules on export taxes under the GATT 
and therefore the issue remains unresolved and controversial up to this date.
86
  It can 
moreover be argued that the practice of dual pricing is an inverted type of subsidy and could 
be in conflict with Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM).
87
 The unequal distribution of natural resources around the world is evidently 
connected to the issue of dual pricing.
88
 Export taxes on energy products are potentially 
considered as an unfair method of competition under the GATT and some Members were 
questioning their legitimacy as an instrument of domestic economic policy.
89
 During the 
                                                 
82 See e.g. GATT, Committee on Trade and Development, COM.TD/W/208 28 January 1974, ‘The Impact of 
Higher Petroleum Prices on Developing Countries – Note by the Secretariat’; Although, by 2016, we see a 
decline in OPEC’s ability to influence world prices, as the discovery of shale gas in the United States has 
reduced the bargaining power of the Gulf countries. 
83 During the Tokyo Round, export restrictions were taken up in various fora, namely in Group 3(b), see GATT 
doc (MTN/3B/9); See WTO, Export Restrictions and Charges, Background Note by the Secretariat, Multilateral 
Trade, Negotiations, the Uruguay Round, Doc, MTN.GNG/NG2/W/40, 8 August 1989. 
84 See generally on energy dual pricing, Y Selivanova, Energy Dual Pricing in the WTO (Cameron May, 
London 2008) and V Pogoretskyy, ‘Chapter 5: Energy Dual Pricing in International Trade: Subsidies and Anti-
Dumping Perspectives’ in Selivanova (ed) (n 37) 181. 
85 Ibid; Also see L Ehring and CF Chianale, ‘Chapter 3 – Export Restrictions in the Field of Energy’ in 
Selivanova (ed) (n 37) 112ff.  
86 GATT Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions); Mavroidis, however, argues that while 
export taxes escape the disciplines under Article XI GATT, they must observe the obligations in GATT Article I 
(MFN) and could also be potentially captured under a non-violation complaint, see PC Mavroidis, The 
Regulation of International Trade – Volume 1: The GATT (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London, England 2015) 87. 
87 Article 3 (Prohibition) of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, concluded 15 April 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. 
88 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 16. 
89 See the articles by the then United States Trade Representative (USTR) TR Graham, ‘Results of the Tokyo 
Round’ (1979) 6 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 153, 161 and ‘Reforming the 
International Law Trading System: The Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations in the Final Stage’ (1979) 12 Cornell 
International Law Journal 1, 20 and 31. 
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Tokyo Round, the Members who suffered the most from the oil crisis and dual pricing, such 
as the United Sates, pushed for including clear provisions on dual pricing either in the GATT 
or in a separate agreement.
90
 The United States was of the opinion that: 
‘The criteria presently set forth in Article XVI to prohibit subsidies are far too 
narrow. The present prohibition applies only to non-primary products. There should 
be uniform criteria for all products. Furthermore, the present prohibition applies 
only to those subsidies that result in the sale of a product for export at a price lower 
than the comparable price charged for the like product in the domestic market. It 
excludes subsidies that are highly trade-distorting but for which no dual pricing 
exists, either because the subsidy has resulted in lower prices both in the domestic 
market and for export, or because the subsidy does not result in lower export prices. 
The latter situation may occur, for example, if the firm utilizes the subsidy not to 
lower export prices but to expand export capacity, to extend international distribution 




However, there was strong resistance by oil producing and exporting countries to binding 
commitments and no agreement on this subject was reached.
92
 It was merely established that 
there was a need to examine the adequacy of GATT provisions dealing with export 
restrictions and taxes in the future.
93
 The issue of export taxes and restrictions has not been 
clarified in WTO until now, although an increasing amount of oil producing and exporting 
countries and their accompanying trade practices are entering the WTO system.  
 
Schedule-wise, though, it is interesting to note that during the Tokyo Round Czechoslovakia, 
though keeping its tariffs unbound, did take up the previously absent category of fossil fuels 
in the form of ‘Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude’ in its 
Schedule
94
 Other countries’ fossil tariffs remained at the same level.
95
 With respect to 
commitments on fossil fuels by newly acceding countries, most countries did take up the 
category of fossil fuels up in their Schedules, but left them unbound: this was the case for 
                                                 
90 TR Graham (then USTR), ‘The Reorganization of Trade Policymaking: Prospects and Problems’ (1980) 13 
Cornell International Law Journal 221, 226 ff; R Leal-Arcas, A Filis and ES Abu Gosh, International Energy 
Governance – Selected Legal Issues (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2014) 123.  
91 See GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Group on ‘Non-Tariff Measures, Sub-group on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, MTN/NTM/W/43/Add.6 (31 May 1976), page 3. 
92 Ibid; Also see Shih (n 23) 439. 
93 Graham ‘Results of the Tokyo Round’ (n 88) 172. 
94 The situation of Pre-Uruguay Round schedules can be found in GATT documents TAR/W/7 and 
TAR/W/85l; See Schedule X – Czechoslovakia, Part I, Item No 27.09.00, Geneva Protocol 1979 Tokyo Round 
Schedules, vol I, Geneva, Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 156(I), 30 June 1979, 460 
(hereafter: Tokyo Round Schedules, vol I).  



























2.3.2. The Uruguay Round (1986-1994): Natural Resource-Based Products and Energy 
Accessions  
 
Though no pressing energy issues were solved, the oil crises nonetheless sparked the energy 
debate  in the Tokyo Round and it was clear that energy related issues made their way onto 
the agenda and were there to stay. Prior to the kick-off of the Uruguay Round at the 
Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este in 1986, for instance, it was agreed with respect to 
natural resource-based products (i.e. including energy), that ‘Negotiations shall aim to 
achieve the fullest liberalization of trade in natural resource-based products, including in 
their processed and semi-processed forms. The negotiations shall aim to reduce or eliminate 




The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (1986-1994) for four reasons was relevant for the 
energy debate in the GATT/WTO: First, Members renegotiated tariffs in their Schedules of 
Concessions, resulting in tariff reductions on several fossil fuel products.
107
 Second, a major 
success of the Uruguay Round was the conclusion of the General Agreement on Trade in 
                                                 
96 See Schedule XIII – New Zealand, Part I, Ex 34.03, Tokyo Round Schedules, vol I (n 94) 658.  
97 See Schedule XIV – Norway, Part I, Tariff Item No 27.09 and 27.10, Tokyo Round Schedules, vol I (n 94) 
756.  
98 See Schedule LXII – Iceland, Item Nos 27.10 ff, p 2947, Geneva Protocol 1979 Tokyo Round Schedules, vol 
IV, Geneva, Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 156(IV), 30 June 1979 (hereafter: Tokyo 
Round Schedules, vol IV). 
99 See Schedule LXXI – Hungary, Item No 27.09-00, Tokyo Round Schedules, vol IV (n 98) 3088. 
100 See Schedule XXXII – Austria, Item Nos 2709 ff: ‘Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals, crude’, Geneva Protocol 1979 Tokyo Round Schedules, vol III, Geneva, Protocol to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 156(III), 30 June 1979 (hereafter: Tokyo Round Schedules, vol III) 2029. 
101 See Schedule XXXVIII – Japan, Item Nos 27.10 ff, Tokyo Round Schedules, vol III (n 100) 2321. 
102 See Schedules of Tariff Concessions of Bulgaria, Item Nos 2709 ff, The Tokyo Round Schedules 39 – 40.  
103 See Schedule LXXII – EEC, Tokyo Round Schedules, vol IV (n 98) 3302. 
104 See Schedule LXIV – Argentina, Tokyo Round Schedules, vol IV (n 98) 3024. 
105 See Respective Tokyo Round Schedules of these Members. 
106 GATT, Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986; Also see SS Haghighi, Energy 
Security – The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and Gas Supplying Countries 
(Hart, Oxford 2007) 237. 





 Regarding the services relevant for energy sector, this implied 
that some Members did make specific commitments in their Services Schedules.
109
 Third, 
energy negotiations were taken up yet again to address the persisting issues concerning 
energy dual pricing.
110
 Fourth, two energy producing and exporting countries acceded the 
GATT during the Uruguay Round, Venezuela and Mexico (and many more would later 
follow). The latter made explicit commitments and reservations with respect to restrictive 




With respect to Members’ Schedules of Concessions, on average there was no reduction on 
import tariffs for crude petroleum (except for the EU) during the Uruguay Rounds.
112
 And 
tariffs on other petroleum products under HS Chapter 27 generally remained much higher 
than those for crude oil.
113
 However, significant tariff reductions were achieved on 
hydrocarbons.
114
 The UNCTAD report analysing the evolution of tariff lines during the 
Uruguay Round concluded that the Uruguay did not impact tariffs for crude petroleum, but 
that reductions were noteworthy with respect to other petrochemicals.
115
 The report also 
pointed out that the limited tariff reductions on crude oil were likely linked to the low amount 
of petroleum producing and exporting countries involved in the negotiations and predicted a 




The Uruguay Round also have birth to a Negotiating Group on Natural Resource-Based 
Products was established in 1989, which took a fresh initiative to address dual pricing and 
export restrictions. It attempted to readdress problems of dual pricing and export restrictions. 
                                                 
108 Trade in services relevant for the energy sector was only regulated after conclusions of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services 1994 (GATS) 1869 U.N.T.S. 183; See how GATS is relevant for the energy 
sector infra Chapter 3.  
109 See infra Chapter 3 Section 4. 
110 See supra Section 2.2.1. 
111 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents Series, 33rd Supplement, ‘Protocol for the Accession of 
Mexico to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (17 July 1986) para 5.  
112 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 26: for the United States and Japan they remained unbound. See Table K ‘Tariff 
Treatment for Crude Oil’ HS Category 2709. UNCTAD made comprehensive Tables on tariff escalations pre- 
and post-Uruguay for fossil fuels, see pages 138 ff. 
113 See HS Chapter 27 ‘Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; 
mineral waxes’; See also page 26 and Table L UNCTAD Report (n 3) 141 
114 Ibid: Also see Table M UNCTAD Report (n 3) 144. 
115 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 27: ‘there have been significant general tariff reductions across the tariff lines. 
MFN tariffs on petrochemicals in the developed markets were already bound before the Uruguay Round. 





Together with the United States and the European Commission, the Negotiating Group 
argued that these practices could distort international trade and grant a competitive advantage 
to exporters, therefore constituting prohibited subsidies.
117
 The parties proposed that these 
topics should be dealt with in a generic way under the GATT.
118
 As in the Tokyo Round, the 
United States were of the opinion that either a new code should be developed, specifically 
tailored to deal with trade practices affecting natural resources, or that GATT articles should 




In short, these Members proposed that these topics be dealt with in a generic way under the 
GATT,
120
 only to face the unchanged position of energy-endowed countries again. They 
resisted to establishing any binding rules on trade in natural resources.
121
 Furthermore, they 
maintained that the Group should stick to its mandate, which dealt with other exhaustible 
natural resources (such as forestry, fisheries, non-ferrous materials and metals), rather than 
fossil fuels.
122
 Although the Negotiating Group managed to agree that energy ‘is the single 
most important commodity, both in value and volume terms, traded internationally, 
accounting for nearly a third of world seaborne trade’, any concrete steps seemed 
unthinkable.
123
 Apart from a discussion and a report, no definitive answers were given to 
these questions and no agreement was reached on how to include energy policies and 




By end of the Uruguay round two petroleum-producing and exporting countries acceded the 
GATT; Mexico in 1986 and Venezuela in 1990. Interestingly, it was the petroleum 
                                                 
117 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 18; See the U.S. submissions in MTN.GNG/NG3/W/2, MTN.GNG/NG3/W/13 and 
MTN.GNG/NG3/W/23 and the European Community's submission in MTN.GNG/NG3/W/37.  
118 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 17. 
119 See GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Natural 
Resources-Based Products, Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG3/11, 10 August 1989, para. 5; Also See Y 
Selivanova, ‘The WTO and Energy – WTO Rules and Agreements of Relevance to the Energy Sector’, (2007) 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Issue Paper No.1, 11. 
120 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 17. 
121 See Uruguay Round, Group of Negotiations on Goods, Negotiating Group on Natural Resource-Based 
Products, Meeting of February 11, 1987, Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNC/NG3/1 (February 26, 1990) as 
cited in Y Selivanova, ‘Managing the Patchwork of Agreements in Trade and Investment’ (n 14). 
122 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 17. 
123 See note by the Secretariat, Uruguay Round – Group of Negotiations on Goods – Negotiating Group on 
Natural Resource-Based Products-Energy Products, (1988) GATT Doc MTN.GNG/NG3/W/16, 123, cited in 
Haghighi (n 106) 237.  
124 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 18. 
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discussions that made Mexico reject the GATT earlier, in 1980.
125
  Mexico explicitly did not 
want to make any commitments with respect to dual pricing, and when they did accede in 
1986, their Accession Protocol with respect to energy stated that:  
 
‘Mexico will exercise its sovereignty over natural resources, in accordance with the 
Political Constitution of Mexico. Mexico may maintain certain export restrictions 
related to the conservation of natural resources, particularly in the energy sector, on 
the basis of its social and development needs if those export restrictions are made 




In conclusion, although no binding decisions were taken with respect to the dual pricing 
debate, the Uruguay round was relevant for the energy debate in other ways, through tariff 
reductions on several petrochemical products, commitments of Members in GATS and 
accessions of two substantial energy producing and exporting countries. Last but not least, 
the Negotiating Group on Natural Resources-based products touched upon the controversial 
issue of energy dual pricing and that way alluded to the fact that the topic of energy 




Right after the wrap-up of the Uruguay Round in and just before the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization in 1995, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) decided that questions concerning energy trade under the GATT 
demanded more explanation and released a comprehensive report on energy trade in 2000.
128
 
UNCTAD had done so for two reasons: First of all, there still seemed to be a misperception 
that energy was not covered under the WTO and there was a need to clarify its status under 
the WTO.
129
 Second, there were prospects of more OPEC countries joining the GATT in the 
future. Arab countries requested the report following Uruguay Round negotiations, during 
which misconceptions arose that the WTO would not apply to petroleum.
130
 One of the main 
conclusions of the report was that energy is indeed covered by GATT/WTO, or put 
differently, there is no explicit reason why petroleum products should not be covered by the 
                                                 
125 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 20. 
126 See Mexico’s Accession Protocol (n 111) para 5; Mexico’s statement on export restrictions in the energy 
sector is very interesting with respect to the fact whether production quota could qualify as an export restriction 
in the sense of GATT Article XI.1 (see infra Chapter 6 on this matter); Also see Pogoretskyy (n 84) 184.  
127 Haghighi (n 106) 238. 
128 Generally, see UNCTAD Report (n 3). 
129 Selivanova, ‘Managing the Patchwork of Agreements in Trade and Investment’ (n 14) 53. 





 The ‘chicken or the egg dilemma’ comes to mind here: Was it the shift in the 
energy debate that sparked the need for the UNCTAD report, or did the report cause the 
change in the energy debate? In any case, UNCTAD’s report seems to have been a turning 
point in the energy discussion in the GATT/WTO. It was the first report to explicitly 
reminding us that energy trade indeed falls within the GATT/WTO’s remit.  
 
With respect to case law, interestingly, the first WTO dispute to make it to the Appellate 
Body (AB) was a case involving energy, the Reformulated Gasoline Case, in 1996.
132
 This 
case dealt with to what extent the United States was allowed to derogate from GATT Article 
I (Most-Favoured Nation Treatment) and Article III.4 (National Treatment) in connection 
with restricting imports of gasoline containing harmful pollutants by relying on the 





2.3.3. The Materialization of Energy Inclusion in the Doha Round (2001-) 
 
Finally, multifaceted aspects of energy have materialized in the on-going Doha Development 
Agenda negotiations (2001-) in several ways. To stress the importance of the Doha round for 
energy, former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy even stated in 2010 that ‘through more 
open markets, greater competition, and the spread of clean technology, the Doha Round 




Most importantly, ‘Energy Services’ were discussed as a specific services sector for the first 
time. Although this does point to embracing energy regulation on a more official level in the 
                                                 
131 UNCTAD Report (n 3) 118 and Cottier et al (n 81) 212. 
132 WTO, Report of the Panel in United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 
(Treatment of Imported Gasoline and Like Products of National Origin, 29 January 1996, 25 ILM (1996) 274 
and Report of the Appellate Body, 20 May 1996 35 ILM (1996) 603; Also see C Redgwell, ‘Chapter II – 
International Regulation of Energy Activities’ in: MM Roggenkamp et al (eds), Energy Law in Europe (OUP, 
Oxford 2007) 135-136; Also another case concerning energy was brought to the panel was the Superfund case: 
US – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (L/6175 – 34S/136) (Report of the Panel Adopted 
on 17 June 1987). 
133 Articles I, III.4 and XX(g) GATT; There are four requirements that have to fulfilled in order to successfully 
invoke the exceptions of Article XX(g) GATT: 1) the measure must be non-discriminatory, 2) primarily aimed 
at the conservation on natural resources, 3) enforced in conjunction with restrictions on domestic products or 
consumption, and 4) aimed at conserving natural resources within the jurisdiction.   
134 See WTO, News, Speeches, DG Pascal Lamy, ‘A stronger WTO rule book could benefit the energy sector’, 
available at <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl169_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
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WTO, it has to be mentioned that just as with many other elements of the Doha round, no 
conclusive list was agreed upon and the negotiations on the topic have dormant for a long 
time.
135
 Nevertheless, the relevance of GATS for the energy sector will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
 
‘Energy Goods’ are not on the negotiation agenda so far (instead some are in the 
Environmental Goods Agreement negotiations which take place outside of the WTO).
136
 But 
three other sector specific negotiations on the Doha agenda are closely related to energy: 1) 
Energy Services (mentioned above), 2) Environmental Goods,
137
 and 3) Environmental 
Services. However, just as with energy services, negotiations on environmental goods and 
services were difficult and stalling.  
  
For that reason, negotiations were taken to the next level following the 2014 World 
Economic Forum in Davos, when a group of fourteen WTO Members (including the 
European Union, the United States and China) has launched negotiations on so-called ‘green 
goods’, with the objective of producing a plurilateral deal eliminating tariffs completely, the 
so-called Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA).
138
 The negotiating Member are building 
on reducing and eliminating barriers on a list of 54 environmental goods proposed by the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
139
 The idea is to expand to the list of goods in 
the EGA, in addition to adding relevant services and environmental technologies. These are 
ranging from renewable and clean energy generation, air pollution control, water and 




                                                 
135 See WTO, Services, Sector by Sector, ‘Energy Services’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/energy_e/energy_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016); Energy 
Services identified by Member in WTO, Council for Trade in Services – Special Session of the Council for the 
Trade in Services, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/S/23 28 November 2005. 
136 See The Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA): Liberalising trade in environmental goods and services 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1116> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
137 Doha agenda (Paragraph 31(iii) of the DMD): There is no agreed list of environmental products. Some 
Members attempt to label it under ‘environmental projects’. 
138 European Commission Press Release, 24 January 2014, ‘EU in joint launch of WTO negotiations for green 
goods agreement’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-71_en.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016) and 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), ‘Green goods trade initiative kicks off in 
Davos’ <http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/182795/> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
139 See for more background Office of the United States Trade Representative, Environmental Goods 






Also, the legitimacy of green subsidies under the SCM Agreement has been dominating the 
debate for some time now.
141
 Although green subsidies not necessarily imply subsidies on 
energy, they can include subsidies on green energy products as well.  
Building on this, the Negotiating Group on Rules raised the recurring dual pricing debate 
again during the Doha Round.
142
 They inter alia propose amendments to the SCM 
Agreement. Again though, due to its political sensitivity and complexity discussed earlier in 
the chapter, no general binding rules have been laid out so far. Rather, there have been efforts 
to solve the issue with respect to individual WTO accessions of energy producing and 
exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation. For example, dual 
pricing was the key issue for Saudi Arabia’s accession and it has that has committed not to 
sell petrol below the world prices.
143
 The question is to what extent this commitment reflects 
the actual practice behind dual pricing. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Since the start of the DDA, we witnessed major disputes related to energy and sovereignty 
over natural resources. This indicates that by now, Members fully accept that energy falls 
within the scope of the WTO and that the Dispute Settlement System is increasingly being 
used to settle such disputes. Canada – Feed in Tariff is the most important renewable energy 
case in the WTO up unit now, dealing with the Ontario Feed-In Tariff program and subsidies 
for renewable energy.
144
 The China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths cases 
concerned China’s export restrictions agreed to in the Protocol of Accession and discussed 
                                                 
141 Cottier et al (n 81) 213; Also see generally R Howse and BP van Bork, ‘Options for Liberalising Trade in 
Environmental Goods in the Doha Round’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
(ICTSD) Issue Paper No 2 (2006).    
142 See Negotiating Group on Rules, New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements, 
Draft SCM Agreement, Art 2.1(c) (Specificity) and Art 14 (Calculation of the Amount of Subsidy), 
TN/RL/W/326 (19 December 2008); S Zarilli, ‘The Doha Work Programme: Possible Impact on Energy Trade 
and on Domestic Policies in Energy-Producing Developing Countries’ (2003) 21 Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law 399. 
143 See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/ACC/SAU/61 (1 
Nov 2005) para 28: ‘In response to a question from a Member of the Working Party, the representative of 
Saudi Arabia stated that all petroleum-based and natural gas-based products in Saudi Arabia were made 
available to all users regardless of whether the users were Saudi or foreign owned.  He noted that currently 
domestic sales of heavy naphtha were not subject to any discount and were priced at the prevailing 
international price.  Prices of exports of these products, he confirmed, were based entirely on international 
market conditions’; As far as the Russian Federation goes, no specific commitments with respect to dual pricing 
were made, see WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World 
Trade Organization WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2 (17 November 2011). 
144 Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (n 77). 
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the notion of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the WTO context.
145
 
Moreover, anti-dumping disputes were started over solar panels and biodiesel, as well as the 
first dispute on antidumping duties imposed in connection with dual pricing of natural gas 
(European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Imports from Russia).
146
 Last but not least, 2015 witnessed the initiation of a dispute of 
Russia against the EU’s Internal Energy Market, the Third Energy Package and its 
unbundling requirements.
147
 Apart from that, there have been numerous dispute resolution 




2.3.4. Energy in the GATT/WTO from ‘Out’ to ‘In’ – Explaining the Shift   
 
From the foregoing we can deduct that energy issues were more excluded than included at the 
outset of the GATT 1947 and for several decades to follow. The reasons for this were the fact 
that energy trade was limited to fossil fuels only, moreover in hands of an oligopoly at the 
time. Additionally, a lot of major energy producing, exporting and transporting countries 
were not parties to the GATT. Since the nationalization of oil production in the 1970s and the 
consequential emerging power of OPEC, energy issues slowly became a topic of debate in 
the GATT.  
 
By now, the opposite is true and we can say that coverage of energy is fully accepted, albeit 
                                                 
145 China – Raw Materials: Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various 
Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 
2012:VII, p. 3295; Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 
22 February 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / 
WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3501; China – Rare Earths: Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures 
Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / 
WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014; Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R and Add.1 / WT/DS432/R and Add.1 / WT/DS433/R 
and Add.1, adopted 29 August 2014, upheld by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / 
WT/DS433/AB/R; See infra Chapter 6 Section 7 on this issue. 
146 WTO, DS456, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (Panel Composed on 
24 September 2014); WTO, DS473, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina 
(Panel Composed on 23 June 2014); WTO, DS494, European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and 
Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia (Second Complaint 7 May 2015, in consultations). 
147 WTO, DS476, European Union and Its Members States – Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector 
(Panel Established 20 July 2015).  
148 See e.g. Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Measures Concerning Wind Power 
Equipment (Jan. 6, 2011) WT/DS419/1, G/L/950, G/SCM/D86/1; Request for Consultations by China, 
European Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector (Nov. 7, 2012) WT/DS452/1; G/L/1008; G/SCM/D95/1; G/TRIMS/D/34. 
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many contentious issues remain.
149
 Factors contributing to the inclusion of energy in the 
multilateral trading system are: a) the growing number of accessions of major energy 
producing countries (e.g. nine out of thirteen OPEC Members are currently in the WTO), 
often agreeing on energy related matters in their protocols of accession;
150
  b) the reality that 
tradable energy is no longer limited to fossil fuels and clean energies are rapidly gaining 
ground (e.g. in view of the climate change debate and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2015 COP21 Agreement in Paris, the forecast 
that clean energy may outcompete fossil fuels does not seem unrealistic anymore)
 151
; and, c) 
the growing number of energy disputes being settled in the WTO DSS as a result of these 
factors combined.  
 
In view of a future outlook, it should also be noted that the gentlemen’s agreement allegedly 
excluding energy trade from the GATT could certainly not be upheld in today’s changing 
energy landscape. Even though the agreement was supposedly aimed at primarily excluding 
fossil fuels from international trade, its interpretation has often been extended to the 
understanding that the GATT did not cover energy trade in general.
152
 However, trade in 
alternative forms of energy has become a common practice and will likely only increase in 
the future. This concerns trade in biofuels, solar panels and wind turbines and their related 
technologies, just to name a few.
153
 Trade in these types of energy pose challenges that need 
solutions under international trade law. For instance, with respect to subsidies on biofuels, 
questions arise with respect to striking a balance between promoting environmental policies 
                                                 
149 Y Selivanova, ‘Energy Challenges for International Trade Rules’ (2011) 8 Transnational Dispute 
Management (TDM) 3; according to her, ‘it is commonly accepted that the existing WTO Agreements, including 
fundamental principles of WTO – Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment (MFN) and National Treatment, apply 
equally to energy as to any other products.’  
150 These are Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and 
Venezuela, see WTO, Members and Observers  
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/org6_map_e.htm>, and OPEC, Member Countries 
<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm> (both accessed 27 March 2016). 
151 See generally S Dale, ‘The New Economics of Oil’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (October 2015); 
UN FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ (12 December 2015).  
152 See e.g. supra text to note 13 (WTO Background Note) and text to note 3 (UNCTAD report). 
153 These are several goods that might be included in the category of ‘Environmental goods’. Negotiations on 
environmental goods and services are included on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), under Paragraph 
31(iii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD). They have been discussed for many years in the context of 
the Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTESS), though they did not result in an 
agreed list of environmental products; See 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_serv_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
 
 36 
of WTO Members and their consistency with WTO law.
154
 If such matters will not be dealt 
with in the WTO itself, e.g. by means of the EGA that is currently being negotiated, rapidly 




2.4.  Conclusion 
 
In sum, de jure, trade in energy is, and has always been, covered by the disciplines of the 
GATT/WTO. But de facto, energy trade has been treated as mostly outside of the GATT for 
several decades. For this reason, difficult questions concerning the relation between energy 
and trade could be ducked in the GATT/WTO forum for several decades. The developments 
throughout the GATT/WTO negotiation rounds described in this chapter expose that such an 
evasive stance towards energy is no longer workable in the WTO today. 
 
This chapter demonstrated that the complex yet inseparably intertwined relationship between 
energy trade and the GATT/WTO framework was formed at the inception of the multilateral 
trading system. Two contradictory forces seemed at work here: First of all, there was the 
exceptionality of the nature of fossil fuel trade that only was at full throttle in the course of 
the 20
th
 century and seemed irreconcilable with the rationale of the GATT. Second, there was 
a gradually growing push to nevertheless deal with the issue of energy in the forum, slowly 
but surely materializing from the Tokyo Round in 1973 onwards. Energy issues are making 
their way onto the WTO agenda, with a preliminary culmination in the DDA at present:  
energy services are a negotiation topic in the GATS, energy disputes are being settled in the 
WTO dispute settlement system and major energy producing and exporting countries 
acceding to the Organization have made energy specific commitments in their Protocols of 
Accession. For example, dual pricing was the key issue for Saudi Arabia’s accession and it 
has been the only country so far that has committed not to sell petrol below world price on 
                                                 
154 For legal issues concerning renewable energy and WTO law, see R Howse and AL Eliasion, ‘Domestic and 
International Strategies to Address Climate Change: An Overview of the WTO Legal Issues’ in: T Cottier, O 
Nartova and SZ Bigdeli, International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change – World Trade 
Forum (CUP, Cambridge 2009) 80 – 90. 
155 See infra Chapter 4 on the crystallization of new rules in international energy regulation. Energy and access 
to raw materials is e.g. an important TTIP negotiations. Also, several EU Free Trade Agreements have included 






 Nevertheless, energy has not been accommodated as an official topic 
of discussion in the WTO, yet some recent voices call to do so urgently. As former WTO 
Secretary-General Lamy put it:  
 
“When thinking about how the WTO can most effectively contribute to the energy 
goals of the international community, the question is not whether the WTO legal 
framework is relevant and applicable to trade in energy goods and services, for it 
clearly is. Instead, we need to ask ourselves how the WTO’s contribution can be 
further improved, given rapid changes in the energy policy landscape and the 




With the acceptance that energy is fully covered by the WTO Agreements, however, comes 
the realization that this is a challenging and politically sensitive topic accompanied by many 
legal questions. For it is clear that the WTO Agreements were not designed to regulate 
international energy trade. This insight has opened up a Pandora’s box of unresolved issues 
and the outcome is that energy regulation by WTO rules as they stand now persists to be 
contested and uncertain. This thesis will focus on several of these issues (such as the 
relationship between the Energy Charter Treaty and the WTO, restrictive practices in the 
energy sector and issues concerning energy subsidies in the WTO). 
                                                 
156 See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/ACC/SAU/61 (1 
Nov 2005) para 28: ‘In response to a question from a Member of the Working Party, the representative of 
Saudi Arabia stated that all petroleum-based and natural gas-based products in Saudi Arabia were made 
available to all users regardless of whether the users were Saudi or foreign owned.  He noted that currently 
domestic sales of heavy naphtha were not subject to any discount and were priced at the prevailing 
international price.  Prices of exports of these products, he confirmed, were based entirely on international 
market conditions’; As far as the Russian Federation goes, no specific commitments with respect to dual pricing 
were made, see WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World 
Trade Organization WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2 (17 November 2011). 
157 P Lamy, ‘Chapter 8 – Trade and Energy: The Case for a Greater WTO Role’ in: The Geneva Consensus – 

































3. Overview of the Current WTO Legal Framework Relevant for Energy 
 
3.1. Introduction 
From the previous chapter we can deduct that the inclusion of energy was anything but a 
problem-free matter in GATT/WTO history. However, by now it is firmly established that in 
principle WTO Agreements apply fully to energy trade. Since energy was not at the heart of 
GATT/WTO negotiations, the result is a set of rules that do not necessarily reflect the needs 
of the energy sector well. In some cases, this even creates a ‘mismatch’ between WTO law 
and rules that would arguably work well for energy trade. What is meant by this is that in an 
optimal scenario, global energy trade in some cases would benefit from rules that are 
different form those for manufactured goods. Several of these ‘mismatches’ between the 
existing rules and energy trade will be discussed more in depth in this thesis, but difficulties 
amount to export restrictions,
1






 and access 
to technology.
5
 Despite this fact, the status quo is that WTO law applies to energy trade 
between Members, with all the possible consequences thereof. This chapter will give an 
overview of what agreements and disciplines of the WTO are particularly relevant to energy 
trade, including some problematic issues and examples in case law. 
 
3.2. Prologue: The Goods/Services Divide in Energy 
 
The architecture of the GATT is such that its subject matter deals with trade in goods only.
6
 
Trade in services is regulated by the GATS. A challenge with respect to the energy sector and 
this WTO divide is that it may be difficult to distinguish between the ‘goods’ and ‘services’ 
aspects of trade at times, and consequently, to determine which one of the agreements would 
                                                 
1 See on export restrictions in energy infra Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
2 See e.g. G Marceau, ‘The WTO in the Emerging Energy Governance Debate’ in: J Pauwelyn (ed), Global 
Challenges at the Intersection of Trade, Energy and Environment (Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, 
the Graduate Institute, Geneva 2010) 34; Transit of Energy in WTO and public international law has been 
written on extensively, and for this reason is not the focus of this book, see e.g. D Azaria, Treaties on Transit of 
Energy via Pipelines and Countermeasures (OUP, Oxford 2015); L Ehring and Y Selivanova, ‘Energy Transit’ 
in: Y Selivanova (ed), Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, Nafta and Energy Charter 
(Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 2011) and M Cossy, ‘Energy Transport and Transit in the WTO’, in: J 
Pauwelyn (ed), Global Challenges at the Intersection of Trade, Energy and Environment (Centre for Trade and 
Economic Integration, the Graduate Institute, Geneva 2010) 113. 
3 See on the subsidies paradox and outcomes for renewable energy and fossil fuels, infra Chapter 7, 
4 Marceau (n 2) 37. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See WTO, legal texts, Annex 1A ‘Multilateral Trade in Goods’.  
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
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apply. This also accounts for the Annex 1A agreements on Trade in Goods, such as the 
Agreement on Agriculture, Technical Barriers to Trade, Trade-Related Investment Measures, 
Anti-Dumping, etcetera, which are presumed to only apply to goods and not to services 
trade.
7
 Therefore, it can have far-reaching consequences whether a certain energy-related 
economic activity is considered a good or a service in view of the WTO agreements 
potentially applicable to it.
8
  An additional reason why classification of an energy commodity 
as a ‘good’ or a ‘service’ is important is because of the fact that trade in services (GATS) are 
generally considerably less liberalized that trade in goods.
9
 We should note, however, that 
Panel in EC – Bananas III decided that the GATT and GATS can overlap and be 




A large part of energy traded globally possesses elements of goods as well as services.
11
 The 
reason for this is that the manufacturing of an energy good is sometimes hard to separate 
from the service/activity connected to generation/extraction/distribution of the product.
12
 
Vertically integrated energy companies were traditionally and still are in charge of all these 
processes, from extracting, to manufacturing, to distributing the energy product in question.
13
 
These are often ‘natural monopolies’, because of the high investments in infrastructure that 
                                                 
7 Ibid, see categorical division of WTO agreements on the website (Annex 1A, Multilateral Trade in Goods; 
Annex 1B, General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annex 1C, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights); 
Also see SCM Agreement, Article 32.1 (Other Final Provisions) ‘No specific action against a subsidy of 
another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this 
Agreement.’   
8 i.e. if a certain economic activity in the energy sector is a service in stead of a good, all the Agreement under 
Annex 1A and 1C would not apply to it. 
9 Services (GATS) are generally considerably less liberalized, because they are heavily regulated domestically 
and can have far reaching implications for e.g. national immigration and investment policies, see PC Mavroidis, 
G Bermann and M Wu, ‘The GATS’ in: The Law of the World Trade Organization – Documents, Cases and 
Analysis (West Academic Publishing, 2010) 757 and B Hoekman and A Matoo, ‘Liberalizing Trade in Services: 
Lessons from Regional and WTO Negotiations’ (2013) 18 International Negotiation 131, 132 ff.  
10 EC – Bananas III: Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591; Panel Report, 
European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Mexico, 
WT/DS27/R/MEX, adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 
1997:II, p. 803, para 7.283. 
11 Marceau (n 2) 25. 
12 Services can generally be distinguished from goods through the following characteristics: (a) intangibility, 
(b) non-storability, (c) differentiation (i.e. difficult to classify because tailored to the need of the customer and 
(d) joint production (e.g. the costumer often has to participate in the process), Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 
762.   
13 WTO, Council for Trade in Services, ‘Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat’, Doc 
S/C/W/52, 9 September 1998 (hereafter: WTO 1998 Background Note) 1, 2 states that most GATT contracting 
parties regard electricity as a good and some of them have also undertaken tariff bindings on it. 
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energy extraction and distribution demands.
14
 Consequently, the industry itself did not 




Some energy products are clearly goods, mostly when they are in their final and tradable 
form after extraction, such as petroleum, natural gas (and Liquefied Natural Gas), coal, etc.
16
 
The easiest way to identify energy goods is by looking up their respective codes in the HS 
Convention.
17
 However, it is not always clear if the extraction of e.g. petroleum and 
petroleum products is always a clear-cut service, or can be also defined as the manufacturing 
of a good. Arguments could be made for both: Usually, services do not result in a good.
18
 In 
that case, one could regards the extraction process not as a service but as manufacturing a 
good. On the other hand, it is clear that the extraction process itself could be considered a 
service in certain circumstances, especially in the scenario were foreign energy companies 
enter the territory of a WTO Member to perform this sometimes highly specialised and 
technically complex task.
19
 Generally, energy services are perceived as a value added to 





Electricity, often traded across borders, is another problematic example to classify. In EU 
law, electricity is considered a ‘good’ and not a ‘service’, but there is still no conclusive 
categorization of electricity in the WTO.
21
 Although ‘electrical energy’ is taken up in the HS 
Convention, this may not be identical to ‘electricity’. Electricity may have aspects of a 
service as well, again because of the vertically integrated process from generating 
                                                 
14 JP Tomain, Energy Law in a Nutshell – 2nd edn (West Academic Publishing 2011) 169 ff. 
15 WTO 1998 Background Note (n 3) 1; T Cottier, G Malumfashi, S Matteotti-Berkutova, O Nartova, J de 
Sepibus and SZ Bigdeli, in ‘Energy in WTO Law and Policy’ in T Cottier and P Delimatsis (eds), The Prospects 
of International Trade Regulation – From Fragmentation to Coherence (CUP, Cambridge 2011) 215. 
16 WTO, Council for Trade in Services, ‘Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat’, Doc 
S/C/W/311, 12 January 2010 11 (hereafter: WTO 2010 Background Note) para 51: The 2010 Background Note 
continues on this notion by discussing many forms of energy goods and services in detail and reiterating the 
difficulty to make clear distinctions between them in a lot of cases.  
17 The Harmonised System Convention (Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System), adopted 14 
June 1983, entered into force 1988, 1503 U.N.T.S. 167 is the system according to which all schedules are 
structured, See World Customs Organisation,  <http://www.wcoomd.org/home.htm> (accessed 27 Marhc 2016). 
18 See supra note 12, Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 762 
19 Extracting services do not exist, closest to this are ‘Services Incidental to Mining’ CPC 883 + 5115. 
20 Y Selivanova, The WTO and Energy – WTO Rules and Agreements of Relevance to the Energy Sector, 
(2007) International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Issue Paper No.1, 21.  
21 In ECJ Case C-393/92 Almelo v Energiebedrijf IJsselmij [1994] ECR-I-1477 [28] and Case C-158/94 
Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-5789 [17], the European Court of Justice has ruled that electricity, despite its 
intangible character, should be treated as a ‘good’.  
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(manufacturing) electricity to transporting it to a household, often performed by one and the 
same company.
22
 The same as for petroleum extraction goes for electricity generation: The 
generation of electricity is not classified as a separate service in the CPC, and it thus seems 
more logical to deem the generation of electricity as the manufacturing of a good. Adding to 
this the analogy with EU law, it seems reasonable to consider electricity as a good in the 
sense of the WTO as well. The supply of energy to a household, though, should be regarded 
as a service.
23
 Last but not least, in the Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT cases, the Appellate 
Body confirmed the Panel’s finding that the government purchase of electricity under the FIT 
Program constitutes a government purchase of goods within the meaning of Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement.
24
   
 
The WTO Secretariat issued two insightful background notes on the Energy Services 
negotiations, one in 1998 and one in 2010.
25
 Though no negotiations on ‘energy goods’ as a 
separate unified category are conducted under the auspices of the GATT, the 2010 WTO 
Background Note, even when primarily focused on energy services, does seem to imply that 
energy would benefit from being dealt with in a coherent manner in the WTO.
26
 By a sectoral 
approach to energy trade regulation, the cumbersome goods/services divide could be 
overcome, although this of course begs the questions what should happen to existing 
commitments. Cottier et al promote this idea as well, and even suggest that the WTO can 
only deal with energy in a proper manner if a separate Framework Agreement on Energy is 
negotiated.
27
 In the opinion of the author, this is just one possible scenario to incorporate 
international energy trade on a more official level in the multilateral trading framework.
28
 
                                                 
22 ‘Electrical energy’ is registered under code 2716 of the HS Convention (n 17); Also see L Macedo, 
‘Electrical Energy and the WTO Customs Valuations Agreement’ WTO Research and Analysis, 2010  
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_2july10_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 
2016). 
23 Marceau (n 2) 25; WTO 1998 Background Note (n 3) states that most GATT contracting parties regard 
electricity as a good and some of them have also undertaken tariff bindings on it. 
24 WTO Appellate Body Reports, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector & 
Canada-Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program (Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT), WT/DS412/AB/R 
and WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted on 6 May 2013, para 5.128. 
25 WTO 1998 Background Note (n 3) and WTO 2010 Background Note (n 16). 
26 See 2010 Background note by the WTO Secretariat (n 16), which discusses the following forms of energy: 1) 
Oil and Gas, 2) Coal, 3) Renewable energy, 4) Nuclear, and 5) Electricity; NB In the DDA some Members have 
expressed that nuclear energy should not be associated with energy trade in general, see 2010 Background Note 
2010 (n 16) 6.  
27 Cottier et al (n 15). 
28 See infra Chapter 8 Section 2 on this issue. 
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Nevertheless, this chapter will discuss the applicability of WTO law to energy trade as it 
stands now. 
 
3.3. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods 
3.3.1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
 
The GATT regulates international trade in goods. Non-discrimination is at the core of the 
multilateral trading system and is enshrined in the GATT in several ways: by means of Most-
Favoured Nation (MFN – GATT Article I), prescribing that the most favourable treatment 
accorded to a WTO Member, must be extended to all other WTO Members as well.
29
 
National Treatment (NT – GATT Article III.2) guarantees that once a good enters a territory, 
it cannot be treated less favourably than the ‘like’ domestic good.
30
 WTO members are 
allowed to discriminate (on an MFN basis), but only by means of bound tariff rates (Article II 
GATT).
31
 Furthermore, quantitative import and export restrictions (QRs) are prohibited my 
means of Article XI.1 GATT.
32
 The reason for this is that in addition to hampering trade, 
QRs are less transparent than bound tariffs.
33
 If WTO Members want to deviate from their 
GATT obligations, they can have recourse to the exceptions in GATT Article XX (General 




The GATT applies to energy trade insofar we are dealing with energy ‘goods’. Normally 
speaking this means those products that qualify as a good in de HS convention, whether they 
are fossil fuels or clean energy (explained below).
35
 This means pursuant to GATT Article I, 
in practice, ‘like’ energy goods cannot be discriminated against on the basis of their origin, or 
                                                 
29 GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) (hereafter: 
GATT) Article I (Most-Favoured Nation).  
30 GATT (n 29) Article III.2 (National Treatment). 
31 Except when relating to government procurement (Article III.8 GATT). 
32 GATT (n 29) Article XI (Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions. 
33 Economically speaking, free trade flows without any barriers (based on the model of Ricardo’s comparative 
advantage) is the optimal model. A level down from this are tariffs, which hamper free trade but are still 
transparent, because there are negotiated and bind parties. Quota are yet another level down from tariffs, since 
they hamper international trade flows in the same way as tariffs but are less transparent. An outright trade ban is 
the worst in this scenario, because it implies a complete standstill of all trade flows, see on this PC Mavroidis, 
Trade in Goods (OUP, Oxford 2012) 57 ff. 
34 General Exceptions and Security Exceptions discussed infra Section 3.3.1.5. 





 It also means that pursuant to GATT Article III on national treatment, ‘like’ 




3.3.2. Energy Products and Policy Distinctions: Tariff Classification and ‘Likeness’ 
 
3.3.2.1. Tariff Classifications 
Under the GATT, import tariffs on foreign products are the only allowed form of 
protection.
38
 Thus, tariffs are not illegal under WTO law, but they are nevertheless 
considered a serious obstacle to trade, and it is therefore the long-term objective of the WTO 




Article II of the GATT, titled ‘Schedules of Concessions’ stipulates that Members may set 
tariffs, but they are not allowed to apply tariffs higher on their imports than they have agreed 
to in their Schedules of Concessions.
40
 Once a Member has agreed to a particular tariff on a 
product, it must grant all other Members the same tariff, i.e. they have to be applied to the 
foreign ‘like products’ imported into the domestic market on a non-discriminatory basis 




Virtually all goods that are globally traded are registered and classified in the HS Convention 
(Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System), managed by the World Customs 
Organization (WCO).
42
 In the commodity description and coding system, products are either 
classified as raw materials, semi-finished goods or finished products.  
 
                                                 
36 Selivanova (n 20) 14. 
37 Ibid. 
38 The GATT 1947 preamble states with respect to tariffs: ‘Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by 
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs 
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce […]’. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; 
Additionally, see B Hoekman and PC Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization – Law, Economics and Politics 
(Routledge, New York 2007) 15.   
39 Ibid; Also see L Ehring and CF Chianale, ‘Chapter 3 – Export Restrictions in the Field of Energy’ in Y 
Selivanova (ed), Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter 
(Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 2011) 109. 
40 GATT (n 29) Article I (MFN) and GATT Article II.1 (a): ‘shall accord to the commerce of the other 
contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the 
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement’ 
41 GATT (n 29) Article I (MFN). 
42 The Harmonized System Convention (n 17). 
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Import tariffs on energy products are generally low, because consumers want access to 
conventional energy more that producers need access to the market, but this depends on how 
separate energy goods are classified. It is here that challenges arise with regard to the 
regulation of energy in the GATT. Due to their classification, some biofuels, for instance, are 
treated as agricultural products instead of conventional goods and fall within the disciplines 
of Agreement of Agriculture. As a result, they are subject to much higher import tariffs than 
other energy products. This is for example the case with ethanol, which has been classified 




Additionally, Article II.2 GATT allows a member to apply ‘charges equivalent to an internal 
tax’ imposed consistently with Article III.2 GATT on the imported product in respect of the 
like domestic product. This article is crucial in discussing the so-called ‘carbon tax’ on fossil 
fuels. The idea of the carbon tax is that polluting products are taxed higher at the border than 
non-polluting products.
44
 The risk of institutionalising such a tax might be that exporting 
countries would rather shift their production to countries where such a carbon tax does not 




3.3.2.2. ‘Like’ energy goods 
With regard to policy distinctions relevant for energy in the GATT, Article III GATT 
prohibits discriminatory treatment of imported products vis-à-vis domestic ‘like’ products, 
through taxes (Article III.2) or other regulations (Article III.4).
46
 At the heart of non-
discrimination disciplines is the concept of ‘likeness’. Discrimination is only illegal if the two 
products are ‘like’. Likeness is generally judged on the basis of: (i) the properties, nature and 
quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of the products; (iii) consumers’ tastes and habits; 
and (iv), the tariff classification of the products (see e.g. US-Poultry (China)).
47
  
                                                 
43 Alan Yanovich, ‘Chapter 1: WTO Rules and the Energy Sector’ in Yulia Selivanova (ed), Regulation of 
Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 
2011) 27 and Harmonized System Convention (n 17), Chapter 22 ‘Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar’. 
44 See on this issue generally K Holzer, Carbon-Related Border Adjustment and WTO Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham 2014). 
45 Yanovich (n 43) 29. 
46 GATT (n 29) Article III; Also see on this issue D Crosby, ‘Energy Discrimination and International Rules in 
Hard Times: What’s New This Time Around, and What Can Be Done’ (2012) 5 Journal of World Energy Law 
and Business 325, 333 - 336. 
47 Yanovich (n 43) 34: This approach was first articulated by the 1970 Working Party on Border Tax 
Adjustments. A number of Appellate Body and panel reports have also followed this approach. See, for 





What constitutes a ‘like’ energy product, is particularly relevant for the energy debate under 
the GATT.
48
 It remains unclear to what extent e.g. clean energy goods are ‘like’ fossil fuels, 
although such distinctions can have far-reaching environmental implications. Here, the age-
old debate on whether process and production methods that are not part of the products’ 
physical characteristics (‘unincorporated’ PPMs) can be taken into account in the ‘likeness’ 
analysis relevant to all tradable goods comes into play.  The question is to what extent the 
Process and Production Methods (PPMs) should be a determining  factor and whether non-
product related criteria (i.e. elements that are not visible in the final product), could be 
considered a product characteristic, rendering the ‘same’ products ‘unlike’ in the sense of the 
GATT.
49
 Is a fossil fuel ‘like’ a biofuel? Is electricity generated by coal ‘like’ electricity 
generated by the wind?
50
 
In other words, when regulatory distinctions are made between products of which the end 
result is the same, can energy generated by clean(er) means be treated any differently than 
energy produced by traditional, dirtier means?
51
 Following GATT/WTO case law this 
distinction cannot yet be made.
52
 US-Auto Taxes, however, offered a more optimistic outlook 
                                                                                                                                                       
WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 97, para 22 and Panel Report, United States – 
Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, WT/DS392/R, adopted 25 October 2010, DSR 
2010:V, p. 1909, paras 7.424–7.427, 7.429; In US-Poultry (China), the Panel established the main (though 
inconclusive) approaches for establishing ‘likeness’ of a product: ‘The traditional approach for determining 
‘likeness’ has, in the main, consisted of employing four general criteria: ‘(i) the properties, nature and quality 
of the products; (ii) the end-uses of the products; (iii) consumers’ tastes and habits — more comprehensively 
termed consumers’ perceptions and behaviour - in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff classification of 
the products.’ 
48 In the sense of GATT (n 29) Article I and III. 
49 Also see Marceau (n 2) 26-27; Selivanova (n 20) 14 on the Asbestos case, stating: ‘the Appellate Body ruled 
that the criteria of likeness are ‘neither a treaty-mandated nor a closed list of criteria’. In that case, it found 
that health risks associated with products can be taken into consideration as criteria related to physical 
properties and consumers’ tastes and habits. If some goods present more risks for health than others, two 
products might be considered not like and treated differently.’; See Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 
April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243; Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS135/AB/R, DSR 2001:VIII, p. 3305. 
50 There are arguments against this, see Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (n 24) 
paras 5.211 where it was determined that the market benchmark for renewable energy was not the same as for 
all electrical energy. 
51 Yanovich (n 43) 34 and Crosby (n 46) 334. 
52 Tuna Dolphin I:US – Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (L/5198 – 29S/91) 
(Report of the Panel Adopted on 22 February 1982) and US – Tuna II: Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, 
adopted 13 June 2012, DSR 2012:IV, p. 1837; Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS381/AB/R, DSR 2012:IV, p. 2013 
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when deciding that fuel-efficient cars are not ‘like’ other cars under Article III.2 GATT.
53
 
Additionally, in Canada-Renewable Energy, the AB/PANEL was of the opinion that the 
market for electricity made from renewable sources was not the same as the market for all 
electricity, pointing in the direction that one can differentiate between the two.
54
 While this 
bodes well for differentiating between clean and polluting energy products, no conclusive 
answers have been given to such questions. Nevertheless, there may be a way out for WTO 
Members wishing to treat clean energy products differently. Even in case polluting and clean 
energy goods are deemed ‘like’, Members may still opt for invoking Article XX Exceptions 




3.3.3. Transit of Energy under the GATT 
 
Transit of energy has been extensively written on, and although a pertinent matter, will 
therefore not be the focus of this volume.
56
 Of crucial relevance to energy trade in goods is 
Article V on the Freedom of Transit (especially with regards to gas pipelines and electricity 
grids). The article prohibits MFN and NT violations, in addition to unnecessary charges, 
delays and regulations for products in transit from one Member’s territory to the country of 
destination, possibly through the territory of one or more other WTO Members.
57
 GATT 
Article V.2 sets out: 
 
‘There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting party, via 
the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the 
territory of other contracting parties. No distinction shall be made which is based on 
the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any 





The definition of freedom of transit of goods through the territory of one WTO member to 
another is rather broad, including by vessel and other means of transport.
59
 What constitutes 
                                                 
53 US – Taxes on Automobiles (DS 31/R) (11 October 1994, Report of the Panel not adopted); Crosby (n 46) 
333 – 336.  
54 See supra text to note 50 on the Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program. 
55 The Brazil-Retreated Tyres case shows that there is a lot of leeway for the exceptions for health reasons, 
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 
December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527; para 151.  
56 See supra text to note 2. 
57 GATT (n 29) Article V (Freedom of Transit). 




‘other means’ is debatable, and the question is whether ‘fixed infrastructures’ such as 
pipelines, through which natural gas and petroleum are mainly transported, fall within the 
scope of GATT Article V.1.
60
 When looking into the commitments Ukraine – a major transit 
country and transporter of natural gas –  made in its Accession Protocol, one could answer 
this question in the affirmative: The country agreed that as far as trade in fossil fuels is 
concerned, ‘charges for transportation of goods in transit’ would be bound by the disciplines 
of GATT Article V.
61
  
It remains up to discussion to what extent gas pipes and fixed electricity grids are covered by 
the article and no case law on the matter up to date, although commitments in accession 
protocols seems to increasingly confirm this.
62
 However, when taking into account a broad 
interpretation of ‘other means of transport’, the questions is why fixed energy grids should be 
excluded from this definition. The WTO Panel in Colombia – Ports of Entry, did however 
interpret the obligations under Article V:2, obliging parties to extend freedom of transit 




Finally, whether or not fixed energy grids such as gas pipelines and electricity transmission 
networks are covered by Article V GATT can moreover have major consequences for dispute 
settlement in the WTO: it is a decisive factor in determining whether an energy transit dispute 
(one can e.g. thing of the obstruction of gas flows), can be settled in the WTO forum.  
 
Regarding the transit of energy, the goods/services divide discussed earlier again plays a role 
here. It seems that both the GATT and the GATS can apply to transit activities, such as 
                                                 
60 Cossy (n 2) 2; Also see D Azaria, ‘Energy Transit under the Energy Charter Treaty and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (2009) 27 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 559 and Marceau (n 
2) 87. 
61 ‘Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine – Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine – 
Part II: Schedule of Specific Commitments in Services - Addendum’ WTO doc WT/ACC/UKR/152/Add.2 
(January 25, 2008) 361; See in this context also Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 97. 
62 E.g. before joining the WTO Russia contested that this was the case, see audio registration of Mr 
Medvedkov, Director of the Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Development, Russian Federation 
during the ‘Workshop on the Role of Intergovernmental Agreements in Energy Policy’, Geneva, 29 April 2013, 
Session 2 – Current Challenges for International Regulation of Trade in Energy: Transport and Transit, available 
at <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wksp_envir_apr13_e/wksp_envir_apr13_e.htm> (accessed 27 
March 2016). However, in its accession report, Russia has partially committed to regulate its transit of energy in 
accordance with GATT Article V, namely with regard to transit fees (not with regard to access to pipelines); see 
Accession Protocol: WT/L/839 and WT/MIN(11)/27 (22 August 2012) 
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2 
(17 November 2011), para 1161. 
63 Colombia – Ports of Entry: WTO Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of 
Entry, WT/DS366/R and Corr.1, adopted 20 May 2009, DSR 2009:VI, p. 2535 
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transporting natural gas through gas pipelines, or electricity through international energy 
transmission networks. Assuming that Article V GATT indeed applies to fixed infrastructures 
such as gas pipeline networks, the energy goods in question (natural gas and electricity) are 
covered by the Article. However, the services connected to the transportation of energy in 
question are arguably in addition covered by the GATS. During the Uruguay Round and 
afterwards, several members made commitments in their Schedules concerning services 
incidental to energy distribution and pipeline transportation of fuels.
64
 In its Service 
Schedule, Ukraine (again), for instance, made a specific commitment on pipeline 
transportation: 
 
‘Ukraine commits itself to provide full transparency in the formulation, adoption and 
application of measures affecting access to and trade in services of pipeline 
transportation. Ukraine undertakes to ensure adherence to the principles of non-
discriminatory treatment in access to and use of pipeline networks under its 
jurisdiction, within the technical capacities of these networks, with regard to the 
origin, destination or ownership of product transported, without imposing any 
unjustified delays, restrictions or charges, as well as without discriminatory pricing 




For Ukraine this means that the country committed itself not to interrupt or discriminate in 
the trade in services through fixed infrastructures, specifically pipelines which transport gas. 
These ‘double’ commitments related to gas transit both under the GATT and GATS seem to 
originate in the gas disputes between the Russian Federation and the Ukraine in 2005 and 




3.3.4. Import and export restrictions 
 
As discussed above, import and export restrictions are prohibited by means of Article XI.1 of 
the GATT as they hamper free trade flows. In energy trade, export restrictions are usually a 
greater concern than import restrictions, since consumers generally want access to unevenly 
                                                 
64 See e.g. WTO, electronic Schedules, <http://tsdb.wot.org/matrixlist.aspx> (accessed 27 March 2016), 
Member/Sector Matrix Report, 11 Transport Services, 11.G Pipeline Transport, for a matrix that shows what 
countries have committed to. 
65 See Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine (n 61) 7 a (4). 
66 These disputes concerned gas pricing between Russia and Ukraine and tariffs for the transit of Russian gas to 
Europe. The most serious of these disputes occurred during the winter of 2008 – 2009: gas exports to sixteen 
EU Member States, the Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova were cut on January 7th 2009 and only restarted on 
January 20th 2009, see on this A Marhold, ‘The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Disputes, the Energy Charter Treaty and 
the Kremlin Proposal - Is There Light at the End of the Gas Pipe?’ (2011) Oil, Gas and Energy Law (OGEL) 3. 
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distributed energy supplies, rather than energy producers seeking markets to export to. 
Chapter 6 of this thesis will take a closer look at export restrictions in the energy sector by 
discussing the example of the OPEC cartel.
67
 One particularly controversial issue is whether 
or not domestic production quota on petroleum could qualify as an export restriction in the 
sense of Article XI.1 GATT and could therefore violate the article. 
 
 
3.3.5. State Trading Enterprises 
 
GATT Article XVII on State Trading Enterprises (STEs) requires that in its purchases, and 
STE acts consistently with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment.
68
 STEs 




What constitutes a STE has not been clearly defined in WTO law or case law. There is a 
definition given on the WTO website, however, this is does constitute a definition agreed 
upon by the membership: ‘State trading enterprises are defined as governmental and non-
governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which deal with goods for export 
and/or import.’
70
 The website moreover reproduces a list with the types of enterprises 
notified to the WTO so far. The types of enterprises the list is comprised of is: a) Statutory 
marketing boards; b) Export marketing boards; c) Regulatory marketing boards; d) Fiscal 
monopolies; e) Canalizing agencies; f) Foreign Trade Enterprises, and; g) Boards of 
nationalized industries.
71
   
 
Clearly, a great deal of energy companies that continue to be vertically integrated, state-
owned companies fall into this category. The question is to what extent such corporations act 
in accordance with ‘commercial considerations’, especially when considering dual energy 
pricing mechanism, where energy on the domestic market is sols for much lower prices than 
abroad. It is possible that in such instances, national energy monopolies control the energy 
market completely and enterprises from other WTO Members do not have the chance to 
                                                 
67 See infra Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
68 GATT (n 29) Article VXII.1(a) (State Trading Enterprises). 
69 GATT (n 29) Article XVII (b). 
70 See WTO website and PC Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade – Volume 1: The GATT (The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England 2015) 401. 
71 Ibid, and Mavroidis (n 70) 402-403. 
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equally compete for the sales or purchases, which would be contrary to Article XVII.
72
 This 
is especially the case if the prices for energy are set by the government rather than market 
forces, for what ever policy reasons.
73
 This could be contrary to the acting ‘solely in 
accordance with commercial considerations’ requirement set out in Article XVII(b).
74
 
Another issue is again tied to the transit of energy: can the STE article be interpreted as 
imposing obligations on energy companies that own distribution networks to respect the rules 
of non-discrimination when in comes to third party access to pipelines?
75
 This is relevant 
because the article on STEs applies to any enterprise that has been granted exclusive or 
special privileges, even if such a company is not owned by the state. One could consider the 
control over national energy infrastructure such a privilege, which implies that the enterprise 





3.3.6. General Exceptions 
If a WTO Member wishes to deviate from it obligations under the GATT to pursue legitimate 
policy objectives, it can seek recourse to Article XX Exceptions. A successful invocation of 
an Article XX exception will not remove the GATT-inconsistent behaviour, merely justify 
it.
77
 Subparagraphs (a) to (j) provide an exhaustive list of measures that can be invoked. Note 
however, that an Article XX invocation can only hold if the WTO Member in question 
complies with the chapeau, which sets out that the measures in question ‘are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.’
78
 In addition to guaranteeing non-discrimination, compliance with the chapeau is a 
mechanism that prevents ‘abus de droit’ of the exceptions for discriminatory purposes.
79
 
More than this, it also guarantees non-discrimination. 
 
                                                 
72 Marceau (n 2) 28. 
73 Ibid. 
74 GATT Article XVII (b); Mavroidis (n 70) on page 404-408, opposes this view clarified by case law, that 
commercial consideration is fulfilled if non discrimination has been achieved. 
75 Selivanova (n 20) 19. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See Mavroidis, Bermann, Wu (n 9) Chapter 5 ‘Deviating from WTO Obligations’ 325 ff. 
78 GATT (n 29) Article XX Chapeau.  
79 See Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 359. 
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Regarding trade in energy, subparagraphs (b) necessarily to protect human, animal, plant life 
or health and (g) related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources are the most 
relevant. The broad definition in case law of what constitutes the protection of animal, plant 
life or health in Article XX(b) GATT, give WTO members a leeway to justify GATT 
inconsistent measures in place to further environmental policies. The Panel in Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres gave a broad interpretation of what legitimate policy objectives with the 
subparagraphs of GATT Article XX encompass, and to what extent a measure has to fulfil its 
objective. 
80
 Subparagraph (g) on measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources also arguably affords Members broad possibilities for justifying environmental 
policy objectives: The definition of what constitutes an exhaustible natural resources in the 
meaning of the article is rather wide-ranging and extends from mineral and raw materials to 
fish stocks and clean air.
81
 Since US-Gasoline has indeed confirmed that clean air is an 
exhaustible natural resource, one could state that GATT inconsistent measures, such as those 
that promote clean air and curb CO2 emissions, could be justified under the agreement.   
 
3.3.7. Security Exceptions 
Article XXI GATT on Security Exceptions prescribes that nothing in the Agreement should 
                                                 
80 The AB in the Brazil – Retreated Tyres case (n 55) stated in para 151: ‘We recognize that certain complex 
public health or environmental problems may be tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising a 
multiplicity of interacting measures. In the short-term, it may prove difficult to isolate the contribution to public 
health or environmental objectives of one specific measure from those attributable to the other measures that 
are part of the same comprehensive policy.  
Moreover, the results obtained from certain actions — for instance, measures adopted in order to attenuate 
global warming and climate change, or certain preventive actions to reduce the incidence of diseases that may 
manifest themselves only after a certain period of time — can only be evaluated with the benefit of time. In 
order to justify an import ban under Article XX(b), a panel must be satisfied that it brings about a material 
contribution to the achievement of its objective. Such a demonstration can of course be made by resorting to 
evidence or data, pertaining to the past or the present, that establish that the import ban at issue makes a 
material contribution to the protection of public health or environmental objectives pursued. This is not, 
however, the only type of demonstration that could establish such a contribution. Thus, a panel might conclude 
that an import ban is necessary on the basis of a demonstration that the import ban at issue is apt to produce a 
material contribution to the achievement of its objective. This demonstration could consist of quantitative 
projections in the future, or qualitative reasoning based on a set of hypotheses that are tested and supported by 
sufficient evidence.’ 
81 Article XX negotiation history, in UN, Economic and Social Council, ‘Preparatory Committee of the 
International Conference on Trade and Employment’, UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/50 (13 November 1946) and the 
case law as developed by in the  US- Shrimp and US-Gasoline cases: Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 
1998:VII, p. 2755; Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS58/AB/R, 
DSR 1998:VII, p. 2821 and Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 3; Panel Report, United States – 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 29. 
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be construed in a way to require ‘any contracting party to furnish any information the 
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests’.
82
 Needless to say, 
information on a lot of possibly GATT-inconsistent measures can be placed under this 
exception. This somewhat somewhat obscure provisions is also know as the ‘Pandora’s Box’ 
article in the GATT, and has never been invoked in a GATT/WTO dispute.
83
 However, states 
have used the Article XXI defence in their notifications of GATT inconsistent behaviour. The 
US, for instance, has been said to have used the Article XXI Security Exception to justify its 
almost forty-year long export ban of crude oil.
84
 Article XXI (b)(i) is additionally applies to 
trade in nuclear materials and states that nothing in the GATT can be construed in a way ‘to 
prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests relating to fissionable materials or the materials 




3.4. Agreement on Agriculture 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was a result of the Uruguay round and resulted in 
differential treatment of agriculture products.
86
 Why farm trade was and is treated differently 
in the GATT/WTO has some parallels why energy was treated differently in the WTO 
context:  it is a strategic sector essential for human survival. After WWII, many countries 
opted for becoming self-sufficient regarding food production and instituted corresponding 
policies.
87
 The result were highly insulated and protectionist farm markets globally.
88
 
Especially the EU assigned itself to be to become completely self sufficient, by means of the 




                                                 
82 GATT (n 29) Article XXI (Security Exceptions). 
83 Except in US – Trade Measures (1986): US – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua (L/6053) (13 October 
1986, Report of the Panel not adopted). 
84 This ban was lifted in the fall of 2015, see the Financial Times, ‘Lifting of America’s 40-year Oil Export 
Ban’ December 17, 2015; Also generally see on the US crude oil ban J Bordoff and T Houser, Navigating the 
US Oil Export Debate (Columbia | SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy, New York, January 2015). 
85 GATT (n 29) Article XXI(b)(i) ‘Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any contracting 
party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests 
relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived.’  
86 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9)744. 
87 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9)745. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9)746. 
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The eventual goal of the AoA is to reduce and eliminate agricultural export subsidies and 
import tariffs completely, and to tame all domestic support.
90
 The main legal disciplines of 
the AoA are (a) the request to convert all non-tariff border measures into tariffs (Article 
AoA); (b) the curbing of domestic support through a so-called system of ‘boxes’ (Articles 1 
(a) , 6 and Annex 3 AoA)
 91
; (c) product-specific reduction commitments on export subsidies 
for agriculture products (Article 8-10 AoA); (d) de minimis provisions whereby subsidies are 





At first glance the AoA bears little relevance for energy trade. However, this is deceptive. As 
discussed above on tariffs and policy distinctions, some biofuels are treated as agricultural 
products, and, as a consequence, have very high import tariffs, especially as compared to 
traditional energy products. This is for instance the case with ethanol.
93
 Additionally, WTO 
rules on agriculture subsidies may affect biofuels and other cases of subsidized fuels. Such 
rules may currently allow for domestic and export subsidies on such fuels, something that 




3.5. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Technical standards are important to energy trade as they can encourage energy efficiency 
regulations. Such regulations can restrict trade, but this is allowed insofar the effects of the 
regulation are not more trade restrictive then necessary (Article 2.2 TBT) and applied on an 
MFN basis (Article 2.1 TBT). Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement further prescribes that when 
a regulation is based on an international standard, ‘It shall be rebuttably presumed not to 
create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade’.
95
 This has to be taken into account as 
                                                 
90 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 744. 
91 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 751, stating that support has to be reduced by 20 per cent: ‘There are 
green, blue and yellow categories of ‘boxes’, which escalate in their trade-distortedness. Members can place 
agricultural products in these boxes, as long as they respect the 20 per cent reduction.’ 
92 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 751-752.  
93 Yanovich (n 43) 27 and Harmonized System Convention (n 17), Chapter 22 ‘Beverages, Spirits and 
Vinegar’;  
94 Marceau (n 2) 28. 
95 Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement: Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120. 
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the energy sector is a heavily standardized sector, with standards from everything of solar 




3.6. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), is a lex specialis to 
Articles III and XI, since the Agreement prohibits export performance and local content 
requirements.
97
 Article 2.1 of the TRIMS prohibits any investment measure that is 
inconsistent with Article III or XI and the Annex to the Agreement provides an illustrative 
(i.e. not necessarily conclusive) list of measures that are inconsistent with these articles.
98
  
These are (a) Local content requirements; (b) Export performance requirements; (c) Trade 
balancing requirements; (d) Foreign exchange balancing restrictions; and (e) restrictions on 
an enterprise’s export or sale or export of products.
99
 If a challenged measure falls within the 




The TRIMS Agreement is important for energy trade, there where it concerns cross-border 
energy investments or energy generation. In these instances, local content requirements are 
prohibited, except for when it concerns government procurement as set out in Article III:8 
GATT. In cases where a Member maintains a feed in tariff (FIT) for renewable energy (a 
form of subsidy to encourage the scale up clean energy) combined with a local content 




This was one of the issues at stake in the Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT case.
 102
 The 
Province of Ontario maintained a FIT Programme, providing FIT and MicroFIT contracts to 
producers of renewable energy.
103
 Only if these producers used locally produced wind energy 
                                                 
96 See for an overview of international standards in energy the International Organization on Standardization 
(ISO) <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/search.htm?qt=pipeline&sort=rel&type=simple&published=on> (accessed 
27 March 2016). 
97 See TRIMS Agreement: Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186; GATT Article III 
(National Treatment) and Article XI (Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions). 
98 See TRIMS Annex and Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 310. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Appellate Body Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/AB/R, 
WT/DS175/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V, p. 1821, para 7.157 and Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 
9) 310. 
101 See on this infra Chapter 7. 
102 Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (n 24). 
103 Ibid, Panel report para 7.108. 
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generation equipment they received a contract and guaranteed preferential tariffs on the 
energy they produced.
104
 The EU and Japan objected to this measure. The Panel indeed was 
of the opinion that these programmes were designed in a way so as ‘to encourage investment 
in the local production of equipment associated with renewable energy generation in the 
province of Ontario.’
105
 Therefore, the Panel decided (and the AB later confirmed) that the 
FIT Programme and it contracts were a TRIM within the meaning of Article I of the TRIMS 
Agreement and thus inconsistent with Article III:4 and XI of the GATT.
106
 Canada’s defence 
that the FIT programme constituted government procurement and by means of Article III.8 




3.7. Anti-Dumping Agreement 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), which is an elaboration of Article VI of the GATT, 
provides for detailed rules on the use of anti-dumping measures.
108
 Dumping entails that a 
foreign producers ‘floods’ the import market with a product below the home market price, 
thereby causing injury to the domestic industry producing the like product.
109
 Although the 
practice of dumping is not illegal per se, it is considered an ‘unfair’ trade practice.
110
 The 
rationale of the agreement therefore is that it offers WTO Members protection to dumping by 
means of setting rules for anti-dumping and countervailing duties only.
111
 The ADA allows 
the WTO Members that suffer ‘material injury to an established industry’ from the dumping, 
to levy anti-dumping duties to offset the effects of the dumping (Article VI.2 GATT). These 




The disciplines on Anti-Dumping are relevant for energy trade insofar they are invoked in 
connection with energy goods being dumped on a foreign market. As we read above, a 
                                                 
104 Ibid, paras. 2.1, 7.6, 7.9-68. Only those projects that ‘satisfy all of the specific eligibility requirements set 
out in the FIT and microFIT Rules, and that can be connected to the Ontario electricity system, will be offered a 
Contract, and thereby permitted to participate in the Programme.’ 
105 Ibid, paras 7.109 – 9.110. 
106 Ibid, para 7.112. 
107 Ibid, paras. 7.152 – 7.154. 
108 P van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – 2nd Edition (CUP, Cambridge 
2008) 47. 
109 GATT (n 29) Article VI and Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 414. 
110 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 415. 
111 Article 18.1of the Agreement on Anti-Dumping: Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 and Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 415. 
112 GATT (n 29) Article VI.2. 
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company that exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges, is said to 
be ‘dumping’ the product on that foreign market.
113
 With the rise in trade in goods for 
renewable energy generation, the so-called ‘solar-panel trade wars’ triggered disputes 
between major producers of solar panels and photovoltaic cells.
114
  While one of the cases 
revolved mainly around local content requirements and subsidies (India – Solar Cells ), 
another case concerned anti-dumping duties. 
115
 In US – Countervailing Measures, China 
requested consultations with the US over the imposition of countervailing duty measures on 
solar panels from China.
116
 EU anti-dumping duties on biodiesel from Argentina are also 
subject of a dispute in EU – Biodiesel.
117
   
 
More interesting and directly tied to some of the inherent difficulties of energy trade, so-
called ‘energy dual pricing’, is the Anti-dumping case that Russia started against the EU in 
EU – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from 
Russia.
118
 Russia requested consultations against the EU for its Council Regulation protecting 
against dumped imports and the use of ‘cost adjustment’ administrative procedures.
119
 The 
EU started imposing anti-dumping duties on ammonium nitrate and certain tubes, pipes and 
other goods originating in Russia.
120
 The EU introduced these duties and cost adjustments to 
                                                 
113 See for this ‘Technical Information on Anti-Dumping’ on the WTO website, explaining that dumping 
occurs when the price of the product sold abroad is: (a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course 
of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or, (b) in the absence of 
such domestic price, is less than either: (i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any 
third country in the ordinary course of trade, or (ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin 
plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit. 
114 See e.g. on this The New York Times, ‘Solar Rises in Malaysia During Trade Wars over Panels’ by K 
Bradsher, December 11, 2014 <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/business/energy-environment/solar-rises-
in-malaysia-during-trade-wars-over-panels.html?_r=0> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
115 India – Solar Cells: Panel Report, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 
WT/DS456/R, circulated to WTO Members 24 February 2016 [adoption/appeal pending]. 
116 US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China): 
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 22 July 2014; Panel Report, United States – Countervailing and 
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/R and Add.1, adopted 22 July 2014, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS449/AB/R 
117 EU – Biodiesel: DS473, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, 
WT/DS473 (Panel composed on 23 June 2014) 
118 EU – Anti-Dumping (Russia):EU – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Imports from Russia, Second Complaint, WT/DS494 (Request for Consultations received 19 May 2015) 
Requests for consultations G/L/1115; G/ADP/D110/1; G/SCM/D107/1 (19 May 2015). 
119 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from 
countries not members of the European Community1 (the "Basic Regulation"), page 1 of the request. 
120 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November, page 3 request 
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Dual energy pricing implies that energy, in this instance natural gas, is sold on the domestic 
market at much lower rates than the market price.
122
 However, since it is a vital product that 
other countries want access to, the exporting country can afford exercise its market power 
and charge much higher prices when exporting the natural gas abroad (in this instance Russia 
exporting natural gas to Europe). Dual pricing, if practiced by state-owned companies, could 
qualify as an actionable subsidy in the sense of Article 1.1 and 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.
123
 
The reason for this is that a dual pricing mechanism that differentiates between domestic and 
export prices, can be a way for governments to guarantee cheap input materials for the 
domestic industry, indirectly paid for form abroad by means of the more expensive export 
price.  
 
In this particular case, the EU justifies its anti-dumping duties by claiming that Russia has 
cheaper inputs for their domestic industry because of the low domestic price of energy, 
thereby not having to pay for the ‘actual’ cost of energy. As a consequence, Russia can 
‘dump’ certain products such as steel pipes, etc, on the European market.
124
 This is the first 
dispute in the WTO addressing the issue of energy dual pricing, a policy that has been 
especially opposed by the EU and the US for many decades.
125
  
                                                 
121 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November, page 4 request, under 5.1 and 5.2: ‘[…] the 
rejection of the costs of production of the product under consideration, actually born by foreign producers and 
exporters including the costs of energy inputs such as gas and electricity, that are recorded in exporters' or 
producers' records on the basis of the generally accepted accounting principles of the country of origin and 
exportation that reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under 
consideration; 5.2 the replacement and "adjustment" of the costs of production of the product under 
consideration actually borne by foreign producers and exporters, including the costs of energy inputs such as 
gas and electricity, by using prices including those outside the country of origin and exportation that do not 
reflect the costs of production in the country of origin and exportation actually born’  
122 WTO, World Trade Report 2010, Trade in Natural Resources (WTO, Geneva 2010) 173 ff. 
123 World Trade Report 2010 (n 122) 15. 
124 See ‘Russia Launches WTO Dispute Against EU Import Duties’ International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development, Bridges Volume 18, Number 1  
<http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/russia-launches-wto-dispute-against-eu-import-duties> 
(accessed 27 March 2016).  
125 Marceau (n 2) on page 27 says that anti dumping duties were applied against such practices before, however 




3.8. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (an elaboration of Article XVI 
and Article VI GATT), sets rules for WTO Members concerning the use of subsidies. In 
particular, it sets out (a) the prohibition of using export subsidies and local content 
requirements (Article 3.1 (a) and (b) ASCM); (b) request that Members avoid adverse effects 
towards fellow Members with other subsidies (Article 5 ASCM); and, (c) lays out rules for 
the imposition of countervailing duties so that such subsidies can be counteracted (Article 4 
and 7 ASCM).
126
 Apart from prohibited subsidies (subsidies on export and local content 
requirements), subsidies are not illegal per se, but WTO Members can take action against 




Disciplines on subsidies are of particular relevance for energy trade and the advancement of 
certain policy goals by the government (such as incentivizing the scale up of clean energy 
technologies through e.g. Feed in Tariff programmes). In the Canada-Renewable Energy 
Case (discussed supra in Section 3.3.4, with respect to TRIMS) subsidies were another 
central issue. The question was whether the Canadian government through its Feed-In Tariff 
(FIT) programme conferred a benefit to local producers in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1) iii 
(financial contribution and/or price support) and Article 1.1(b) ASCM (existence of a 
benefit). While both the Panel and the AB were of the opinion that the measures of Canadian 
government amounted to a financial contribution,
 128
 they disagreed whether or not the 
measures conferred a benefit in the sense of Article 1.1(b) ASCM.
129
 Eventually, the AB was 
                                                 
126 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 520-521 
127 Article 5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. 
 
128 Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (n 24) Panel report, paras 7.243-245 and 
AB report para 5.121. 
129 Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (n 24); The Panel was unable to find the 
relevant market benchmark for electricity and thus, it stated, ‘the competitive wholesale electricity market that is 
at the centre of the complainants' main submissions cannot be the appropriate focus of the benefit analysis in 
these disputes.’ Recalling that it had also rejected the complainants' alternative benchmarks, the Panel 
concluded, "[t]here is therefore no basis to uphold the complainants' benefit arguments.’ (Para. 7.320) (On 
appeal, the Appellate Body criticized certain aspects of the Panel's reasoning, and it set out its own approach; 
the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's findings, but it could not complete the analysis. The AB was of the 
opinion that a benefit was conferred, but could not complete the analysis. On this basis, the Appellate Body did 
"not consider that there are sufficient factual findings by the Panel and uncontested evidence on the Panel 
record" that would allow it to complete the legal analysis and conduct a benefit benchmark comparison with the 
prices of wind-generated electricity under the RES initiative. Thus, it could not determine whether the 




‘unable to complete the analysis’ whether or not the programme constituted a subsidy in the 
sense of the ASCM.
130
 In any case, both the Panel and the AB engaged in what some called 
‘legal acrobatics’ to avoid labelling the Ontario FIT Programme as such.
131
 A possible 
explanation for this is that FIT-programmes are generally seen as furthering legitimate policy 
goals, that may however be incompatible with the current WTO disciplines on subsidies, 
leading to a dilemma for the adjudicators. 
 
The Canada-Renewable Energy example begs the question what the implications are of the 
existing regime for subsidies in the WTO regarding clean energy vis-à-vis those on fossil 
fuels. Dual pricing, for instance, the practice where energy on the domestic market is sold at a 
much lower price as abroad, could also be seen as a subsidy, and may be an actionable 
subsidy in the sense of Article 5 of the SCM Agreement. However, the problem is that it is 
often difficult to determine specificity of the subsidy (therefore not making difficult to 
qualify as a actionable subsidy).
132
 It may nevertheless cause adverse effects to another WTO 
Member, who has to pay much more for their imported energy inputs.
133
 Also, by 
maintaining dual pricing policies, the exporting country may have cheaper inputs for its 
domestic industry. However, nobody has challenged fossil fuel subsidies in a dispute in the 
WTO, except for anti-dumping duties imposed by the EU in connection with ‘dumped’ 
Russian gas.
134
   
 
We can deduct that subsidies on fossil fuels remain largely untouched, while subsidies on 
green energies seem more problematic and have been subject to dispute settlement. That this 
may lead to unfavourable policy outcomes is clear, although it is also evident that a balance 
has to be struck to prevent protectionism under the guise of advancing policy goals (e.g. 
protection of the environment).
135
  
                                                                                                                                                       
they constitute prohibited subsidies inconsistent with SCM Agreement Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2. (Para. 5.246). 
130 Ibid. 
131 See A Cosbey and PC Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and 
Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ EUI Working Papers, 
RSCAS 2014/17, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Global Governance Programme – 82.  
132 Marceau (n 2) 27. 
133 Specificity is a requirement set out in Article 2 ASCM (n 127) to meet the definition of a subsidy. 
134 EU – Anti-Dumping (Russia) (n 118). 
135 See Chapter 7 Section 2; For legal issues concerning renewable energy and WTO law, see e.g. R Howse 
and Eliason, ‘Domestic and International Strategies to Address Climate Change: An Overview of the WTO 
Legal Issues’ in: T Cottier, O Nartova and SZ Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation 
of Climate Change (CUP: Cambridge 2009) 80-90 and T Meyer, ‘Energy Subsidies and the World Trade 




Article 8 of the SCM Agreement – which expired at the 1999 – actually deemed government 
assistance in some cases non-actionable, such as for the updating of existing facilities to new 
environmental requirements.
136
 Academics and commentators have generally argued for re-
instating such a provision, to allow the promotion of clean energy and the mitigation of 
climate change.
137
 However, so far, these attempts have not been successful. Energy 





3.9. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
 
One of the achievements of the Uruguay Round was the entry into force of the GATS. The 
GATS provides rules for all measures connected international trade in services. Under the 
GATS, Members are obliged to accord MFN treatment to all services across the spectrum 
(Article II GATS). This is one of the ‘horizontal’ commitments under the GATS. However, 
granting access to foreign services and service suppliers is not a given, and Members only 
have to do so if they have specifically committed to these services in their respective services 
schedules.
139
 In those instances, Members have to afford National Treatment to the services 
in question.  
 
As with the GATT Schedules, Members make sector specific commitments in their GATS 
Schedules of Specific Commitments, where Members agree specific market access 
commitments with regard to services.
140
 There are horizontal commitments, which apply to 





In principle, GATS rules apply to all energy related services.
142
 The list of services that is 
directly or indirectly connected to energy trade such as generation, extraction, construction 
                                                 
136 Article 8 ASCM (n 127) and Marceau (n 2) 27. 
137 Ibid. 
138 See infra Chapter 7. 
139 See WTO, online Services Schedules Database, available through <http://i-
tip.wto.org/services/default.aspx> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
140 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 802 – 819. 
141 Ibid. 
142 See for instance Marceau (n 2) 26. 
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and distribution is vast and potentially endless. One could think of construction services, all 





Additionally, there are four modes of supply in the GATS that are all relevant for the energy 
sector.
144
 These are: a) Mode 1, when neither the service supplier nor the service consumer 
has to move, b) Mode 2, when the consumer moves to the country where the service is 
supplied, c) Mode 3, when the service supplier establishes commercial presence in the 





The GATS also has rules on monopolies and exclusive service suppliers in Article VIII.
146
 
The Article applies to those energy companies that are monopolies, something that, 
considering the often vertically integrated market, is not uncommon. The Article prescribes 
that the WTO Member in question should ensure that the monopoly does not act in an WTO-
inconsistent manner and in line with its specific commitments.
147
 In addition, the monopoly 
supplier should no abuse its position in the supply of the service outside of its monopoly 




Although energy services were not negotiated as a separate sector in the GATS initially, there 
were several sectors that were of relevance to the energy sector to which Members committed 
in the services schedules.
149
 Examples are Construction and related engineering services, 
Distribution services, Environmental services, Financial services, Transport services and 
other services not included elsewhere.
150
 Members’ commitments can be found in the WTO 
                                                 
143 See for an indication of potentially relevant services the tables on pages 52–55 in Fostering Low Carbon 
Growth: The Case for a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement by the ICTSD, Global Platform on Climate 
Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy (ICTSD, Geneva 2011). 
144 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 810-811. 
145 See Article 1.2 of the GATS, defining the four modes of supply, General Agreement on Trade in Services, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994). 
 
146 GATS (n 145) Article VIII (Monopolies and Exclusive Suppliers). 
147 Ibid. and Marceau (n 2) 29. 
148 Ibid. 
149 However, the WTO 1998 Background Note (n 3) states on page 1 that ‘the vast majority of the global 
energy services industry is not covered by GATS specific commitments.’ 





 During the Uruguay Round and after, several Members for instance 
made commitments in their Schedules concerning services incidental to energy distribution 




In the course of the DDA, a list of ‘energy services’ was initiated. Generally, besides meeting 
the needs of the energy industry, the idea behind including energy services as a separate 
sector in the WTO is that opening up this sector to competition will benefit Members and 
contribute to their economic growth.
153
 Negotiations were triggered by more and more 
liberalisation in the field of energy, and energy services being increasingly supplied by 





Proposals on energy services negotiations include: 1) commitments based on the Central 
Product Classification, for all activities in the energy services sector and across all modes of 
supply, and 2) commitments in the oil and gas sector, e.g. for exploration services, services 
incidental to mining, technical testing and analysis, and toll refining services.
155
 However, as 





After the 2005 the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of December 2005, Members 
identified twelve types of activities that could be relevant as energy services, under the three 
main sectors of Business Services, Construction and Distribution.
157
 One can think of 
activities such as engineering, construction of pipelines, and wholesale and retail of energy 
                                                 
151 See the WTO Services Database (n 139); NB: More research needs to be done in Members’ Schedules to 
map their separate commitments in the services sector relevant for energy.  
152 See e.g. WTO, electronic Schedules, http://tsdb.wot.org/matrixlist.aspx, Member/Sector Matrix Report, 11 
Transport Services, 11.G Pipeline Transport for a matrix that shows what countries have committed to.  
153 SS Haghighi, Energy Security – The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and 
Gas Supplying Countries (Hart, Oxford 2007) 295  
154 WTO 1998 Background Note (n 3) 1. 
155 See WTO, Council for Services, Special Session, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, TN/S/23 (28 November 2005); Also see M Cossy, ‘Energy Services under the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services’ in: Y Selivanova (ed), Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA 
and Energy Charter (Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 2011) 149, 169.  
156 Ibid: WTO Doc TN/S/23 (n 155). 
157 WTO, Doha Work Programme – Ministerial Declaration, Annex C – Services WT/MIN(05)/DEC (adopted 
18 December 2005); Also see generally about energy services discussions in the Doha Round, M Gibbs, 
‘Energy Services, Energy Policies and the Doha Agenda, in: UNCTAD, Energy and Environmental Service: 
Negotiating Objectives and Development Priorities, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2003/3 (United Nations, New 
York and Geneva 2003). 
 
 64 
products. While WTO panels understand the mixed nature of products and services, gas 
trade, for instance, is marked as a ‘service’ in the Doha negotiations. Commitments in the 
sector of energy services were made by forty-five Members concerning ‘services incidental 
to mining’,
158
 twenty-seven in ‘on-site preparation work for mining’,
159
 eighteen have 
undertaken commitments ‘incidental to energy distribution’,
160
 and twelve Members have 




Additionally, the energy services negotiations also seek to address commitments on the four 
GATS modes of supply as set out in Article I.2 GATS, particularly with respect to Mode 3, 
which is relevant for the investment regime and the most far reaching (a foreign company 
setting up subsidiaries or branches to provide services in another country).
162
 It must be 
mentioned however, that since the start of the Doha round, not much progress has been 
achieved with respect to energy services negotiations and the list and well as the negotiations 
remain without a conclusion. 
 
 
3.10. Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is the first 
WTO Agreement to set positive regulatory obligations for WTO Members.
163 
It imposes on 
Members to ensure a minimum level of protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
(IP) rights on their territory.
164 
The Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement explains its rationale 
as: 
 
‘[…] to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade…taking into 
account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property 




                                                 
158 WTO 2010 Background Note (n 16) 
159 Ibid, UN Central Product Classification (CPC) 5115. 
160 Ibid, CPC 887.  
161 Ibid, page 14.  
162 WTO, Energy Services <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/energy_e/energy_e.htm>; Mode 3 is 
particularly relevant for foreign investments; See Article I.2 GATS (n 145). 
163 Van den Bossche (n 108) 742. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Preamble, TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 




Part I of the Agreement contains general provisions and rules that apply to all IP right that it 
covers. Part II deals with all the separate categories of IP protection (eight in total), and Part 
III sets outs obligations of WTO Members with regard to the enforcements of these rights.
166
 
Right covered by the Agreement are (a) Copyright and related rights (Section 1); (b) 
Trademarks (Section 2); (c) Geographical indications (Section 3); (d) Industrial design 
(Section 4); (e) Patents (Section 5); (f) Layout-designs of integrated circuits (Section 6); and, 
(g) Protection of undisclosed information (Section 7).
167
 The Agreement provides Members 
with a balance by allowing flexibilities for governments to comply with the agreement in a 




One of the main objectives of the TRIPS Agreement (Article 7) is the promotion of 
technological innovation and transfer and dissemination of technology.169 It is here that the  
Agreement is especially important for energy trade, i.e. where it concerns the development of 
new technologies and access to technology.170 The linkages between energy trade and 
climate change mitigation and climate change become especially evident: one could think of 
IP rights regarding the design of clean energy technologies such as solar cells, etc. The debate 
concerning IP rights, energy trade and climate change mitigation mainly revolves around 
whether the TRIPS Agreement provides enough flexibility regarding the promotion of 
necessary innovation and access to new technologies, while doing so in a socially beneficial 
manner, respecting the protection of the IP rights in question.171  
 
3.11. Plurilateral Trade Agreements: Government Procurement 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements within the WTO context are agreements of minority interest 
that not all WTO Members want to become a party to.
172
  There two plurilaterals at present, 
                                                 
166 Van den Bossche (n 108) 742. 
167 Van den Bossche page (n 108) 747. 
168 Marceau (n 2) 37. 
169 Article 7, TRIPS Agreement (165). 
 
170 Marceau (n 2) 37. 
171 WTO, World Trade Report 2010 (n 122) 195: ‘Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement states that intellectual 
property protection should “contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in 
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”’. 
172 See WTO, Plurilaterals: Of minority interest  
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
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but only the the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is relevant for energy trade.
173
 
The GPA is an elaboration of GATT Article III.8 on government procurement.
174
 GATT 
Article III.8 lays out that products purchased for governmental purposes ‘not with a view of 
commercial resale or to use in the production of of goods for commercial sale’, do not have 
to abide by the NT obligations set out in Article III. The difference between this Article and 
the GPA consequently is that all GATT Members have to respect the broad obligation set out 
in Article III.8, but only those WTO Members that have signed onto the GPA have to abide 
by the more elaborate rules of this plurilateral.  
 
Governments can influence the terms of trade with their behaviour. It is for this reason that 
WTO Members party to the GPA commit that certain governmental entities (which they have 
included on their lists concessions), will buy products from other Members on a non-
discriminatory basis only (National Treatment, Article III:1 (a) and MFN, Article III:1 (b) 
GPA).
175
 Each party is also required to make sure that the entities taken up in its list do not 
treat domestic suppliers differently based on the greater or lesser degree of foreign affiliation 
or ownership (Article III:2 GPA).
176
 In addition, parties have to ensure that its entities do not 
discriminate against domestic suppliers in case a good or a service is produced in the territory 
of a different Member.
177
 The major difference between government procurement and State-





Since energy is a product that can be procured by the government for its own use, the GPA is 
significant for energy to those WTO Members that have signed up to the Agreement. For the 
entities Parties have taken up in their schedules, this means they have to procure energy on a 
                                                 
173 The other active plurilateral agreement is the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (there were also bovine 
meat and dairy agreements, which were terminated in 1997, however). 
174 Article III.8 of the GATT (n 29) (and the Government Procurement Agreement, to be discussed below), 
lays out that products purchased for governmental purposes, ‘not with a view of commercial resale or to use in 
the production of of goods for commercial sale’, do not have to abide by the NT obligations set out in Article 
III. This covers energy products as well.  
175 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 798; World Trade Report 2010 (n 122) 173: ‘For instance, in respect of 
the procurement covered by the Agreement, parties are required to accord the products, services and suppliers 
of any other party to the Agreement treatment “no less favourable” than that given to their domestic products, 
services and suppliers (Article III:1(a)). Furthermore, parties may not discriminate among goods, services and 
suppliers of other parties (Article III:1(b)).’ 
176 Article III:2 Government Procurement Agreement. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 9) 798. 
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non-discriminatory basis (NT and MFN). The GPA moreover allows Parties to impose 
justifiable exceptions. Several GPA Parties (e.g. Canada, the EU and US), have taken up 
procurement items that are from the energy sector (fuels and nuclear reactors) or that may be 






This chapter gave an overview of what WTO Agreements are important for energy trade and 
in what sense. The purpose of this exercise was to show that although the rules international 
trade may not always reflect the functioning of the energy sector properly (since they were 
not necessarily drafted with energy in mind), WTO agreements apply and are relevant 
nevertheless.  
 
The chapter tried to highlight what disciplines are especially significant for energy and at the 
same time aimed to expose the discrepancy between some of these ‘basic set’ of international 
trade rules and common practices in energy trade. It discussed the (a) Multilateral Trade in 
Goods; (b) General Agreement on Trade in Services; (c) Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights, and (d) the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement.  
 
It started out by discussing the sometimes problematic goods/services divide in the energy 
sector, and its possible consequences for the applicability of the GATT and the GATS 
respectively. Subsequently, the chapter discussed the various Agreements dealing with 
multilateral trade in goods, from the GATT to the ASCM. We can conclude that there are 
many areas where the law is contested and uncertain with respect to energy regulation. One 
could think of policy distinctions relating to ‘like’ energy goods, energy transit and State 
Trading Enterprises. Issues that deserve extra attention are Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) 
and subsidies, both of which will be discussed more in depth in Part II (Chapter 6 and 7) of 
this thesis. The following chapter, however, will look into the crystallization of new energy 
rules after the WTO’s establishment in 1995, by looking into a selection of Accession 
Protocols and Preferential Trade Agreements relevant for energy. 
 
                                                 































In this chapter, we aim to examine to what rules are crystallizing beyond the WTO 
establishment in 1995. It will investigate relevant WTO-plus and minus commitments in 
Accession Protocols of major energy producing, exporting and transporting WTO Members 
and selected Preferential Trade Agreement (PTAs).
1
 What kind trends can we identify? We 
will first discuss energy commitments in WTO Accession Protocols post 1995 in Section 
4.2.
2
 Then, in Section 4.3, we will turn our attention to a small number of PTAs particularly 
relevant for the energy sector. These consists of the North-American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and EU-Ukraine Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), as well as the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Some of these treaties are already in force (such 
as the NAFTA), others have been signed but have not yet entered into force (the EU centred 
agreements), while the TTIP negotiations are still ‘work in progress’ and have not been 
concluded altogether.
3
 Based on the substance of these instruments, Section 4.4 will assess 
what inferences can be drawn.  
 
 
4.2. Energy in Post-1995 WTO Accession Protocols (1996 – 2015) 
Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, 34 new countries have joined the Organization, 
bringing the total amount of WTO Members to 162 in 2016.
4
 Several of these countries, such 
as China, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Ukraine are major energy 
                                                 
1 WTO-plus commitments generally refer to those made by the applicant in areas not addressed by rules in the 
WTO Agreements. WTO-minus could be defined as the non-application of the rights under the WTO 
Agreements available to acceding Members. See for further explanation on this S Charnovitz, ‘Mapping the 
Law of WTO Accession’ (2013) George Washington Law Faculty Publications and Other Works, 11 ff. 
2 As the focus of this chapter is to look at the crystallization of new rules, pre-1995 WTO Accession 
Commitments will note be discussed in this section. 
3 It goes without saying that for a more in-depth analysis, a much larger number of Preferential Trade 
Agreements should be studied. Unfortunately, this goes beyond the scope of this chapter and intends to be a 
topic of future study by the author. 
4 See WTO, ‘Protocols of accession for new members since 1995, including commitments in goods and 
services’ (30 November 2015) <www.wto.org> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
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producing, exporting, importing and/or transporting countries and have taken up 
commitments relevant for this sector. This section will highlight the most important of these 
commitments in chronological order of accession.  This section will discuss the main 
commitments made by 7 WTO Members that are particularly important player on the global 
energy stage, although in various way. Several of these countries major fossil fuel producers. 
These Ecuador, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kazakhstan. Of this group, Ecuador and 
Saudi Arabia are moreover OPEC Members. By way of contrast, we also discuss the WTO 
Member that is the biggest solar panel producers and energy importer in the world: China. 
Last but not least, we will look at the accession commitments of one of the most contested 
energy transit countries worldwide: Ukraine. 
4.2.1. Ecuador (1996) 
 
Ecuador is one of the thirteen Members of OPEC. The country joined the WTO briefly after 
its establishment, in 1996.
5
 As becomes clear from Chapter 2, energy discussions were not 
centre stage in the multilateral trading forum in the nineties, when the newly established 
Organization and its Members had plenty of other matters on their minds.
6
 Perhaps for this 
reason, energy did not figure prominently Ecuador’s Accession Protocol. Energy (oil and 
gas), are mentioned with respect to economic policies and state trading enterprises, as the 
only sector that where prices were controlled by the state.
7
 Nevertheless, no stringent 
commitments were made in this sector. The country did however, take up some commitments 




4.2.2. Oman (2000) 
 
                                                 
5 Accession Protocol: WT/L/432 (21 January 1996); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ecuador, 
WT/L/77 + Corr.1 (21 January 1996). 
6 Supra Chapter 2. 
7 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ecuador (n 5) para 7: ‘The only prices controlled by the 
State were internal prices of certain oil and gas products for domestic consumption, pharmaceuticals and 
electricity.’; Para 63 on State-Ownership and Privatization; State Trading Enterprises: ‘Furthermore, there were 
no monopolies in Ecuador except in the case of natural gas and some petroleum products.’ And, Pricing 
Policies, para 52: ‘The price-setting policy Ecuador had established in the 1970s had been virtually dismantled. 
The exceptions to this trend were fuels and gas for household use, where prices were set by the Ministries of 
Finance and Energy and Mining; and medicaments.’ 




While Oman is not a Member of OPEC (though often mistaken for one), it is a prominent oil 
producer and exporter. It acceded to the WTO in 2000. In contrast to Ecuador, energy issues 
already played a bigger role in Oman’s accession. Leading up to its efforts to accede to the 
WTO, Oman for instance significantly liberalized it markets.
9
 Aside from going through a 
process of privatisation, it agreed to consider its national oil company, Petroleum 
Development Oman (PDO) a State Trading Enterprise in the sense of the GATT Article 
XVII.
10
 It also opened its service sector with respect to reservoir exploration and electricity 
distribution with out any conditions.
11
 Last but not least, Oman signed up to the Agreement 
on Government Procurement, which is an optional plurilateral.
12
 This means when procuring 
energy products, Oman has to abide by the rules of this Agreement, which has far-reaching 
consequences in the country’s case.   
 
4.2.3. China (2001) 
 
China joined the WTO in 2001.
13
 While it us not a major energy producer, it is the world’s 
biggest importer of energy, it is also the main manufacturer of solar panels worldwide.
14
 
Therefore, it bears relevance to discuss the country in this context. Because China’s domestic 
market is so vast, concerns were raised with respect to price controls that the country 
maintains on various products.
15
 Energy (gas and electricity) is also subject to these price 
controls.
16
 In its protocol, China has agreed to apply its price controls in a WTO consistent 
manner, although it was permitted to maintain them.
17
 China is also expressly allowed to 
maintain import quota on processed oil (a WTO-minus commitment).
18
  
                                                 
9 Accession Protocol: WT/ACC/OMN/28 (9 November 2000); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
Oman, WT/ACC/OMN/26 (28 September 2000) para 14; Also see IBP, Inc, Oman – Energy Policy, Laws and 
Regulations Handbook – Vol 1 (International Business Publications, Washington DC 2015) 114. 
10 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Oman (n 9) paras 109 and 110; Also see A Jimenez-Guerra, 
The World Trade Organization and Oil – SP 12 (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2001) 23.  
11 Ibid. 
12 See supra Chapter 3 and Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Oman (n 9) 121. 
13 Accession Protocol: WT/L/431 (23 November 2001); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China, WT/MIN(01)/3 (10 November 2001). 
14 Earth Policy Institute, ‘Annual Solar Photovoltaics Production by Country, 1995-2012’ (31 July 2013) 
<www.earth-policy.org> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
15 P Milthorp and D Christy, ‘Energy Issues in Selected WTO Accessions’ in: Y Selivanova (ed), Regulation of 
Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 
2011) 314. 
16 Ibid and Annex 4 to China’s Accession Protocol (n 13). 
17 Ibid and China’s Accession Protocol (n 13) para 64: ‘In response, the representative of China confirmed that 
China would apply its current price controls and any other price controls upon accession in a WTO consistent 
fashion, and would take account of the interests of exporting WTO Members as provided for in Article III:9 of 





With regard to State Trading, China also undertook WTO-minus commitments, as it retained 
the right to impose import and export state trading measures on crude and processed oil, but 
has to do so in fully transparent and WTO-compliant manner.
19
 Last but not least, it is well 
known that China agreed to tie its export duties on several raw materials and rare earths, not 
to mention that it would eliminate other export restrictions (such as licensing). This matter 
was central to the China-Raw Materials and China-Rare Earths cases.
20
 While not directly 
pertaining to energy, this is relevant for the wider debate concerning restrictive behaviour on 
raw materials and natural resources. Additionally, it is important with regard to the 
(im)possibility of Members to invoke GATT Article XX Exceptions to its obligations 
flowing from Accession Protocols.
21
  
4.2.4. Saudi Arabia (2005) 
 
Saudi Arabia’s WTO Accession marked the entry of one of the world biggest oil producers 
and the most prominent OPEC Member to the WTO. As mentioned throughout this book, 
dual energy pricing issues were a key issue in its accession.
22
 After heated negotiations, 
especially with the EU (back then still the EC), Saudi Arabia did eventually take up the the 




‘In response to a question from a Member of the Working Party, the representative of 
Saudi Arabia stated that all petroleum-based and natural gas-based products in 
Saudi Arabia were made available to all users regardless of whether the users were 
Saudi or foreign owned.  He noted that currently domestic sales of heavy naphtha 
                                                                                                                                                       
impairing China’s market-access commitments on goods and services. The Working Party took note of these 
commitments’ 
18 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (n 13) 134, Table 2. 
19 Ibid, Annex 2A2 (‘Products Subject to State Trading Import’), paras 50–57 and 58–73, respectively, and 
Annex 2A2 (‘Products Subject to State Trading Export’), items 31–49, list coal, crude oil and processed oil. 
20 Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295; 
Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, Add.1 
and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as 
modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, 
p. 3501; Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and 
Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014; Panel 
Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, 
WT/DS431/R and Add.1 / WT/DS432/R and Add.1 / WT/DS433/R and Add.1, adopted 29 August 2014, upheld 
by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R. 
21 China – Raw Materials (n 20) Panel Reports, paras 7.124-7.129; Appellate Body Report, paras 279-285. 




were not subject to any discount and were priced at the prevailing international 





The question is to what extent this is really a firm commitment to eliminate dual pricing, 
given the influence Saudi Arabia and OPEC (still) have on that world price by means of the 
production quota they apply on crude petroleum.
25
 Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s dual pricing 
policies may be administered in different ways than just through a low domestic price of 
petroleum (e.g. by administering export taxes on petroleum, which may not be included in the 
calculation of the world price).  
 
Apart from petroleum, there is also a lot of natural gas in Saudi Arabia, mostly in the form of 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) produced as a by-product of oil exploration.  In its accession 
report, the country did note that natural gas was sold domestically at a regulated price, as this 
gas is not intended for export.
26
 As this given was subject to considerable criticism from the 
EU, the representative from Saudi Arabia in the Report of the Working Party stated that:  
 
‘Saudi Arabia would apply its price regulations and profit controls in a WTO 
consistent fashion, taking into account the interests of exporting WTO Members as 
provided for in Article III:9 of the GATT 1994 and in Article VIII of the General 




Because it is so closely tied to its petrochemical sector, State Trading was another issues that 
attracted a lot of attention in Saudi Arabia’s accession negotiations.
28
 Paragraphs 44-52 of the 
Working Party Report dealt with that. State Trading Enterprises that especially relevant for 
the Saudi energy sector are the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Cooperation (SABIC), the 
Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) and the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco). 
Concerning the first, SABIC, the report stated that the company, although state owned, does 
not enjoy any special or exclusive privileges and there are no legal impediments to 
                                                 
24 Accession Protocol: WT/L/627 (11 December 2005); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/ACC/SAU/61 (1 Nov 2005) para 28. 
25 See infra Chapter 6 of this book. 
26 But it emphasised that this price was available to all on the domestic market, whether from domestic or 
foreign origin. See especially Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (n 
24) para 29; This is not deemed to be contrary to Article III.9 GATT.  
27 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (n 24) para 37, incorporating 
by reference the list in Annex A, which includes an exhaustive lists of goods that are subject to price controls.  





 The same statement was made regarding SEC.
30
 Saudi Aramco plays a 
prominent role in exploiting domestic energy resources and the countries investor climate in 
the energy sector remains restricted, although it has opened up in recent years.
31
 With regard 
to its procurement procedures, the Report stated that:  
 
‘Saudi Aramco’s procurement procedures afforded full opportunity for all qualified 
suppliers of goods and services of WTO Member countries to compete for 
participation in competitive bidding. The company selects the most technically and 





All in all, it is clear that energy issues took centre stage in Saudi Arabia’s accession 
negotiations. While perhaps not to the desired degree of all negotiating parties, the countries 
did undertake important commitments in the energy sector. 
4.2.5. Ukraine (2008) 
 
In this list of acceding countries, Ukraine is also a unique example. It is another country on 
the list that is not a significant energy producer. However, Ukraine may be the most 
important and controversial energy transit State in the world. It is the gateway for Russian 
and Central Asian gas to Europe, apart from being highly depended on gas imports itself. In 
the 2000s, Ukraine was at the centre of heated gas transit disputes with its neighbour, Russia, 
that left the EU partially in the cold.
33
 Since these events occurred around the time of 
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO, transit issues received special attention in its negotiations. 
The result was that transit commitments in the energy sector were made by Ukraine in the 
most comprehensive was, both with respect to goods and services. Concerning GATT Article 
V, especially third-party access was an issue.
34
 The country committed itself to the following: 
 
‘The representative of Ukraine confirmed that Ukraine would apply all its laws, 
regulations and other measures governing transit of goods (including energy), such 
                                                 
29 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (n 24; Subparagraph 44(i). 
30 Ibid, subparagraph 44(iii). 
31 Milthorp and Christy (n 15) 312. 
32 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (n 24), subparagraph 44(vi). 
33 Chiefly in the winters of 2005/2006 and 2009/2010. 
34 Third party access policy requires the owners of natural monopoly infrastructure, such as gas pipelines and 
electricity grids, to grant access to those facilities to parties other than their own customers, usually competitors 
in the provision of the relevant services, often from other countries, on commercial terms comparable to those 
that would apply in a competitive market. 
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as those governing charges for transportation of goods in transit, in conformity with 
the provisions of Article V of the GATT 1994 and other relevant provisions of the 




These commitments indicate that transit trough fixed infrastructures such as pipelines is 
covered by GATT Article V, at least for those countries that have taken WTO-plus 
commitments on it (see also Kazakhstan below). In its services schedule, Ukraine moreover 
undertook commitments regarding ‘Services incidental to energy distribution’ and ‘Pipeline 
transportations of fuels’.
36
 In addition, Ukraine committed itself to: 
 
‘Provide full transparency in the formulation, adoption and application of measures 
affecting access to and trade in services of pipeline transportation. Ukraine 
undertakes to ensure adherence to the principles of non-discriminatory treatment in 
access to and use of pipeline networks under its jurisdiction, within the technical 
capacities of these networks, with regard to the origin, destination or ownership of 
product transported, without imposing any unjustified delays, restrictions or charges, 





These commitments, especially in combination with Ukraine’s State Trading obligations, can 
be interpreted as a requirement for the country to give access to its gas transport network and 




Regarding STEs, three national energy and energy distribution companies, UkrGasEnergo, 
Naftogas and Energorynok, are listed as State Trading Enterprises in the Report.
39
 The 
language on STEs is very similar to that of Saudi Arabia’s Protocol, partly because it had to 
satisfy US trading demands.
40
 Last but not least, regarding price controls that Ukraine does 
maintain on energy, although discussed in the Report of the Working Party, no commitments 
were taken on them.
41
 
                                                 
35 Accession Protocol: WT/L/718 (16 May 2008); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine, 
WT/ACC/UKR/152 (January 25, 2008) para 367. 
36 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine (n 35) WT/ACC/UKR/152/Add.2, (services 
incidental to energy distribution) and 33 (Pipeline Transport, and (a) transportation of fuels (CPC 7131)); Both 
sectors record commitments of ‘None’ in modes 1, 2 and 3, and ‘Unbound’ in mode 4 for both market access 
(right to participate in the market) and national treatment (non-discrimination against non-nationals). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Milthorp and Christy (n 15) 317ff. 
39 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine (n 35) para 44. 
40 Milthorp and Christy (n 15) 318; The language agreed was sufficient for the US President to make the 
certification required by Section 1106. 
41 Milthorp and Christie (n 15) 317 referring to paras 63-67 of the Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of Ukraine (n 35). 
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4.2.6. Russia (2012) 
 
Russia’s accession process was particularly lengthy and cumbersome, taking almost two 
decades.
42
 While Russia did undertake some commitments with regard to energy, they are 
perhaps not as far-reaching as all negotiating parties would have wanted (e.g. especially the 
EU tried to commit Russia to eliminate dual pricing policies).
43
 Additionally, some of the 
commitments Russia undertook were framed in the context of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU).
44
 Overall, it seems that the nature of the commitments is not so much WTO-plus 
(going beyond those contained in the WTO Agreements), but more of a confirmation that 
Russia’s energy sector has to comply with WTO rules.
45
 Nevertheless, Russia has agreed to 
tie some of its export duties on energy products. It has also committed to phase out several of 
these duties over time.     
 
With respect to export restrictions, Russia naturally confirmed that these would not be 
justified under the WTO agreement.
46
 While some parties expressed concern about licensing 
requirements connected to access to oil and gas pipelines, Russia stated that there are no such 
requirements with respect to oil and natural gas, and that that, according to the Federal law on 
licensing of specific activities, there are no licensing requirements for the following 
activities: (i) the operation of oil and gas production facilities; (ii) the sale of oil, gas and 
oil/gas processing products; (iii) the processing of oil, gas and oil/gas processing products 
thereof; (iv) the transportation of oil, gas and oil/gas processing products; (v) the storage of 
oil, gas and oil/gas processing products; and (vi) the activity of operating gas networks.
47    
 
                                                 
42 Accession Protocol: WT/L/839 and WT/MIN(11)/27 (22 August 2012); Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2 (17 November 2011) 
43 Milthorp and Christy (n 15) 324. 
44 The Eurasian Economic Union was established in 2014 and is comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, 
Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, see <http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
45 Milthorp and Christy (n 15) 324; See also generally, TP Stewart and PJ McDonough, Opportunities and 
Challenges from Russia’s 2012 Accession to the WTO (Stewart and Stewart, Washington DC 2011) and Global 
Intelligence Alliance, Russia’s Accession to the WTO and its Impact on Her Energy and Commodities 
Industries, GIA Industry White Paper, March 2012.  
46 Milthorp and Christy (n 15) 324. 
47 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation (n 42) para 270 and Federal Law 




As noted above, Russia has taken up some binding commitments on export duties applied to 
energy goods, based on the HS Classification of Chapter 27.
48
 Regarding export duties on 
crude oil, as well as some other oil products, Russia committed to formula, which calculates 
the duties on the basis of the world price of oil.
49
 For non-petroleum gasses, the export duty 
will decrease to zero over the implementation period of the Accession Protocol (four years). 
 
With respect to State Trading Enterprises, Russia’s state-owned (51 per cent) Gazprom 
Group and other owner and operators of pipeline networks, were subject to much debate in 
the accession process.
50
 Russia stated that it will notify Gazprom as an STE in accordance 
with Article XVII upon its accession, but further stated that the Gazprom Group is the only 
enterprise having special or exclusive privileges with respect to exporting natural gas. 
Nevertheless, the question remains to what extent Article XVII on STEs allows for charging 
by a STE of different prices for its sales of a product in different market provided that such 
different prices are charged for commercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply and 
demand in export markets. This matter is relevant for the dual pricing debate.
51
 Although 
Russia has stated that it would eliminate dual pricing on the production and distribution of 
natural gas to the domestic industry, this issue should be kept in mind.  
 
As far as dual energy pricing itself is concerned, as mentioned above, the EU (together with 
the US) was pushing for commitments on Russia’s side, but was not very successful in this 
respect.
52
 These Members stated that: 
 
 ‘According to certain studies of the costs required for production and sustainability 
of the production of natural gas, domestic regulated prices did not cover the full 
long-run marginal cost of producing natural gas of Gazprom.  They requested a 
confirmation from the Russian Federation that gas suppliers would act on the basis of 




                                                 
48 See Russia's Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods, Schedule CLXV, Part V, p. 853 and 870; 
HS Convention: The Harmonised System Convention (Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding 
System), 14 June 1983, 1503   U.N.T.S.   167, Chapter 27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 
distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes. 
49 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation (n 42) Annex 1. 
50 Milthorp and Christy (n 15) 294. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation (n 42) paras 120 – 133. 
53 Ibid. para 122. 
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Russia however, used the argument that is in its right to exercise its sovereignty over natural 
resources with respects to its subsurface resources, including natural gas.
54
 Moreover, the 
Russia stressed that the practices were not very different from practices maintained by many 
other Members, possibly having Saudi Arabia in mind. Also, with regard to subsidies, Russia 
additionally firmly stated that it did not believe that the governmental regulation of national 
monopoly prices constitute a subsidy within the sense of the ASCM.
55
 However, this does not 
mean that other WTO Members may not see these as actionable or prohibited subsidies and 
challenge them in dispute settlement. Moreover, in relation to concerns from Members about 
the disparity between the price of gas sold to industrial consumers in the Russian Federation 
and the world price of gas, the representative of the Russian Federation stated: 
 
‘[...] that gas export prices were not regulated and were established on the basis of 
supply and demand in the importing country.  He was of the view that there was no 
"world market price" for gas, and noted that for gas shipped to Europe, costs of 
shipment and transport reflected a substantial part of the landed price.
56
   
 
It follows that regarding dual pricing, as touched upon above, negotiation parties did not get 
the full commitments they hoped for, although some commitments were made. First and 
foremost, Russia confirmed that producers and distributors of natural gas would operate on 
the basis of normal commercial considerations regarding their supplies to industrial users.
57
 
Russia also stated it intended to increase its prices for natural gas by 2030. This implies that 
the prices of natural gas within Russia will be calculated on the same principles as those for 
the rest of Europe, which will mitigate the difference between domestic and export prices 
significantly. However, Russia will maintain dual pricing policies with respect to domestic 
energy supplies to household and non-commercial users, under the label of social policy.
58
   
 
This was much to the EU’s discontent, and as a result of this, the European Commission in 
2015 started an antitrust investigation into Gazprom’s business practices in Central and 
Eastern Europe.
59
 The EU’s objections in this ongoing investigations are, among others, 
                                                 
54 Ibid. para 123 
55 Ibid. para 696.  
56 Ibid. para 127. 
57 Ibid. para 132. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See European Commission, Factsheet, Antitrust: Commission send Statement of Objections to Gazprom, 




addressed at what the the EU labelled as ‘Gazprom’s alleged unfair pricing policy’.
60
 On the 
basis of a comparison, the EU concluded that Gazprom is charging unfair prices:  
 
‘In order to assess whether individual price levels in a country are unfair, the 
different Member State prices were compared to a number of different benchmarks, 
such as Gazprom's costs, prices in different geographic markets or market prices. On 
the basis of this analysis, the Commission has come to the preliminary conclusion in 
its Statement of Objections that the specific price formulae, as applied in Gazprom's 
contracts with its customers, have contributed to the unfairness of Gazprom's prices: 
Gazprom's specific price formulae which link the price of gas to the price of oil 
products seem to have largely favoured Gazprom over its customers. 
 
The Commission's preliminary conclusion, as outlined in the Statement of Objections, 
is that Gazprom has charged unfair prices in five Central and Eastern European 




Concerning price controls, provided a list and services subject to them and confirmed they 
will be applied in a WTO consistent manner, especially with regard to GATT Article III.9.
62
 
The list includes natural gas, gas transportation, nuclear fuel cycle products, electric power 
and heat generated by suppliers on the wholesale market, electric energy network 





Inevitably, transit of energy was an important issue. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, 
prior to its accession, Russia put in question whether or not GATT Article V would cover 
fixed infrastructures such as gas pipelines.
64
 Its accession commitments on transit proved a 
partial turnaround on this issue. With respect to transit fees, the country confirmed that it 
would apply all its laws, regulations and other measures governing the transit of goods, 
including energy in accordance with the obligations set out in Article V.
65
  However, with 
regard to access to pipelines and pipeline transport services, Russia has not undertaken any 
commitments.
66
 Gazprom as an STE will furthermore continue to be the sole exporter of 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 GATT Article III.9 and Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation (n 42) para 
133. 
63 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation (n 42) Tables 7 and 8 on pages 407-
411. 
64 See supra Chapter 3 Section 3.3.1.2. 
65 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation (n 42) para 1161. 





 Moreover, gas is subject to an export monopoly when the goods originate in 




Last but not least, regarding services, Russia undertook some commitments with regards to 
market access in the energy sector in its Services Schedule (mining, manufacturing and 
energy distribution).
69
 However, these commitments are not particularly strong.    
 
4.2.7. Kazakhstan (2015) 
 
Kazakhstan is one of the WTO’s newest Members (it joined the Organization in 2015).
70
 It is 
the last in the string of major energy players joining the WTO. Just as with Russia, a lot of 
Kazakhstan’s Energy Commitments some of its energy commitments are framed in the 
context of the Eurasian Economic Union.  
 
Regarding transit, Kazakhstan’s commitments on transit go further than Russia’, as it was 
explicitly agreed that transit related laws, regulations and other measures governing the 




Further, Kazakhstan made accession-specific commitments with respect to it Government 
owned/regulated pipelines. Access to them is granted for foreign investors producing crude 
oil and gas in Kazakhstan on a non-discriminatory manner.
72
 Additionally, when applying 
measures to transportation through pipelines, Kazakhstan committed not to discriminate with 
respect to the origin of crude oil and gas production and destination, or with respect to the 




                                                 
67 Ibid, para 271. 
68 Ibid, para 1147 and Table 28. 
69 Mining under the UN Central Product Classification (CPC) 883: Manufacturing under CPC 8845 and energy 
distribution under CPC 887. 
70 Accession Protocol: WT/L/957 (30 November 2015); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
Kazakhstan, WT/ACC/KAZ/93 (23 June 2015) 
71 WTO, ‘Overview of Kazakhstan’s Commitments’ <www.wto.org> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
72 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Kazakhstan (n 70) paras 87, 162, 163. 
73 WTO, ‘Overview of Kazakhstan’s Commitments’ <www.wto.org> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
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Kazakhstan also made commitments regarding Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
in the energy sector. It will eliminate all existing WTO-inconsistent measures on local 




In contrast to Ecuador, that joined two decades earlier, we can see that issues pertaining 
energy played an important role in Kazakhstan’s accession. This illustrates the different 
attitude towards energy as opposed to at the time of the WTO’s establishment in 1995.  
 
4.2.8. WTO Accession Protocols and Energy: Trends 
 
If we look at the accession protocols above, what right away catches the eye is the gradual 
development in energy discussions and commitments in the accession of energy producing, 
exporting and transporting countries. Where these were only a minor issue in Ecuador’s 
accession, from Oman’s accession onwards we see a steady rise in energy topics on the 
agenda of the Working Party Reports. What is clear is that the WTO accession process 
automatically sheds light on the energy sector in these countries; acceding countries have to 
make sure that, at minimum, these sectors are WTO compliant.  
 
What are the trends can distil when looking at these accession commitments? One 
development is that energy transit issues are increasingly being discussed in the forum, at 
least when it comes to acceding members. While it is not clear whether GATT Article V 
applies to fix energy transmission structures of WTO Members that joined the organization in 
1995, it is clear that the Article applies to those that have made specific energy commitments 
on it in its accession protocols (i.e. Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan). While the commitments 
may not always be full-fledged ones, it does show that the WTO is a forum where energy 
transit issues are discussed and negotiated actively. Perhaps the WTO is complementing or 
even taking over from the Energy Charter Treaty in this respect, as energy discussions there 
seem to have been inactive in that forum for quite a while now.
75
   
 
Another trend is that acceding countries are increasingly binding their export duties (such as 
China and Russia) and that some new Members have specifically bound export duties on 
                                                 
74 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Kazakhstan (n 70) para 897. 
75 The most recent draft of the Energy Charter Treaty, ‘Transit Protocol’ Doc No: TT87 22/01/2010 was dated 
22 October 2010. 
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energy goods (Russia in particular). This is a positive development indicating that countries 
are shifting away from non-transparent pricing policies and are realizing that export duties, 
just as much as import duties, can be subject to bargaining, and can be in the negotiating 
country’s advantage.  
 
Connected to this are commitments with regard to dual pricing policies. While commitments 
may have not been as firm as the EU and the US would have liked to see them, it is positive 
development that the issue as such was being discussed in the accession negotiations in the 
first place. Both Saudi Arabia and Russia have partially committed to eliminating such 
practices, which may be a small victory, but is better than no commitments at all in this 
sensitive area.  
 
All in all, we can discern that with a greater number of major energy players acceding to the 
WTO, these topics figure more prominently in accession negotiations, resulting in gradual 
clarification on important issues such as transit, export taxes and dual pricing policies.  
 
 
4.3.  Beyond the WTO: Energy in Preferential Trade Agreements 
Pursuant GATT Article XXIV, WTO Members are allowed to enter into customs unions and 
free trade areas.
76
 Many of these Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) include sections or 
provisions that are relevant for energy. Here, we discuss a small selection of agreements that 
contain particularly relevant commitments for the energy sector. We will discuss the North-
American centred NAFTA, two innovative, EU centred PTAs (those with Singapore and 
Ukraine), as well as energy negotiations in the framework of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP).
77
 This geographical division of PTAs is done by way of 
convenience and the instruments in question were chosen to provide an overview of the 
various types of relevant commitments on energy in PTAs. It goes without saying that the 
                                                 
76 GATT Article XXIV (Territorial Application – Frontier Traffic – Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas). 
77 NAFTA: The North American Free Trade Agreement, 1 January 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 14; EU-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement, Authentic text as of May 2015; EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: European Commission, 
‘Association Agreement between the European Union and Its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of 
the other part’ L161/3 (29 May 2014) (not yet in force) and European Commission, DG Trade, ‘In focus: 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’ <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/index_en.htm> 
(accessed 27 March 2016) and United States Trade Representative, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership <https://ustr.gov/ttip> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
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selection here is narrow and that further study should be conducted, as this area provides a 




4.3.1. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
 
The 1994 NAFTA, although anything but new, is a rather ground-breaking and progressive 
PTA as far as energy is concerned.
78
 It includes a separate chapter on trade in Energy, 
Chapter 6, titled ‘Energy and Basic Petrochemicals’.
79
 As set out in Article 602, the chapter 
covers trade and investment in energy goods and services.
80
 The function of this chapter 
(comprised of 9 articles in total) proves to be threefold: 1) it confirms the applicability of 
NAFTA rules to trade and investment in energy goods and services; 2) it explicitly states that 
domestic energy regulatory measures are subject to national treatment and should promote a 
stable commercial environment; and, 3) it narrows some of the exceptions on import and 




Especially the United States was pushing for the inclusion of an energy chapter, with the 
motive to secure its energy supply and gain as much access as possible to Canadian, but also 
particularly to Mexican energy reserves.
82
 Chapter 6 was the result of these efforts. 
Substance-wise, the chapter was based on the energy chapter in the preceding US-Canada 
PTA. While Mexico was initially opposed to making any concessions on energy, it was 
eventually willing to include a chapter on energy, on the condition that it covered 
petrochemicals as well.
83
 While the outcome was that Mexico did open up its energy sector 
somewhat, it did make extensive reservations to the chapter as well.
84
 Additionally, it refused 
to make any concessions on the sovereignty over its natural resources or its Pemex oil 
                                                 
78 NAFTA (n 77). 
79 NAFTA (n 77) Chapter 6: Energy and Basic Petrochemicals. 
80 NAFTA (n 77) Article 602: ‘This Chapter applies to measures relating to energy and basic petrochemical 
goods originating in the territories of the Parties and to measures relating to investment and to the cross-border 
trade in services associated with such goods, as set forth in this Chapter.’ 
81 KJ Benes, Considerations for the Treatment of Energy in the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (Columbia | SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy, New York, September 2015) 11. 
82 Benes (n 81) 11-12. 




exploration and production monopoly.
85
 It did, however, agree to increase US and Canadian 
access to the electricity, petrochemicals and the natural gas transport markets.
86
 And, last but 
not least, with regard to government procurement, Mexico agreed to foreign participation in 




There has not been any dispute under NAFTA Chapter 6 so far to clarify any of its 
provisions. What is worth discussing though, is that although NAFTA incorporates GATT 
articles by reference, some articles in NAFTA give a stricter interpretation than the Articles 
in the GATT, or add to them.
88
 This is for instance the case for Article 603(2) on import and 
export restrictions.
89
 The Article reads as follows: 
 
‘The Parties understand that the provisions of the GATT incorporated in paragraph 1 
prohibit, in any circumstances in which any other form of quantitative restriction is 
prohibited, minimum or maximum export - price requirements and, except as 
permitted in enforcement of countervailing and antidumping orders and 
undertakings, minimum or maximum import-price requirements.’ 
 
This article is a ‘GATT-plus’-style article, in that it adds to GATT Article XI.1 (General 
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions): NAFTA Article 603(2) prohibits minimum or 
maximum import and export-price requirements, something which is permitted under the 
GATT.
90





Article 604 NAFTA on export taxes is another important ‘GATT-plus’ provision, in that it 
limits export taxes on energy goods.
92
 It reads as follows: 
 
‘No Party may adopt or maintain any duty, tax or other charge on the export of any 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Benes (n 81) 12-13. 
87 Ibid. 13 
88 R Rios Herrán and Pietro Poreti, ‘Energy Trade and Investment under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement’ in: Y Selivanova (ed), Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA and 
Energy Charter (Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 2011) 383. 
89 NAFTA (n 77) Article 603(2) (Import and Export Restrictions). 
90 Herrán and Poreti (n 88) 383. 
91 Ibid, 400. However, as Herrán and Poreti note: ‘Under Annex 603.6 Mexico reserved the right to conduct 
foreign trade in certain goods through the monopolist Pemex. Mexico’s reservations listed in Annex 603.6 are 
rather comprehensive in scope and include virtually all refined petroleum products plus bitumen, oil shale, tar 
sand and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).’ 
92 NAFTA (n 77) Article 604 (Export Taxes). 
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energy or basic petrochemical good to the territory of another Party, unless such 
duty, tax or charge is adopted or maintained on: 
  
a) exports of any such good to the territory of all other Parties; and  b) any such 
good when destined for domestic consumption.’ 
 
As is well known, the GATT does not prohibit export taxes, although it is no secret that they 
are used for discriminatory purposes in connection with dual pricing. Export taxes are not 
completely prohibited in the NAFTA, but they are only allowed when they meet two 
conditions cumulatively: 1) they have to be applied on an MFN basis, and 2) only on goods 
that are deemed for domestic consumption.
93
 Article 604 moreover does not allow any 
exceptions, meaning that it applies to all NAFTA parties. In this sense, the obligations in the 
NAFTA go significantly further than those in the GATT.  
 
The underlying rationale of NAFTA Article 605 on other export measures seem to be to 
ensure security of supply and price stabilization in the NAFTA region.
94
 It provides for a 
more stringent regime on the invocation of GATT Exceptions to the parties with respect to 
energy goods.
95
 While NAFTA parties can still invoke GATT exceptions, the scope for their 
application is limited, again by means of three cumulative conditions that have to be met 
under subparagraphs a), b) and c) of Article 605. First of all, restrictions imposed on energy 
goods may not cannot result in relative reduction of exports.
96
 Second, an export restriction 
cannot result in higher export prices of the energy good by means of taxes, fees, licenses and 
minimum price requirements.
97
 This Article can be seen as a de facto equal access to supplies 
(or, in other words, a supply commitment) , because it requires NAFTA parties to sell energy 
domestically at the same price as abroad.
98
 Lastly, restrictions should not disrupt normal 
channels of supply.
99
 This is additionally a rather progressive provision, as it disallows 
NAFTA parties to shut down their production completely under the guise of critical shortages 
or the conservation of natural resources. Nevertheless, Mexico made a complete reservation 
to this Article, making it applicable in practice between Canada and the US only.  
 
                                                 
93 Herrán and Poreti (n 88) 399. 
94 Herrán and Poreti (n 88) 401ff. 
95 NAFTA (n 77) Article 605 (Other Export Measures); GATT Exceptions XI:2(a), XX(g)(i)(j). 
96 NAFTA (n 77) Article 605 (a).  
97 NAFTA (n 77) Article 605 (b). 
98 Herrán and Poreti (n 88) 401. 
99 NAFTA (n 77) Article 605 (c). 
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Last but not least, Article 607 on national security measures does allow parties to restrict 
imports or exports on the basis of grounds of national security, although in more stringent 
ways than by means of Article XXI GATT.
100
 Mexico made a reservation to this article as 
well, and it consequently again only applies between Canada and the US. In fact, the Article 
excludes the application of Article XXI GATT on energy goods and petrochemicals, unless 
they meet the conditions provided for in the subparagraphs of Article 607, meaning to the 
extent they: a) supply a military establishment of a Party or enable fulfilment of a critical 
defence contract of a Party; b) respond to a situation of armed conflict involving the Party 
taking the measure; c) implement national policies or international agreements relating to the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or d) respond to 




We can conclude that the NAFTA is a rather unique treaty that goes beyond most preferential 
trade agreements with respect to energy regulation. While it may not have been effective to 
its full potential due to Mexico’s many reservations, it does lay out a good structure on what 
more elaborate disciplines in international energy trade may entail. 
 
4.3.2. The EU-Singapore FTA and EU-Ukraine DCFTA 
 
The new Singapore and Ukraine Free Trade Agreements with the EU (both yet not in force) 
offer good examples of modern day PTAs that include progressive energy regulation. Here, it 
was the EU pushing for new rules with their negotiation partners. Much like the NAFTA, the 
Singapore and Ukraine FTAs accomplished to include topical energy chapters. While non 
tariffs barriers for renewable energy were at the heart of negotiations with Singapore, with 
Ukraine the objective clearly seems to have been to enhance energy security for the EU. The 
result is that the EU-Singapore FTA incorporates a ground-breaking chapter on non-tariffs 
barriers in renewable energy generation. The Ukraine DCFTA chapter on energy, on the 
other hand, rather focuses on transit and pricing policies. Be as it may, both PTAs are proof 
of the fact that, even if the WTO is currently at a standstill as far as Doha Round negotiations 
                                                 




is concerned, countries do want to push the agenda on specific trade topics and continue to 




4.3.2.1. EU – Singapore FTA (not yet in force) 
The EU – Singapore Free Trade Agreement was concluded on 17 October 2014 and is 
currently pending ratification on the side of the EU.
103
 Singapore is the biggest trade partner 
of the EU in the region of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
104
 
Chapter 7 is called ‘Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade and Investment in Renewable Energy 
Generation’. The chapter is particularly novel, as it not only covers energy, but renewable 
energy with a focus on sustainable development and climate change mitigation. Moreover, it 
approaches the theme of renewable energy from a comprehensive trade and investment angle, 
rather than viewing these two elements as two separate things. This indicates that more 
holistic approaches to certain topics (such as energy) are now understood to be better dealt 
with in a holistic manner. The chapter inter alia is progressive in that it explicitly addressed 
the need to move away from fossil sources, as set out in the Preamble to the chapter: 
 
‘In line with global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Parties share the 
objective of promoting, developing and increasing the generation of energy from 
renewable and sustainable non-fossil sources, particularly through facilitating trade and 
investment. To this effect, the Parties shall cooperate towards removing or reducing 
tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers and fostering regulatory convergence with or 
towards regional and international standards.’105 
 
The Chapter consists of 7 Articles, most of which contain ‘GATT-plus’ type of commitments 
on trade and investment in renewable energy. The obligations set out in the chapter apply to 
all measures that may affect trade and investment between the parties related to the 
generation of energy from renewable and sustainable non-fossil sources, such as wind, solar, 
aero thermal, geothermal, hydrothermal and ocean energy, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, 
sewage treatment plant gas and biogases, but not to the products from which energy is 
                                                 
102 EU – Singapore FTA (not yet in force) (n 77): See European Commission, Trade, Countries and Regions, 
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 To prevent potential conflict with other parts of the Agreement 
the FTA sets out in Article 7.3(3), that the other provision of the Agreement prevail.  
 
There are five main principles set out in the chapter that parties to the agreement have adhere 
to. These are: 
a) Refraining from using local content requirements; 
b) Refraining from local partnership requirements; 
c) Ensuring that procedures concerning the authorisation, certification, etc, are applied in 
a non-discriminatory, objective and transparent manner; 
d) Ensure that any administrative charges in connection with the importation of goods 
and provision of services are complaint with the rules of the overall agreement; and 
e) Guarantee that the terms, conditions and procedures for the connection and access to 
electricity transmission grids are transparent and non-discriminatory.
107
  
Article 7.5 of the FTA sets out rules on non-tariff barriers for the parties in their trade in 
products for the generation of energy from renewable and sustainable non-fossil sources.
108
 It 
prescribes that in trading such products, the EU and Singapore have to use international 
standards as a basis for their technical regulations.
109
 Moreover, parties are encouraged to 
include environmental performance in their technical regulations.
110
 
Finally, Article 7.6 of the Agreement allows parties to invoke general exceptions that are 
present throughout the whole agreement (e.g. Articles 2.14 and 8.62) and which cannot 
derogate from the exceptions provided for in the WTO Agreements.
111
 
All in all, we can conclude that although the obligations are not extensive and incredibly far-
reaching, this chapter of the EU-Singapore FTA sets the current standard for the regulation of 
renewable energy in PTAs. Not only does it firmly commit to the effort of eliminating green 
house gas emissions, it also, as mentioned before, approaches (clean) energy from a more 
holistic way. As will be discussed in the concluding chapter to this book, in the opinion of the 
                                                 
106 EU-Singapore FTA (n 77) Article 7.3 (1).  
107 Ibid, Article 7.4 (Principles). 
108 EU-Singapore FTA (n 77) Article 7.5(1). 
109 Especially the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) are considered to be relevant international standards and are especially encouraged.   
110 EU-Singapore FTA (n 77) Article 7.5 (2). 
111 EU-Singapore FTA (n 77) Article 2.14 sets out exceptions for the trade in goods, Article 8.62 does the same 
for services trade.  
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author, this is the only way forward as far as future global energy governance is concerned. 
This makes is truly a 21
st
 century PTA in this respect.    
 
 
4.3.2.2. EU – Ukraine DCFTA (provisionally in force) 
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement is part of the larger Association 
Agreement that the EU concluded with Ukraine.
112
 It was singed on 27 June 2014, but it has 
not yet entered into force, as it is still pending ratification in some EU Members States.
113
 
Moreover, due to security, political and economic challenges faced in the region, the active 
implementation of the DCFTA was postponed for 2016.
114
  
Notwithstanding the above, Chapter 11 of the DCFTA, titled ‘Trade-Related Energy’, is yet 
another example of a highly evolved PTA as far as energy is concerned. Unlike is the case 
with EU-Singapore FTA, its focus is not so much on renewable energy. The chapter does, 
however, go far in clarifying some outstanding issues in the more traditional energy field of 
fossil fuels and electrical energy. We can understand this more thorough regulation of energy 
between the EU and Ukraine also from the viewpoint of Ukraine being part of the Energy 
Community Treaty, by whose means the EU extends it internal energy acquis to third 
countries.
115
 In addition to this, clearly, the chapter’s underlying rationale was to guarantee 
an enhanced security for supply for the EU. 
The chapter is comprised of 12 Articles that centre around issues of dual pricing, transit, 
transport and quantitative restrictions. Chapter 11 starts off by giving clear and unambiguous 
definitions of certain otherwise often ambiguous terms. It describes ‘energy goods’ within the 
means of the Agreement as natural gas, electricity and crude oil, and explicitly includes their 
respective HS codes.
116
 What is more, the definition of ‘fixed infrastructures’ such as gas 
storage facilities and gas and electricity grids, is taken over from the 2003 EU Gas and 
Electricity Directives.
117
 Last but not least, ‘transit’ and ‘transport’ of energy is implied to 
                                                 
112 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (n 77). 
113 Only after all EU MS have adopted/approved the Association Agreement, it will enter into force. 
114 European Commission, DG Trade, ‘Ukraine’ 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ukraine/> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
115 Energy Community Treaty: ‘Treaty Establishing the Energy Community Treaty’, OJ L 198 of 20/07/2006, 
p. 18 (1 July 2006). 
116 EU-Ukraine DCFTA (n 77) Chapter 11: Trade-Related Energy, Article 268(1)  
117 EU-Ukraine DCFTA (n 77) Article 268(2) and the 2003 European Commission Gas and Electricity 
Directives: Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003, concerning 








Article 269 – 271 of Chapter 11 form its centre of gravity and prohibit explicitly any forms of 
dual pricing and related discriminatory measures when trading energy. Article 269 (1) 
prescribes that the price of  gas and electricity supply shall be determined on the basis of 
supply and demand only, although parties are allowed to regulate for the purposes of ‘general 
economic interest’.
119
 If parties do decide to do so, they have to ensure that the regulations 
and calculations thereof are published prior the their entry into force.
120
  
Dual pricing is prohibited altogether by means of Article 270.
121
 This “GATT-plus” style 
commitment can be seen as very clear stance on the practice, and in line with the EU stance 
on dual pricing policies of the past decades. Although the prohibition does not link dual 
pricing with subsidization directly, as is often the case in WTO debates, it does so implicitly 
by including all measures that may result in dual pricing:
 
 
‘[…] neither Party or a regulatory authority thereof, shall adopt or maintain a 
measure resulting in a higher price for exports of energy goods to the other Party 
than the price charged for such goods when intended for domestic consumption.’
 122
 
The same applies with respect to customs duties and quantitative restrictions, which are 
prohibited, unless they are justified on grounds of public policy or public security; protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health, or the protection of industrial and commercial 
property.
123
 It goes without saying that such restrictions or measures cannot constitute a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties. 
Considering the fact that Ukraine lies in a geopolitically sensitive position, especially as far 
as the transit of energy is concerned, Chapter 11 could not go without rules on energy transit 
                                                                                                                                                       
2003) and Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003, concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ L176/57 (15 July 
2003). 
118 EU-Ukraine DCFTA (n 77) Article 268(3) and (4). 
119 Ibid, Article 269(2).  
120 Ibid, Article 269(3). 
121 Ibid, Article 270 (Prohibition of Dual Pricing).  
122 Ibid, Article 270(1).  
123 Ibid, Article 270(2). 
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and the transportation of energy.
124
 To forego any ambiguity, the drafters of Article 272 
clearly wanted to ensure a broad as possible coverage of transit in the article. For that reason, 
the principle of freedom of transit, enshrined in the rules of both the GATT and Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) were comprehensively included.
125
 The Article reads as follows: 
 
‘The Parties shall take the necessary measures to facilitate transit, consistent with the 
principle of freedom of transit, and in accordance with Article V.2, V.4 and V.5 of 
GATT 1994 and Articles 7.1 and 7.3 of the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994, which are 




The result is that without a doubt, this article goes beyond any commitment we have seen in 
the past, and the Article sets a new and higher standard on energy transit this respect. First 
and foremost, it combines the relevant transit provisions of both the GATT and the ECT, 
including GATT Article V as covering fixed infrastructures.
127
 It adds to that the obligations 
on transit set out in Article 7 of the ECT that go beyond those in the GATT.
128
 By combining 
both relevant articles from both treaties, the article mitigates the uncertainty of the extent of 
coverage of energy transit in the EU-Ukraine DCFTA. That being said, both the EU and 
Ukraine are parties to the WTO and the ECT, and in that sense the Article merely 
summarizes there existing commitments.
129
 Nevertheless, it is novel to see them combined in 
one and the same article.  
 
In connection to the above, Article 275 obliges parties to take all measures to prevent 
unauthorised taking of energy goods, while Article 276 deals with the interruption of 
transit.
130
 The Article inter alia prohibits, under any circumstance, the interruption of existing 
transport or transit of energy goods: 
 
‘A Party through whose territory energy goods transit or are transported shall not, in 
the event of a dispute over any matter involving the Parties or one or more entities 
subject to the control or jurisdiction of one of the Parties, interrupt or reduce, permit 
                                                 
124 As is well known, Ukraine was subject of many gas transit issues in the 2000s, see on this in particular A 
Marhold, ‘The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Disputes, the Energy Charter Treaty and the Kremlin Proposal - Is There 
Light at the End of the Gas Pipe?’ (2011) Oil, Gas and Energy Law (OGEL) 3 
125 See infra Chapter 5 one a more in depth discussion of the relationship between the WTO and the ECT.  
126 EU-Ukraine DCFTA (n 77) Article 272 (Transit). 
127 GATT Article V (Freedom of Transit). 
128 See infra Chapter 5.  
129 Ibid.  




any entity subject to its control or jurisdiction, including a state trading enterprise, to 
interrupt or reduce, or require any entity subject to its jurisdiction to interrupt or 
reduce the existing transport or transit of energy goods, except where this is 
specifically provided for in a contract or other agreement governing such transit or 





It does, however, take into account that ‘a Party shall not be held liable for an interruption or 
reduction pursuant to this Article where that Party is in an impossibility to supply, transit or 
transport energy goods as a result of actions attributable to a third country or an entity 
under the control or jurisdiction of a third country.’
132
 It is obvious that Article 275 and 276 
were taken up in view of unreliable energy supply and transit situation following the gas 
disputes between Russia and Ukraine in the 2000s. 
With regard to transport of energy, Article 273 focuses mainly on third-party access to the 
grid. Parties must ensure that the tariffs, capacity allocation procedures and all other 
conditions are objective, reasonable and transparent and do not discriminate on the basis of 
origin, ownership or destination of the electricity or gas.
133
 Here, explicit reference is made to 
the Energy Community Treaty.
134
 Other Articles of the Chapter (namely Articles 277 and 
278), emphasize this relationship once again, also with respect to setting up regulatory 




Last but not least, it should be noted that the chapter incorporates a provision on the access to 
and exercise of the activities of prospecting, exploring for and producing hydrocarbons, in 
Article 279.
136
 In this article it is emphasizes Parties’ right in accordance with international 
law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. Parties retain 
full sovereignty over hydrocarbon resources located in its territory as well as in its 
archipelagic and territorial waters, in addition to sovereign rights, for the purposes of 
exploring and exploiting hydrocarbon resources located in its exclusive economic zone and 
                                                 
131 Ibid, Article 276(2). 
132 Ibid, Article 276(3). 
133 Ibid, Article 273 (Transport).  
134 Ibid.  
135 EU-Ukraine DCFTA (n 77) Article 277 (Regulatory authority for electricity and gas) and Article 278 
(Relationship with the Energy Community). 







While of a very different nature than the EU-Singapore FTA, Chapter 11 on Trade-Related 
energy in the EU-Ukraine FTA managed to address many contentious and outstanding energy 
issues in a comprehensive and rather extensive way. The Parties in this chapter accomplished 
thorough energy trade commitments on the bilateral level, most of which have proven to be 
unthinkable on the global level so far. It is a prime example of how energy rules can be 
elaborated upon in PTAs, there were commitments on the multilateral level have failed until 
now. If anything, Chapter 11 of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA definitely demonstrates how matters 
such as dual pricing and transit can be dealt with in the future in a more holistic and 
comprehensive way. 
4.3.3. EU – US Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Negotiations  
 
Negotiations for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have been 
anything but controversy free, not in the least because of the proposed Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) mechanism.138 However, with respect to negotiations on energy, TTIP is 
a interesting and potentially even game-changing example. The reason for this is that in TTIP 
negotiations, the EU is explicitly seeking access to US energy supplies (mostly shale gas), 
and wants to see solidified in legal commitments on these issues in the agreement.  
 
Behind this strategy is again the EU’s wish to attain greater energy security. It aims to 
diversify its energy supplies and move away from capricious suppliers in the European 
neighbourhood and the reliance on countries in the Gulf. Therefore, the inclusion of an 
energy chapter in TTIP is of great importance to the EU in the negotiations. Much like the 
US during its negotiations on the NAFTA, the EU wants to go beyond what WTO provides 
for in this respect. The EU advocates for an ‘access to supplies’ approach, rather than the 
‘access to markets’ rationale of the WTO. This is an interesting development when taking 




                                                 
137 Ibid, Article 279(1). 
138 See on this issue e.g. M Bronckers, ‘Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Superior to Litigation 
Before Domestic Courts? An EU View on Bilateral Trade Agreements’ (2015) 18 Journal of International 
Economic Law 1.  
139 See infra Chapter 6 on OPEC and restrictive practices in the WTO. 
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The United States has so far not been willing to accommodate the EUs wishes in this respect 
and does not seem to be eager to include an energy chapter in the agreement.
140
 One 
explanation for this is that the position of the US as an energy importing/exporting country 
has changed significantly over the years: The US was a net importer until recently and even 
had an oil export ban in place since the 1970s oil crises to guarantee its energy security.
141
 
However, large discoveries of shale gas in the early 2010s turned the situation around 
completely. Where in 2008, the US was importing 67 per cent of its total crude oil demand, 
by 2014 this diminished to 27 per cent.
142
 Moreover, the US has by now become the biggest 
producers of liquid fuels globally and the largest gross exporter of refined products.
143
  As a 
consequence, the energy security rationale for this ban became outdated. The US decided to 
lift the almost four-decade long ban with the backing of the domestic energy industry by the 
end of 2015.
144
 However, the EU’s role in insisting on lifting ban as part of TTIP 
negotiations, should not be underestimated.  
 
The US has thus transformed from a net energy importing, to a net energy exporting country. 
It goes without saying that this has influenced its negotiation position on the international 
trade front: In the nineties the US was still eager to include an energy chapter with Canada 
and Mexico in the NAFTA, containing rather far-reaching commitments with regard to 
access to energy supplies (discussed supra in section 4.3.1.).
145
 By today, after the discoveries 
of shale gas on its territory, the US may regret the commitments it made in NAFTA in 
retrospect. In any case, the question remains to what extent the US is willing to take up 
energy commitments in TTIP, if at all. The topic of energy may prove to be a ‘make it or 
break it’ matter for the realisation of the Agreement. 
 
The EU, on the other hand, as mentioned above, is very eager to include such a chapter and 
has openly advocated it in its negotiation documents. The EU does not import US crude oil or 
                                                 
140 Benes (n 81) 15. 
141 See Borderlex, Interview: End of US Crude Oil Export Ban – Consequences for TTIP and the Climate, 15 
January 2016 and J Bordoff and T Houser, Navigating the US Oil Export Debate (Columbia | SIPA Center on 
Global Energy Policy, New York January 2015). 
142 Benes (n 81) 7. 
143 Ibid.  
144 See The Economist, ‘America Lifts Its Ban on Oil Exports’ 18 December 2015.  
145 Supra Section 4.3.1. 
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natural gas at present, but hopes to start importing LNG from the US soon.
146
 This way, it 
would lessen its dependency on natural gas from Russia. 
 
Apart from increasing its energy security, the EU’s ambitions also seem to be to set a new 
global energy regulation standard for energy governance, using TTIP as a pioneer example. 
This becomes particularly clear from a leaked EU Commission non-paper from May 2014, 
which reveals some interesting insights. Among others, it states that: 
 
‘The EU and the US have been at the forefront of challenging export restrictions for 
the last decade, as illustrated by their successful common effort to lift China’s export 
restrictions on raw materials including rare earths.  
 
Combatting resource nationalism, together vis-à-vis third countries while at the same 
time allowing for export restrictions to exist between us sends the wrong message to 
our partners and offers some of these resource-rich countries a great opportunity to 




Here, the EU alludes to the fact that the EU and the US were for decades united against 
restrictive practices in the energy and natural resources sector. As is well known, both 
opposed to dual energy pricing practices maintained by OPEC countries.
148
 The EU also 
reminds the US on its stance against restrictive practices on natural resources in the China – 




However, beyond this leaked non-paper, these ideas are also explicitly put forward in the EU 
Initial Position paper on energy and raw materials.
150
 The EU states its discontent on the 
current WTO rules and the way the address energy. Amongst other, it is particularly critical 
of the import bias of the current rules in that respect. The EU position paper states, among 
others:  
 
‘In the EU’s view, World Trade Organization (WTO) rules do not fully reflect issues 
related to international production and trade in raw materials and energy, as also 
illustrated in the WTOs 2010 Annual Report which was devoted to this issue. The 
                                                 
146 Benes (n 81) 8. 
147 European Commission, EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, ‘Raw Materials and Energy 
– Initial EU Position Paper’ (2015) and Non-paper on a Chapter on Energy and Raw Materials in TTIP (leaked) 
27 May 2014. 
148 Infra Chapter 6 
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WTO rulebook contains tough rules to tackle import barriers, and weaker 
concomitant rules to address export barriers. This has affected energy and raw 





Therefore, the EU Initial Position Paper on Energy aims to make a potential energy chapter in 
TTIP a new standard in multilateral energy regulation, as it is of the opinion that international 
trade agreements up to date have failed to deliver in this respect. The EU is a strong 
proponent of stronger rules regarding energy access, distribution, trade and sale. Moreover, it 
emphasises the importance of enhanced global energy governance and transparency in the 
sector, as well as the contribution it could make to sustainable development, highlighted by 
the following excerpts:  
 
 ‘The EU and the US have worked closely together over the past years and sent a 
strong signal in support of open trade and non-discriminatory access for raw 
materials and energy. […] 
 
The multilateral trade system would however benefit from a stronger set of rules in 
the area of energy and raw materials. Indeed, international trade agreements have 
made only a modest contribution to promoting the application of market principles in 
this area regarding access, distribution, trade and sale.’ […] 
 
‘Disciplines agreed in the transatlantic context could serve as a model for subsequent 
negotiations involving third countries. It also sends a powerful signal to other 
countries that trade in raw materials and energy can be and will be subject to global 
governance, including the fundamental principles of transparency, market access and 
non-discrimination. In addition, agreed rules on trade and investment in raw 





These statements are rather frank and progressive, especially when compared to the sensitive 
production quota debate to be discussed infra in Chapter 6 of this book. The EU’s position 
sends a strong message about what it is aspiring to with respect to TTIP and energy. Since the 
publication of this initial position paper, the EU has calmed down its tone somewhat, and 
more diplomatically refers to the general wish to include and energy chapter in TTIP. 
Nevertheless, the EU’s strategy points to important changes and developments in the field. In 
any case, the EU’s proposals on energy in TTIP are more extensive than any trade agreement 
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Nevertheless, as Benes has rightly pointed out, there are risks of trying to negotiation on 
more politically sensitive matters is. The more contentious an issue, the less likely it is that 
TTIP will find solutions to it or produce binding commitments.
155
 On the other hand, not all 
rules in energy are political; a lot of them are merely technical in nature. Here, a TTIP 
chapter on energy may provide clarification. Other things that could be addressed concern 
clear gaps in the current rules.
156
 An example of this is the lack of a definition of energy 
services.
157
   
 
 
4.4. Crystallization of New Rules in Energy Regulation: What Are the Developments? 
From the discussion in this chapter we can draw several inferences. First and foremost, it 
becomes clear that even if trade negotiations have stalled in the WTO, countries proceed with 
negotiations on topics of their interest, including energy. We see this in WTO Accession 
Protocols and their WTO-plus or minus commitments. But this manifests itself even stronger 
beyond the WTO, in PTAs that contain relevant provisions on energy.  
 
With respect to WTO Accession Protocols, clearly, energy is increasingly playing a bigger 
role in the negotiations. Where energy issues were hardly discussed in Ecuador’s 1996 
accession, by 2015 they played an important role in Kazakhstan’s WTO accession in 2015. 
These developments can be explained by the fact that the topic of energy is increasingly 
gaining attention in the WTO context, not in the least due to the growing amount of disputes 
on energy. But the rising interest in the topic in WTO accessions can also be understood from 
the fact that a growing number of major energy producers is joining the Organization.  
 
With respect to commitments that acceding countries to the WTO have undertaken in the 
energy sector, it is interesting to note the following: In several instances, it concerned major 
energy producing countries with a vast vertically integrated state-owned petrochemical 
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sector. Their accession process to the WTO, inter alia, served the goal to open up this sector, 
privatise and liberalise its energy markets (even if only to a certain extent). This was the case 
in the accessions of Oman, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This was either done by 
means of notifying their State Trading Enterprises to the WTO, or signing onto the 
Agreement of Government Procurement. This points to a larger global trend in introducing 
competition to these often state owned and state run energy markets. We witness similar 
development e.g. in the case of the European Union and its unbundling practices since the 
1990s. 
 
In WTO Accession Protocols, we also see Members seeking stronger rules on energy transit 
crystallizing in the WTO. Both Ukraine and Kazakhstan made extensive commitments on 
GATT Article V (Freedom of Transit) in their accession protocols. Russia, to the contrary, 
has refrained from this. Nevertheless, this points to the fact that the relevance of GATT 
Article V and transport services commitments are becoming an important issue of discussion 
in the WTO forum. Less then a decade ago, the Energy Charter Treaty seemed to have been 
the primary setting for such transit discussions, but since 2010, discussions there have 
stalled.
158
 Perhaps transit commitment in the WTO accession context are a sign that the WTO 
is taking over from the ECT in this respect. 
 
Another development we see is that some new WTO Members, such as China and Russia, 
undertook binding export tariffs on raw materials and natural resource products. This seems 
to indicate that the WTO Membership is moving on from the focus on import barriers and 
recognising that addressing export barriers is especially relevant when it comes to trade in 
unevenly distributed natural resources. This being said, energy dual pricing was not 
addressed in WTO accessions as comprehensively as some WTO Members would have 
wanted to. The WTO membership did not manage in convincing Saudi Arabia and the 
Russian Federation to commit to eliminating these policies completely.  Nevertheless, we can 
conclude that WTO Accession Protocols have advanced energy issues in the forum and will 
likely continue to do so in the future.  
 
                                                 
158 2010 saw the last draft of the Energy Charter Treaty, ‘Transit Protocol’ (Draft) Doc No: TT87 22/01/2010 
(22 October 2010); See infra Chapter 5 on this. 
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However, as mentioned above, we are witnessing significantly more progress on energy 
negotiations outside of the WTO context. Since the Doha Round of trade negotiations is at a 
standstill, countries continue on their own initiative and push for progress on outstanding 
issues, including energy, by means of concluding PTAs. Consequently, we see much more 
far-reaching developments in PTAs than those in WTO Accessions so far. The NAFTA’s 
inclusion of a comprehensive chapter on energy was a pioneer example of this. But we see 
the same tendency in the EU-Singapore FTA and EU-Ukraine DCFTA, as well as energy 
figuring prominently in TTIP negotiations.  
 
We can deduct several principles from the rules that are crystallizing across these PTAs. 
First, countries are negotiating with energy security on their mind. They want to achieve this 
greater energy security by means if including the following types of obligations in their 
PTAs: 
a) Increasing access to energy supplies (NAFTA, TTIP negotiations); 
b) A prohibition dual energy pricing policies (NAFTA, EU-Ukraine DCFTA); 
c) Limiting export taxes on energy (NAFTA, EU-Ukraine DCFTA); 
d) Limiting the scope of import and export restrictions on energy (NAFTA, EU-Ukraine 
DCFTA and TTIP negotiations; 
e) Limiting the scope of invoking exceptions on restricting exports on energy (NAFTA); 
and 
f) Extensive and broad commitments on energy transit and transport obligations, 
including third-party access to infrastructure (EU-Ukraine DCFTA). 
 
We can also observe another inclination: negotiating PTAs with a more holistic approach to 
energy. This comes to expression in the following types of commitments: 
a) Widening the scope of energy specific chapters to include goods and services 
(NAFTA, TTIP negotiations); 
b) Widening the scope of energy specific chapters to include trade and investment in 
energy (EU-Singapore FTA, TTIP Negotiations); 
c) Including rules with a rounded energy, environment, sustainable development and 
climate change mitigation approach (EU-Singapore FTA, TTIP Negotiations); 








This chapter considered the crystallization of new rules in energy governance by looking into 
commitments in WTO Accession Protocols and rules in selected Preferential Trade 
Agreements. We can conclude that new rules and approaches to energy regulation are 
emerging in both of them. WTO Accession Protocols largely served opening up of the energy 
sectors in new WTO Members and cementing energy transit commitments. The PTAs we 
discussed go beyond this and offer more comprehensive and far-reaching provisions in their 
energy specific chapters. We see rules crystallizing with respect to enhancing energy 
security, as well as more holistic approaches to energy. This trend of regulating energy in 
more detail in PTAs is likely to only grow, as it enables a smaller group of countries to 
negotiate on more stringent and innovative rules, there where this seems impossible on the 
multilateral level.    
 
Chapter 4 will herald Part II of this book will venture into discussing challenges posed to 
international energy trade regulation. It will start by adding yet another specialised 
international agreement to the mix: The Energy Charter Treaty (the ECT). The ECT cannot 
be left out of the debate as it based on, and connected to, the WTO and especially tailored to 
deal with international energy governance. The following chapter will investigate to what 

























Part II – Energy Challenges in International Trade:  
 
The Nexus between the WTO and the Energy Charter Treaty, the Law and Economics 









































The previous chapters examined energy regulation in the GATT/WTO context. This chapter 
adds another essential agreement to the mix that cannot be left out of the discussion: The 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The ECT is an agreement especially tailored towards energy 
governance and moreover connected to the WTO in several ways.
1
 For this reason, the ECT 
deserves to be look at more in-depth. The chapter will look into the origin of the ECT and its 
relationship to the WTO. Subsequently, the chapter will point out some challenges in this 
respect and examine where the treaties overlap and at tension with each other. This is 
especially relevant in view of the changes that have taken place over the past two decades of 




The case of the ECT and its nexus with the WTO is one of the examples that illustrates how 
regulation of energy in international law is still extremely fragmented and its study in its 
youth.
3
 The reasons for this fragmented global energy landscape are manifold, and can inter 
alia be sought in: 1) the lack of cohesiveness of the energy governance system, 2) the rise of a 
multitude of treaty regimes significant for energy governance in various ways, 3) a 
corresponding plethora of relevant entities, 4) the diversity and continuous development of 
energy sources, and, finally 5) the pursuit of national interest.
4
 The WTO and the ECT are 
two treaty-based regimes each covering an area of the global energy governance patchwork. 
While the former is concerned with providing a framework for the regulation of trade in 
                                                 
1 The Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17 December 1994, entered into force 18 April 1998) 2080 U.N.T.S. 100 
(ECT) <www.energycharter.org> and The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on 1 January 1995 
<www.wto.org> accessed 31 January 2015. 
2 But the WTO (founded in 1995) and the ECT (treaty came into force in 1998) have been in existence for 
roughly two decades by 2016. 
3 See generally Thomas Cottier, Garba Malumfashi, Sofya Matteotti-Berkutova, Olga Nartova, Joelle de 
Sepibus and Sadeq Z Bigdeli, in ‘Energy in WTO Law and Policy’ in Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis 
(eds), The Prospects of International Trade Regulation – From Fragmentation to Coherence (CUP, Cambridge 
2011) 212 and Timothy Meyer, ‘The Architecture of International Energy Governance’ (2012) 106 ASIL 
Proceedings 389, 389 ff.   
4 For a more elaborate analysis see R Leal-Arcas and A Filis, ‘The Fragmented Governance of the Global 
Energy Economy’ (2013) 6 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 1, 4-6 and R Leal-Arcas, A Filis and ES 
Abu Gosh, ‘Chapter 1 – A Fragmented Energy Governance’ in International Energy Governance – Selected 
Legal Issues (Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham 2014) 15 ff; Also see Meyer (n 3). 
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virtually all goods and services amongst its Members, the latter offers a specialized regime 
for energy trade and investment regulation. 
 
The chapter will start out by discussing the origins of the Energy Charter Treaty against the 
backdrop of the WTO, in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 will focus on the overlap in Membership 
between the two treaties, changes therein over roughly the past twenty years and the 
implications thereof. Then, it will scrutinise the substantial overlap between the two treaties 
regarding energy trade and investment regulation, in Section 5.4 Section 5.5 will address the 
procedural overlap and tension between the two treaties. Finally, Section 5.6 will touch upon 
some ways to overcome potential difficulties resulting tension and overlap between the WTO 
and the ECT.  
 
5.2. The WTO and the Origins of the Energy Charter Treaty 
5.2.1. The WTO and Energy in Context 
 
The GATT 1947 was originally set up to regulate trade in goods. The WTO took on a broader 
set of responsibilities in 1995, adding trade in services (GATS), Trade Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS) and intellectual property (TRIPS) to its portfolio.
5
 The WTO has an 
economic focus since it governs the trade relations amongst its Members.
6
 The objective of 
the WTO is to promote free trade by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers and eliminating 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.
7
 Simply put, it is an organization that 
administers trade rules and a specialized dispute settlement system. It additionally provides 
for an institutional forum for trade negotiations, addressing various trade-related issues. The 
subject matter of the WTO is to regulate the trade in goods (by means of the GATT), services 
                                                 
5 See supra Chapter 3; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 ILM 1167 (1994) (hereafter: 
GATS); TRIMS Agreement: Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 (hereafter: TRIMS 
Agreement); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) 
(hereafter: TRIPS Agreement), all published in WTO, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (WTO, Geneva 1999) (hereafter: WTO, The Legal Texts).  
6 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) Article II.1 (Scope of the WTO): 
 ‘The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its 
Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this 
Agreement’.  
7 Preamble, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (n 6). 
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As became clear from Chapter 2, energy products have been de jure covered by the 
GATT/WTO system from 1947, and energy services were added after the establishment of 
the WTO.
9
 However, it also became clear regulation of energy has been anything but 
problem-free in the multilateral trading system and continues to pose a plethora challenges to 




5.2.2. The Energy Charter Treaty 
The ECT seems to have sprouted as a separate branch of the GATT/WTO regime in the early 
nineties and continues to operate as a (semi-)distinct treaty-based system today.
11
 In a certain 
sense, the ECT is partly an elaboration on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), but specially geared towards energy.
12
 Both the WTO and ECT frameworks contain 
partially overlapping elements, objectives and membership. Conversely, both treaties have 
diverging functions and mechanisms, which are not necessarily in accordance with one 
another.  
 
The Energy Charter Treaty was signed in Lisbon in 1994, just before the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization. It entered into force in 1998.
13
 The ECT is a similar treaty regime 
to the WTO, but in addition to regulating energy trade, it incorporates a significant 
                                                 
8 See supra Chapters 2 and 3; Also see generally Article II, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization.  
9 See supra Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
10 See supra Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis; See for a brief overview of challenges with respect to energy 
regulation in the WTO e.g. A Marhold, ‘The World Trade Organization and Energy: Fuel for Debate’ (2013) 8 
European Society of International Law (ESIL) Reflections (30 September 2013) <www.esil-sedi.eu> (accessed 
27 March 2016); unresolved issues e.g. concern the not always clear goods and services distinction of energy in 
the WTO, energy dual pricing, transit under GATT Article V, the ‘likeness’ of non-renewables and renewables, 
subsidies and the non applicability of Article XX(g) exceptions with regard to commitments made in WTO 
Accession Protocols, which is arguable at tension with the notion of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources. 
11 The inauguration of the ECT was in 1994 – right before establishment of the WTO in 1995. The term semi-
distinct is used here because the treaties are partly connected in substance through Article 4 ‘Non-derogation 
from GATT and Related Instruments’ and 29 ECT ‘Transitional Arrangements’, see elaboration in Section 5.2 
and further; The ECT incorporates WTO rules by reference and can be seen as a ‘stepping-stone’ treaty for 
countries on their way to WTO Accession. 
12 GATT 1947: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
13 ECT (n 1). 
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investment part and an environmental protocol.
14
 In essence, the ECT was born as an 
alternative to concluding an energy specific agreement within the GATT/WTO framework 
after the Cold War had ended.
15
 The trade provisions of the ECT draw largely upon the 
GATT, but are better adapted to the needs of energy trade, for instance by providing 
extensive definitions of energy products (Energy Materials and Products) and services (in the 
form of ‘Economic Activity in the Energy Sector’) and clearly incorporating gas pipelines as 
a means of transport in Article 7 ECT on Transit.
16
 The objective of the Treaty is to provide a 
stable and predictable framework for trade in energy materials, products and energy-related 




To assume that the ECT is a completely separate treaty regime from the WTO would be a 
mistake. With regard to the trade provisions of the ECT, the purpose of its establishment 
seems to have been to introduce GATT-type standards in the energy sector to former 
communist countries that had not yet ratified the GATT.
18
 It was intended to promote reform 
towards GATT compatibility and, consequently, help with GATT/WTO accession.
19
 Thus, 
while being a separate treaty on paper, there were clear intentions to introduce the 
multilateral trading system to countries that had not yet acceded to the Organization. This is 
visible in the way ECT trade rules are set up: the ECT incorporates WTO rules in trade in 




The nexus between the ECT and the WTO seems somewhat asymmetrical: The ECT clearly 
                                                 
14 Investment and its dispute settlement are regulated in Parts III and V of the ECT, and the ECT additionally 
houses a Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA). 
15 Leal-Arcas and Filis (n 4) 24. 
16 Energy Materials and Products are taken up in ANNEX EM ECT; Article 1(5) ECT incorporates ‘Economic 
Activity in the Energy Sector’ and Article 7 (10) (b) ECT explicitly groups gas pipelines as ‘Energy Transport 
Facilities’.  
17 Energy Charter Secretariat, Applicable Trade Provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty (Energy Charter 
Secretariat, Brussels 2003) (hereafter: ECS, Applicable Trade Provisions of the ECT) and Energy Charter 
Secretariat, Trade in Energy: WTO Rules Applying under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECS, Brussels 2001) 
(hereafter: ECS, Trade in Energy); On its website, the ECS explains the objective of the ECT as: ‘The 
fundamental aim of the Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues, by creating a 
level playing field of rules to be observed by all participating governments, thereby mitigating risks associated 
with energy-related investment and trade’ <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7> (accessed 27 March 
2016). 
18 I Frasl, ‘Chapter 21 – The Trade Rules of the GATT and Related Instruments and the Energy Charter Treaty’ 
in: Thomas W Waelde, The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment and Trade (Kluwer 
Law International, London 1996) 459, 460-461. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Art 4 ECT ‘Non-derogation from GATT and Related Instruments’; Also see Article 29 ECT ‘Interim 
Provisions on Trade-related Matters’. 
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refers to rules of the WTO and states which should prevail in what instances, going as far as 
labelling itself as a ‘stepping stone’ for member states towards their accession to the WTO.
21
 
The WTO, however, merely mentions the ECT as an ‘intergovernmental organization 
working with the WTO Secretariat’.
22
 Russia’s failure to ratify the ECT and the withdrawal 
from its provisional application in 2009 was a considerable setback for the Treaty, and the 
effectiveness of the ECT has been questioned many times since then.
23
 Nevertheless, the ECT 
seems to have survived the test of time, not in the least because of its investment protection 
and dispute settlement capacities. Additionally, it serves as one of the few fora where 




The Energy Charter Secretariat (hereafter ECS), the administrative body overseeing the ECT, 
has taken tension and overlap between the WTO and the ECT into account by providing 
extensive guidelines on incorporation of WTO rules into the Treaty.
25
 This so-called 
‘coordination ex ante’ was aimed at functioning as a conflict prevention tool.
26
 However, 
gaps, conflicts and uncertainties remain.  
 
In the substantive sense, the WTO and ECT deal with partially overlapping issue-areas: The 
WTO regulates the trade of goods and services, of which energy goods and services are a 
                                                 
21 See ECT website answer FAQ on its relationship with the WTO:  
‘The Energy Charter shares core principles with the World Trade Organization, in particular the principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination. The rules of the Treaty are fully compatible with those of the 
international trading system, and in practice the Energy Charter Treaty has been a valuable stepping-stone for 
some member states on their way towards accession to the WTO.’  
<http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=18&L=0> (accessed 27 March 2016); The Energy Charter Treaty and 
Related Documents, ‘An Introduction to the Energy Charter Treaty’ 15. 
22 See WTO, Intergovernmental Organizations working with the WTO Secretariat 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/igo_divisions_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
23 See ECT ‘Members and Observers’ <http://www.energycharter.org> (accessed 27 March 2016): ‘On 20 
August 2009 the Russian Federation has officially informed the Depository that it did not intend to become a 
Contracting Party to the Energy Charter Treaty and the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related 
Environmental Aspects. In accordance with Article 45(3(a)) of the Energy Charter Treaty, such notification 
results in Russia's termination of its provisional application of the ECT and the PEEREA upon expiration of 60 
calendar days from the date on which the notification is received by the Depository’. 
24 The ECT houses a ‘Trade and Transit Group’, which facilitates transit talks between the ECT Parties. This 
might in fact be the only effective international platform where transit of energy is discussed. 
25 The GATT and several WTO Agreements are incorporated into the ECT ‘by reference’ through Art 4 ECT, 
but important exceptions exist ECS, Applicable Trade Provisions of the ECT (n 17) and ECS, Trade in Energy 
(n 17). 
26 J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law – How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 





 The ECT, on the other hand, aims to regulate trade and investment in energy 
materials and products and related services.
28
 With respect to geographical delimitations, 
neither of the treaties is bound to a specific topographical area, but the WTO and ECT have 
largely overlapping membership, that has moreover changed significantly since the 




Procedurally, overlap also occurs with respect to dispute settlement in the WTO and the ECT. 
The WTO aspires to be a self-contained regime and has its own built-in dispute settlement 
mechanism, the Dispute Settlement Body (hereafter: DSB), to solve trade disputes between 
WTO Members in this exclusive forum.
30
 As the wording of Article 23.2 DSU is 
unambiguous, can one deduct that energy-trading disputes between WTO Members have to 
be settled solely by the DSB and not under the ECT?
31
 The ECT provides a rather ‘informal’ 
mechanism to resolve trade disputes through diplomatic means, and additionally has an 




If follows that overlap between the WTO and ECT regimes occurs both in the issue-area (i.e. 
energy goods, related services and with regard to membership to both Organizations) and in 
                                                 
27 Energy products are taken up in WTO Members’ Schedules of Concessions, based on the Harmonized 
System (HS) Convention (Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System), adopted 14 June 1983, 
entered into force 1988, 1503 U.N.T.S. 167, See World Customs Organization, <http://www.wcoomd.org> 
(accessed 27 March 2016); Negotiations on Energy Services as a separate sector have been added at the outset 
of the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 2001  
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/energy_e/energy_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2017). 
28 ANNEX EM ‘Energy Materials and Products’ (n 16). 
29 See for an overview Figures 1 and 2 in Table I below.  
30 See on self-contained regimes in international law generally B Simma and D Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the 
Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483; 
There are moreover two diverging views on this matter with respect tot WTO law: Pauwelyn argues that the 
WTO law cannot operate as a ‘closed legal circuit’ (Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms (n 26) 35, while others, 
notably Mavroidis and Trachtman, are of the opinion that even though general international law may be used to 
interpret WTO law, this does not mean that non-WTO law is directly applicable as law in the WTO. They point 
to the risks of expecting trade delegates ‘to move outside the (illusory) comfort of the covered agreements in 
order to adjudicate disputes’, PC Mavroidis, ‘No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO 
Courts’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 421, 474 and Trachtman, ‘Conflict of Norms in 
Public International Law – How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Book Review)’ (2004) 
98 American Journal of International Law 855, 857. 
31 Article 23.2 (a) of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding prescribes that WTO members shall use the 
DSU as the sole forum to settle their disputes under the covered agreements, Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (hereafter: DSU). 
32 Annex D ECT ‘Interim Provisions for Trade Dispute Settlement’ and ECT Articles 26 ‘Settlement of 




the procedural sense (with respect to the settlement of disputes both in the area of trade and 
investment).  
  
5.3. WTO and ECT: Overlap and Changes in Membership 
 
Since neither the WTO nor the ECT is tied to a particular region per sé. However, substantial 
overlap in membership between the ECT and WTO does occur, because the treaties are 
connected in substance through Article 4 and 29 ECT, providing for incorporation of GATT 
trade rules in the ECT.
33
 Moreover, the ECT is a self-proclaimed stepping-stone for WTO 
Membership.
34
 Rather then looking at strict geographical lines, it therefore arguably proves is 
a more fruitful exercise to scrutinize the overlap and change in Membership to both the WTO 
and ECT. This allows us to assess what developments have taken place in the past two 
decades and draw conclusions from them. Figures 1 and 2 in Annex I below give an overview 
of the Membership situation to the ECT and WTO, including overlap therein, in 1998 and in 
2016. Although the WTO was established in 1995, a representative scheme comparing 
membership could only be made with the entry into force of the ECT in 1998. 
5.3.1. WTO  
From its establishment in 1995, the  Organization started out with hundred-and-thirteen 
Members, and sixty-one Observers.
35
 Fourteen countries were neither Members, nor 
Observers, and continue to function outside of the multilateral trading system today.
36
 By 
2016, WTO Membership has expanded drastically: With the General Council’s approval of 
Kazakhstan’s accession to the Organization in 2015, the WTO has one hundred and sixty-
two.
37
 Amongst them are major fossil fuel producing, exporting and transporting countries 
such as Angola, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, China, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United States and 
                                                 
33 Article 4 ‘Non-derogation from GATT and Related Instruments’ and 29 ECT ‘Transitional Arrangements. 
34 Supra note 21. 
35 Nota bene: Observers to the WTO must start accession negotiations to the Organization within five years of 
becoming observers, WTO, Members and Observers 
 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm#observer> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
36 See Table I, Figure 1 ‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap (1998)’ below. 
37 See WTO, Members and Observers (n 35) and Table I, Figure 2 ‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap 
(2015)’ below; Accession Protocol: WT/L/957 (30 November 2015); Report of the Working Party on the 




Venezuela, a large part of which has joined the WTO only after its establishment in 1995.
38
 
Other major players in the energy field such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Libya and 
Sudan are in the process of negotiating accession.
39
 Nine members out of thirteen of the 
Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) are already in the WTO.
40
 It is thus evident 
that major stakeholders in the global energy landscape are full-fledged participants in the 
multilateral trade system.  
5.3.2. The Energy Charter Treaty  
The WTO’s wide-ranging membership is in stark contrast with the membership of the ECT. 
It entered into force in 1998 with forty Parties to the Treaty.
41
 At the same time, eight ECT 
signatories chose to apply the Treaty provisionally pending ratification, while twenty-nine 
countries were observers to the ECT.
42
 121 countries did not join the ECT. By 2016 the 
numbers have changed, but the amount of countries that has acceded to the ECT is still far 
less comprehensive than that of the WTO: merely 46 countries have ratified the ECT.
43
 Five 
ECT Signatories continue to apply the Treaty provisionally, and twenty-six countries have 
Observer status with the ECT.
44
 In a notorious move touched upon above, Russia stepped 
back from the agreement altogether in 2009, after applying it provisionally since its signature 
in 1994.
45
 In 2016, Italy withdrew from the ECT, as well.
46
 The number of countries who are 
                                                 
38 Major energy producing, exporting and/or transporting States who joined the WTO after 1995 are Angola 
(1996), China (2001), Ecuador (1996), Oman (2000), Qatar (1996), Russia (2012), Saudi Arabia (2005), 
Ukraine (2008) and the United Arab Emirates (1996).  
39 WTO, Members and Observer (n 35). 
40 See OPEC, Member Countries <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm> (accessed 27 March 
2017) and infra Chapter 6. 
41 See Table I, Figure 1 ‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap (1998)’ below and ECT, Members and 
Observers <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See Table I, Figure 2 ‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap (2015)’ below; Russia stepped back from 
provisional application of the ECT in 2009, but investments made during the period of provisional application 
(1998 – 2009) are protected until 29 October 2029 (see also infra note 45). 
45 Allegedly, in connection with the controversial Yukos arbitration cases Hulley Enterprises Limited v the 
Russian Federation (PCA Case No AA226), Yukos Universal Limited v the Russian Federation (PCA Case No 
AA227) and Veteran Petroleum Limited v the Russian Federation (PCA Case No AA228), Final Awards, 18 
July 2014; Note that in the prior interim awards on jurisdiction and admissibility in the same cases (Hulley 
Enterprises Limited v the Russian Federation (PCA Case No AA226), Yukos Universal Limited v the Russian 
Federation (PCA Case No AA227) and Veteran Petroleum Limited v the Russian Federation (PCA Case No 
AA228), Interim Awards on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009) the Tribunal decided that 
Russia undeniably provisionally applied ECT, and was therefore bound to it in its entirety until October 19, 
2009, stating: ‘Accordingly, the Tribunal has concluded that the ECT in its entirety applied provisionally in the 
Russian Federation until 19 October 2009, and that Parts III and V of the Treaty (including Article 26 thereof) 
remain in force until 19 October 2029 for any investments made prior to 19 October 2009.’  
46 Pursuant to article 47 of the ECT, Italy's withdrawal will take effect upon the expiry of one year after the 
date of notification, thus in January 2016. 
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neither Parties nor Observers is hundred-and-twenty. Major energy producing and exporting 
countries like Canada, Indonesia, the United States, Algeria, Bahrain, China, Kuwait, 
Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela have Observer 




5.3.3. WTO and ECT Membership: Changes and Overlap 1998-2016 
As Figures 1 and 2 in Annex I below point out, substantial changes have taken place in 
Membership to the WTO and ECT alike, from the early days of the WTO and the entry into 
force of the ECT, to roughly two decades later. The biggest development admittedly is the 
vast number of accessions to the WTO of a considerable amount of former WTO Observers. 
These were reduced from fifty in 1998 to only twenty-two in 2016. Prominent non-ECT 
countries in this category are Russia,
48




Overlapping Membership between the two Treaty-regimes became an instant reality with the 
entry into force of the ECT in 1998. This de facto resulted into two ‘tiers’ of ECT 
membership: 1) Countries who are simultaneously WTO Members and ECT Parties, so-
called WTO/ECT Members and 2) ECT Parties have not acceded to the WTO (yet), so-called 
non-WTO ECT Parties. Therefore, there are three possible modes of ‘membership 
interaction’ within the legal framework of the ECT, namely: a) among ECT/WTO Members, 
b) between ECT/WTO Members and non-WTO ECT Parties, and c) among non-WTO ECT 
Parties.
50
 The two tiers of ECT Membership and the three possible modes of interaction 
among them will be continuously referred to in this chapter. 
  
In 1998, Twenty-five Members to the WTO were simultaneously Party to the ECT.
51
 By 
2016, the number of simultaneous ECT/WTO Members has risen to forty-two. This increase 
indicates that a substantial number of countries that were ECT Parties only in 1998 did indeed 
accede to the WTO in the course of the past twenty years. Hence, the ECT’s partial objective 
to function as a stepping-stone to WTO Accession seems to have been successful in this 
respect, though arguably ECT membership was not the only reason that triggered WTO 
                                                 
47 ECT, Members and Observers (n 41).  
48 But, see supra text to notes 44 and 45.  
49 See Table I, Figure 2 ‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap (2015)’ below. 
50 See Figures 1 and 2 in Table I below. 
51 Table I, Figure 1 ‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap (1998)’ below. 
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accession for there countries. Russia, as the major Eurasian energy producing and exporting 
country, proves to be a special case and the only country to effectively ‘swap’ (provisional) 
ECT Membership for WTO Accession, while minimising unwanted commitments on energy 
along the way. It acceded to the Organization in August 2012, after protracted negotiations of 
almost two decades.
52
 But, perhaps owing to the absence of consensus on many energy-
related issues (such as dual pricing) among the Members of the WTO, Russia was able to 
negotiate the accession with almost no ‘WTO-plus’ commitments in the energy sector.
53
 As a 
result, Russia’s state-owned energy exporter, Gazprom, is practically free of trade barriers 





The change of Membership not only affects the applicability between the ECT and/or the 
WTO countries who have acceded to either Organization. It also changes the significance of 
the ECT as a whole. The legal implications with regard to application of both treaties in the 
light of changing membership will be discussed in Section 5.6 below.  
 
5.4. Issue-Area Overlap between the WTO and the Energy Charter Treaty 
5.4.1. Trade in Energy 
 
As mentioned in Section 5.2,  the WTO and the ECT partially overlap in issue-area as both 
instruments are relevant for trade in energy products and related services. Consequently, the 





Energy falls within the WTO’s remit, inter alia because energy products are taken up in 
                                                 
52 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade 
Organization (17 November 2011) WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2. 
53 Russian WTO Accession Protocol (n 52); In some other sectors, Russia consented to bind and reduce its 
export duties (i.e. on lumber, fish, crabs and leather), however, on raw mineral materials and fuels Russia 
reserved its right to continue applying export taxes.  
54 DG Tarr, ‘Chapter 5 – The Economic Impact of Export Restrictions on Raw Materials on Russian Natural 
Gas and Raw Timber’ in OECD Trade Policy Studies – The Economic Impact of Export Restrictions on Raw 
Materials (OECD: Paris 2012) 131, 132.  
55 See M G Desta, ‘The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the World Trade Organization, and 
Regional Trade Agreements’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 523, 539. 
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Members’ GATT Article II Schedules.
56
 Additionally, energy services are being negotiated 
as a separate services sector in the Doha Round and disputes relevant for energy are being 
settled in the WTO Dispute Settlement System.
57
 The WTO estimates that at least eighteen 
per cent of intra WTO-trade involves energy goods such as fossil fuels.
58
 Energy is either 
classified as a good, regulated by the GATT (energy products such as crude petroleum or 
natural gas) or a service, regulated by the GATS (such as the transportation of an energy 




The WTO deals with trade in goods and services of which energy goods and services are a 
sub-category. The ECT in Articles 4 – 6 and 29 deals with trade in energy goods and related 
economic activity (read: services) only, with the exception that the ECT deals with 
investment in addition to trade.
60
 The definition of ‘energy’ under the ECT is very wide: it 
relates to trade in energy, energy products and energy related equipment, all of which are 
specified under Annex EM of the ECT.
61
 The ECT generally focuses on five broad areas: 
 
                                                 
56 See supra Chapter 2 and 3; WTO Members’ Schedules are based on the classifications the in the HS 
Convention (n 27), relevant for energy is e.g. Chapter 27 ‘Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 
distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes’. 
57 See WTO, Services, Sector by Sector, ‘Energy Services’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/energy_e/energy_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016); WTO, 
Energy Services identified by Member in WTO, Council for Trade in Services – Special Session of the Council 
for the Trade in Services, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/S/23 28 November 
2005; Recent WTO case law relevant for energy includes WTO, China – Measures Related to the Exportation 
of Various Raw Materials – Appellate Body Report (30 January 2012) WT/DS395/AB/R, WTO, China – 
Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum – Report of the Panel (26 
March 2014) WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R and WT/DS433/R) (both cases dealing with the GATT Article 
XX(g) exception); WTO, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program – Appellate Body Report 
(6 May 2013) WT/DS426/AB/R and Canada – Certain Measured Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector – 
Appellate Body Report (6 May 2013) WT/DS412/AB/R (on subsidies); and a whole string of disputes 
concerning solar panels such as WTO, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from 
China – Report of the Panel (14 July 2014) WT/DS437/R and WTO, India – Certain Measures Relating to 
Solar Cells and Solar Modules (Panel established on 23 May 2014) WT/DS456/R, and, most recently a case 
concerning the EU’s Third Energy Package in WTO, EU – Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector (in 
consultations on 30 April 2014) WT/DS476/R.  
58 WTO, World Trade Report 2010, Trade in Natural Resources (WTO, Geneva 2010) 54. 
59 See supra Chapter 3 Section 2: A case in point here is electricity: There is still no conclusive categorization 
of electricity in the WTO, although ‘electrical energy’ is registered under code 2716 of the HS Convention (n 
44); In EU law, however, electricity is explicitly considered a ‘good’ and not a ‘service’, in ECJ Case C-393/92 
Almelo v Energiebedrijf IJsselmij [1994] ECR-I-1477 [28] and Case C-158/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR 
I-5789 [17], the European Court of Justice has ruled that electricity, despite its intangible character, should be 
treated as a ‘good’. 
60 A Konoplaynik and T Waelde, ‘Energy Charter Treaty and its Role in International Energy’ (2006) 24 
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 523, 529. For more information on the background and legal 
provisions of the ECT see generally Thomas W Waelde, The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for 
Investment and Trade (London: Kluwer Law International 1996). 
61 ANNEX EM ‘Energy Materials and Products’ (n 16). 
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1. Protection and promotion of foreign energy investments, based on most-favoured-
nation treatment or national treatment, whichever is more favourable, set out in 
Article 10(3) ECT; 
2. Free trade in energy materials, products and energy-related equipment, based on 
WTO rules, in Articles 4, 5, 6, and 29
62
 ECT; 
3. Freedom of energy transit through pipelines and grids in Article 7, based on GATT 
Article V on ‘Transit’, but the ECT is much more specific on what energy transit 




4. Reducing the negative environmental impact of the energy cycle through improving 
energy efficiency, set out in Article 19 ECT and the PEEREA
64
; and 
5. Mechanisms for the resolution of various disputes, such as trade related disputes, 
state-to-state and / or investor-to-state disputes – set out in Part V, Articles 26 to 32 – 




As mentioned above, the Energy Charter Secretariat, the body overseeing the ECT, 
intentionally based ECT trade rules on the GATT/WTO. The ECT has, for instance, 
incorporated the trade rules of the GATT in its trade part by means of Article 4 ECT.
65
 
Overlap with respect to the trade provisions of both treaty-regimes therefore occurs there 
where the trade provisions of the WTO (GATT) meet the energy trade provisions of the ECT 
(Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 29). To foster transparency concerning this overlap between the 
GATT and the ECT, the ECS issued two extensive guides with a referencing mechanism, in 
2001 and 2003.
66
 There are several basic rules at the heart of this incorporation of GATT 




                                                 
62 Article 29 ECT ‘Interim Provisions on Trade-related Matters’ sets out temporary trade rules for ECT parties 
in the process of WTO accession.  
63 See Article 7 (10) (ii) (b) ECT, at 1: ‘“Energy Transport Facilities” consist of high-pressure gas 
transmission pipelines, high-voltage electricity transmission grids and lines, crude oil transmission pipelines, 
coal slurry pipelines, oil product pipelines, and other fixed facilities specifically for handling Energy Materials 
and Products’. NB: A Transit Protocol, which intends to be an elaboration on Article 7 ECT and the ECT as a 
whole is still under negotiation. 
64 PEEREA (n 14). 
65 Article 4 ECT reads ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall derogate, as between particular Contracting Parties which 
are parties to the GATT, from the provisions of the GATT and Related Instruments as they are applied between 
those Contracting Parties.’ 
66 ECS, Applicable Trade Provisions of the ECT and ECS, Trade in Energy (n 17). 
67 ECS, Applicable Trade Provisions of the ECT (n 17) viii.  
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1. Trade in energy materials and products (i.e. goods) between ECT Parties, who are 
also WTO Members, are regulated by the trade provisions of the WTO and the ECT.
68
 
However, by virtue of Article 4 of the ECT the provisions of the latter should be 
interpreted as derogating from the provisions of the former; 
2. Trade between ECT Members, of which at least one is not a WTO Member, is, with 
some exceptions, governed by WTO rules incorporated into to the ECT through 
Article 29(2)(a) ECT, in addition to those of the ECT. In that case, Article 4 of the 
ECT does not apply;
69
  
3. The ECT uses a ‘negative’ reference listing technique and incorporates all WTO 




There are a couple of important main exceptions with regard to WTO rules integrated in the 
ECT: Firstly, bindings on customs duties as set out in Article II of the GATT are not 
automatically taken over. Instead, they are replaced by a softer, ‘best-endeavours’ 
commitment discouraging Parties to the ECT to increase custom duties or importation and 




Article 7 ECT on Transit goes further than Article V GATT and explicitly incorporates gas 
pipelines as a means of transport.
72
 It thereby creates additional obligations for ECT Parties 
who are also WTO Members. This in essence entails that Article 7 ECT, to the extent that its 
provisions are broader than those of the GATT, imposes disciplines additional to those of 
GATT Article V, binding all parties to the ECT. This can be seen as a so-called ‘WTO-plus 
                                                 
68 Article 4 ECT ‘Non-Derogation from GATT’ for GATT Members. 
69 Article 29(2)(a) ECT; The exceptions are listed partly in Annex W of the ECT Trade Amendment, partly in 
Article 29(2)(b) of the ECT and most importantly relate to the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO (DSS), 
which cannot be used for non-WTO Members, is replaced in Annex D by a panel-based dispute resolution 
mechanism which is inspired by the DSU, but is less ‘heavy’ (no standing appellate body is foreseen); Note 
however, that Japan and Turkey did not ratify the ECT Trade Amendment, while some other countries only 
apply it provisionally, see ECT ‘Signatories and Contracting Parties, Energy Charter Treaty and Related 
Documents’ 223-225: The ECT only refers to the GATT, and it is the ECT Trade Amendment that introduces 
reference to the WTO and the commitment to protect intellectual property rights. 
70 Annex W(A) ECT ‘Exceptions and Rules Governing the Application of the Provisions of the WTO 
Agreement – in Accordance with Article 29(2)(a)’. 
71 Article 29 (3), (4) and (5) ECT; However, export tariffs, which are highly relevant for the energy sector and 
utilized for ‘dual energy pricing’, also remain largely unregulated in the WTO, with the exceptions of some 
recent bindings on them in selected Accession Protocols (e.g. Russia and China).  
72 In WTO law, it is still debated whether Article V GATT covers fixed infrastructures such as gas pipelines. 
See generally on this issue D Azaria, ‘Energy Transit under the Energy Charter Treaty and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (2009) 27 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 559. 
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effect of the ECT’.
73
 It is also worth mentioning that negotiations on an ECT Protocol on 
Transit are on-going (but stalled) since 1999 and foster the same ‘WTO-plus’ ambitions: 










 are not taken over into the ECT, but each have an equivalent 
Article in the Energy Charter Treaty: Services are covered under the overarching term of 
‘Economic Activity in the Energy Sector’,
78
 a commitment to protect intellectual property 
rights is taken up in the Final Act of the International Conference
79
 and Article 5 ECT 
incorporates trade related investment measures.
80
 It should be mentioned that here, the 
conflict between the two treaties caused by simultaneously applicable provisions is not 
solved. Additionally, the WTO Special and Differential Treatment provisions do not apply in 




Relevant trade-remedy agreements of the WTO, such as TBT, Antidumping, Subsidies and 
Safeguards, are incorporated into the ECT, just as the market-access agreements on Import 




Plurilaterals that are not binding on all WTO Members have not been taken over in the ECT. 
In the same vein, WTO Multilateral agreements, which are substantially irrelevant for the 
subject matter of the ECT, such as SPS, Textiles and the Agreement on Agriculture, do not 
                                                 
73 Frasl (n 18) 484. 
74 See the most recent informal text of the ‘Transit Protocol’, dated 22 October 2010, under document number: 
TT87 22/01/2010; NB Article 7 ECT proves to be a complex article in itself, looking for instance at the non-
discrimination required contained article 7(3), see N Nychay and D Shemelin, ‘Interpretation of Article 7(3) of 
the Energy Charter Treaty’ Trade and Investment Law Clinic Papers, 2012, the Graduate Institute, Geneva, 
Centre for Trade and Economic Integration.   
75 Annex W (A)(b) ECT. 
76 Annex W (A)(c) ECT. 
77 Annex W (A)(iv) ECT; Also generally see S Defilla, ‘Energy Trade under the ECT and Accession to the 
WTO’ (2003) 21 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 428. 
78 Article 1(5) ‘Definitions’: ‘Economic Activity in the Energy Sector’ means an economic activity concerning 
the exploration, extraction, refining, production, storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, 
marketing, or sale of Energy Materials and Products except those included in Annex NI, or concerning the 
distribution of heat to multiple premises.’ 
79 ECT Parties made a commitment to provide protection of intellectual property rights, laid down in the Final 
Act of the International Conference and Decision by the Energy Charter Conference in Respect of the 
Amendment to the Trade-Related Provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty, Joint Declaration on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights. 
80 Article 5 ECT ‘Trade-Related Investment Measures, linked to Annex D and Article 26 ECT. 
81 Through Annex W (A) para 2(a) ECT. 





 Last but not least, Protocols of Accession of new Members to the WTO are not 




While it is possible to engage in Plurilateral Agreements (PTAs) in the GATT (Article 
XXIV), the ECT, interestingly enough, does not provide for such a possibility.
85
 The reason 
for this may be that the ECT itself was seen as a sectoral/plurilateral type of agreement of 
sorts, and PTAs within the ECT would have been superfluous and cumbersome.  
 
One can conclude that with regard to trade in goods provisions, the Energy Charter 
Secretariat has taken into account the risks stemming from overlap and tension in substance 
between the ECT and the WTO and has pre-emptively set out conflict rules to reconcile both 
treaties. Conflicts not (directly) solved in the ECT concern TRIMS, TRIPS and GATS. 
5.4.2. Investments in Energy  
Another important issue-area where conflict of rules between the WTO and the ECT remain 
unsolved is where investment protection in the WTO (through GATS Mode 3)
86
 meets 
protection of energy services investments in the ECT (Part III ECT). Trade in services is 
covered in the ECT by means of Article 1(5) ECT, but the GATS is not incorporated in the 
ECT as such.
87
 This leads to a parallel applicability of WTO rules and ECT rules concerning 
the protection of energy investments in the following manner: 
 
The ECT protects investments in the energy sector in a direct way by granting them National 
Treatment (hereafter: NT) and Most Favoured Nation treatment (hereafter: MFN) in Article 
10(3) in Part III of the ECT.
88
 ‘Investment in the energy sector’ in the sense of the ECT in 
this case refers to any investment associated with an ‘Economic Activity in the Energy 
Sector’, i.e. concerning the exploration, extraction, refining, production, storage, land 
transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing, or sale of Energy Materials and 
                                                 
83 Note however, that the Agreement of Agriculture is of some relevance with regard to the energy sector, as it 
incorporates tariffs on biofuels; Alan Yanovich, ‘Chapter 1: WTO Rules and the Energy Sector’ in Yulia 
Selivanova (ed), Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter 
(Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 2011) 27 and Harmonized System Convention (n 27), Chapter 22 ‘Beverages, 
Spirits and Vinegar’. 
84 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (n 31), Article XII.1 and Annex W(A)(1) ECT. 
85 GATT Article XXIV (Territorial Application — Frontier Traffic — Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas). 
86 GATS Article 1.2 (c). 
87 Annex W (A)(b) ECT. 
88 Article 10(3) ECT ‘Promotion, Protection and Treatment of Investments’. 
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Conversely, investment in the WTO comes into play in a different manner and becomes 
relevant when we look at the modes of supply of services in the GATS. As with GATT 
Schedules, WTO Members make sector-specific commitments in their GATS Schedules of 
Specific Commitments, where they agree on particular market access commitments with 
regard to trade in services.
90
 There are horizontal commitments, which apply to all 
commitments in the schedules, and sector specific commitments affecting only to the sector 
in question, which may additionally only apply to one or more of the four modes of supply of 
the GATS. These are a) Mode 1, when neither the service supplier nor the service consumer 
has to move, b) Mode 2, when the consumer moves to the country where the service is 
supplied, c) Mode 3, when the service supplier establishes commercial presence in the 





WTO Members have to grant Most Favoured Nation (MFN) to all foreign services, and 
National Treatment (NT) to GATS commitments made in their Schedules.
92
 It figures that 
investments in services, and particularly investments in energy services, can in fact be 
covered in the GATS through Article I.2 under c, Mode 3, when the service supplier 
establishes commercial presence in the country where he/she supplies (i.e. a foreign company 




In principle, GATS rules apply to all energy related services.
94
 There are some sectors, which 
are particularly relevant to energy and to which Members committed in the services 
                                                 
89 See definitions of respectively ‘Economic Activity in the Energy Sector’ and ‘Investment’ in Articles 1(5) 
and (6) ECT. 
90 PC Mavroidis, G Bermann and M Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization (WEST Publishing, New 
York 2010) 802 – 819. 
91 GATS Article I.2. 
92 GATS Articles II ‘General Obligations and Disciplines’ and XVII ‘National Treatment’. 
93 See on this issue in particular PC Mavroidis, ‘Chapter 1: Regulation of Investment in the Trade Regime’ in: 
Z Drabek and PC Mavroidis (eds), World Scientific Studies in International Economics: Volume 21, Regulation 
of Foreign Investment – Challenges to International Harmonization (World Scientific, New Jersey 2013) and M 
Molinuevo, Protecting Investment in Services – Investor State Arbitration versus WTO Dispute Settlement 
(Wolters Kluwer: Alphen a/d Rijn 2011). 
94 See for instance G Marceau, ‘The WTO in the Emerging Energy Governance Debate’ in: J Pauwelyn (ed), 






 These are for instance: construction and related engineering services, distribution 





Moreover, since the start of the Doha Round (2001-present), energy services are under 
negotiation as a separate sector under the GATS and sector-specific commitments in energy 
services were made so far by forty-five Members concerning ‘services incidental to 
mining’,
97
 twenty-seven in ‘on-site preparation work for mining’,
98
 eighteen have undertaken 
commitments ‘incidental to energy distribution’,
99
 and twelve Members have undertaken 




It therefore follows that investment in energy services may fall within the scope of GATS 
protection on the basis of Article I.2 (c) Mode 3. This would be the case for those WTO 
Members that have made sector-specific commitments in services relevant to the energy 
sector, or in energy services directly, and to which Mode 3 of supply of services (commercial 
presence) applies.  
 
The rules of conflict of the ECT have not taken this into account adequately, presumably 
since the complete exclusion of the GATS from the ECT left this scenario unforeseen. One 
thing should be noted in this respect, though: The ECT does not provide for pre-
establishment or market access obligations, in contrast to GATS Articles II and XVI.
101
 The 
conflict between the ECT and the GATS is therefore likely to arise in the post-establishment 
phase only.
102
 The result, however, is one of fragmentation: both treaties can apply with 
                                                 
95 However, see WTO, Council for Trade in Services, ‘Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat’, 
Doc S/C/W/52, 9 September 1998 stating on page 1 that ‘the vast majority of the global energy services industry 
is not covered by GATS specific commitments.’ 
96 Energy Services identified by Members in WTO, Council for Trade in Services – Special Session of the 
Council for the Trade in Services, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/S/23 28 
November 2005; See WTO ‘Services Sectoral Classifications List’, Doc MTN.GNS/W/120. 
97 WTO, Council for Trade in Services, ‘Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat’, Doc 
S/C/W/311, 12 January 2010, Central Product Classification (CPC) [883]. 
98 Ibid CPC [5115]. 
99 Ibid CPC [887].  
100 Ibid page 14.  
101 See Articles II (MFN) and XVI GATS (Market Access). 
102 See on this e.g. R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP, Oxford 2008) 
80; Note that Russia wanted to incorporate pre-investment stage protection and thereby mutual consistency with 
the GATS. This was expressed during the phase of first ECT negotiations, see the Chairman's statement at the 




respect to protection of investments in the energy sector. Overlap in issue-area in this 
instance can continue to have an impact when it comes to procedural provisions of the 
treaties: with respect to dispute resolution in energy investments, both the procedures 
provided for the ECT and the WTO could apply. This will be discussed in more detail in 
Section 5.5 below. 
 
5.5. Procedural Overlap: Dispute Settlement in the WTO versus Dispute Settlement in the ECT   
 
Parallel competence concerning the WTO and the ECT occurs in the area of settling trade as 
well as investment disputes as well. The first has been accounted for by ECT rules of 
conflict, the latter has not.
103
 This section will briefly discuss both. 
 
5.5.1. Settlement of Trade Disputes 
An advantage of the institutional function of the WTO is the Dispute Settlement System, 
governed by the rules of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
104
 Article 3.2 of the 
DSU designates the dispute settlement mechanism as a central element in providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system.
105
 Members to the WTO must settle any 
trade dispute among themselves, including the disputes on energy trade that come under 
Article 1 of the DSU, in this exclusive forum.
106
 What this means in practice is that Members 
are in effect precluded from settling their trade disputes elsewhere. The function of this is 
twofold: it provides Members with a multilateral forum for the settlement of their disputes to 
the exclusion of any other and at the same time it prevents them from having recourse to 
unilateral determinations of a breach of WTO law.
107
 Even though the functioning of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
consideration of appropriate amendments to the Treaty pursuant to Article 30 affecting sectors of services 
within the scope of this Treaty to which measures of the GATS apply, and the negotiations towards the 
supplementary investment treaty provided for in Article 10(4), should be conducted in such a manner as to 
assure mutual consistency of the Treaty provisions arrived at. Here again, I am sure that all delegations would 
fully endorse the need to achieve such consistency in the future incorporation in the Treaty of the results of the 
Uruguay Round, and in negotiation of the second Treaty for the pre-investment stage.’ 
103 See Table II, ‘Resolution of Conflict, Issue-Area and Procedural Overlap – A Comparison between the 
WTO and the ECT’ below. 
104 Article III.3 of the Marrakesh Agreement and see the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (n 31). 
105 Article 3.2 DSU (n 31). 
106 See connection with Article 4 ECT. 
107  WTO, In US — Section 301 Trade Act, Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 
1974, WT/DS152/R, adopted 27 January 2000, DSR 2000:II, p. 815, the Panel held that Article 23.1 of the DSU 
(n 31) prescribes “a general duty of a dual nature”: ‘“Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances 




WTO dispute settlement system is not free of criticism, with around five hundred cases 
submitted for resolution in  the nearly twenty years of the WTO’s existence, it is clearly one 
of the WTO’s success stories.
108
 The WTO has witnessed several energy-related disputes 
recently, notably the Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program 
case.
109
 In that case, the Panel and the AB had to resort to what some call ‘legal acrobatics’ in 
order to avoid finding that a scheme aimed at promoting a public good – the underlying feed-




The ECT, on the other hand, provides mechanisms for the settlement of both energy trade and 









 and Environment and Competition
115
 dispute settlement. Concerning energy 
trade dispute settlement and overlap in competence between the WTO and the ECT, the latter 
has taken into account several conflict resolution measures to avoid parallelism and forum 
shopping.
116
 Following Article 4 ECT, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
applies to the resolution of energy trade disputes between ECT Parties who are 
simultaneously WTO Members.
117
 Since the DSU is not available to non-WTO Members, it 
is replaced by a dispute resolution mechanism in Annex D for trade disputes between an 
ECT/WTO Member and a non-WTO ECT Party or a dispute amongst non-WTO ECT 
Parties.
118
 The special mechanism provided for in Annex D of the ECT follows the WTO 
                                                                                                                                                       
the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these 
circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any 
other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one 
could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members’ rights and obligations 
under the DSU.’ 
108 Generally, see D McRae, ‘What is the Future of the WTO Dispute Settlement?’ (2004) 7 Journal of 
International Economic Law 3 and WTO, Chronological list of Disputes Cases 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
109 See supra text to note 57. 
110 See infra Chapter 7; A Cosbey and PC Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial 
Policy and Renewable Energy: the Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) EUI 
Working Paper RSCAS 2014/17, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Global Governance 
Programme – No 82, 9. 
111 Article 27 ECT ‘Settlement of Disputes between Contracting Parties’; this article does explicitly not apply 
to energy trade disputes, see Article 28 ECT. 
112 Article 26 ECT ‘Settlement of Disputes between an Investor and a Contracting Party’. 
113 Article 7.7 ECT ‘Transit’. 
114 Article 29 ECT ‘Interim Provisions on Trade-related Matters’ ECT and Annex D ECT ‘Interim Provisions 
for Trade Dispute Settlement’ ECT. 
115 Articles 6 ECT ‘Competition’ and 19 ECT ‘Environmental Aspects’. 
116 Frasl (n 18) 478. 
117 Article 4 ECT and ECS, Applicable Trade Provisions of the ECT (n 17) viii. 
118 In conjuncture with Article 29(7) ECT. 
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dispute settlement model closely, but it is more informal in nature, meaning less detailed and 
legalistic. For instance, there is no right to appeal in the procedure to Annex D, contrary to 
the DSU.
119
 Nor does the procedure in ECT Annex D provide for automatic adoption of panel 
reports, which have to be adopted by the Energy Charter Conference instead and with no less 




Transit disputes are treated differently from the rules of conflict for ‘regular’ trade disputes 
between the ECT and WTO.
121
 Resolution of transit disputes under the ECT is accounted for 
in Article 7(7) ECT.
122
 It prescribes that in case of an energy transit dispute, ECT parties will 
have recourse to the mechanism under Article 7(7) ECT, after exhausting any other relevant 
contractual remedies between them.
123
 The procedure for dispute resolution itself is 
conciliatory in nature and largely takes place along diplomatic channels, with the 
appointment of a conciliator by the Secretary General of the ECT, who ‘shall seek the 




There is no apparent conflict between Article V GATT and the procedure set out in Article 
7(7) ECT, since the commitment in this Article goes back to what is called the ‘WTO-plus 
nature of the ECT’:
125
 It offers settlement of transit disputes in a way that is not provided for 
by GATT Article V.
126
 As a result, the rights and obligations provided for in Article 7(7) 
ECT go beyond WTO commitments for simultaneous WTO/ECT Members. Article 7(8) ECT 
further emphasises that nothing in Article 7 ECT shall derogate from a Party’s rights and 
obligations under international law including customary international law, existing bilateral 
                                                 
119 As set out in Articles 17 and 20 DSU (n 31), Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement; See additionally Frasl (n 18 
) 479. 
120 Annex D(2)(c) and 4 (c) of the ECT. 
121 See also generally Azaria (n 72). 
122 Article 7(7) ECT. 
123 Ibid; Frasl (n 18) 495; ECS, Trade in Energy (n 17) 37, and Azaria (n 72). 
124 Article 7(7)(b) ECT; Article 7(7)(c) ECT stipulates that ‘Only If within 90 days of his appointment he has 
failed to secure such agreement, he shall recommend a resolution to the dispute or a procedure to achieve such 
resolution and shall decide the interim tariffs and other terms and conditions to be observed for Transit from a 
date which he shall specify until the dispute is resolved.’ 
125 It seems that this was the intention of the ECT travaux preparatoires, see Legal Sub-Group's Report on 
Inter-relationship of the Charter Treaty with the GATT, European Energy Charter, Conference Secretariat, 
Room Document 1, Plenary Session, 14-18 December 1993, Brussels, 14 December 1993, 1; However, note that 
Art 7(7) ECT states that ‘The following provisions shall apply to a dispute described in paragraph (6), but only 
following the exhaustion of all relevant contractual or other dispute resolution remedies previously agreed 
between the Contracting Parties party to the dispute or between any entity referred to in paragraph (6) and an 
entity of another Contracting Party party to the dispute’.  
126 Article V GATT ‘Freedom of Transit’.  
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or multilateral agreements, ergo including Article V of the GATT.
127
 Article 7 ECT, 
including its dispute resolution mechanism, therefore proves to be an elaboration on the 
obligations set out in Article V GATT, with Article V GATT setting the minimum 
standard.
128
 For energy transit disputes between all shades of ECT Membership interaction 
(among ECT/WTO Members, between a ECT/WTO Member and a non-WTO ECT Party and 
among non-WTO ECT parties), the obligations in this Article thus seem to go further than 
those in Article V GATT for energy transit disputes.  
 
5.5.2. Settlement of Investment Disputes 
With regard to the resolution of energy investment disputes in the ECT and WTO, the 
parallelism stemming from issue-are overlap in this field continues to hold in the area of 
dispute settlement. Article 26 ECT provides for Investor-State dispute settlement, while 




The unresolved rules of conflict between energy investment dispute resolution flows from 
overlap between ECT energy investment protection and possible protection of such 
investments through GATS Mode 3, but only where this concerns State to State dispute 
resolution as set out in Article 27 ECT. 
130
 In other words, there may be overlaps and 
conflicts between the dispute settlement mechanisms if they are available to the same parties, 
i.e. States that are simultaneous ECT and WTO Members. Where Article 27 of Part V of the 
ECT offers a route for resolution of such disputes for ECT Members, the DSU arguably 
simultaneously applies to disputes of energy investment protection stemming from violation 
of GATS Mode 3 for WTO Members. This observation theoretically opens up a route for 
forum shopping for WTO/ECT Members in case of an energy investment dispute.  
 
One provision worth mentioning with regard to ECT investment protection in relation to 
other agreements, though, is Article 16 ECT.
131
 The article comes closest to being a conflict 
prevention/coordination tool and is aimed at the instances when one or more Contracting 
                                                 
127 Art 7(8) ECT and Azaria (n 72) 589. 
128 Azaria (n 72) 591, referring to the traveaux preparatoires of the ECT: European Energy Charter Conference 
Secretariat 22.4.94/2647. 
129 Articles 26 and 27 ECT.  
130 See supra Section 5.4.2. 
131 Article 16 ECT ‘Relation to other agreements’. 
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Parties enter or have entered into other international agreements, concerning the subject 
matter of Part III (Investment) or Part V (Dispute Settlement) of the ECT. In essence, the 
provision – in a somewhat cumbersome manner – prescribes that those provisions, which are 





The potential overlap and/or conflict in the narrow sense of private law in this area between 
the WTO and the ECT does not hold true where it concerns GATS Mode 3 dispute resolution 
in the WTO (State to State) versus Investor-State dispute settlement according to Article 26 
ECT. Here, we see the two dispute settlement mechanisms working in parallel rather than in 
conflict with one another, since they do not involve the same parties of or the same applicable 
law, even though the disputes may stem from the same events.
133
 In this case there is a 
fruitful complementarity between the ECT and the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms, 
where both the WTO (for States) and the ECT (for Investors) provide a potential forum for 
redress in the field of energy investment protection.    
5.5.3. Recap: The Nexus between the ECT and the WTO –  A Schematic Overview 
 
By way of overview of this Section, Table II attempts to compare both treaties and identify 
issue-area and procedural overlap between them. It also identifies resolution of conflict 
between the WTO and the ECT, where available. Section 5.6 will subsequently analyse what 
conclusions can be drawn from this when adding the vast changes in Membership to both 
treaty-regimes to the picture.  
 
5.6. The WTO-ECT Relationship Twenty Years Later: Unresolved Issues 
 
One element that stands out in particular after analysing the membership situation is the 
fading relevance of the ECT provisions on energy trade. Above we discussed how the trade 
provisions of the ECT are only applicable between non-WTO Members who are Party to the 
ECT. Because of the large number of accessions to the WTO, this means that these trade 
rules are only applicable between a handful of ECT Parties by 2016 (as opposed to 1998): 
                                                 
132 Ibid. 
133 See, as an interesting analogy to WTO/ECT conflict in dispute settlement, the discussion on conflicting 
judicial decisions and res judicata in investment law and diplomatic protection in M Paparinskis, ‘Investment 
Arbitration and the Law of Countermeasures’ (2008) 79 BYIL 264, 297-298. 
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Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
134
 With the 
exception of Turkmenistan, all these countries are WTO Observers and currently in the 
process of acceding to the WTO. Between all other ECT Parties who already are WTO 
Members, and even between these ECT/WTO Members and non-WTO ECT Parties, GATT 
rules apply, with the abovementioned exceptions.  
 
The fundamental question that arises from this is what will happen to the trade provisions of 
the ECT once all WTO Observers who are ECT Parties have acceded to the Organization? 
Will they become obsolete, with the exception of the ‘WTO-plus’ style provisions such as 
Article 7 ECT on Transit (especially relevant for natural gas)? Will the other trade provisions 
of the ECT still have a legitimate purpose? This remains to be seen.  
 
5.6.1. The Risks of ECT-WTO Tension and Overlap  
 
While the WTO was set-up from the standpoint of creating an optimal long-term governance 
model for international trade regulation, the ECT seems to have been brought into life to deal 
with problems as they arose after the fall of the Iron Curtain. It was these unpredicted 
circumstances that led to the establishment of the ECT and which simultaneously caused 
tension and overlap between the two treaties in the first place.
 135
 It has to be reiterated, 
though, that the WTO and the ECT are not unique in this. Unforeseen developments are often 
the triggers of the creation of new treaty regimes that can contribute to fragmentation in a 
certain field. As mentioned in the introduction, the WTO and ECT are just two instruments, 
which happen to cover a patch of global energy and trade governance and partially overlap in 
doing so. 
 
The main risk of overlap between the WTO and the ECT is evidently one of parallel 
applicability in issue-area and procedure with no clear hierarchy. While introducing ECT 
rules of conflict from the start has averted tension between the main trade provisions between 
WTO and the ECT, certain conflicts remain unresolved even two decades later.  This is a 
problem, because it results in an inefficient system of energy governance. This is particularly 
                                                 
134 See Table I, Figure 2 ‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap (2015)’ as opposed to Figure 1 
‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap (1998)’; Left out are the ECT countries who apply the ECT 
provisionally, or have applied it provisionally in the past: Russia, Belarus, Australia, Iceland and Norway. 
135 Meyer (n 3) 390. 
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harmful when considering the need for a well-functioning trade framework that reflects 
modern energy and sustainable development needs.  
 
A case in point here is the applicability of TRIMS, TRIPS and GATS Agreements of the 
WTO with respect to trade in energy, mentioned in Section 5.4, in parallel with their 
corresponding provisions in the ECT: Article 5 ECT on Trade Related Investment Measures, 
the commitment to provide protection of intellectual property rights in the ECT in the Joint 
Declaration on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, and Article 1(5) ECT covering 
‘Economic Activity in the Energy Sector’.
136
 The tension here has not been solved: TRIMS, 
TRIPS and GATS cover energy goods and services insofar as they fall within the scope of the 
WTO, while the ECT, in its own wording, additionally provides protection in these areas for 
energy sector.  
 
There is no ‘real’ normative conflict between these norms in that they are not contradictory in 
nature and both the WTO and the ECT aim to transmit a similar message: to provide rules on 
trade-related investment measures, intellectual property and trade in services (although it has 
to be kept in mind that they could be interpreted differently by both the WTO and the ECT. 
But the rules on TRIMS, TRIPS and GATS of the WTO and the rules of the same notion in 
the ECT are not in the least identical and might result in significantly diverging results if 
applied in practice.
137
 Instead of an inherent normative conflict, the problem here is that both 
the WTO and ECT are applicable in parallel. Which of the norms prevails? It appears there is 
no straightforward answer in this case. The rules of the ECT have not provided for any 
explicit conflict clauses regarding TRIMS, TRIPS and the GATS and both norms are deemed 
to be ‘equal’. As Pauwelyn suggests in such circumstances, a non liquet may be declared.
138
 
However, if a conflict arises with regard to TRIMS, TRIPS and GATS in the energy sector, it 
is clear that while the rules of the ECT convey the essence of these notions, WTO rules on 
these matters are drafted with more clarity and precision and may be litigated more 
successfully under the DSU. Yet, the fact remains that there is no legal hierarchy regarding 
the application of either treaty. 
                                                 
136 See overview in Table II, ‘Resolution of Conflict, Issue-Area and Procedural Overlap – A Comparison 
between the WTO and the ECT’. 
137 It goes without saying that rules on TRIMS, TRIPS and GATS (n 5) within the WTO are much more 
elaborate that the rules provided on these topics in the ECT. 




Another WTO/ECT overlap, concerning both issue-area and procedure, stems from the 
unresolved parallel applicability of the WTO and the ECT with regard to the protection and 
dispute settlement of energy investments. This overlap is not an exclusive problem of the 
WTO and the ECT, but part of a greater discourse on the gaps and overlaps between trade 
and investment law in general. 
 
While the issue-area overlap with respect to GATS Mode 3 investment protection and Part III 
ECT is subject to the same questions as those with regard to TRIMS, TRIPS and the GATS 
above, the procedural overlap in this particular instance faces a practical issue for countries 
who are simultaneous WTO/ECT Members. Arguably, investments of one WTO Member in 
the energy sector are protected by GATS rules under GATS Mode 3 in the area of another 
WTO Member. But, investments of an ECT Party or an Investor of an ECT Party in the 
energy sector are additionally protected through the rules set out in Part III of the ECT.
139
 
Dispute settlement for States (not Investors) who are WTO/ECT Members would therefore 
appear to be possible under the DSU as well as under Article 27 of Part V of the ECT.
140
 If 
both the WTO and the ECT have competence in resolving disputes concerning energy 
investment disputes, which dispute settlement forum has precedence? Here, there are two 
possible lines of argument, one making the case for prevalence of dispute settlement in the 
WTO over the ECT, and the other vice versa. Nonetheless, neither of these scenarios 
provides conclusive legal answers to the question which treaty-regime should have priority.  
 
With respect to the WTO, one could claim that a dispute in the energy sector, stemming from 
a violation in of the GATS in connection with Mode 3 (commercial presence) should be 
litigated first and foremost between WTO Members before a WTO Panel. A strong argument 
in favour is that the WTO offers an exclusive forum for dispute resolution for its Members 
and they are precluded from going elsewhere. Furthermore, GATS Mode 3 is evidently a part 
of the Agreements of the WTO (namely the GATS), and consequently falls within the 
jurisdiction of WTO Panels.
141
 That being said, GATS Mode 3 has only been one the table in 
                                                 
139 Part III ECT ‘Investment Promotion and Protection’. 
140 Note, however, that in the case of article 26 of the ECT, the Investor would be the litigating party, while 
under the DSU (n 31) it would be a state, namely a WTO Member. 
141 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms (n 26) 443 Article 1.1 DSU (n 31). 
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one WTO dispute so far, namely in China – Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment 




Conversely, there is a case to be made that settling State-to-State energy investment disputes 
through Article 27 ECT has precedence over the WTO. The ECT offers a specialised regime 
for the settlement of energy investment disputes. The view that a specialised regime should 
prevail in this case could coincide with the rules of conflict resolution. What is more, the 
ECT has been used very frequently for such disputes, as opposed to the WTO.
143
  It must 
however be said that contrary to the WTO, there is nothing in the wording of the ECT that 




Another possible solution in such circumstances is to resort to the text of Article 16 ECT, and 
decide which provision of what agreement (WTO or ECT) is more favourable to the case at 
hand.
145
 Nevertheless, again, there is no legal hierarchy with respect to either of these fora, 
making this a clear example where the risks of fragmentation of procedure between the WTO 
and the ECT are obvious, possibly triggering forum shopping. If nothing else, it certainly 
does put the perceived ‘exclusivity’ of the WTO dispute settlement system into question, as a 
parallel route of settlement for energy investment disputes is available through the ECT. 
 
5.6.2. Cooperation and Coordination to Overcome Tension? 
From the above it is obvious that parallel applicability causes some tension between the 
WTO and ECT. But how can these institutions best manage the unsolved conflicts stemming 
from overlap in substance and procedure? This seems difficult to predict and largely depends 
on the course both treaty-regimes aim to take in the future.  
 
                                                 
142 Panel Report, China – Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R and Add.1, 
adopted 31 August 2012, DSR 2012:X, p. 5305 
143 Ibid; In contrast, see the extensive list of dispute settlement cases litigated under the ECT, ‘Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Cases’ <http://www.energycharter.org> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
144 In fact, in case parties to a dispute failed to settle it amicable pursuant to Article 26(1) ECT, Article 26(2) 
ECT gives the Investor three options for submitting the dispute for resolution: ‘(a) to the courts or 
administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party party to the dispute; (b) in accordance with any applicable, 
previously agreed dispute settlement procedure; or (c) in accordance with the following paragraphs of this 
Article [settlement procedure provided for in ECT – author].’ 
145 Article 16 ECT ‘Relation to other agreements’. 
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Nevertheless, in absence of clear rules prescribing how to manage the risks of overlap and the 
ensuing tension between the legal regimes of the WTO and ECT, one can look at the fairly 
straightforward suggestions made in analogy in the somewhat related field of international 
environmental law.
146
 Wolfrum and Matz propose an approach where closer cooperation and 
coordination between overlapping regimes and institutions can contribute to overcoming 
tension.
147
 What is meant here is a broad concept of both terms, and it implies voluntary and 
coordinated action between stakeholders of both institutions.
148
 To make coordination and 
cooperation successful, it seems that both institutions have to have a common objective in 
mind. With regard to the WTO and the ECT this could be a (more) optimal regime to regulate 
economic activity in the energy sector. But fruitful cooperation does not only concern active 
involvement of institutions, for there are two crucial aspects: 1) interaction of States in the 




Increased coordination and closer cooperation between the WTO and the ECT can solve 
existing overlapping competence and conflict more efficiently.
150
 This should not be in the 
form of a one-time event, but has to be part of a continuing process.
151
 In part, this has been 
attempted in the early 2000s, with the Energy Charter Secretariat providing rules of 
coordination for WTO and the ECT. But this alone is not enough: As this chapter has pointed 
out, gaps and overlaps continue to exist. To add to this, conflict resolution between the WTO 
and the ECT based on the ECS guides as it stands now seems quite complex and perhaps 
unnecessarily so.
152
 Table II attempted to draw a drastically simplified picture of overlap 
between the two treaties and their resolution of conflict, yet this has proved not to be light 
exercise.
153
 Perhaps it is not unthinkable that coordination between the two treaty-regimes 
could happen in a simpler manner in the future. 
 
                                                 
146 J Pauwelyn, ‘Fragmentation in International Law’ in: Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008-, online edition 
para 25 citing R Wolfrum and N Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer Verlag, Berlin 
2003) 159-163. 
147 Wolfrum and Matz (n 146) 159-163. 
148 Ibid. 161. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Wolfrum and Matz (n 146) 162. 
151 Ibid. 159. 
152 See ECS, Applicable Trade Provisions of the ECT and ECS, Trade in Energy (n 17). 
153 See Table II, ‘Resolution of Conflict, Issue-Area and Procedural Overlap – A Comparison between the 
WTO and the ECT’. 
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Recently, the WTO and ECT seemed to have made a renewed careful step in the direction of 
increased cooperation and coordination by organising a common conference at the WTO 
Headquarters in Geneva in 2013, focusing on legal problems concerning energy in the WTO, 
the ECT and the interaction of these legal instruments.
154
 This is just the beginning of what 
predictably will be a long journey if both institutions aspire to take trade and regulation of the 
energy sector seriously.  
 
Nonetheless, these modest developments seem to be in line with the recently issued political 
declaration on global cooperation in the field of energy, the 2015 International Energy 
Charter, negotiated under the auspices of the Energy Charter Secretariat in The Hague.
155
 
While this declaration is a soft law instrument and has no legal validity, it is a positive sign 
that ECT members, signatories as well as non-signatories gathered around the table to discuss 
global energy challenges ahead. Its purpose was to produce an updated document to the 
founding document of the ECT, the European Energy Charter, concluded in 1991.
156
 The 
concept of the International Energy Charter ‘aims at enhancing international cooperation in 
order to meet common challenges related to energy at national, regional and international 
levels, including the evolution of global energy architecture.’ 
157
 Additionally, the document 
hints to more cooperation and coordination between multilateral agreements in the field of 
energy. Its signatories have agreed to foster synergies among energy-related multilateral fora 
and stated that they are willing to take full advantage of the expertise of existing international 
organisations in the energy field.
158
 More importantly, for cooperation between the ECT and 
WTO, the Signatories to the 2015 Charter aim to ensure the development of trade in energy is 
consistent ‘[…] with major multilateral agreements such as the WTO Agreement and its 
related instruments […]’.
159
 This goals should be achieved by means of, for instance, 
guaranteeing an open and competitive market for energy products, materials, equipment and 
                                                 
154 WTO, WTO News, ‘Lamy Calls for Dialogue on Trade in Energy in WTO’  
<http://wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl279_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016), and Energy Charter 
Secretariat, ‘Workshop on the Role of Intergovernmental Agreements in Energy Policy - 29 April 2013’ 
 <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=595&L=0> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
155 International Energy Charter, ‘Agreed text for adoption in The Hague at the Ministerial Conference on the 
IEC on 20 May 2015’  
156 The 1991 Energy Charter, also known as the European Energy Charter, was the founding document for the 
Energy Charter Treaty and provides the political foundation for the Charter process.  
157 See Preamble to the text of the 2015 Charter. 
158 Ibid. 
159 See the text of the 2015 International Energy Charter, under Title I – Objectives, para [1].  
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This chapter examined the nexus between two major treaty-based systems relevant for 
governance in the energy sector, the World Trade Organization and the Energy Charter 
Treaty. While the WTO, established in 1995 governs global trade in general, the ECT with 
came into force in 1998, offers a specialized regime for the regulation of the energy sector. 
Both treaties intersect and overlap in several places. The goal of this chapter was to scrutinize 
the origins of the resulting overlap between them and to examine where tension and parallel 
applicability occurs. It has schematized areas of overlap to show where solutions have been 
found and, vice versa, where the conflict has not been solved.  
 
Parts that are prone to the risks of fragmentation are the parallel applicability of the WTO and 
the ECT in the field of TRIMS, TRIPS and GATS. The tension between energy investment 
protection and State-to-State dispute resolution in the ECT vis-à-vis the protection offered to 
such investments in Mode 3 of the GATS presents us with an additional challenge. One 
straightforward way to prevent and overcome conflict in these areas of the WTO and the ECT 





Additionally, the chapter attempted to identify the nature ever-changing nexus between the 
two treaties from integration to one of complementarity. Over the course of roughly two 
decades, significant changes in Membership have taken place (in particular concerning WTO 
Accessions), with far-reaching consequences for both regimes. The future of the ECT trade 
provisions, once all WTO Observers who are simultaneously Party to the ECT accede to the 
WTO, is especially unclear. 
                                                 
160 Ibid. 
161 Wolfrum and Matz (n 146). 
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Nevertheless, with an eye on future energy governance, both treaty regimes would arguably 
highly benefit from increased cooperation, coordination, and perhaps even integration. This 
would be particularly useful considering the ambitions of the ECT – in view of the 2015 
International Energy Charter – to function as a hub in international energy regulation, 
whether with or without involvement of the WTO. Or, alternatively, it would be a helpful 
exercise for the WTO in tackling energy issues more proactively. For this reason, Chapter 8 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. WTO Law and Economics and the Challenge of Restrictive Practices in Energy 
Trade: The Case of the OPEC Cartel 
 
6.1. Introduction 
It is no secret that WTO law at its core has an import bias; focusing on access to markets and 
eliminating import barriers is central to the system.
1
 This can be explained by the fact that the 
original focus of the GATT 1947 was on trade liberalization. For this reason, import barriers 
had to be tackled first and foremost. The question remains, however, why, when tariffs went 
down over the decades, the negotiations did not refocus on export barriers. Nevertheless, the 
result is that the system, as it stands now, still has much weaker commitments on export 
barriers, which are a more vital concern in the energy sector. Consumers understandably want 
access to energy supplies, instead of producers seeking lower import barriers for their energy 
exports.
2
 This is one of the reasons why energy in the form of fossil fuels is different from 
most other traded goods. There are three causes underlying their anomaly: 1) Energy is 
essential for human life and development and fossil fuels are still the main source of energy 
the world relies on; 2) Fossils fuels are unevenly distributed around the world; a relatively 
small group of countries possess large quantities of them, and; 3) The first and second 





It is generally assumed that the policy of free trade contributes to the overall development 
and welfare of nations.
4
 The WTO promotes trade flows through non-discrimination and 
protects producers by eliminating import barriers and facilitating their access to markets. But 
while the WTO through these rules contributes to one pillar of the policy of free trade, the 
                                                 
1 Most articles in the GATT focus on eliminating import barriers and very few discipline barriers on exports. 
One example that illustrates this is the asymmetry between the treatment of import tariffs (GATT Article II) 
versus export tariffs (no equivalent GATT Article). Although export tariffs are increasingly being negotiated, 
they remain much less frequent, see K Bagwell, RW Staiger and AO Sykes, ‘Chapter 3 – Border Instruments’ in 
H Horn and PC Mavroidis (eds), Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law (CUP, Cambridge 2015) 
129. 
2 A recent example that is illustrative of this is how the EU in its negotiations with the US for the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) pushes for the inclusion of a chapter on energy, inter alia to guarantee 
access to US shale gas supplies, see European Commission, EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership – Raw Materials and Energy – Initial EU Position Paper  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/cfm/doclib_results.cfm?docid=151624> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
3 A Sykes, PC Mavroidis and DA Irwin, The Genesis of the GATT (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 179. 
4 The benefit of the policy of free trade is based on David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage; See also 
D Fuller and D Geide-Stevenson, ‘Consensus among Economists Revisited’ (2003) 34 Journal of Economic 
Education 369.    
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WTO does not have rules on another vital pillar of free trade policy that would deal with 
managing market power: competition. The goal of competition rules is rather to protect 
consumers and to prevent firms (e.g. in the energy sector) from abusing their dominant 
position. While competition and antitrust laws exist on national (e.g. US antitrust law) and 
regional level (EU competition law), there are no such rules in the WTO.
5
 Consequently, 
potential abusive practices of global public monopolies – for instance those administered by a 
state or a group of states – will arguably not be caught easily under either national (regional) 




The result is that cartels (e.g. active in the energy sector) can exercise their market power on 
the global level. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC) is the most famous 
public cartel in energy in this respect.
7
 It effectively constitutes an international agreement 
among oil-producing countries. Although times are changing because of the steep decline in 
world oil prices, OPEC has so far succeeded in influencing world oil prices above 
competitive levels to a certain extent.
8
 OPEC behaves in an anticompetitive way and can 
exercise its market power by restricting their petroleum exports through administering quotas 




Because of the absence of competition rules in the WTO it is very difficult for the 
Organization to deal comprehensively with restrictive export practices maintained by public 
                                                 
5 Competition was a topic in the WTO, but its discussions in the Doha context were abandoned, see WTO, 
‘Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy’,  
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016), although some argue 
that the issue should be revisited as one of the future challenges in the context of the WTO, see P van den 
Bossche and W Zdouc, Law and Policy of the World Trade – Texts, Cases and Materials – 3rd Edn (CUP, 
Cambridge 2013) 1019; Note however, that it may in some cases be possible to apply anti-dumping duties 
against anti-competitive behavior by states, as suggested by B Hoekman and M Kostecki, The Political 
Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT to WTO – 3rd Edn (OUP, Oxford 2009) 258; It should also 
be noted that there were rules on completion in the International Trade Organization (ITO), the predecessor of 
the GATT 1947 that never came into being. Nevertheless, Article XXIX GATT (Relation of this Agreement to 
the Havana Charter) keeps the link to the ITO in best endeavours form, GATT 1994: General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) 
6 Nota bene: not all countries have full-fledged antitrust and competition policies in place to begin with.  
7 Public monopolies are maintained by states vis-à-vis private monopolies which are maintained by private 
entities. 
8 RS Pindyck and DL Rubinfeld, Microeconomics – 8th Edn (Pearson, 2013) 478 ff; However, there are many 
things that influence the price of oil and OPEC is not omnipotent: by 2016 it is evident that we are at a shift as 
prices of oil are at an all time low, see e.g. S Dale, ‘The New Economics of Oil’, Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies (October 2015). 




cartels such as the OPEC in the WTO context.
10
 However, although the WTO does not have 
rules on competition, it does have other rules, such as GATT Article XI on the Prohibition on 
Quantitative Restrictions.
11
 This chapter will explore whether restrictive practices in the 
energy sector can be caught by this article, by taking the OPEC cartel as an example. It will 
analyse whether OPEC’s ‘monopolist market power instrument of choice’, namely the 
administration of production quota on petroleum, could be caught under the laws of the 
WTO. To this end, the chapter aims to take into account both the economic and legal 
rationales for functioning of the WTO and OPEC.  
 
First, the chapter will explore to what extent the WTO is about ‘free trade’ only, in section 
6.1. Then, in section 6.2, it will explain the functioning of the OPEC cartel. Section 6.3 will 
discuss OPEC in the WTO context. By looking into the economic rationale and legal 
analysis, section 6.4 will study whether, in absence of WTO competition rules in the WTO, 
OPEC practices could be caught under Article XI.1 of the GATT. 
 
6.2. To What Extent is the WTO About Free Trade? 
6.2.1. The Policy of Free Trade and some Economic Rationales for the GATT  
 
The policy of free trade in international markets aspires to establish open markets by 
eliminating restrictions on imports and exports. At the core of the theory behind the gains 
from free trade, we find the Ricardian model of comparative advantage: One country will 
have a comparative advantage to produce a particular product, while another country will a 
have an advantage producing another product.
12
 The reason for each country’s advantage is 
the extent to which each country is naturally better endowed with the inputs for the 
                                                 
10 Although WTO Members may violate their obligations under the GATT if the they maintain restrictive 
business practices directly attributable to them, see Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer 
Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, p. 1179. 
11 GATT (n 5) Article XI (Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions). 
12 See E Michaud, Trade Theory: The Intuition, Results and Limitations of Major Economic Frameworks (The 
Graduate Institute, Geneva 2015) 4; Also see WTO, World Trade Report 2010, Trade in Natural Resources 
(WTO, Geneva 2010) 80, stating: ‘As far as patterns of trade under imperfect competition are concerned, 
economic theory suggests that the prediction of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theorem – i.e. that countries will 
export goods using the factor with which they are relatively better endowed – also holds true (Lahiri and Ono, 
1995; Shimomura, 1998). This explains why mineral-rich countries tend to export mineral products and import 
manufacturing-intensive products from capital-rich countries. It is worth noting, however, that in the case of 
fully cartelized commodities, the amount each country exports will depend on the production quotas agreed by 
the cartel’s members. Considerations other than comparative advantage may affect decisions on quota 




production of the good in question, meaning that the country will have a lower opportunity 
cost relative to other goods in that country (e.g. lower input costs and/or faster workers).
13
 As 
a result, countries are better off trading in those products in which they have a comparative 
advantage. Simply put, when nations trade, they ideally should specialize and trade in the 




In this model, consumers are better off, although producers may not always be better off (at 
least not in the short term), because they will sometimes have to incur costs if they need to 
switch their production to the more efficient good their country has a comparative advantage. 
This coincides with one of the major reasons for protectionism in international trade -  the 




To understand whether and to what extent OPEC practices run against the rationale of the 
WTO, we first have to understand what the WTO stands for and to what extent it is about free 
trade. As this section will show, the WTO with its policies contributes to the policy of free 
trade. However, not all pillars of free trade, such as competition policy, are provided for by 
the WTO. The section will first explain some economic rationales of the core agreement of 
the WTO, the GATT. It will then zoom out and discuss the WTO’s role in free trade policy.  
6.2.2. Some Economic Rationales of the GATT and the Place of Free Trade Theory Therein 
 
Cornerstone GATT provisions can be viewed through the prism of several indicative, though 
inconclusive, economic theories of trade.
16
 In light of one prevalent theory, that of the 
‘Terms-of-Trade’, core WTO disciplines in essence seek to promote free trade and lower 
trade barriers for its Members, in order to secure a long-term gain of greater economic 
welfare.
17
 Lower trade barriers and improved terms of trade (the price of countries’ exports 
                                                 
13 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 8) 618 ff 
14 Ibid, page. 619. 
15 Ibid, page. 620 and 623. 
16 See generally Chapter 3 - Rationales of the GATT in: Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin (n 3). Although the focus 
of this chapter is to analyse the economic rationale behind the GATT and the prohibition on quotas, economic 
theory of the terms of trade is not the only explanation of why countries enter into trade agreements. Two other 
theories are the Commitment Theory and Foreign Policy Motivations for entering into trade agreements. The 
first theory asserts that multilateral trade agreements can function as a commitment device (both political and 
economical) for governments that allow them to ignore pressure from domestic lobbies to impose trade barriers. 
The latter theory that concerns foreign policy motivations, the objective of the GATT is to set ‘good rules’ to 
promote political stability and provide for an effective system to settle disputes.  
17 Ibid, 177.  
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relative to its imports) expand trade and lead to bigger gains.
18
 This also explains why it is in 
a country’s advantage to join a multilateral trade agreement.  
 
In a nutshell, by cooperating through the conclusion of binding trade agreements and 
reciprocal lowering of trade barriers, countries overcome the risk of an inefficient Nash 
equilibrium, which would be the case if countries were able to unilaterally set their trade 
policies.
19
 According to this theory, a small country that cannot influence the terms of trade 




Bagwell and Staiger have discussed core WTO disciplines in light of the terms of trade 
theory and concluded that non-discrimination and reciprocity (two important elements of the 
GATT) are essential rules for concluding efficient trade agreements.
21
 By entering into 
cooperative trade agreements such as the GATT, countries collectively lower trade barriers 
and overcome disadvantageous externalities that stem from unilateral tariff settings.
22
 GATT 
articles are consequently constructed to promote market access and curtail import barriers, by 
for instance prohibiting quantitative restrictions in Article XI GATT, and by binding import 
tariffs in Article II GATT applied on a Most-Favoured-Nation basis (in accordance with Art I 




The dilemma here is that the terms-of-trade theory as developed by Bagwell and Staiger does 
not account for export-restricting trade practices based on market power. A criticism to this 
theory is one of particular importance to this chapter: Although this is slowly changing, the 
GATT does not constrain the use of export taxes, which can be used to manipulate the terms 
of trade because some countries can exercise market power over their exported goods.
24
 As 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin (n 3) 178; In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a non-
cooperative game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium 
strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy, see e.g. 
MJ Osborne and A Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory (MIT, Cambridge, MA 1994).   
20 Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin, The Genesis of the GATT (n 3) 177. 
21 See generally K Bagwell and RW Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (MIT Press, Boston 
2002); Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin (n 3) 178; K Bagwell and RW Staiger, ‘An Economic Theory of the GATT’ 
(1999) 89 American Economic Review 215; Also see S Charnovitz, ‘Triangulating the World Trade 
Organization’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 28, 34, arguing that the WTO pushes 
economies towards greater efficiency. 
22 Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin, The Genesis of the GATT (n 3) 178. 
23 GATT (n 5) Article I (Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment) and II (Schedules of Concessions).  
24 Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin, The Genesis of the GATT (n 3) 179, in particular notes 4 ff: ‘For example, it is 




will become clear in the course of this chapter, this criticism is particularly valid when we are 
looking at the present case of production quotas and OPEC. Although import tariffs are 
normally a much stronger tool to influence the terms of trade, with respect to certain 
products, such as petroleum, export taxes prove to be a much more imperative tool.
25
 The 
GATT does almost nothing to constrain export-related measures; the emphasis of its 
regulatory thrust is on the free flow of imports.
26
 However, export taxes, for example, can be 
a powerful instrument of manipulation for governments who have market power over certain 
goods, a practice frequently utilized when it comes to energy.  
 
It follows that countries in possession strategic natural resources can – to a certain extent – 
unilaterally influence the terms of trade.
27
 This conflict stems from the difference between 
natural resources and manufactured types of goods. In most trade disputes involving 
manufactured goods, an importing country generally seeks to restrict foreign imports.
28
 In 
contrast, when it comes to energy, most importing countries want access to energy from 
foreign suppliers. Exporting countries, on the other hand, may be reluctant to allow their 
resources to flow freely to other nations and might apply restrictions on fossil fuels 
production and exports to increase their income. At times, the restrictions on exports are 
achieved through the application of export taxes.
29
 In other words, there appears to be a 
market access bias in the WTO, i.e. the goal is to reduce import barriers between nations, 
while in global energy trade, the problem is export taxes and export restrictions. This 
consequently results in free trade distorting practices in energy trade.  
                                                                                                                                                       
and oil, Chile and Copper, Morocco and phosphates, Russia and South Africa and gold and diamonds’. Note 
however, that export taxes are increasingly becoming a subject of negotiation, though very few countries have 
bound export taxes in their national schedules of concessions.  
25 Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin, The Genesis of the GATT (n 3) 180. 
26 Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin, The Genesis of the GATT (n 3) 179. See also generally for an economic analysis 
of this critique WJ Ethier, ‘Politcal Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World’ (2004) 12 
Review of International Economics 303; Although absent for decades, it must be mentioned that 
acceding/recently acceded member have in some instances bound their export taxes and negotiation rounds, 
showing that there was a need for this. For instance, in some other sectors, Russia consented to bind and reduce 
its export duties (i.e. on lumber, fish, crabs and leather), however, on raw mineral materials and fuels Russia 
reserved its right to continue applying export taxes, see Accession Protocol: WT/L/839 and WT/MIN(11)/27 (22 
August 2012) 
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2 
(17 November 2011). 
27 Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin, The Genesis of the GATT (n 3) 179. 
28 World Trade Report 2010 (n 5) 48. 
29 Ibid, and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade Agreements, Petroleum 
and Energy Policies, UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/9, (United Nations, New York and Geneva 2000) 15 stating: ‘It is 
evident that an import policy for petroleum products is determined primarily by energy needs; hence, tariffs or 
import duties have a more important role as revenue tools than as instruments of trade policy. This explains to a 




The economic theory of the Terms of Trade is not the only explanation of why countries 
enter into trade agreements. Two other theories are the Commitment Theory and Foreign 
Policy Motivations for entering into trade agreements.
30
 The former theory asserts that 
multilateral trade agreements can function as a commitment device (both political and 
economic) for governments that allow them to ignore pressure from domestic lobbies to 
impose trade barriers.
31
 According to the latter theory, the objective of the GATT is to set 
‘good rules’ to promote political stability and provide for an effective system to settle 
disputes.
32
 Once again, these theories for the rationales of the GATT are not conclusive and 
arguably, evidence can be found for all three. However, from the way the GATT was set up, 




6.2.3.  The WTO and Free Trade 
 
The theories set out above give us some insight into why countries join multilateral trade 
agreements, the GATT in particular. However, they leave the question of what the actual goal 
of the WTO is unanswered. Can one simply state that the reason for the WTO’s existence 
(and its core agreements such as the GATT) is to promote free trade? Yes, and no. 
 
The WTO Preamble states with regard to the purpose of the Organization: 
'Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should 
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and 
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing 
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange 
of goods’ 
[…] 
‘Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs 
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international trade relations […]’
34
  
                                                 
30 See sections 3.2 and 3.3 in Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin, The Genesis of the GATT (n 3). 
31 Ibid, 184. 
32 Ibid, 188 
33 The regulation of subsidies and antidumping to some extent run contrary to these principles and can be seen 
as political compromises rather than making sense in the eyes of economists.  
34 WTO, Preamble to the WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994); For a topical debate, see K Jones, ‘Towards a New 
WTO: An Institutional Approach’ VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal (30 November 2015) 




While the WTO with its rules on non-discrimination and elimination of trade barriers 
contributes to the policy of free trade, it lacks rules on competition that can discipline the 
abuse of dominant players in the market. Although competition policy was discussed in the 
WTO in the context of the Doha round, it was abandoned soon thereafter.
35
 It is thus evident 
that the Organization does not deal with free trade policy comprehensively as it do not cover 
the competition element of free trade policy. 
 
Additionally, as we have seen above, the policy of free trade promotes countries to trade in 
what they have the comparative advantage in. This way, all countries are better off. To 
achieve this in practice, it is in the interests of these countries to lower any obstacles to trade, 
i.e. trade barriers. While the WTO aims to do this, it would be incorrect to say that the 
rationale of the WTO is to promote free trade only. Although the WTO can be seen as a ‘free 
trade agreement in spirit’, it is interesting to notice that none of the WTO agreements 
mentions the term ‘free trade’. Nor does the WTO identify itself as a ‘Free Trade’ 
Institution.
36
 In fact, in its own words the WTO says: 
 
‘The WTO is sometimes described as a “free trade” institution, but that is not entirely 
accurate. The system does allow tariffs and, in limited circumstances, other forms of 
protection. More accurately, it is a system of rules dedicated to open, fair and 
undistorted competition. 
 
The rules on non-discrimination — MFN and national treatment — are designed to 
secure fair conditions of trade. So too are those on dumping (exporting at below cost 
to gain market share) and subsidies. The issues are complex, and the rules try to 
establish what is fair or unfair, and how governments can respond, in particular by 





It goes on to explain that the theory of comparative advantage lays out that ‘countries prosper 
first by taking advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what they produce best, 




                                                 
35 See supra text to note 5. 
36 See WTO website, ‘Principles of the World Trading System’  
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid; This is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem (‘A capital-abundant country will export the capital-
intensive good, while the labor-abundant country will export the labor-intensive good’). 
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Nevertheless, the Organization in fact carefully avoids associating itself with explicitly. It 
rather talks about ‘open trade’, ‘freer trade’ and ‘liberal trade policies that allow the 
unrestricted flow of goods and services’, instead.
39
 Note also, that the GATT Membership 
could have easily opted for calling the WTO the ‘Free Trade Organization’, which is not the 
case. 
 
The reasons for this are manifold. First of all, one could argue that the WTO is not only about 
the promotion of free trade flows. It is also about providing countries with a negotiation 
platform and a dispute settlement mechanism in the field of trade. Next, the WTO may also 
be viewed as an instrument to keep potential violators in check, thereby preventing them 
from overcoming an inefficient Nash equilibrium. Concerning the policy of free trade itself, 
while it may be a long-term goal of the Organization, it is not the only one. This may also 
explain why discussing competition policy in the WTO has been unsuccessful so far. To 
implement full blown free trade as it would exist in theory may simply be too much to ask of 
countries and their national lobbies, at least in the short term.  
 
Taking into account that the WTO already extensively reaches into the national policies of 
countries it should not take over the sovereign state completely. Hence, the objectives of the 
WTO have to remain realistic and we have to accept that there is only so far one can go with 
the unlimited promotion of free trade. There must have been a strong political rationale not to 
link the WTO to free trade explicitly, although the trade instruments promoted by the system 
all point in the direction of liberalization. It is important to keep these ‘limitations’ of the 
WTO (if one wants to label it like this) in mind when looking into production quotas and the 
WTO in the context of OPEC policies below. 
 
6.3. Understanding the OPEC Cartel and Its Anticompetitive Effects 
6.3.1. The Policies and Economics behind OPEC: An Overview 
 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (hereafter: OPEC) was founded in the 
1960’s to coordinate the petroleum policies of its members.
40
 Its original objective was 
                                                 
39 See WTO, ‘The Case for Open Trade’ <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm> 
(accessed 27 March 2016).  
40 See generally ‘Chapter 26 – OPEC and the Surge Plot’ and ‘Chapter 31 – OPEC’s Imperium’ in: D Yergin, 




strongly tied to the struggle of former colonies to regain control over their countries’ oil 
resources and the emergence of the UN Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources.
41
 OPEC thus rather started out as a combination of produces – an oligopoly if you 
like – of oil exporting countries. At the beginning, OPEC was not actively involved in setting 
quota on the production of oil (through which it can exercise its market power on the global 
energy market). It started consciously influencing the price of petroleum only later, during 
the oil crisis in the 1970s. Since 1987, it has been administering a downright production 
quota system.
42
 The Organization’s self-proclaimed mission is: 
 
‘To coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure 
the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular 
supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on 




OPEC’s existence is based on a statute, by which its members entered into a binding 
international agreement.
44
 From an international law perspective the OPEC statute can be 
seen as an international agreement. OPEC has the status of an intergovernmental organization 
headquartered in Vienna.
45
 There are 13 OPEC Members at present: Algeria, Angola, 
Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates and Venezuela.
46
 Two countries, Indonesia and Gabon, initially left the 
Organization after its establishment because they seized to be net-exporters of oil. However, 
the former reactivated its membership on 1 January 2016, while the latter remains an 
observer to OPEC to this day.
47
  There are six other associate observer countries that produce 
substantial amounts of petrol but are not OPEC Members: Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Mexico, 
                                                                                                                                                       
meeting held on September 14, 1960 in Baghdad, Iraq, by five Founder Members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and Venezuela. It was registered with the United Nations Secretariat on November 6, 1962 (UN 
Resolution No 6363) <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/index.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
41 Chapter 31, Yergin (n 40) and UNGA Res 1803 (XVII) (18 December 1962) ‘Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources’; See infra Section 6.6.1 for discussion on permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
42 F Chalabi, Oil Policies, Oil Myths – Analysis and Memoir of an OPEC ‘insider’ (IB Tauris, London, New 
York 2010) 215. 
43 See Article 2 (Our Mission) of the Statute of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC 
Statute), 1 May 1965, 443 U.N.T.S. 427, 4 ILM 1175. 
44 On the basis of Article 2.1(a) and Article 5 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 27 
January 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT). 
45 Article 5 OPEC Statute (n 43). 





Norway, Russia and Sudan.
48
 Their status allows them to sit in OPEC meetings.
49
 OPEC 
Members hold the vast majority of the world’s oil reserves (about 80 per cent) and produce 
around 40 per cent of crude oil on the global market.
50
 The largest shares of OPEC’s reserves 




In contrast to its earlier years, OPEC actively manages its supply of oil since the end of the 
eighties, thereby influencing the price on the world market to the maximum of its abilities.
52
 
What this means in practice is that OPEC administers a production quota on crude petroleum 
amongst its members.
53
 It decides how much oil is extracted from the ground, at what rate 
and when. It regularly reassesses and readjusts the ceiling at its biannual Ministerial 
Conference, where the Minsters of Oil, Mines and Energy of its Members meet and decide on 
the Organization’s output level. They base any adjustments on current and anticipated market 
developments. Each OPEC Member has one vote and the Organization operates on the basis 
of unanimity. Generally speaking, when the quota is increased, the world price drops and vice 
versa. Overall, the price of crude oil is volatile and fluctuating; it is at a record low of around 
$ 30 per barrel at present.  
 
The economics behind OPEC policies prove to be complex and non-transparent, not in the 
least because a fine balance has to be maintained.
54
 What is clear is that on the one hand, 
OPEC does not want the price of oil to be too high, as consumers would likely shift to other 
                                                 
48 See United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy Data and Analysis (BETA) 
<http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/> and International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Atlas (Oil) 
<http://energyatlas.iea.org/?subject=-1920537974> (both accessed 27 March 2016). 
49 See OPEC Statute (n 43), Article 11.D and Article 7.D: ‘A net petroleum-exporting country, which does not 
qualify for membership under paragraph C above, may nevertheless be admitted as an Associate Member by the 
Conference under such special conditions as may be prescribed by the Conference, if accepted by a majority of 
three-fourths, including the concurrent vote of all Founder Members.’ 
50 See OPEC, ‘Share of Crude Oil Reserves, 2014’ <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm> 
(accessed 27 March 2016). 
51 Ibid. 
52 See Dale (n 8); World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 6, stating: ‘While it is true that OPEC’s member countries 
do voluntarily restrain their crude oil production in order to stabilise the oil market and avoid price 
fluctuations, they do not set prices. However, given that OPEC countries produce about 40 percent of the 
world’s oil and about 50 percent of the oil traded internationally, any decisions to increase or reduce 
production may lower or raise the price of crude oil.’ 
53 OPEC is by no means the only energy cartel globally, while it surely is the most well known public energy 
cartel. The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) <www.gecf.org> (accessed 27 March 2016) is similar to 
OPEC and made up of the world’s leading gas producers (Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, 
Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela – partially overlapping membership with 
OPEC). Another major gas monopolist is Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy company. 
54 See WTO website, Research and Analysis, ‘Oil Price Volatility: Origins and Effects’  
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201002_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
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(perhaps cleaner) means of energy. This issue touches upon the measure of price elasticity of 
demand.
55
 On the other hand, OPEC does not want the price of oil to be too low either, since 
it wants to ensure it extracts the maximum revenues for its crude oil. Behaving as a 
monopolist, OPEC therefore aims to attain the equilibrium between supply and demand that 
serves its economic interest. What adds to the non-transparency of OPEC’s practices is the 
fact that the quotas it administers and the distribution thereof amongst its Members are not 
made public and up for speculation.
56
 The anticompetitive effects of OPEC production quotas 




                                                 
55 Price elasticity of demand (PED or Ed) is a measure used in economics to show the responsiveness, or 
elasticity, of the quantity demanded of a good or service to a change in its price. More precisely, it gives the 
percentage change in quantity demanded in response to a one percent change in price (i.e. holding constant all 
the other determinants of demand, such as income); The price elasticity of demand for oil remains relatively 
inelastic, around -0.4, as there are few direct substitutes. 
56 The internal politics behind OPEC production quotas are generally influenced by the economic needs of its 
Members. Allegedly, several members have pushed for reductions in production quota to increase the price of 
oil and thus their own revenues. However, this conflicts with Saudi Arabia's stated long-term strategy of being a 
partner with the world's economic powers to ensure a steady flow of oil. Behind this policy is in part the Saudi 
concern that expensive oil or supply uncertainty will drive developed nations to conserve and develop 
alternative fuels, see e.g. NA Owen, OR Inderwildi and DA King, ‘The Status of Conventional World Oil 
Reserves: Hype or Cause for Concern?’ (2010) (38) Energy Policy 4743–4749; A Al-Naimi, ‘Saudi Oil Policy: 
Stability with Strength’ (Saudi Embassy, 20 October 1999) and P Waldman, ‘Saudi Arabia's Plan to Extend the 
Age of Oil’ Bloomberg News (12 April 2015) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-12/saudi-
arabia-s-plan-to-extend-the-age-of-oil> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
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Figure 1: The OPEC Oil Cartel (Source: RS Pindyck and DL Rubinfeld, Microeconomics – 
8th edn) 
 
In this figure, TD is the world demand for oil and Sc is the competitive, non-OPEC oil supply 
curve (i.e. what the market would look like without any production quota intervention). 
Where the two meet, one would encounter a free-market equilibrium between the demand 
and supply of oil. Note that MCOPEC is OPEC’s Marginal Cost curve, indicating that OPEC 
has much lower production costs than non-OPEC oil producers.
57
 QOPEC is OPEC’s 
production quota, through which production remains artificially low, and the demand and 
price artificially high (P*). If OPEC did not maintain a production quota as a cartel, the price 
would be set at Pc.
58
   
 
OPEC is a ‘successful’ cartel, meaning that it can exercise its market power (at least it has 
been able to do so until recently). What does this mean? In economics, cartels are usually 
defined as an international group of producers that collude and agree to cooperate on output 
levels and prices.
59
 Not all the producers of the cartelized product in question need to join the 
cartel for it to be successful. There are two main conditions for a cartel to be effective. First, 
enough producers need to join the cartel and adhere to the agreement they made. Second, the 
market demand for the product in question (here: petroleum) should be sufficiently inelastic, 




OPEC satisfies both of these conditions and can thus be relatively easily identified as a ‘well-
functioning’ cartel. While OPEC does not control world oil production completely, its 
contribution and influence is significant enough as its Members unite to avoid competition 
                                                 
57 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 8) 478. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 8) 477-478 ff. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a cartel as: An association of 
manufacturers or suppliers with the purpose of maintaining prices at a high level and restricting competition. 
Oxford Dictionary, Online edition. However, some argue that OPEC’s behaviour is much less collusive than a 
full cartel, see e.g. M Ruta and AJ Venables, WTO, Staff Working Paper ERDS-2012-07, March 2012, (WTO, 
Economic Research and Statistics Division) 21. 
60 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 8) 477-478; See also, World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 104: ‘Higher oil prices do 
not stimulate global production in the near future because the short-run price elasticity of oil supply is near 
zero (i.e. oil supply is not very responsive to price changes in the short-run). At the same time, in the case of oil, 
there is no evidence to suggest that, on the supply side, the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries 





 It should be mentioned that players (in this case countries) that are not 
part of a cartel might still support the existence of the cartel since they can profit from the 
high price that the cartels members agree upon, undercutting that price by just a little.  
 
OPEC is a state-led cartel, i.e. what we call a ‘public monopoly’. This is contrary to a private 
cartel.
62
 Additionally, OPEC Members trade in a vital good for which the market demand is 
quite inelastic and for which the demand is predicted to last for a long time (unless other 
forms of energy become so competitive that the demand for crude petroleum will halt 
altogether, something OPEC tries to delay with its policies). At present, prices are not high 
enough to make consumers switch to another form of energy (quite to the contrary), but the 
price is clearly higher than it would be if the demand and supply of oil was determined only 
by the market. It could be argued that fossil fuel cartels such as OPEC have a larger chance of 
being successful cartels, since they generally have little fear of losing market power, even in 
the longer run. Lastly, they have a dominant position possessing strategic resources (oil 




Nevertheless, an important caveat is in place here: OPEC is by no means the only state-led 
energy cartel on the global stage.
64
 Nor is energy the only sector where global monopolies 
and restrictive practices occur.
65
 One could think of raw materials (at play in the China-Raw 
Materials and China-Rare Earths disputes) and other natural resources and commodities such 
as copper and diamonds.
66
 In fact, it is safe to assume that natural resources for which there is 
a high demand are the goods in respect of which restrictive practices and corresponding 
                                                 
61 T Carey, ‘Cartel Price Controls vs.  Free Trade: A Study of Proposals to Challenge OPEC’s Influence in the 
Oil Market through WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2009) 24 American University International Law Review 786, 
789. 
62 A distinction is drawn between public and private cartels. In the case of public cartels, the government may 
establish and enforce the rules relating to prices, output and such other matters. While the private versus public 
monopoly divide may be insignificant to economists, it is important to lawyers in order to understand what type 
of laws apply to the situation in question: public cartels are often ‘allowed’, i.e. there are no laws constraining 
them. Private cartels, on the other hand, in most jurisdictions are viewed as contrary to antitrust laws. 
63 However, demand may shift to other products, such as natural gas (think of shale gas discoveries in the US).  
64 See above (n 53) e.g. the Gas Exporting Countries Forum.  
65 One could think of the CIPEC Copper cartel (Chile, Peru, Zambia and Congo), diamonds (Angola and 
Congo, de Beers), international shipping conferences <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3311> 
(accessed 27 March 2016), just to name a few. See also on this issue KJ Dogaheh, Integrating Energy into the 
World Trading System: Law and Policy (PhD Law University of Warwick, 2007) 73. 
66 See generally M Ruta and AJ Venables ‘International Trade in Natural Resources: Practice and Policy’, Staff 
Working Paper ERSD-2012-07 (March 2012), WTO, Economic Research and Statistics Division. 
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market powers are exercised most often.
67
 The reason for this undoubtedly is their uneven 
distribution and the fact that the endowed states have a full control over their extraction from 
the ground. It is also these natural resources sectors where the import bias of the WTO is felt 
most acutely.
68
 As OPEC is one of the best-known and biggest energy cartels globally, 
however, it serves as a good example for restrictive practices in this sector.  
 
That being said, OPEC’s restrictive practices are obviously quite understandable from the 
viewpoint of OPEC Members and the position of market power they are in. If a country has 
an abundance of highly desired natural resources (and possibly a lack of other competitive 
sectors), it is logical that the country or the group of countries in question want to extract the 
maximum amount of benefit from these resources. Yet, there can be a flip side to such 
policies: For some OPEC Members, oil revenues are of such vital importance for their 
economic development, that they are arguably subject to what is known as the ‘natural 
resource curse’.
69
 This notion implies that an abundance of natural resources may rather be a 
curse than a blessing and a cause for poor economic growth in the long run.
70
 Such situations 
tend to occur when other industries of a country become less competitive on world markets 
because of the heavy reliance on the revenues on the natural resource in question.  
 
6.3.2. Production Quota: Definition and Economic Effect 
 
This section will briefly explain why the production quota that OPEC administers are 
inefficient by looking into the definition and welfare effects of production quotas (the 
‘market power instrument of choice’ of OPEC). In economics, a production quota is the goal 
for a production of a good: It simply determines the amount of it that can be produced. A 
company, government or an organization (or, in the case of OPEC, a combination of the last 
                                                 
67 See WTO, Quantitative Restrictions Database, for export restrictions on natural resources  
<http://qr.wto.org/Private/Welcome.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fReports%2fHome.aspx&lang=en>  
(accessed 27 March). 
68 Ruta and Venables (n 66). 
69 See e.g. ML Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton 
University Press 2013). 
70 J Sachs and AM Warner found that ‘one of the surprising features of modern economic growth is that 
economies with abundant natural resources have tended to grow less rapidly than natural-resource-scarce 
economies’, see ‘Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth’, (1995) NBER Working Paper Series – 
Working Paper 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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two in the form of an intergovernmental organization) may set a production quota, which 
they in turn may apply to a certain industry, company or worker.  
 
Quotas can be set high to encourage production, or they can be set low to control and restrict 
the supply of goods, with the aim of maintaining a certain price level. To force the price up 
for the product in question, the quota will often be below the “market clearing level”, i.e. 
below the demand of the market for the good in question.
71
 Another, indirect, way of 
achieving the same effect would be to provide financial incentives to an industry to curb 
production (for example, in the form of price support) rather than by maintaining an outright 
production quota.
72
 The welfare effects and the deadweight loss of the administration of 
production quotas in the form of supply restrictions are illustrated in the graph below. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Welfare Effects of a Production Quota (Source: RS Pindyck and DL Rubinfeld, 
Microeconomics – 8th edn) 
 
In order to drive the prices up, an entity (such as the government or OPEC), can restrict the 
supply of a good by setting the production Quota at Q1 rather than at the market clearing 
                                                 
71 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 8) 333-334. 
72 M Parkin, M Powell and K Matthews, Economics – 7th Edn (Pearson Education, 2008) 134; Also see 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 8) 332. 
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level Q0, where the market demand would determine the product’s production. This 
restrictive practice makes sure that the supply curve and the price of the product goes up to 
S1. The consumer surplus of the product is reduced by rectangle A and triangle B, because 
the consumers that do buy the good pay a higher price (A). Additionally, some consumers 




Producers that are subject to a production quota gain rectangle A, because they are now 
selling at a higher price, but they lose triangle C, because their output levels are now Q1 
rather than Q0. The overall deadweight losses compared to a free trade equilibrium are thus B 
and C. For an incentive like this to work in the producers’ benefit, it must be at least B, C and 
D combined, which would have a higher profit as its effect. The cost for the government or 
organization to maintain a production quota is thus at least B, C and D, because they will 
have to provide a financial incentive (i.e. subsidy) to curb producers’ output.
74
  
In conclusion, maintaining a production quota will always mean extra costs and therefore 
losses for a government and indirectly,  consumers.
75
 In this sense, it could be argued that a 
production quota that is applied with a goal to raise the price of a product is in theory 
contrary the notion of free trade, because it can restrict imports or exports.  
 
It cannot be reiterated enough, however, that in essence, every manufactured product is 
subject to a production quota one way or another, as there is no manufacturing process with 
unlimited output. Preferably, though, the quota of production and supply of a good would be 
determined by market demand. What is the benefit of applying a production quota, then, if 
the costs are so high? One explanation is that there are powerful lobbies that are in control of 
or own the product in question (as is arguably the case with OPEC and crude petroleum). It is 
in their interest to keep the price and their incomes high. In the national context, this could be 
influential companies or families lobbying the government to apply a production quota.
76
 In 
the international context, these are the ‘successful’ international cartels that can operate 
without too many restrictions and thus exercise their market power on the global level. 
6.3.3. OPEC Production Quota Are Against the ‘Competition Pillar’ of Free Trade Policy 
 
                                                 
73 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 8) 334. 
74 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 8) 333-334. 
75 Ibid, 335. 
76 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 8) 338 and 340. 
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From OPEC’s intervention in the petroleum market, it becomes clear that is not just the 
market forces of free trade that determine the global supply and demand for crude oil. The 
Organization’s objective is not free trade for mutual benefit, but rather restricting production 
and trade in petroleum to raise the price in the interest of its Members.
77
 Consequently, 
OPEC can exercise its market power to a certain extent through administering production 
quotas, thereby influencing the world price of oil to its advantage. The Organization itself is 
not secretive of this intention: OPEC’s policies are openly and explicitly tailored to control 
the production, and by that means the demand and price, of crude oil.
78
 Consequently, it can 
be safely asserted that OPEC functions in an anticompetitive manner and its polices are 
therefore not in line with the ‘competition pillar’ of free trade policy. 
 
6.4.  OPEC in the WTO Context 
This section discusses OPEC’s status in the WTO and the interaction of some individual 
OPEC Members with the WTO. 
6.4.1. The Status of OPEC in the WTO 
 
6.4.1.1. International Organisations: Two modes of involvement with the WTO 
It is possible to distinguish two ‘modes’ of interaction for intergovernmental organizations 
(IOs) with the WTO. First of all, there is an extensive list of organizations working with the 
WTO. ‘Working with’ ought to be interpreted broadly here and can range from mere informal 
contacts and information sharing with other IOs, to having joint projects and programmes.
79
 
OPEC is listed as an Intergovernmental Organization ‘working with’ the WTO, but only in 
the context of the Committee on Trade and Environment.
80
 
                                                 
77 OPEC is open about this, as becomes clear from its Article 2 of its Statute (n 43). 
78 Ibid. 
79 See WTO website, ‘Intergovernmental Organizations working with the WTO Secretariat’  
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/igo_divisions_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
80 Ibid; This is interesting because it shows that the observer status was (obviously) strongly supported by 
individual OPEC States, see statements made by representatives in the Committee on Trade and Development, 
‘Report of the Committee on Trade and Development’, WT/COMTD/M/29 (14 November 2000) para 
8;‘(Nigeria) He said that OPEC had also applied to the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), and that 
by applying to both the CTD and the CTE, it wished to correct the impression that it was only concerned with 
price and quota fixing, which were the most visible parts of its activities.  He said that OPEC was also seriously 
concerned with the environmental impact of oil resources, as well as the equilibrium between oil producers and 
oil exporters. OPEC therefore sought ad hoc Observer Status with the CTD and the CTE, in order to benefit 
from the work of the Committees in these areas.  He said that the Nigerian delegation strongly supported the 
application by OPEC for ad hoc Observer Status, and called on members to give the application favourable 
consideration.’; And paras 16-13: ‘The representative of Venezuela put on record his country's support of the 





The second mode of interaction is a more intense form of cooperation: IOs can also obtain an 
official Observer Status (hereafter: OS) with the WTO. The purpose of this status is to enable 
these organizations to follow discussions in the WTO, which are on matters of direct interest 
to them.
81
 The basis for OS for IOs is Article V of the Marrakesh Agreement, stating that ‘the 
General Council shall make appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other 




The guidelines for obtaining and exercising this status are taken up in Article 11 of Chapter 
IV and Annex 3 of the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and 
Meetings of the General Council.
83
 OS requests are considered from organizations which 
have ‘a competence and a direct interest in trade policy matters, or which, pursuant to 
paragraph V:1 of the WTO Agreement, have responsibilities related to those of the WTO.’
84
 
Interested IOs can make a request to a particular WTO body, except for meetings of the 




In case the WTO has entered into a formal arrangement for cooperation with an organization, 
these IOs may also be granted OS with the WTO, if so provided for by the agreement 
between them.
86
 This option reveals there may be some overlap between the two categories 
of Organizations ‘working with’ the WTO and official IO Observers. For instance, the WTO 
has concluded agreements or Memoranda of Understanding with a number of 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, International 
Telecommunication Union, World Organization on Animal Health (OIE), World Bank, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
helping Members analyse the new dimensions of development which the WTO was reviewing. He said that 
OPEC was in fact reviewing its own role, and he believed that granting ad hoc Observer Status to the OPEC 
would enhance debates on questions related to development in the WTO.’  
81 WTO website ‘International intergovernmental organizations granted observer status to WTO bodies’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016) and WTO, Rules of 
Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference, ‘Guidelines on Observer Status for International 
Organizations’ WT/L/161 (25 July 1996) Annex 3, Number 1. 
82 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, Article V.1 (Relations with Other Organizations) Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO. 
83 ‘Guidelines on Observer Status for International Organizations’ (n 82) Article 11: ‘Representatives of 
international intergovernmental organizations may attend the meetings as observers on the invitation of the 
Ministerial Conference in accordance with the guidelines in Annex 3 to these Rules. In combination with Annex 3.’ 
84 Ibid; Number 2, Annex 3. 
85 Ibid; Number 3, Annex 3. 
86 Ibid; Number 6, Annex 3. 
 
 158 
the World Intellectual Property Organization.
87
 An interesting element further is that 





After the WTOs establishment in 1995, the General Council first granted Observer Status to 
seven international intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations, 
UNCTAD, IMF, the World Bank, FAO, WIPO, and the OECD, after which it extended this 
status to the IMF and the World Bank in connection with its cooperation agreements.
89
 
Finally, the International Trade Centre (ITC) representative is invited to sit in meetings; since 
the organization is a joint product of the WTO and UNCTAD the official granting of OS was 
deemed redundant.
90
 So far, no other IOs (including OPEC) have been granted observer 
status.
91
 The next section will briefly discuss OPEC’s unsuccessful attempts to become a 
WTO IO Observer. 
 
6.4.1.2. OPEC Attempts in Obtaining WTO Observer Status 
 Since the late nineties, OPEC has sought more solid forms of cooperation and repeatedly 
requested Observer Status with the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Development since the 
late nineties.
92
 The request was often made in conjunction with that of the League of Arab 
                                                 
87 See the WTO Analytical Index commentary under a) to Article V.1 of the Marrakesh agreement and 
respectively documents WT/L/195, S/C/11, WT/L/272, WT/L/195, IP/C/6. 
88 ‘Guidelines on Observer Status for International Organizations’ (n 82) Number 10, Annex 3; Note that for 
session for the ministerial conference, this period is two years. Although there are exceptions, some members 
have permanent observer status, e.g. in its meetings of 7 February 1997, the General Council granted this 
observer status to the United Nations, UNCTAD, FAO, WIPO, and the OECD (WT/GC/M/18).  
89 See WTO docs WT/GC/M/3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 17. The General Council, upon the recommendation of the 
Preparatory Committee, extended ad hoc observer status to the UN, UNCTAD, IMF and the World Bank for the 
first General Council meeting (WT/GC/M/1); In subsequent meetings, WIPO, FAO, and the OECD were 
extended the same invitation.  
276. With respect to the Agreement with the IMF, see (WT/L/195), Annex I, para. 6; With respect to the 
Agreement with the World Bank, see (WT/L/195), Annex II, para. 5. 
90 Ibid. 
91 However, consultations have been held concerning the pending requests of intergovernmental organizations 
for observer status in the General Council, see Section II of WT/GC/W/51/Rev.10; Intergovernmental 
organizations have also been accorded observer status at various Ministerial Conferences (But interestingly, 
OPEC is not mentioned there).  
92 See for instance Report of the Committee on Trade and Development (n 80) para 8 and paras 16-23; 





 However, two WTO Members (the United States and Israel) have, until now, been 




The reason for this is, unsurprisingly, couched in politics: The objection of these two 
members against the Observer Status of OPEC to the WTO is inevitably linked to Iran’s 
accession attempts the to the WTO. The United States and Israel have blocked Iran’s effort to 
become a member of the WTO as part of the trade embargo in reaction to the country’s 
regime.
95
 OPEC’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain OS can be at least partially attributed to 
being part of a broader package of sanctions against Iran on behalf of these two opposing 
WTO Members.  
 
As noted in the previous section, Iran has one of the largest oil reserves within OPEC, and its 
observer status within the WTO would arguably have indirectly granted Iran more access to 
monitoring the WTO process.
96
 Consequently, OPEC’s status in the WTO remains pending. 
As mentioned above, OPEC merely remains an ‘international organization working with the 
WTO’ and solely in the context of the Committee of Trade and Environment.   
6.4.2. Membership and Individual Accessions of OPEC Members to the WTO  
 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
94 Report of the Committee on Trade and Development (n 80), note on the meeting of 28 June and 10 July 
2000, para 21: ‘The representative of the United States said that her delegation had examined the material 
provided by OPEC which explained that organisation's interest in the CTD and its interest in trade.  She said 
that unlike the submission made by the League of Arab States, her delegation was unable to go along with 
granting ad hoc Observer Status to the OPEC, but hoped to be in position to do so at the time of the next 
meeting, provided further material was provided which could substantiate both the interest of the OPEC in the 
CTD and its trade function.’ 
95 Iran officially submitted an application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 19 July 1996. From 
July 1996 to May 2001, Iran’s application had not been considered, mainly as a result of US objections and the 
US veto power in the WTO Council. From May 2001 Iran’s application for WTO membership has been brought 
up 22 times. At the 22nd time, on 26 May 2005, Iran’s application for WTO membership was approved 
unanimously by the organization’s members (and thus by the United States and Israel as a goodwill gesture so 
as to ease the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the international community). Thus the process of Iran’s 
membership in the WTO started. Once Iran’s application was accepted and examined by WTO General Council, 
Iran became WTO observer member and started the process of full membership in the organization. In 
November 2009 Iran submitted the Foreign Trade Regime Memorandum as the process of accession entered a 
new phase, see WTO, Accessions, Iran <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_iran_e.htm> (accessed 




OPEC as an intergovernmental organisation cannot become a Member to the WTO, only its 
individual member states can. OPEC Membership in no way precludes WTO Membership.
97
 
Quite to the contrary: Nine of thirteen current OPEC Members are simultaneously Members 
to the WTO. These are Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.
98
 Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Libya are WTO Observers 
negotiating WTO accession. Kuwait, Nigeria and Venezuela acceded to the WTO in 1995; 





It is a well-known fact that those countries that were initial WTO members in 1995 did not 
have separate protocols to negotiate upon their accession. These countries merely had to 
accept the WTO ‘package deal’ as it stood. Article XVI:5 of the WTO Agreement states that: 
 
‘No reservations may be made in respect of any provision of this Agreement. 
Reservations in respect of any of the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
may only be made to the extent provided for in those Agreements. Reservations in 
respect of a provision of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the 




Members that acceded to the WTO during its establishment in 1995 thus could not make 
reservations to the Agreement. Those countries that joined after 1995, however, generally had 
to negotiate “WTO-plus” conditions in separate accession protocols.
101
 Concerning the eight 
WTO/OPEC Members mentioned above, only Ecuador and Saudi Arabia, who both joined 
after 1995, had to negotiate such protocols. 
 
It is interesting to note that the issue of production quotas on crude petroleum and OPEC 
practices has been explicitly absent from the Accession Protocols of the two OPEC Members 
in question. The Accession Protocol of Ecuador (which joined the WTO in 1996) for instance 
is entirely silent on this, although petroleum and the oil and gas industry are mentioned in the 
                                                 
97 P Milthorp and D Christy, ‘Energy Issues in Selected WTO Accessions’ in: Y Selivanova (ed), Regulation of 
Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 
2011) 297. 
98 See OPEC Members (n 46). 
99 See WTO, ‘Members and Observers’. 
100 Article XVI:5 WTO Agreement, also see Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 5) page 113 and 114-115; 
Exceptions to this are (temporary) waivers (Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement) and the never used non-
application clause. 
101 WTO website, ‘Protocols of Accessions of New Members Since 1995, including commitments in goods and 
services’ <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
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Protocol in connection with competition and pricing policies.
102
 However, it should be taken 
into account that Ecuador suspended its OPEC Membership from 1992 – 2007, exactly 




In contrast, in the Accession Protocol of Saudi Arabia energy issues were briefly addressed, 
however, these were mainly targeted at energy ‘dual pricing’ practices.
104
 The country agreed 





Additionally, pending its accession, existing WTO Members asked whether Saudi Arabia 
maintained any export controls (not the same as a production quota), which it answered in the 
negative.
106
 One can deduct that Membership of OPEC was not a major obstacle in Saudi 
Arabia’s accession (at least not in the opinion of the country itself).
107
 According to the 
representatives of Saudi Arabia, the production quotas are not challengeable before a 
panel.
108
 The concept of production quotas nor OPEC practices is not mentioned by name 




6.4.3. Implications for WTO Dispute Settlement 
As it is clear from the previous section, OPEC countries are in different positions with 
respect to the WTO membership. This has consequences for WTO dispute settlement. While 
there has never been a WTO dispute challenging any of the restrictive practices of OPEC 
                                                 
102 Accession Protocol: WT/L/432 (21 January 1996); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
Ecuador, WT/L/77 + Corr.1 (21 January 1996) ‘State Ownership and Privatization’ para 63 ff, mentioning that 
this sector is the only sector in the country functioning as a monopoly.  
103 From December 1992 until October 2007, Ecuador suspended its OPEC membership  
<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
104 PC Mavroidis, Trade in Goods – 2nd Edition (OUP, Oxford 2012) on page 63-64 states concerning Saudi 
Arabia and the WTO: ‘Saudi Arabia is the most recent WTO Member and the Working Party Report on its 
accession reflects a rather benign discussion of this issue, where it was made clear that petroleum production 
quotas were not, at least in the view of the acceding country, legally challengeable before a GATT panel’. 
105 Milthorp and Christie (n 97) 307: ‘By the fall of 2003, the discussions had ‘matured’ into a request for a 
binding entry commitment that Saudi Arabia would not sell the energy product in question at a price below the 
‘world price’’. 
106 Saudi Arabia, Working Party Report, 179 ff and Annex J.  
107 Ibid and Mavroidis supra note (n 109). 
108 Accession Protocol: WT/L/627 (11 December 2005); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/ACC/SAU/61 (1 Nov 2005) 179 ff, ‘Economic Policies, para 7: The only prices 
controlled by the State were internal prices of certain oil and gas products for domestic consumption, 
pharmaceuticals and electricity.’ 
109 Ibid, Annex J of the Protocol includes crude petroleum and petroleum products. 
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Were a WTO Member ever to initiate a dispute against any of the OPEC Members regarding 
OPEC related behaviour, the WTO Member in question would not be able to start such a 
dispute against the OPEC as an entity, in the WTO context.
 
The Dispute Settlement System 
only allows disputes by states, against states (and not against other entities, such as IOs).
111
 
The claimant would therefore have to know which individual OPEC WTO Member it would 
want to challenge and on what grounds exactly. Additionally, it goes without saying that only 
those OPEC states, which are Members to the WTO could be challenged in the forum. This 
effectively means only nine of thirteen OPEC countries that are in the WTO could be 
challenged in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  
 
While nothing in the DSU explicitly prohibits disputes against multiple parties, it is 
interesting to observe that the Understanding is completely silent in this respect. Nor has the 
phenomenon of a dispute against several WTO Members at once ever occurred in the history 
of the dispute settlement system. This may indicate that a dispute against multiple Members 
for one and the same measure is not deemed desirable. This suspicion is strengthened, given 
that the DSU does have clear rules dealing with the reverse scenario: It is possible to initiate 




In practice, a challenge brought against identical measures maintained by several states, this 
would most likely result in separate disputes against individual states. Or, alternatively, when 
claiming identical or similar measures maintained by multiple WTO Members, the 
complainant would need to challenge one Member initially. Other Members suspected of 
maintaining like measures could subsequently join the dispute as Third Parties in accordance 




                                                 
110 Although there was opposition to dual pricing by mainly the US and the EU, this has never developed into a 
dispute, see supra Chapter 3 and 4 and infra Chapter 7 of this book. 
111 Article 1.1 DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). 
 
112 Article 9 DSU (n 111). 
113 Article 10 DSU (n 111). 
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WTO jurisprudence also shows us that Panels and the AB has the discretion to grant 
‘enhanced third party rights’ to Members who have a substantial interest in the case at 
hand.
114
 This implies that parties can be granted additional participatory rights, meaning that 
they may for example have an opportunity to be heard by the Panel and to share their views 
and to, inter alia, make written submissions to the Panel.
115
 These matters need to be kept in 
mind when thinking of the OPEC in WTO dispute settlement context. OPEC practices have 
not so far been challenged before a panel. This does not mean, however, that OPEC practices 
have not been subject to criticism or actively opposed to (notably the United States and the 
European Union). 
6.5. Avenues for Tackling OPEC Production Quota in WTO Law  
6.5.1. GATT Art XI.1 and OPEC Production Quota: Some Economic Insights  
 
We started this chapter by explaining to what extent the WTO is about free trade. We then 
proceeded to explain the functioning of the OPEC cartel and its ‘market power instrument of 
choice’ in the form of production quota on oil. While it becomes clear that OPEC behaves in 
an anticompetitive manner, which is contrary to the competition pillar of free trade, the rules 
to deal with this comprehensively in the WTO are absent. Nevertheless, there are other rules 
in the GATT, namely the prohibition of quantitative restrictions in Article XI.1. The question 
is to what extent these rules can ‘catch’ production quota as applied by OPEC, which will be 
the focus of the rest of the chapter. To see to what extent the law of Article XI.1 would apply 
to production quota, we first have to understand the Article’s economic rationale and the 
linkages between production quota and import and export quota. 
 
6.5.1.1. Economic Rationale for the Prohibition of Quantitative Export Restrictions 
Before we look into production quotas in the WTO context, we first must understand why 
quantitative export restrictions (e.g. by means of quotas) – aside from quantitative restrictions 
                                                 
114 See in US – FSC: Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations", 
WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, DSR 2000:III, p. 1619, the Appellate Body confirmed the above 
statement; Also see Article 10.2 of the DSU which indicates that the term ‘third party’ is used throughout the 
DSU to refer to a Member that has “a substantial interest” in a matter before a panel, and which has notified its 
interest to the DSB; and Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), WT/DS353/R, adopted 23 March 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS353/AB/R, 
DSR 2012:II, p. 649, paras. 7.14 — 7.17. See also Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member 
States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R, adopted 1 June 2011, as modified by 





on the import side – are prohibited in the GATT by means of Article XI.1. This builds on the 
understanding of the wider rationale for the GATT and the goals of the WTO discussed in the 
previous section. The purpose of this section is not to go into the legal details of the Article 
XI.1 but to understand the economic reasoning behind the prohibition of restrictions on 
exports that prevail in fossil fuel trade. 
 
The logic behind the prohibition of quota in international trade in general could be 
understood in terms of the degree of severity in which border instruments pose a barrier to 
international trade. In terms of efficiency in international trade flows between nations, full-
fledged free trade absent of all protectionism would be the most optimal model. If countries 
cannot commit to that, tariffs are an undesirable but still acceptable barrier to trade because 
they are quantifiable and can be negotiated in a transparent and binding manner. A level up in 
terms of trade restrictiveness from tariffs are quota, which are less desirable and considered 
the most inefficient barriers to trade (except for an outright ban on imports/exports, which 
economically speaking is a quota, too, namely quota = 0). The reason for this is that tariffs 
are the inverse of quota in terms of economic effect on international trade, with the crucial 
abovementioned exception that tariffs are more easily quantifiable.
116
 For this reason, tariffs, 
although they are considered to be inefficient with regard to promoting open trade flows, are 
thus allowed, while quotas and import/export restrictions are prohibited in the GATT. 
 
This idea seems to be the rationale behind prohibiting quantitative restrictions in any form by 
means of GATT Article XI.1: It prohibits both import and export quota because they 
constitute a barrier to freer trade flows.
117
 However, the question remains whether import and 
export restrictions are the same. In terms of economic theory they have the same restrictive 
effect on trade flows.
118
 But in practice, this is highly dependent on the circumstances, i.e. the 
good traded and market concerned. Clearly, for more ‘regular’ manufactured goods to enter a 
foreign market, import restrictions are more of a concern, while with natural resources such 
                                                 
116 K Bagwell, RW Staiger and AO Sykes, ‘The Rationale for Negotiated Constraints on Traditional 
Instruments of Protection (Tariffs and QRs)’ in: H Horn and PC Mavroidis (eds)  (n 1) 93 ff; Also see on the 
economics of Quantitative Restrictions Chapter 2 in PC Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade – 
Volume 1: The GATT (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England 2015). 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ruta and Venables (n 66). 
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as raw materials and fossil fuels, export restrictions have proven to be a much bigger 
problem.
119
   
 
Their restrictive effect on trade aside, the question remains why export restrictions in the 
GATT are prohibited in addition to import restrictions. This question is especially valid 
considering that the GATT mostly contains disciplines addressing the import side of barriers 
to trade (what some call the import bias of the GATT).
120
 Bias or not, there without a doubt 
seems to be an asymmetry between the disciplines covering imports (more elaborate and 




One of the reasons the drafters of the GATT decided to prohibit both import and export 
restrictions in Article XI.1 must have been the common concern that upstream industries (e.g. 
natural resources such as fossil fuels or raw materials) would receive an unfair advantage if 
the countries that could exercise market power in those sectors  were allowed to maintain 
export quota.
122
 If one takes a look at Article XX(g) exception relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources to the QRs prohibition, this makes sense, for it is only justified 
if ‘if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 




However, if we acknowledge that both import and export restrictions can constitute barriers 
to international trade, the question still remains why the founders of the GATT were 
primarily concerned with drafting articles that tackled import restrictions. It surely must have 
come to the attention of the founders of the GATT at some point that Members were inclined 
to restrict the export of some products (e.g. natural resources and raw materials). Why did 
they not include disciplines to address the export side more thoroughly (e.g. by binding 
                                                 
119 Ibid, and World Trade Report 2010 (n 12). 
120 See M Cossy, ‘Energy Trade and WTO Rules: Reflections on Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Export 
Restrictions and Freedom of Transit’ in C Herrmann and JP Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law (EYIEL), Vol. 3 (2012), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012) 281, 288 
121 Ibid Cossy; Ruta and Venables (n 66) 23. 
122 In practice, domestic policies such as production quota lead to the same result; See also Bagwell, Staiger 
and Sykes (n 116) 145 on export restrictions, stating: ‘It is worth underscoring that Article XI applies to export 
QRs as well (but not to export taxes). A common practice that would fall under Article XI, for example, would 
be a prohibition on the exportation of an unprocessed product, perhaps enacted for the purpose of lowering the 
price of the unprocessed product to the local processing industry.’  
123 GATT (n 5) Article XX(g) (General Exceptions) ‘Conservation of Exhaustible Natural Resources’. 
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export tariffs or prohibiting export taxes)?
124
 Note for instance that there is no inverted 
GATT Article III to guarantee National Treatment when exporting a product that is also sold 
domestically, i.e. an article that would guarantee foreign producers the same input price for 
the exported product as the country accords to its domestic producers.
125
 One could argue, 
however, that the exception in Article XX (g) in combination with the Article XX chapeau is 
supposed to play this role and function as a quasi Article I-plus-III provision. For this to 
apply, though, the measure that affects exports would have to fall within the ambit of Article 
XI.  
 
Some explanations on why this was not the case may be that the GATT was primarily 
established to prevent eminent trade wars, which were centred around domestic protectionist 
policies.
126
 Additionally, natural resources in 1947 were often still extracted from colonies, 
and export restrictions were consequently not much of a problem. Regarding the fossil fuel 
trade, one could say that it was completely in the hands of the Seven Sister oligopoly, which 
dealt with vertically integrated private companies and concessions and thus de facto remained 
mostly outside of the scope of the GATT.
127
 In sum, while some argue that there is no 
intentional import bias in the WTO, the current state of WTO law is economically puzzling in 
this respect.  
6.5.1.2.  Links between Production Quota and Export Restrictions in the WTO Context  
It is the element of domestic production and consumption relative to export restrictions 
discussed in the foregoing section that brings us to the question of the difference between a 
production quota and an export quota. We learnt that ‘made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption’ is a prerequisite for the successful 
invocation of the Article XX(g) exception for the measures relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources). The relevant question is when a production quota and an 
export restriction is one and the same in terms of their economic effect?  
                                                 
124 This issue is also touched upon in I Espa, ‘Emerging Trends in Critical Raw Materials Trade’ 6 ff and 
Cossy (n 120) 288, in note 20: and World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 166; In this context, an important question 
is to what extent a prohibitive export tax could be likened to a quantitative restriction, and thus be found to be 
incompatible with GATT (n 5) Article XI:1.  
125 See generally L Ehring and CF Chianale, ‘Export Restrictions in the Field of Energy’ in Y Selivanova (ed), 
Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law – WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (Wolters Kluwer, 
Alphen a/d Rijn 2011) 141. 
126 Cossy (n 120) 288 - 289. See supra Chapter 2 of this thesis on the history of petroleum in the GATT/WTO. 




In case of unevenly geographically distributed natural resources, domestic measures, e.g. 
concerning production and extraction, are very similar to trade measures.
128
 Thus, it naturally 
follows that governments have a greater leeway in influencing the trade of natural resources 
by the use of domestic measures when compared to other products.
129
 In this sense, though 
perhaps not necessarily legally inconsistent (see next section) with the GATT, one can say 
that economically speaking, effect of a production quota can be (though not always is) the 
same as that of an export quota, especially in cases where there is no domestic consumption 




Just as an export restriction, a production quota in the country of export will lower the supply 
on the international market, thereby increasing the price.
131
 In case there is domestic 
consumption to which the production quota applies equally, the effect may still be restrictive, 
but not necessarily discriminatory in the sense of the GATT. However, let us say that there is 
some domestic consumption and thus a production quota is not an outright export quota. One 
would think that domestic demand is always served first (at least when we talk about oil), and 
the rest exported. From this point of view, the quota would only govern this residual output 
after domestic consumption is satisfied, and thus become a de facto export quota. 
 
In sum, countries in possession of strategic natural resources can often exercise their market 
power and potentially circumvent violation of GATT disciplines by using suuch domestic 
policies as production quota.  
6.5.2. OPEC Production Quotas: Compatible with the Economic Rationale of the 
GATT/WTO? 
We have established that OPEC functions in an anticompetitive manner. But in the absence 
of rules on competition in the WTO, one has to resort to other measures with regard to 
                                                 
128 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 147 and generally, K Bagwell and RW Staiger, ‘Domestic Policies, 
National Sovereignty and International Economic Institutions’ (n 21). 
129 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 147. Ibid. 
130 In the same vein, an export tax applied to resources have the same effect as a consumption subsidy, World 
Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 185;  Also see Ruta and Venables (n 66) 24: ‘[…] in natural resource sectors, a 
number of trade and domestic instruments can be close substitutes: a production quota is equivalent to an 
export quota for countries that export the quasi-totality of their resource production, and a tax at the border has 
the same effect as a domestic tax where countries importing the resource do not produce it. In these cases, 
regulating only one of the equivalent measures is insufficient to achieve undistorted trade in natural resources.’ 
131 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 185. 
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production quota. Are they compatible with the rationale of the GATT/WTO? We can 
observe several important things concerning OPEC’s restrictive practices of production quota 
on crude oil: 
 
First, it is clear that the way OPEC operates (by applying a production quota) is not based on 
the notion of free trade. OPEC and its Members function as a relatively successful cartel and 
consciously restrict the production of oil to influence the price to be higher than what it 
would be if there was a market equilibrium. Second, we can see that when a state is applying 
a production quota over the goods/natural resources it possesses (especially when there is no 
domestic consumption), a production quota can have the same economic effect as an export 
quota. Last but not least, we learnt that although the term ‘free trade’ does not appear literally 
in the GATT/WTO context, the system is definitely about non-discrimination, promoting 
trade flows and open, fair and undistorted competition. Even though promoting free trade is 
not the sole function of the WTO, the theory of comparative advantage may be broadly said 
to underpin its existence.  
 
A relatively straightforward conclusion that one can draw when taking into account the 
preceding analysis is that OPEC operates in a trade distortive manner. Natural resources are 
often concentrated in a small number of places, and imperfect competition seems to prevail in 
those markets.
132
 Through the allocation of production quota, cartels have a say over trade 
patterns, which are not based on the notion of comparative advantage.
133
 It is clear that the 
application of production quota by OPEC are running against free trade policy. It could be 
argued that if they are not running against the legal provisions of the WTO, they are at the 
very least not reconcilable with the spirit of the GATT and the WTO, at least with that part of 
the system that is concerned with promoting trade flows through the prohibition of export 
restrictions. Not only the asymmetry between imports and exports, but also between domestic 
and trade measures that have very similar effects, lead to inefficiency.  
 
While it is obvious that OPEC and its fossil fuels are not traded on the basis of the notion of 
free trade, this begs the opposite question, however. Would free trade in fossil fuels make 
sense? This could provide extensive material for further research, but some preliminary 
                                                 




remarks are in order here. For the consumer, free trade in fossil fuels would, at least price 
wise, bear some advantages, since the consumer would pay a lower market price for the 
consumption of energy. Through this mechanism, the supply curve of oil would meet the 
demand curve naturally.  
 
On the other hand, one could argue that free trade in fossil fuels would lead to an extremely 
rapid depletion of fossil fuel sources and thus to negative environmental externalities 
connected to the polluting effects of their use. A positive externality of monopoly or resource 
cartel may consequently lead to a more ‘inefficient’ extraction path of the fossil fuel in 
question (meaning slower than optimal), offsetting the negative environmental impact.
134
 
However, this is only true when one takes into account the scenario that not all fossil fuels 
the world holds were to be extracted at a certain point (i.e. in a scenario that we shift 
completely to renewables before all reserves are depleted). In a scenario where we count on 
complete extraction one way or another, the rate does not matter much, since eventually all 
resources would be extracted with their accompanying negative environmental externalities.  
6.5.3.  OPEC, Restrictive Practices and the WTO: Unresolved Issues and Fuel for Thought 
 
The economic explanations for OPEC and production quota allows us to conclude that 
indeed, OPEC practices, at least in spirit, run against the economic rationale of the GATT 
and thus the WTO.  
 
Two points offer some fuel for thought in this respect: 1) Why does the WTO allow 
production quota, if they can have, though not always, the same economic effect as export 
quota? And, 2) is it indeed true that natural resources in general are more susceptible to 
domestic policies such as production quota and thus, discriminatory behaviour?  
 
The answer to the first question is the following: the problem is that the WTO in this instance 
touches upon the fine line between internationally agreed trade rules and national sovereignty 
- to be discussed from the legal viewpoint in more detail in the section below. If a country has 
not explicitly agreed otherwise, there is only so far a trade agreement can reach into the 
domestic policies regarding natural resources depletion. In addition, the WTO is no ‘global 




competition law’ in the end, and the promotion of free trade and trade liberalization is only 
partially its mandate. Its other core functions are to provide a platform for negotiations and a 
mechanism to solve disputes. Considering this, it may still be more beneficial to have 
countries on board that maintain non-WTO compatible policies, rather than not have them on 
board at all. Here, a purely economic reason has to make space for the wider policy objective. 
 
With regard to the second question, the example of OPEC uncovers a wider problem that 
concerns natural resources trade and the WTO system. More than one-third of the export 
restrictions notified are in the natural resource sector.
135
 Moreover, export taxes are twice as 
likely to be levied on the export of resources.
136
 Those countries that are abundant with a 
certain tradable natural resource will undeniably be more inclined to use restrictive trade 
practices through domestic policies such as production quota or export taxes.  
 
Precisely because this touches upon the national sovereignty of a state, the country will have 
more leeway in influencing international trade flows with respect to the natural resource in 
question to its favour. Rather than going into international trade rules and risking violating 
them, countries will resort to domestic policies.
137
 Knowing this and looking at the table 
below, it comes as no surprise that almost all of the OPEC Members are on list of the biggest 
exporters of natural resources, while at the same time operating in a trade restrictive way.
138
 
This leads us to conclude that there is not only an asymmetry regarding the import and export 
disciplines in the GATT, but also one concerning domestic and trade measures that have very 
similar economic effects. This discrepancy allows states and public cartels such as OPEC to 




                                                 
135 Ruta and Venables (n 66) 12. 
136 Ibid, 12-13. 
137 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 185. 
138 Ibid, 131; another area where restrictive practices are vast is in the (tropical) forestry industry.  
139 As argued by Ruta and Venables (n 66) 20 ff; WTO, World Trade Report 2014 – Trade and Development: 
Recent Trends and the Role of the WTO (WTO, Geneva 2014) 163 ff: ‘The OECD recently collected an 
inventory of more than 5,000 restrictions on industrial raw materials applied by 57 countries between 2009 and 
2012. The inventory, which includes both taxes and quantitative export restrictions (prohibitions, quotas, 
automatic and nonautomatic licensing, etc.), covers mostly Harmonized System (HS) categories 25-28 (mineral 
products; chemicals and allied industries); 44-46 (wood); 71-72 (stones and metals); and 74-81 (copper, nickel, 
aluminium, lead, zinc, tin and base metals)’ […] ‘From a theoretical perspective, export restrictions may serve 
the following purposes: achieve terms-of-trade gains; production relocation; support to downstream sectors 
(closely related to the production relocation motive); export diversification (closely related to the two previous 
motives); protection of the environment; avoidance of resource depletion; income stabilization; and response to 






Figure 3: Leading Exporters of Natural Resources (OPEC Members in this table are Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Kuwait, Venezuela, Algeria, Nigeria and Angola) 
(source: World Trade Report 2010)  
 
 
6.6. GATT Art XI.1 and OPEC Production Quota: Legal Analysis  
We have seen in the previous section that in the economic sense, production quotas may have 
a similar effect as export restrictions. The effect actually becomes the same if nearly all the 
production of a certain good is destined for export and not for domestic consumption.
140
 After 
looking into some economic considerations, this section will proceed to test OPEC’s practice 
of maintaining production quotas on crude oil against WTO law, more precisely against 
Article XI.1 on the Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions. One question that is interesting in 
this respect is how far the notion on the prohibition of quota should reach. In particular, 
should the scope of Article XI.1 GATT include production quota on goods, in the way OPEC 
applies it to crude petroleum?   
 
Since we have seen from the economic discussion of the issue, Article XI.1 can find itself on 
the fine line between domestic policy and international trade rules. This is especially true 
                                                                                                                                                       
Raw Materials (OECD, Paris, 2012). 
140 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12). 
 
 172 
when WTO members use the defence that a certain matter is an issue of national sovereignty, 
as was the case in the China-Raw Materials case.
141
 We therefore first want to discuss this 
general international law notion of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and its 
relationship with WTO law and (tradable) natural resources therein. This will be useful for 
the following debate of the ‘narrow’ versus the ‘broad’ interpretation of Article XI.1 
concerning quantitative export restrictions and production quota.  
6.6.1. The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and WTO Law 
6.6.1.1. Origin and Content of the Principle 
The general international law Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources contains the 
right of States and its peoples to dispose freely of their natural resources on their territory, 
including their territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones.
142
 It is enshrined in a variety 
of political declarations from the era of de-colonization onwards, most importantly, the 1962 
General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII).
143
 The Resolution is comprised of eight 
principles and states, among others:  
 
‘The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well as the 
import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in conformity 
with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be 





The strict obligation for States and international organizations to respect the sovereignty of 
peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources mirrors this right of nations to 
explore their natural resources.
145
 The remaining principles set forth in the Resolution 
                                                 
141 Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295; 
Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, Add.1 
and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as 
modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, 
p. 3501, paras 7.377-380. 
142 See generally N Schrijver, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, in the Max Planck 
Encyclopaedia of International Law (MPEPIL) online edn, and SR Chowdhury, ‘Chapter 1 – Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ in: K Hossain and SR Chowdhury, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources in International Law (Frances Pinter Publishers, London 1984). 
143 The General Assembly adopted resolution 1803 (XVII) on the ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources; on 14 December 1962 by 87 votes in favour to 2 against, with 12 abstentions. 
144 UNGA Res 1803 (n 143) para 2. 
145 Schrijver in MPEPIL (n 142). 
 
 173 
concern exploration, development and disposition of natural resources, nationalization and 
expropriation, foreign investment, the sharing of profits, and other related issues.
146
  
The emergence of the principle, through several interrelated United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions in the 1950s and 1960s, is directly connected to the struggle of 
colonial people for self-determination.
147
 It sprung from the idea that newly independent 
former colonies had a right to economic development and were therefore entitled to profit 
from and be in control of their natural wealth and resources.
148
 In this respect, the Principle is 
closely linked to the human right to development, which is for example reflected in the text 
of Article 1.2 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), where a 
similar wording to the UNGA Resolution 1803 is taken up: 
  
‘All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic 
cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no 




Understandably, the Principle is related to both the general notion of sovereignty, in the sense 
that it refers to the supreme authority within a territory, and the concept of jurisdiction in its 
competence to exercise that authority over that territory (and thus its natural resources), 
whether by legislative, executive or judicial means.
150
 In the years following the 1962 UNGA 
Resolution, developing countries actively pursued the implementation of the principle, by 
cooperating in the field of natural resources, inter alia leading to the convocation of first UN 
                                                 
146 UNGA Res 1803 (n 143). 
147 See UN website, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Procedural History’  
at <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_1803/ga_1803.html> (accessed 147); Schrijver MPEPIL (n 142) and UNGA 
Resolution 523 (VI) of 12 January 1952, UNGA Resolution 626 (VII) 21 December 1952 (‘Resolution 626 
[VII]’). Following the nationalization by Iran of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1952 (see also Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company Case), Uruguay submitted a draft resolution recommending that Member States recognize 
‘the right of each country to nationalize and freely exploit its natural wealth, as an essential factor of 
independence’ (UNGA ‘Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries: Uruguay: Draft Resolution’ 
para. 5 Preamble). Although in the final text the phrase ‘nationalize and freely exploit’ was replaced by ‘freely 
use and exploit’ (para. 1 Resolution 626 [VII]), this resolution is still known as the ‘nationalization’ resolution. 
‘All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to 
any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, 
and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.’; Art. 1 (2) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 March 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 / 1057 U.N.T.S. 407; 
For an overview also see SM Schwebel, ‘The Story of the UN’s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources’ (1963) 49 American Bar Association Journal 463. 
148 Ibid; In some nationalisation cases such as the takeover of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951.  
149 Article 1.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 147).  
150 S Besson, ‘Sovereignty’, in: Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2008-, online edition para 59; Also see BH Oxman, ‘Jurisdiction’ in: Wolfrum (ed), 
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008-, online edition. 
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
151
 By the 1970’s, the core ideas of the 
Principle were even pursued in a, what some argue, rather proactive and confronting manner, 
after the establishment of OPEC, the US oil embargo and a wave of (fossil fuel) 
nationalizations in developing countries which followed.
152
 It goes without saying that 
although the Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources was developed in the era of de-
colonization and was mainly invoked by developing countries, the notions set forth by it are 
relevant for all States today, regardless if they are former colonies or not. 
 
Clearly, the Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources as taken up in UNGA 
Resolution 1803 is relevant for those energy commodities that can simultaneously qualify as 
natural resources for states to exercise sovereignty over. In practice, these are typically non-
renewable, primary energy commodities such as fossil fuels. This implies that the Principle 
covers coal, crude oil and natural gas in all possible forms on the territory of a State, 
including its territorial waters and EEZ.
153
  
6.6.1.2. Status of the Principle in International Law 
As international law is intertwined with political considerations, it is anything but easy to 
determine the status of the doctrine of Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources in law with certainty.
154
 It is true that few would disagree that every State owns the 
wealth underneath its surface. This rule can be tracked all the way to the principle of cujus est 
solum found in Roman and Jewish law, which later formed the basis of the respective 
doctrine in common law.
155
 The doctrine stipulates that whoever owns the soil also owns, 
                                                 
151 Schrijver (n 149); THe General Principle Three Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development ([15 June 1964] UN Doc E/Conf.46/141 vol 1, 3) provides that ‘every country has the sovereign 
right freely to trade with other countries, and freely to dispose of its natural resources in the interest of the 
economic development and well-being of its own people’. 
152 E.g. nationalization of the Libyan Oil industry (1971-1974), see Schrijver (n 142) para 4 and 12. 
153 However, one can go as far to also include the sources of renewable energy within the territory of a State in 
the coverage of the Principle, such as water reserves, wind and sun, to the extent that they can qualify both as an 
energy commodity and a natural resource, see for instance Y Lifshitz, ‘Gone with the Wind? The Potential 
Tragedy of the Common Wind’ (2010) 28 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 435.  
154 For a particularly nice quote on international law and its discontents, see JH Jackson, Sovereingty, the WTO, 
and the Changing Fundamentals of International Law (CUP, Cambrigde 2006) 32 ff, stating that‘[Persons who 
have the misfortune of tangling deeply with the logic and sources of international law generally]….[…] realize 
how, in some cases, a rigorous pursuit of the ‘holy grails’ of universal truths can end in a recognition of 
‘universal uncertainties.’ 
155 D Zillman, A McHarg, A Bradbrook, L Barrera-Hernandez (eds), The Law of Energy Underground: 
Understanding New Developments in Subsurface Production, Transmission and Storage (OUP, Oxford 2014) 
493; Also see on this principle, in the same book, C Redgwell and L Rajamani, ‘Chapter 6 – Energy 
Underground: What’s International Law Got to Do With It?’ 108 and generally B Barton, ‘The Common Law of 
Subsurface Activity: General Principle and Current Problems’.  
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without limitation, the airspace above it and the subsurface below.
156
 This common law rule 




Notwithstanding the importance of the Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources, it is 
at minimum controversial in international law, not in the least because of the way it came into 
being.
158
 Schrijver explains that the difficulty of the birth of this particular Principle was that 
its core development took place in the UN General Assembly, while the legal merits of 
developing international law through resolutions of political organs is deemed contentious.
159
 
In other words, the principle did not develop through the traditional routes of international 
law making, such as treaty-making or evolving State-practice. Nevertheless, it has been 
incorporated in several treaties, such as the abovementioned ICCPR,
160
 and featured in 
international arbitrations and judicial decisions.
161
 Still, this cannot be considered a definitive 
classification or confirmation of the status of the principle in international law in general. It 
seems thus that the Principle, albeit controversial, is well established in international law.  
 
Yet, the above begs the question whether the notion of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources actually is so ‘permanent’ to begin with. For the Principle does not seem to fall in 
the norm of ius cogens of international law in the sense of Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties, encompassing:  
 
‘[…] For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community 
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can 





States can make their own arrangements with respect to exercising their right of sovereignty 
over their natural resources, through e.g. concession contracts and bilateral investment 
                                                 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid and Bury vs. Pope (1586) Cro Eliz 118; 78 ER 375.  
158 Schrijver (n 142) para 1. 
159 Ibid; 3.  
160 See ICCPR (n 147). 
161 most notably in the case of the International Court of Justice (hereafter: ICJ) in the 2005 in the Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168; 
Also see the case of 161 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
(arbitration) and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (Award of 19 
January 1977) ((1978) 17 ILM 1). 
162 VCLT (n 44) Article 53. 
 
 176 
treaties (BITs). This means that the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources is one that States can ‘contract out’ of and derogate from.
163
 This notion is also 
reflected in the text of Article 1.2 of the ICCPR, where it is stated that peoples may freely 
dispose of their natural resources ‘[…] without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic cooperation […].’
164
 For this reason, the Principle of Sovereignty 
over natural resources is instantaneously excluded from the realm of peremptory norms, 
which cannot be derogated from. The initial label of ‘permanent’ sovereignty seems derived 
from the first UNGA resolutions emphasizing the character of decolonization, rather than 
referring to the unwavering peremptory nature of the principle. Note however, that only the 
states in possession of the natural resources in question that can unilaterally take a decision to 
derogate from this principle.  
 
It follows that while the principle may be a ‘well established’ principle of international law, it 
has to be emphasized that it remains a mere principle of international law.
165
 It may be used 
as an interpretative tool or as a source of international obligations, in cases where there are no 
clear treaty rules.
166
 Principles of international law may eventually evolve into new rules of 
customary law and serve as a basis for developing new rights and obligations, but this does 
not always have to be the case.
167
 It is thus safe to conclude that while the Principle is without 
a doubt a pertinent one in international law, taken up in treaties and referred to in 




6.6.1.3. The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources and WTO Law: Relevant or Redundant? 
The relevance of the Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources for WTO law this 
depends on the perspective one takes: If one sees WTO law as just another branch of general 
international law, then one could argue that the WTO is a mere ‘contracting out of general 
                                                 
163 Schrijver (n 142) para 23. 
164 ICCPR (n 147) Article 1.2 ICCPR. 
165 SE Rolland, ‘China-Raw Materials: WTO Rules on Chinese Natural Resources Export Dispite’, (2012) 
Volume 16, Issue 21 ASIL Insights (June 19 2012). 
166 R Wolfrum, ‘Sources of International Law’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008-, online edition, para 33-39.  
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168 See Chapters 9 and 10 in N Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources – Balancing Rights and Duties 
(CUP, Cambridge 2008); See also C Armstrong, ‘Against Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ 





 This ‘contracting out’ could even imply contracting out of the Principle 
of Sovereignty over Natural Resources (being a part of general international law). The text 
taken up in Article 1.2 of the ICCPR is illustrative of this idea when stating that nations and 
peoples may freely dispose of their natural resources, ‘without prejudice to any obligations 
arising out of international economic cooperation’.
170
 The obligations arising out of WTO 





Generally speaking, WTO Members have not ‘contracted out’ of the Principle of Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources by virtue of their membership in the WTO; nor have 
they contracted out of all general international law by that means. On this reading, the WTO 





The opposing view that some scholars take to the matter discussed above holds that the WTO 
is a self-contained regime and specialized system regulating international trade, separate from 
general international law altogether.
173
 There is simply no outsourcing of WTO law to 
general international law, because they are two distinct regimes, existing in parallel. In this 
instance, the prevailing opinion is that other rules of international law do not constitute 
directly applicable law in the WTO. From this perspective it could be argued that the 
Principle is in fact irrelevant or even completely redundant for WTO law, since it falls 
completely outside of the scope of the WTO. A caveat here is in place, though, since it seems 
logical that the formation of WTO law occurred in the shadow of general international law.  
 
In the author’s opinion, the Principle is not redundant for WTO law as it relates to it in two 
ways, one general and the other more specific. First, WTO law is a part of general 
international law as a whole and the Organization should therefore respect the Principle. 
Second, there are relevant cases where WTO Members may have partially ‘contracted out’ of 
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6.6.2. Trade in Natural Resources: When Does GATT Article XI.1 ‘Kick In’? 
6.6.2.1. Defining Natural Resources and Fossil Fuels 
As we have seen, domestic policies have an impact on the international terms of trade. 
Sometimes – as it is quite clearly the case of OPEC production quota – domestic policies 
seem to be designed with precisely this objective in mind. Taking into account the Principle 
of Sovereignty over Natural Resources and its relationship with WTO law, we will try to 
identify the point in the process of natural resources extraction and trade when the relevant 
domestic policies become covered by the rules of Article XI.1 of the GATT.  
 
One of the difficulties in determining when WTO rules start applying to natural resources is 
the question of deciding when something constitutes a natural resource in ‘its natural state’, 
and when that product becomes a tradable good in the sense of the GATT. For in the broadest 
sense, all goods embody natural resources, require them for their production or can be traced 
back to natural resources in one way or another.
175
 Since petroleum is a natural resource, and 
natural resources are always the starting point, we will discuss this notion first. It is however 
somewhat unfortunate that the term ‘natural resources’ is a rather broad term difficult to 
define precisely.  
 
The content of the term ‘natural resources’ lies somewhere between the following two 
extremes: One way of arguing would be to label all goods on earth as ‘natural resources’, 
which may be logically correct, but practically not useful.
176
 The other extreme would be to 
say that resources are only natural resources when they are actually in their natural state.
177
 
This may be considered as an overly narrow definition, since natural resources have to be 
processed one way or another before they can be traded for economic gain. It follows that the 
determination of a natural resource is not always a straightforward process and is perhaps 
                                                 
174 See infra the GATT General Exceptions discussion in Section 6.6.4. 





best done on a case-by-case basis.
178
 Generally, however, manufactured and processed goods 
are not considered natural resources.  
 
The WTO in its annual World Trade Report of 2010 dedicated to the issue, describes natural 
resources as: ‘stocks of material that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce 
and economically useful in production or consumption, either in their raw state or after 
minimal amount of processing.’
179
 The main product groups that the WTO identifies as 
natural resources are fish stocks, forestry products, fuels, ores and other minerals, and non-
ferrous metals (the last two groups are commonly known as mining products).
180
 When 
looking at these broad descriptions, which among others include fish stock, it is easy to distil 
that not every type of natural resource is relevant for the extraction or production of what we 
commonly refer to fossil fuels or energy.  
 
Fossil fuels are the natural resources that contain high percentages of carbon, such as crude 
oil, coal and natural gas and have been formed in the ground over thousands of years.
181
 This 
excludes the metals and ores that are included in the broader term of ‘raw materials’.
182
 Due 
to this carbon containing quality, they are used for the production of energy. Contrary to 
natural resources such as stocks and forestry products, fossil fuels are exhaustible at a much 
higher rate, making them non-renewable natural resources. 
 
6.6.2.2. When Does Article XI.1 Kick In? 
The WTO regulates the terms of trade between its Members. This means that while its 
function is to set rules for the trade of goods and services between those Members, which 
may also constitute trade in natural resources and raw materials, the Organization is not 
                                                 
178 Ibid. 
179 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 71: By ‘scarce and economically useful’ the WTO means that they must 
command a positive price in markets and can be used either as inputs in production or directly as a source of 
utility to consumers. 
180 The naturally occurring assets that provide benefits through the provision of raw materials and energy used 
in economic activity (or that may provide such benefits one day) and that are subject primarily to quantitative 
depletion through human use. In addition, the OECD in its glossary for statistical terms describes natural 
resources as ‘natural assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can be used for economic production or 
consumption’ and divides natural resources into four categories: Mineral and energy resources, soil resources, 
water resources and biological resources, see OECD, Glossary of Statistic Terms, Glossary of Environment 
Statistics, as published in: Studies in Methods, Series F, No. 67, (United Nations, New York, 1997). 
181 Ibid. 
182 The naturally occurring assets that provide use benefits through the provision of raw materials and energy 
used in economic activity (or that may provide such benefits one day) and that are subject primarily to 
quantitative depletion through human use, OECD, Glossary of Statistic Terms (n 180). 
 
 180 
primarily concerned with ownership of and sovereignty over those natural resources on the 
territory of a State.
183
 Although the Preamble of the GATT 1947 lists ‘[…] developing the 
full use of the resources of the world […]’ among its objectives, there is no provision in 




This again goes back to the ‘market access bias’ of the WTO: the rules are mainly designed 
to regulate access to markets for producers, but not necessarily to facilitate access to supplies 
for consumers. With respect to trade in natural resources, it therefore seems an accepted view 
that WTO rules only ‘kick in’ after the natural resources in question have been extracted and 
are tradable for economic gain.
185
 This assumption implies that after the extraction of a 
natural resource, WTO Members have to abide by the multilateral trade rules. Consequently, 
States tend to consider that what they do with their natural resources before extraction is their 
exclusive sovereign policy.  
 
However, there is no hard rule in WTO law determining when trade rules start governing 
natural resources. Moreover, exceptions to this assumption exist, i.e. when the Appellate 
Body determined that trees before they are harvested are a tradable good in the US – 
Softwood Lumber IV dispute.
186
 In that case it was decided that there was no basis to exclude 
“tangible items – such as standing, unfelled trees – that are not both tradable as such and 




                                                 
183 World Trade Report (n 12) 177. 
184 GATT 1947: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194, Preamble. 
185 World Trade Report (n 12) 102: there was an analogical case with respect to another natural resources, 
namely fish stock, in the GATT Report in Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and 
Salmon (L/6268 – 35S/98) (Report of the Panel 22 March 1988) which was recalled. In this case, both parties 
and the panel appear to agree that GATT rules do not apply to any measures restricting fish catch (i.e., upstream 
measures) but only to measures restricting the export of fish after they have been caught. 
186 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571, 
para 57, as explained the World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 162: ‘Nevertheless, in some circumstances, WTO 
rules may have implications for products in their “natural” state. For example, in the US – Softwood Lumber 
IV dispute, one of the issues that arose was whether the provision by provincial governments of harvesting 
rights for timber at less than adequate remuneration could be considered a subsidy within the meaning of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). More specifically, the question was 
whether the term “goods” as used in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement could include “trees before they are 
harvested, that is, standing timber attached to the land (but severable from it) and incapable of being traded as 
such” (Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 57). Ultimately, it was decided that there was 
no basis to exclude “tangible items – such as standing, unfelled trees – that are not both tradable as such and 




Similarly, in an interesting North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute 
between Canada and the United States dealing with bulk water transfers, Canada wanted to 
restrict the export of these transfers (with QRs on exports being contrary to NAFTA rules as 
well). However, the law did not provide a clear answer on whether or not water in its natural 
state was covered as a good by the agreement.
188
 To solve the issue and prevent any doubt on 
the matter, the signatories of the NAFTA released a joint statement in 1993, stating that ‘the 




Similarly, supporters of OPEC policies eagerly argue that production quota escape GATT 
disciplines because petroleum only becomes subject to the disciplines after extraction from 
the ground, i.e. a tradable product.
190
 Some add to these views by asserting that the Principle 
of Sovereignty over Natural Resources grants states unrestrained discretion to deal with their 
natural resources as they please.
191
 As no precise legal basis in support this proposition has 
been articulated, only a dispute in the WTO would provide clarity on the matter. 
 
 
6.6.3. The Scope of Article XI.1 and OPEC Production Quota: The Narrow vs the Broad 
Interpretation 
 
In the absence of clear answers in the law, the analysis above focused on the elucidating the 
relationship between sovereign natural resources policies and the WTO legal framework. The 
status quo leaves us with two ways of interpreting Article XI.1 with respect to OPEC 
production quota: the ‘narrow’ interpretation, excluding them from its scope, and the ‘broad’ 
                                                 
188 NAFTA, Bulk Water Transfers case: A useful starting point is the HS Convention. Sub-heading 2201 of the 
HS is entitled ‘Waters, including natural or artificial mineral waters and aerated water’, and explicitly lists 
‘snow’ and ‘ice’, which could support the view that ground or surface water is covered by trade rules. A 
contrary position is that, because sub-heading 2201 is contained within the chapter of the HS entitled 
“Beverages”, then water is only considered a product when it is destined for consumption. Because bulk 
transfers of ground or surface water are usually used for agricultural or industrial purposes, they would not be 
covered. Because of this lack of clarity in the NAFTA itself, the Parties to the agreements released a statement 
in 1993, proclaiming that: ‘Unless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and become a good or 
product, it is not covered by the provisions of any trade agreement including the NAFTA. And nothing in the 
NAFTA would oblige any NAFTA Party to either exploit its water for commercial use, or to begin exporting 
water in any form.’ See on this e.g. H Mann, ‘Who Owns Our Water? Water and Foreign Investors in the Post 
NAFTA Context’, Prepared for the Water for the America’s in the 21t Century Conference, Mexico City, 9 
October 2002. 
189 Joint statement by the Governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States (1993). 
190 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 162. 
191 See generally D Crosby, ‘Energy Discrimination and International Rules in Hard Times: What’s New This 
Time Around, and What Can Be Done’ (2012) 5 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 325. 
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one that brings production quota within the ambit of Article XI.1. Discussing whether and to 
what extent the definition of restrictions in Article XI.1 covers restrictions in the form of 
production quota, this section will scrutinise both interpretations.  
 
The prohibition of quantitative restrictions (QRs) on goods in the form of, among others, 
import and export quota by means of Article XI.1 is one of the cornerstones of the GATT.
192
  
The article reads as follows: 
 
‘No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether 
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product 
of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export 




Article X.1 prohibits both import and export quota on goods, as they are considered to be 
forms of discrimination and barriers to trade. Note that duties, taxes or other charges are still 
allowed. These are thus an accepted – though discouraged – method of discrimination in the 
international trade of goods.
194
 As discussed in the previous section, the rationale behind the 
prohibition of QRs is that they segment markets and are less transparent then tariffs, duties 
and other charges: by not allowing (i.e. restricting) trade, they hamper trade liberalization.
195
 
Finally, it is also worth noting in this respect that the prohibition in GATT Article XI.1 apply 
to import and export restrictions made effective through state-trading enterprises.
196
   
 
There are several exceptions to the prohibition of QRs in Article XI.1. For instance, it 
provides an exception to export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or 
relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting 
party (Article XI.2 (a) GATT) and import restrictions on agriculture or fisheries products 
(Article XI.1 (c) GATT).  OPEC could not rely on the critical shortages argument of Article 
                                                 
192 Together with Most Favoured Nation and National Treatment. 
193 GATT (n 5) Article XI.1 (General Eliminations of Quantitative Restrictions). 
194 Mavroidis (n 104) 57; Carey (n 61) 792; Tariffs and duties are easier to quantify as opposed to quota are 
not. See supra sections on the rationale of Article XI. 
195 Mavroidis (n 104) 57-58. Note that, as discussed in previous sections, the definition of QRs in not self-
interpreting. 
196 The prohibition in Article XI of the GATT and the non-discrimination obligation in Article XIII of the 
GATT apply to import and export restrictions made effective through state-trading operations (Ad note to 
Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII of the GATT). Therefore, state-trading enterprises of energy exporting 
WTO Members, such as the main Saudi Energy company Aramco, must respect Article XI.1 of the GATT.  
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XI.2 (a), not in the least because this exception entails that the restrictive measure is applied 
temporarily, something that after decades of production quota maintained cannot be said of 
OPEC.
197
 Additionally, there is also an exception available for import and export prohibitions 
or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for international 
commodity agreements by means of Article XI.2 (b). It is highly questionable whether the 
OPEC agreement would qualify as a commodity agreement in the sense of the GATT. First 
of all, the OPEC Agreement has never been registered as such with the WTO.
 
Moreover, it is 
commonly understood that commodity agreements are concluded between exporting and 





The crucial point in this discussion is thus whether and to what extent the definition of 
restrictions in Article XI.1 covers restrictions in the form of domestic quota. We will devote 
particular attention to the broad interpretation of Article XI.1, since this is where the 
discussion of OPEC practices bears special relevance. 
 
6.6.3.1.  Article XI.1 and OPEC Production Quota: The Narrow Interpretation 
Concerning the narrow interpretation of GATT Article XI.1, one should simply start with the 
premise that if the negotiators wanted quantitative restrictions in the wording of the article to 
apply to domestic production quota in addition to those on importation and exportation, they 
could have explicitly included them in the wording of the article.
199
 Having analysed the 
negotiation history of Article XI, Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes conclude that ‘it is obvious that 
domestic quotas where not meant to be covered by the disciplines on QRs, although it was on 
the table in prior International Trade Organization (ITO) negotiations to remove internal 




                                                 
197 GATT (n 5) Article XI.2 (a). 
198 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 179 and Mavroidis (n 104) 351. 
199 Mavroidis (n 104) 62. 
200 Genesis of the GATT, Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin (n 3) 152, noting: ‘Australia proposed a carve-out to the 
prohibitions on QRs for temporary restrictions to prevent critical shortages, which eventually turned into 
Article XI.2 (a) GATT. Article XVIII.5 GATT was added to require consultations every time every time the 
primary commodities a country was exporting seriously declined. Also, Article XX(h) was added, where 




This view is premised on the position that the WTO does not regulate ownership over natural 
resources of states, but only provides rules on non-discrimination. Even in case some WTO 
OPEC/WTO Members would export the near totality of their oil production, and the 
economic effect would be the same as an export quota, there are arguments against including 
production quota in the definition. On this reading, domestic production quota are deemed to 
be GATT consistent, because only quota directly tied to import and export are prohibited, but 




The reason for not including production quota in the scope of the article is that they may 
considered less harmful for international trade flows than import or export quota. This 
presumption is based on the fact that their application is equal to both domestic and foreign 




When the export of a certain product is restricted, there is more of that product on the 
domestic market.
203
 This was for instance the case in the China-Raw Materials and China-
Rare Earths cases.
204
 In those instances, China restricted the export of strategic raw materials 
and rare earths to favour the domestic industry to have cheaper inputs. With a production 
quota, however, one could say that this applies to the domestic market in the same way as to 
the export market, i.e. exports are not more restricted than domestic sales.
205
 It could thus be 
argued that production measures by means of quota are therefore unlikely to be border 
measures, falling outside of the scope of Article XI.1. 
 
Another argument supporting this narrow view is the remark made earlier in the chapter that 
in the broadest sense, every good is subject to a production quota one way or another: the 
production capacity of all goods is limited to a certain extent; nothing can be produced 
                                                 
201 Genesis of the GATT, Sykes, Mavroidis and Irwin (n 3) 152; Ehring and Chianale (n 125) 163 e.g. state: 
‘However, the restriction remains a production restraint rather than an export restraint, even if all additionally 
produced quantities would be exported. There still remains a significant difference because additionally 
produced quantities would in theory be available also for the domestic market and would have an impact on the 
price level there’; Also see in support of this Article XI.2 GATT, listing a minimum set of exemptions, but all 
related to import and export; see K Bagwell, RW Staiger and AO Syked in Horn and Mavroidis (eds) (n 1) 144, 
noting that: ‘To fall under Article XI, a measure must be maintained “on importation or exportation.” It is not 
enough that a measure merely has some effect on imports or exports. Thus, purely domestic restrictions are not 
covered.’; See also World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 185. 
202 Mavroidis (n 104) 57 and Ehring and Chianale (n 125). 
203 This was in fact at stake in the China-Raw Material Case (n 141).  
204 Ibid. 
205 Ehring and Chianale (n 125). 
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limitlessly. With this in mind, it would be very difficult to bind states and/or producers to a 
certain amount of a good that has to be produced. On the other hand, the supply would 
preferably meet the demand curve naturally in a free trade equilibrium rather than through a 
recourse to monopolist exercise of market power.  
 
WTO Members could also argue that were the production quota covered by Article XI.1 it 
would constitute an infringement on their national sovereignty, since it would effectively 
mean that the WTO requires its Members to grant ‘access to energy supplies’. This would be 
relevant to the production of goods directly linked to the exploitation of natural resources. 
While international trade rules may force states to respect their WTO obligations regarding 
non-discrimination and import and export quota, one can hardly compel a State to explore its 
natural resources and trade in them. After all, as discussed above, Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources is an established principle in international law: It is a State’s 




This ‘narrow view’, likely to be supported by those in favour of OPEC practices, rhymes with 
the notion that the WTO is about free trade only to the extent its Members are willing to 
commit to it. Legally aligning a production quota with a quantitative restriction would simply 
go beyond that willingness, despite the adverse long-term economic effects and deadweight 
losses of maintaining production quota.  
 
6.6.3.2. Article XI.1 and OPEC Production Quota: The Broad Interpretation 
In the previous section, we have discussed some of the strongest arguments in support of the 
narrow interpretation of Article XI.1 (‘prohibitions or restrictions’) that excludes domestic 
production quota from its scope. However, the arguments for a wider understanding bear just 
as much relevance and need to be taken into account as well. The need to consider a broader 
view is that in absence of competition disciplines in the WTO, Article XI.1 could be one of 
the few avenues to constrain OPEC’s anticompetitive behaviour and prevent its adverse 
economic effects discussed in the previous sections. 
 
                                                 
206 UNGA Res 1803 (n 143).  
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There have been some attempts to denounce OPEC activities and calls to bring a case in the 
WTO on this basis. The most notable of these was surely the 2010 U.S. Senator Lautenberg 
report drafted as a public complaint against OPEC.
207
 However, the report’s conclusions are 




Indeed, it would be a rash conclusion to equate in legal terms a quantitative restriction (QR) 
and production quota. The Lautenberg report may have been pointing in the right direction 
when asserting that OPEC is restricting quantities of oil on the market and that this is 
contrary to the ‘free trade spirit’ of Article XI.1. Being contrary to the ‘spirit’ however is of 
itself not sufficient to demonstrate that production quota violate Article XI.1. To show that 
OPEC production quota is a QR in the sense of Article XI.1 requires a more robust legal 
analysis. The starting point in this analysis is disentangling the economic effect of production 
quota and its interpretation in the contest of relevant WTO rules. We attempt to do so below. 
 
As explained before, from the textual analysis, it does not become clear when Article XI.1 
starts applying to trade in natural resources. One could maintain that if standing trees in a 
forest can be considered a tradable good in the sense of the GATT, why could other natural 
resources in their natural state, such as petroleum, then not be considered a tradable good in 
the sense of Article I.1?
209
 It is even very well possible that petroleum needs less treatment 
than trees in a forest to become a tradable good for economic gain. Taking this view, there is 
no compelling reason for petroleum, even when in the ground, not to be subject to the 
disciplines of Article XI.1.  
 
The rationale of the QR prohibition of Article XI.1 is to prevent the disruption of trade flows. 
We have also seen that production quota are always accompanied by dead-weight losses, 
which is the kind of inefficiency that in effect disrupts trade flows. In this sense, it is not 
                                                 
207 See ‘Busting Up the Cartel: The WTO Case Against OPEC’, A Report from the Office of Senator Frank R 
Lautenberg (2010). 
208 E.g. the discussion on OPEC relying on the the Article XX(g) exception was limited to one paragraph, 
simply stating that OPEC has never cited or relied on this justification for its production limits or quotas and 
that that this provision would therefore simply not apply, the Lautenberg Report (n 207) 11. Among other 
inconsistencies and nonchalant statements, the report in four lines asserted that: 
‘The aim of Article XI.1 is to eliminate quantitative restrictions, in other words, restrictions implemented trough 
measures which stop trade in or restrict tradable quantities of a product, as opposed to measures that allow 
trade in a production to flow even with a fee. Given the aim of the Article, the export restrictive actions of those 
OPEC Members that are also WTO Members is inconsistent with its obligation.’ See The Lautenberg Report (n 
207) 8. 
209 WTO, US - Softwood Lumber IV (n 186).   
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unthinkable that OPEC production quota can qualify as a QR in the sense of the Article and 
their administration is arguably GATT inconsistent. This argument builds on the idea that 
Article XI.1 should be interpreted in light of its economic rationale.  
 
Taking into account their economic effect, it is indeed clear that production quota do have 
restrictive effect on international trade. There may be some OPEC Members (simultaneously 
WTO Members) that export the near totality of their oil production and have next to none 
domestic production. Applied by those OPEC/WTO Members, production quota would have 
the same effect as export quota. Yet, even if they had domestic consumption, the question 
would be whether the import and the export markets are two separate markets. As domestic 
market demand would be satisfied first and the rest of the production would be exported, the 
effect of the production quota would be that of a QR.  
 
Moreover, a plain meaning of ‘production quota’ implies a ‘quantitative restriction’ in the 
sense that OPEC ‘restricts’ the ‘quantities’ of oil on the market. Even when production quota 
are domestic policies ‘only’, they affect the terms of international trade in practice. 
Production quota may duck the disciplines of WTO law, but evidently, economic effect in the 
end does favour the domestic market. OPEC Members gain revenues from applying a 
production quota, and even openly admit that this is their purpose, i.e. to influence the price 
of oil and thus terms of trade to their advantage. Through a variety of other instruments, such 





The support for the broad reading of an export restriction may also be found in case law. For 
instance, in the Japan – Semiconductors GATT panel, Japan and the United States made an 
arrangement consisting of a range of monitoring measures that resulted in restricting the trade 
                                                 
210 See on this infra Chapter 7; Ehring and Chianale (n 186) 165 note on this: ‘All this being said, it should be 
borne in mind that systems of dual pricing should be suspected to nevertheless be coupled with potentially 
WTO-incompatible export restrictions. If no such export restriction were to exist, arbitrage exports of cheaply 
purchased energy products should quickly bring the price levels on the internal and the external markets into 
balance. The fact that this does not happen, suggests that the purchasers of energy at discounted prices are de 
jure or de facto prevented from exporting. It will depend on the precise form of the measures at issue whether 
these export restrictions are WTO-incompatible. If that measure is the mere existence of an export monopoly, 
the applicability of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is arguably set aside in view of the stipulations of Article 
XVII of the GATT 1994.’ 
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in semiconductors from Japan.
211
 Japan’s measures did not include a production quota on 
semiconductors, but rather an export and sale restriction, which had the effect of influencing 
the price of semiconductors.
212
 In its defence, Japan maintained that the measures it instituted 
were not legally binding.
213
 However, the Panel in this case was of the opinion that the 





‘All measures instituted or maintained by a [Member] prohibiting or restricting the 
importation, exportation, or sale for export of products other than measures that take 




The Panel continued by stating that: 
‘Article XI:1, unlike other provisions of the General Agreement, did not refer to laws 
or regulations but more broadly to measures. This wording indicated clearly that any 
measure instituted or maintained by a contracting party which restricted the 
exportation or sale for export of products was covered by this provision, irrespective 




As the panel found that ‘all measures’ restricting importation, exportation or sale of export 
should be included in the scope of the article, the production quota that in essence restrict 
exportation should arguably be included here. On the other hand, the application of the quota 
may not be discriminatory per se (meaning that the domestic market is equally affected) and 
therefore not necessarily contrary to Article XI (this depends on whether one wishes to view 
the domestic and foreign markets separately or together). Additionally, one could say that 
                                                 
211 Japan – Trade in Semiconductors (L/6309 – 35S/116) (Report of the Panel Adopted on 4 May 1988) paras 
104 – 109; See on this issue in particular PC Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade – Volume 1: The 
GATT (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England 2015) 82. 
212 Japan – Semiconductors (n 211) paras 104 – 109 
213 Ibid. 
214 Japan – Semiconductors (n 211) para 106 (finding that Article XI unequivocally forbids any measures 
instituted or maintained by a party to the GATT which restricts the exportation or sale for export of products, 
regardless of whether the measures are legally binding on those affected). 
215 Japan – Semiconductors (n 211) paras 104 – 106: ‘The Panel then examined the contention of the Japanese 
Government that the measures complained of were not restrictions within the meaning of Article XI:1 because 
they were not legally binding or mandatory.  Note that in India – Autos moreover added in para 5.129 that The 
scope of the term ‘restriction’ is also broad, as seen in its ordinary meaning, which is ‘a limitation on action, a 
limiting condition or regulation’’ 
216 Ibid; The Panel in India — Autos endorsed this view: ‘The question of whether [the] measure can 
appropriately be described as a restriction on importation turns on the issue of whether Article XI can be 
considered to cover situations where products are technically allowed into the market without an express formal 
quantitative restriction, but are only allowed under certain conditions which make the importation more 
onerous than if the condition had not existed, thus generating a disincentive to import.’, see Report, India – 
Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, 
DSR 2002:V, p. 1827. 
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semiconductors as a manufactured product are different form scarce natural resources such as 
petroleum. However, especially because petroleum is such a vital and scarce resource 
necessary for human life, one could say there is more reason to tackle restrictive practices in 
this sector.  
 
Another case adopting a similarly broad view of QRs is the Argentine-Hides and Leather 
dispute, where all de facto restrictive measures were deemed to be quantitative restrictions in 
the sense of Article XI.1.
217
 There is also the case of India – Quantitative Restrictions.
218
 In 
that instance, the Panel used the term ‘limiting condition’ to define the scope of the term 
‘restriction’ used in Article XI. The Panel judged that ‘limiting condition’ did not only 
constitute a condition placed on importation, but any condition that has a limiting effect.
219
 
Again, it would not seem unreasonable to consider a production quota on petroleum deemed 





Some authors, such as Farah and Cima, argue that because of the fact that the approach of 
GATT/WTO case law has overall been broad so far, there is no doubt that in a potential 
dispute, OPEC production quota would qualify as an illegal QR in the sense of Article XI.1. 
While we can indeed see that panels and the Appellate Body have applied a broad 
interpretation of a QR, this seems to be a rather hasty conclusion.
221
 The danger here, as 
might have been the case of the Lautenberg report, is neglecting a distinction between the 
economic effect of an export quota and its legal characterization under Article XI.1.  
 
Last but not least, the defence that production quota are a matter of national sovereignty and 
therefore do not fall within the scope of international trade rules, would not always shield the 
measure. First of all, as we have already seen, the Principle of Sovereignty over Natural 
                                                 
217 Panel Report, L – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and Import of Finished Leather, 
WT/DS155/R and Corr.1, adopted 16 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 1779 
218 Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, 
WT/DS90/R, adopted 22 September 1999, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS90/AB/R, DSR 1999:V, 
p. 1799, para 5.119. 
219 Ibid. 
220  See Argentine-Hides and Leather (n 217) on de facto restrictions, para 11.17 and India — Quantitative 
Restrictions (n 218) para 5.129: In the latter instance, the Panel used the term ‘limiting condition’ to define the 
scope of the term ‘restriction’ in the Article. The Panel judged that this did not only constitute a condition 
placed on importation, but any condition that has a limiting effect. 
221 See PD Farah and E Cima, ‘Energy Trade and the WTO: Implications for Renewable Energy and the OPEC 
Cartel’ (2013) 16 Journal of International Economic Law 707, 736.  
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Resources is a mere principle of international law that States can and do contract out of. By 
choosing to enter into an international trade agreement, States are bound by its provisions. 
This in effect means that they in part contract out of this principle, as it becomes apparent 
from the China cases discussed in the sections below.  
 
The arguments above, combined with the overall broad case law interpretation of what 
qualifies as a QR up to date, make for a plausible case to include production quota, as 
maintained by OPEC, within the scope of Article XI.1. However, it also becomes clear that 
the law does not provide any definitive answer on this issue and the question on whether 
production quotas are ‘prohibitions or restrictions’ in the sense of Article XI.1 therefore 
remains open.
222
 Nevertheless, for the purpose of completeness, in the scenario where OPEC 
production quota were to qualify as a prohibited QR, we want to explore to what extent 
OPEC Members would be able to rely on the Article XX(g) exception defence. 
 
6.6.4. OPEC Production Quota as a QR: Possible Defences under Article XX(g) GATT? 
 
We have concluded that the law brings no clear answers as to whether or not OPEC 
production quota fall within the scope of Article XI.1. Based on the narrow interpretation, 
production quota on petrol would not constitute QRs. According to the broad view, on the 
other hand, OPEC’s production quota are likely to be within the purview of Article XI.1. In 
case production quota were found to constitute prohibited QRs under Article XI.1, one has to 
examine whether OPEC Members would be successful in invoking the Article XX(g) 
exception of the GATT. The article reads as follows: 
 
‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  
 
(g)      relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 





                                                 
222 Carey (n 61) 797. 
223 GATT (n 5) Article XX (General Exceptions). 
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A successful invocation of the Article XX(g) exception would not change the nature of the 
measure as a QR, but would merely justify it under this general exception clause. For an 
Article XX defence to be successful, the OPEC WTO Member invoking it in a dispute would 
have to demonstrate that it not only complies with the conditions set out in subparagraph (g), 
but additionally satisfies the chapeau of Article XX. This mechanism prevents parties from 
using measures that are more restrictive that necessary in pursuing their objectives. 
Additionally, its goal is to prevent an arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries, or a disguised restriction on trade. In the EU – Seals case, the Appellate Body 
considered that one important element to determine if a measure is applied in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner is to look at whether the discrimination is rationally related to the 




6.6.4.1. Rationale of Article XX(g) GATT 
It is helpful to gain some clarity on why the exception relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources under (g) was included in the first place. The traveaux 
preparatoires of Article XX(g) and the statements made by delegates negotiating on the 
matter back in 1947 give us some insights into the article’s purpose. New Zealand’s 
arguments show that one of the reasons for including this particular exception was that ‘no 
member country should be compelled to export both manufactured and natural products 
which it wished to conserve for domestic purposes.’
225
 This would imply that the article was 
drafted so as to give Members the freedom to use their own resources for domestic use, much 
in the same spirit as the Principle of Permanent sovereignty over Natural Resources. What 
‘conserve for domestic purposes’ means remained undefined. However, New Zealand’s 
delegate continued by adding that ‘it was obvious that no country would restrict its export 
trade except for valid reasons’.
226
 It appears that New Zealand’s delegate was not speaking 
about unevenly distributed strategic natural resources, over which members could exercise 
their market power. 
 
                                                 
224 See the EC-Seals case, EC – Seal Products, Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures 
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 
June 2014, paras. 5.296-306.  
225 UN, Economic and Social Council, London E/PC/T/C.II/50 13 November 1946, ‘Preparatory Committee of 




On the other hand, India’s representative stated that ‘he felt that his country might have to 
conserve for domestic use its exhaustible and scarce resources, even if such a measure was 
not ‘pursuant to international agreements’, or was not ‘made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.’
227
 This conception leans more towards 
scarce resources to which access to supplies was – and still is – a bigger issue than access to 
markets. It is plausible that the exception under (g) was drafted with commodities such as 
petrol and minerals in mind; however, this is not literally spelled out anywhere in the 
traveaux preparatoires.
228
 Nevertheless, it does seem that the negotiations for the exhaustible 
natural resources exception were pointing in the direction of non-living organisms.  Later, as 




6.6.4.2. Could OPEC Successfully Invoke the Article XX (g) Exception? 
With this mind, we can now turn to the legal analysis of the exception in the context of our 
OPEC case study. If an OPEC Member would want invoke the Article XX(g) defence to 
justify its production quota that would arguably violate Article XI.1, could it be successful? 
The examination of a measure under subparagraph (g) (not including its scrutiny under the 
Article XX chapeau) is a two-step enquiry:
230
  
1. Whether the measure in question relates to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources; 
2. And, whether it is made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption. 
 
6.6.4.2.1. ‘Relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ – Lessons Learned 
from the China-Raw Materials Case 
                                                 
227 Ibid, page 5. 
228 Mavroidis (n 104) 345-46. 
229 Ibid. 346; Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755, paras 128, 130, 153, where is 
says that (g) is not limited to mineral resources:  
‘Textually, Article XX(g) is not limited to the conservation of ‘mineral’ or ‘non-living’ natural resources. The 
complainants’ principal argument is rooted in the notion that ‘living’ natural resources are ‘renewable’ and 
therefore cannot be ‘exhaustible’ natural resources. We do not believe that ‘exhaustible’ natural resources and 
‘renewable’ natural resources are mutually exclusive. One lesson that modern biological sciences teach is that 
living species, though in principle, capable of reproduction and, in that sense, ‘renewable’, are in certain 
circumstances indeed susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human 
activities. Living resources are just as ‘finite’ as petroleum, iron ore and other non-living resources.’  
230 Mavroidis (n 104) 348. 
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It goes without saying that petroleum as a non-renewable commodity is an exhaustible 
natural resource that easily fits the paragraph (g) definition. The question remains, however, 
what is meant by ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.’
231
 The AB in 
US-Shrimp stated that ‘relating to’ implies a rational connection between a measure and the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources and nothing beyond that.
232
 This was confirmed 
by the AB in the EC-Seals case.
233
 This is quite a broad construction, implying that if such 
measures are not inappropriately used for another purpose, even the measures that are not 
primarily aimed at the conservation of the resource could be justified under Article XX(g) – 
the criterion the AB was using before in the US-Gasoline case.
234
 The AB Korea – Beef and 
later in EC – Asbestos, clarified that the importance of the objective has to also be taken into 
account.
235
 Additionally, it is required that the measure under scrutiny be the least-restrictive 




Attempting to answer what is meant by ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources’, several sub questions arise here in connection with OPEC: Is administering 
production quota rationally related to the conservation of petroleum?  Second, what is the 
policy objective behind the conservation of petroleum? Is the production quota the least 
restrictive reasonable available measure to pursue its goal?  
                                                 
231    The Panel in US — Gasoline Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 
1996:I, p. 29 held that the United States measure at issue could not be justified in the light of Article XX(g) as a 
measure ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’. The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s 
finding and held that the United States measure was justified under Article XX(g), although it ultimately found 
that the measure was inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XX; The Appellate Body para 16 held that the 
Panel was in error in searching for a link between the discriminatory aspect of the United States measure (rather 
than the measure itself) and the policy goal embodied in Article XX(g): 
“[The] problem with the reasoning in that paragraph is that the Panel asked itself whether the ‘less favourable 
treatment’ of imported gasoline was ‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of natural resources, rather than 
whether the ‘measure’, i.e. the baseline establishment rules, were ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation of clean 
air. In our view, the Panel here was in error in referring to its legal conclusion on Article III:4 instead of the 
measure in issue. The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on its head. Obviously, there had to be a 
finding that the measure provided ‘less favourable treatment’ under Article III:4 before the Panel examined the 
‘General Exceptions’ contained in Article XX. That, however, is a conclusion of law. The chapeau of Article XX 
makes it clear that it is the ‘measures’ which are to be examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding 
of ‘less favourable treatment.’”; Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 3 
232 Mavroidis (n 104) 349. 
233 EC – Seal Products (n 224). 
234 Mavroidis (n 104) 349; See AB in US-Gasoline (n 231) para 1336. 
235 Mavroidis (n 104) 332; see Korea-Beef: Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Bovine Meat and Meat Products from Canada, WT/DS391/R, 3 July 2012, unadopted and EC-Asbestos: 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243, para 172. 




The China-Raw Materials case may offer some more clarity on this. The case moreover 
provides for an interesting analogy for OPEC, as exhaustible natural resources were also at 
the centre of this case. The US brought a complaint against China’s export restraints on 
various raw materials (mainly used in technology such as smartphones) that benefited the 
domestic industry.
237
 China sought recourse to Article XX exceptions to justify the export 
restraints of these raw materials. Among others, China submitted the Article XX(g) defence, 
claiming it restricted the export of raw materials to pursue a ‘conservation programme’ for 
exhaustible natural resources.
238
 However, it was not successful in this endeavour. The reason 
for this was that the panel concluded, and the AB later confirmed, that China could not 
invoke GATT Exceptions to commitments made in its accession protocol.
239
 Continuing its 
analysis, the Panel arguendo explored whether China would have had a successful case 
invoking GATT exceptions, including Article XX(g).  
 
The Panel was of the opinion that ‘conservation’ in the sense of Article XX(g) means an act 
of preserving and maintaining the existing state of something, in this case natural resources 
covered by subparagraph (g), which included the raw materials in question.
240
 With regard to 
the Article XX(g) conservation of natural resources exception, however, the Panel doubted 
whether the challenged export restrictions were ‘related to’ a conservation programme.
241
 It 
subsequently scrutinised the relationship between the export duties and the declared objective 




The Panel was of the opinion that there should be a close and genuine relationship of end and 
means between the goal of conservation of refractory-grade bauxite and fluorspar (the raw 
                                                 
237 See Rolland (n 164). 
238 China-Raw Material (n 141) Report of the Panel, paras 7.426-7.428; In its first written submission, China 
argued that it had adopted a ‘comprehensive set of measures relating to the conservation of fluorspar’ and a 
‘comprehensive set of measures relating to the conservation of bauxite.’ However, the Panel noted that a ‘policy 
document’ pointed to by China ‘refers for the most part to the economic and development gains that China can 
make through the exploitation of its mineral resources.’ The Panel could not find ‘measures relating to the 
conservation of’ refractory-grade bauxite and fluorspar in the evidence China submitted relating to what it calls 
its ‘mineral policy.’ (Para 7.419). 
239 Accession Protocol: WT/L/431 (23 November 2001); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China, WT/MIN(01)/3 (10 November 2001). 
 
240 China-Raw Materials (n 141) Report of the Panel 7.372. 
241 Ibid, paras 7.369 and 7.416. 
242 Ibid, paras 7.370-7.371. 
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materials in questions) and the means demonstrated by the applicable export duty and export 
quota.
243
 In order to determine whether the challenged export restriction was ‘relating to’ 
conservation, one had to look at the text, design, architecture and context of the measure.
244
 
In China’s instance, the Panel concluded that the measure did not ‘refer to the goal of 





We have to return to the sovereignty issue (discussed earlier this chapter in section 6.6.1.) at 
this point in the analysis.
246
 Contributing to its Article XX(g) defence, China added that 
nothing should interfere with the Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources.
247
 It stated 
that Article XX(g) ‘protects its sovereign right to adopt a comprehensive and sustainable 
mineral conservation policy, taking into account China's social and economic development 
needs.’
248
  The Panel stated that when interpreting the exception under (g), according to 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT), it indeed had to 
take into account ‘principles of general international law as applicable to WTO Members’.
249
 
The Panel was of the opinion, however, that when interpreting Article XX(g), the sovereignty 
principle did not clash with WTO obligations, but rather operated in harmony with them.
250
 
The principle ‘affords Members the opportunity to use their natural resources to promote 
their own development while regulating the use of these resources to ensure sustainable 
development.’
251
 However, the Panel concluded that ‘Members must exercise their 
sovereignty over natural resources consistently with their WTO obligations’ and that Article 





‘Conservation and economic development are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
policy goals; they can operate in harmony. So too can such policy goals operate in 
harmony with WTO obligations, for Members must exercise their sovereignty over 
natural resources consistently with their WTO obligations. In the Panel's view, 
                                                 
243 Ibid, para 7.416. 
244 Ibid, para 7.418. 
245 Ibid. 
246 See supra Section 6.6.1. 
247 China-Raw Materials (n 141) Report of the Panel, paras 7.377-380. 
248 Ibid, para 7.363. 
249 Ibid, paras 7.377 – 380 and Article 31(3)(c) VCLT (n 44). 
250 Ibid, paras 7.381-383. 
251 Ibid, paras 7.381-383. 
252 Ibid, paras 7.381-383. 
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Article XX(g) has been interpreted and applied in a manner that respects WTO 




Additionally, the Panel decided that the ability to enter into international agreements such as 
the WTO was in fact a quintessential example of the exercise of sovereignty.
254
 This could be 
even interpreted as the freedom of the sovereign state to contract out of the Principle of 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources in view of the obligations arising out of international 
economic cooperation.
255
 The Panel was of the opinion that resource-endowed countries are 
entitled to manage the supply and use of those resources through conservation-related 
measures that foster the sustainable development of their domestic economies, provided this 
is done consistently with general international law and WTO law.
256
  
The Panel stated that ‘China's right to economic development and its sovereignty over its 
natural resources are not in conflict with China's rights and obligations as a WTO 
Member.’
257
 More importantly, it emphasised that when China ‘chose to join the WTO in full 
exercise of its sovereignty, China made the concurrent decision that its sovereign rights over 
its natural resources would thereafter be exercised within the parameters of the WTO 




In short, the Panel held that Article XX(g) ‘cannot be invoked for GATT-inconsistent 
measures whose goals or effect is to insulate domestic producers from foreign competition in 
the name of conservation’ (which  is at the heart of non-discrimination).
259
 It should be noted, 
that after the case was concluded, China reportedly resorted to – unsurprisingly – 
                                                 
253 Ibid, para. 7.381: The Panel further stated that ‘the ability to enter into international agreements − such as 
the WTO Agreement − is a quintessential example of the exercise of sovereignty.’ In joining the WTO, China 
‘committed to abide by WTO rights and obligations,’ and ‘exercising its sovereignty over its own natural 
resources while respecting the requirements of Article XX(g) that China committed to respect, is an efficient 
way for China to pursue its own social and economic development.’ (See para 7.383) So, rather than sovereignty 
and economic development justifying the measures at issue under Article XX(g), complying with Article XX(g) 
would, in the Panel's view, be an exercise of sovereignty and would promote development. 
254 China-Raw Materials (n 141) Report of the Panel, paras 7.381-383. 
255 Article I.2 ICCPR (n 147) Article I.2 ICCPR. Finally, in the Panel's view, Article XX(g), which provides an 
exception with respect to "conservation," cannot be interpreted in such a way as to contradict Article XX(i), i.e., 
to allow a Member, with respect to raw materials, to do indirectly what paragraph (i) prohibits directly. In other 
words, "WTO Members cannot rely on Article XX(g) 'to excuse export restrictions adopted in aid of economic 
development if they operate to increase protection of the domestic industry.'" (Paras. 7.384-386) 
256 China-Raw Materials (n 141) Report of the Panel, para 7.404. 
257 Ibid, para 7.404.  
258 Ibid, para 7.405. 
259 Ibid, para 7.408. 
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What can we take from this analysis for OPEC’s case? Would the measure of administering a 
production quota ‘relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’? Assuming 
OPEC’s production quota concern an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of the 
Article, the other requirements of Article XX would not be necessarily satisfied. Especially 
problematic would be the ‘relating to the conservation’ condition of paragraph (g). Taking 
into account the Panel’s arguendo opinion on the matter, we have to ask the question what 
the policy objective behind the conservation, maintained through a production quota on 
petroleum, is and whether there is a close and genuine relationship between the goal and the 





Clearly, it is questionable to what extent OPEC’s production quota are primarily aimed at 
conserving the exhaustible natural resource of oil as such.
262
 In China-Raw Materials, 
conservation was interpreted as ‘the action of keeping from harm, decay, loss or waste; 
careful preservation’.
263
 It is very unlikely that the purpose of OPEC conservation is to 
protect the petroleum in and of itself from harm, etc. While this measure may be relating to 
the conservation of petroleum, the protection of petroleum does not seem its primary purpose. 
OPEC extracts petroleum with a purpose of trading it, after all.  
 
                                                 
260 See on this ‘Rare Earth Demand to Increase 50 Per Cent by 2020’  
<http://www.bnn.ca/Sponsored-News/2015/10/22/Rare-earth-demand-to-increase-50-by-2020.aspx> (accessed 
27 March 2016).  
261 China-Raw Materials (n 141) Report of the Panel, para 7.418. 
262 Ibid, para 7.372: ‘The dictionary definition of the noun "conservation" is "the action of keeping from harm, 
decay, loss or waste; careful preservation. The preservation of existing conditions.... The preservation of the 
environment, esp. of natural resources". The verb "conserve" is defined as "Keep from harm, decay, or loss esp. 
with view to later use; preserve with care. Maintain (energy etc.) unchanged in total quantity according to a 
conservation law". The noun "preservation" is defined as "The action or an act of preserving or protecting 
something; the fact of being preserved". To "preserve", is to "Keep from harm, injury; take care of, 
protect...keep from decay; maintain (a state of things)". In sum, these dictionary definitions define 
"conservation" as the act of preserving and maintaining the existing state of something, in this case "natural 
resources" covered by Article XX(g).’; See also US-Gasoline (n 321) paras 18-19, stating that: ‘All the 
participants and the third participants in this appeal accept that a measure must be ‘primarily aimed at’ the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources in order to fall within the scope of Article XX(g). Accordingly, we 
see no need to examine this point further, save, perhaps, the note that the phrase ‘primarily aimed at’ is not 
itself treaty language and was not designed as a simple litmus test for inclusion or exclusion form Article 
XX(g).’ 
263 China-Raw Materials (n 141) Report of the Panel, para 7.372. 
 
 198 
OPEC may argue that it keeps petroleum in the ground to protect its exhaustibility and/or 
protect the environment. Although a slower extraction rate may have positive externalities for 
the environment, this argument is not convincing. OPEC Members are rather conserving 
petroleum to influence the international price of it to their advantage and quite openly so. In 
this sense, when looking into the design and context of the measure, we can conclude that as 
an ultimate goal the measure is designed to influence the price of oil, rather than to 
‘conserve’ or ‘protect’ the petroleum because it would be vulnerable in and of itself. 
 
This in fact is reminiscent of the abovementioned ‘GATT-inconsistent measure whose goals 
or effect is to insulate domestic producers from foreign competition in the name of 
conservation’ that the Panel in China-Raw Materials said would not satisfy Article XX(g) 
conditions.
264
  There are serious doubts as to the extent conserving petrol to influence the 
world price of oil in OPEC’s interest qualifies as a legitimate objective to meet the conditions 
of paragraph (g). One could quite logically claim that OPEC is using its production quota 
inappropriately for another purpose, namely for extracting the most benefit through the 
exercise of its market power, a practice that clearly contradicts the policy of free trade.  
 
The analysis above shows that the production quota maintained by OPEC would likely fail to 
meet the requirement of subparagraph (g). However, with the case law as it stands now (US-
Shrimp), it seems that there is space for measures that are not primarily aimed at conserving 




6.6.4.2.2. ‘Made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption’ 
Generally, OPEC production quota equally apply to domestic and foreign markets (unless the 
country exports the totality of its production), and therefore do not necessarily discriminate 
against the foreign market. Additionally, in the China-Raw Materials case, the AB was of the 
opinion that although the Member has to make sure that its measures apply in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption, it did not specify to what extent 
                                                 
264 Ibid, para 7.408. 
265 US-Shrimp (n 299) para 934: ‘We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied 
jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation. We note only that in 
the specific circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and 
endangered marine populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g).’ 
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they have to be equal to the import/export restrictions.
266
 The Panel stated that Article XX(g) 
‘does not oblige resource-endowed countries to ensure that the economic development of 
other user-countries benefits identically from the exploitation of the resources of the endowed 
countries.’
267
 In other words, while is clear that domestic restrictions have to operate in 
parallel,  it is not clear to what extent the domestic measures additionally have to be effective 
measures.
268
 Consequently, OPEC would arguably satisfy the element of paragraph (g) that 
requires even-handedness with respect to domestic production or consumption, even if the 
domestic restrictions are not equal to the export restrictions on oil.  
 
6.6.4.3. The Article XX Chapeau 
Even if an OPEC defence could satisfy the conditions of (g), it would likely face some 
difficulty meeting the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau of Article XX 
must be complied with in addition to the conditions set out in the specific subparagraphs of 
the Article. However, it is not the substantive consistency of a measure that has to be 
reviewed under the chapeau.
269
 In US-Gasoline, the AB clarified that when moving to the 
chapeau, the only question that is left to answer is whether the measure at hand is applied in a 
GATT consistent manner.
270
 This seems somewhat contradictory, since the function of the 
chapeau remains ‘the prevention of the abuse of exceptions’ and will arguably in some cases 
demand that the substantive consistency of a measure to be addressed.
271
 There are three 
cumulative conditions that have to be met in order for a measure to comply with the chapeau: 
(i) there must be no ‘arbitrary’ discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail; (ii) there must be no ‘unjustifiable’ discrimination between countries where the same 




                                                 
266 Mavroidis (n 104) 350 and China-Raw Materials (n 141) Report of the AB, paras 360-361 and China-Raw 
Materials Report of the Panel, para 7.408: In short, the Panel in fact concluded that the Article XX(g) defence 
can be successfully invoked if the measures ‘are primarily aimed at rendering effective parallel domestic 
restrictions operating for the conservation of natural resources’. 
267 China-Raw Materials Report of the Panel (n 141) paras 7.403-7.404. 
268 Ibid, paras 7.388-39; Also see Mavroidis (n 104) 350. 
269 See US-Gasoline (n 321) para 22 and Mavroidis (n 104) 355. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid. 
272 US-Shrimp (Art 21.5 – Malaysia) Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 
21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 648,  para 118 and Mavroidis (n 104) 255-56. 
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While OPEC production quota do not seem to be contrary to (i) and (ii), they may not be 
compliant with the no ‘disguised restriction on international trade’ condition under (iii). The 
GATT Panel Report on US – Canadian Tuna explained the meaning of this condition as 
follows:  
‘We consider that ‘disguised restriction’, whatever else it covers, may properly be 
read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
in international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally within the terms of 
an exception listed in Article XX.’ […] The fundamental theme is to be found in the 
purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to 




Mavroidis, in his treatment of the issue, rightly points out that this is very similar to the 
French doctrine of ‘abus de droit’.
274
 More importantly, the EC-Asbestos case subsequently 
stated that the ‘disguised restriction’ question should be understood as prohibiting 
interventions, which, under the guise of protection of one of the interests mentioned in the 





‘We consider that the key to understanding what is covered by "disguised restriction 
on international trade" is not so much the word "restriction", inasmuch as, in 
essence, any measure falling within Article XX is a restriction on international trade, 
but the word "disguised". In accordance with the approach defined in Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention, we note that, as ordinarily understood, the verb "to disguise" 
implies an intention. Thus, "to disguise" (déguiser) means, in particular, "conceal 
beneath deceptive appearances, counterfeit", "alter so as to deceive", "misrepresent", 
"dissimulate". Accordingly, a restriction which formally meets the requirements of 
Article XX(b) will constitute an abuse if such compliance is in fact only a disguise to 




In this chapter, we have clearly established that if anything, OPEC’s restrictive practices by 
means of production quota are contrary to the notion of free trade. It could thus be argued 
that OPEC in fact pursues trade-restrictive objectives – influencing the world price of oil that 
maximises the cartel’s interest. For these reasons, it is highly likely that even if OPEC could 
satisfy the conditions under subparagraph (g), its measures would not be consistent with the 
Article XX chapeau, as they would ultimately constitute a ‘disguised restriction on trade’. It 
                                                 
273 GATT Panel, US – Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (L/5198 – 29S/91) 
(Report of the Panel Adopted on 22 February 1982) page 25. 
274 Mavriodis (n 104) 359. 




is therefore doubtful that OPEC would be successful in invoking the Article XX(g) defence. 
First of all, because it is questionable to what extent OPEC would satisfy the ‘relating to the 
conservation of’ conditions of subparagraph (g), and secondly, in the case that it would, 
whether it would comply with the chapeau of Article XX. 
 
6.6.4.4. OPEC Production Quota and Compliance with WTO Law 
In the previous section we examined the legal consistency of OPEC production quota and 
explored to what extent an OPEC Member can successfully seek recourse to Article XX(g). 
To recap, the question remains whether OPEC’s production quota qualify as quantitative 
restrictions in the sense of Article XI.1 GATT. This article is on the dividing line between 
domestic policies and international trade rules. Where this line is drawn has important 
consequences for our analysis. In the narrow sense of a quantitative restriction, a production 
quota are not covered, despite having a similar economic effect. In the broad sense, however, 
supported by its economic effect and the broad interpretations of what constitutes a QR, the 
production quota fall within the scope of Article XI.1. In that case, it would constitute a 
prohibited QR. 
 
Whether or not an OPEC Member would be successful in invoking the Article XX(g) 
exception depends on whether the objective that the OPEC member in question pursues is 
‘related to the conservation’ of exhaustible natural resources. As demonstrated in the China-
Raw Materials case, there should be a close and genuine relationship between the objective 
and the measure, to be determined by the design, function, architecture and context of the 
measure. The author is of the opinion that OPEC production quota would not satisfy this 
condition, as the production quota are not primarily aimed at conservation, but are rather 
means to influence the terms of trade to its advantage. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that 
under the current broad definition of ‘relating to’, namely that there has to be a rational 
relationship between the objective and the measure, an OPEC member could still comply 
with the conditions under subparagraph (g).  
 
In all probability, such practices would not comply with the Article XX chapeau, as there 
seems to be enough evidence in support of the proposition that OPEC practices constitute a 
disguised restriction on trade. As a matter of last resort, an OPEC Member could invoke the 
‘Pandora’s box’ Article XXI Security Exception. This exception has never been invoked in a 
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WTO dispute, arguably fuelled by the fear that once used, it would become a wild card for 




WTO consistent or not, however, the fact of the matter remains, that the status quo favours 
OPEC. Unless there is a dispute shedding light on the matter, the situation will remain 
opaque. Why a dispute has not been brought remains open for interpretation. Perhaps the 
overall impact of the OPEC cartel has not been ‘bad’ enough to start a dispute in the WTO. 
Alternatively, the issue may be so politically sensitive that countries opposing these practices 
are reluctant to pursue the matter and have just learnt to live with the reality of the influence 
of OPEC policies on the rest of the world.  
 
Recalling the access to markets versus the access to supplies distinction above, this explains 
why OPEC chose to apply quota for production of crude oil, rather than export restrictions. 
The latter would clearly be in breach of their obligations under WTO law, namely Article 
XI.1 GATT on the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions.
278
 The former 
potentially allows OPEC Members to remain outside of the realm of WTO law, 
circumventing WTO obligations on the prohibition of quantitative restrictions.  
 
The line of reasoning here is that restriction on production is not GATT inconsistent since it 
is only after the extraction that the crude oil in question becomes subject to the disciplines of 
the WTO.
279
 No recourse would need to be sought under the exceptions of Articles XX or 
XXI GATT, since there would be no breach of Article XI.1 to begin with. This explains why 
governments in such instances would prefer a domestic policy instrument such as production 
quota and not the equivalent trade measures.
280
 Elaborating on this argument, the Principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources provides an additional explanation for this 
preference. On the basis of paragraph two of the 1803 UNGA resolution that provides that 
nations are free to explore and develop their own natural resources, one could claim that 




                                                 
277 Only once in the 1986 GATT Panel Report on ‘United States - Trade Measures affecting Nicaragua’ (not 
adopted); Although countries have used the security exception to justify measures over the decades.  
278 GATT (n 5) Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions). 
279 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 162. 
280 World Trade Report 2010 (n 12) 185. 
281 UNGA Res 1803 (n 143) para 2. 
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Moreover, one has to keep in mind that the WTO law only offers a framework that regulates 
the terms of trade among its Members. It is not in and of itself an agreement for regulating 
international competition, including the behaviour of cartels, monopolies and private actors. 
Although the debate whether such state of affairs is a desirable one and to what extent the 
WTO should deal with competition law is interesting and worth exploring, it is outside the 
scope of this chapter.
282
 Nevertheless, this chapter explored an important question – whether 
OPEC’s restrictive practices can be caught under any provisions of the WTO law. A crucial 
finding of our analysis is that the economic effect of OPEC production quota is analogous to 




Since OPEC administers production quota on the amount of oil that is extracts from the 
ground, it could be argued that GATT disciplines do not apply to the petroleum when it is 
still in the ground. Surely, Article XI.1 should not be construed so as to disallow 
governments to make important policy choices.
284
 The production quota would thus not 
necessarily constitute an export restriction. It merely restricts the production. However, the 
argument could still be made that production quota could de facto amount to export quota, 





6.7. Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the law and economics of restrictive practices in energy trade, using 
the OPEC cartel as a case study. It first explored to what extent the WTO is about free trade 
policy. It concluded that although the organization in essence seeks to promote free trade, 
competition rules are absent. Then, it examined the practice of, and policy behind, production 
quota as maintained by the OPEC cartel and explained the deadweight losses that result from 
them. It is clear that in the economic sense, OPEC’s behaviour is contrary to the theory of 
free trade. However, because of the lack of competition rules in the WTO, the cartel’s 
practices are difficult, if not impossible, to constrain in the WTO.  
 
                                                 
282 See the discussion supra in section 6.2 on competition policies in the WTO context. 
283 Farah (n 221) and the Lautenberg Report (n 207). 
284 Mavroidis (n 104) 63. 
285 Mavroidis (n 104) 62. 
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The chapter nevertheless continued to examine whether OPEC’s behaviour could be caught 
under the existing rules of the WTO. Of particular relevance to the case of OPEC production 
quota is GATT Article XI.1 on the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions in this 
respect. The chapter looked into the economic rationale of the article and the prohibition of 
quota in the WTO, and tried to assess whether production quota as maintained by OPEC 
could be squared into its definition. Relying on the ‘narrow’ interpretation, it would be 
difficult to equate production quota with quantitative export restrictions. On the broad 
reading of Article XI.1, however, production quota as maintained by OPEC could be seen as 
a QRs. This is based on the economic effect of the production quota and the fact that case law 
has interpreted the notion of quantitative restriction broadly.  
 
To complete the analysis, the chapter investigated whether in case of a dispute against 
production quota maintained by an OPEC Member, OPEC WTO Members could rely on 
Article XX(g). It is questionable that an Article XX(g) defence would be feasible in light of 
the difficulty demonstrating that production quota as maintained by OPEC is ‘relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources’. In the event such a defence were successful, 
OPEC production quota would probably not meet the chapeau of Article XX, being arguably 
‘a disguised restriction on trade’. Be as it may, the production quota of an OPEC Member 
have never been challenged in the WTO and are unlikely to be challenged in the foreseeable 
future. This leads us to the conclusion that the status quo favours OPEC.  
 
Nevertheless, OPEC may perhaps reconsider its strategy and bind its export duties instead of 
maintaining a production quota. For nothing stops WTO Members from negotiating export 
concessions and they do so on an increasing basis.
286
 OPEC Members could use binding 
export tariffs to their advantage and utilize this as a negotiation tool. Last but not least, 
alternative solutions can be found or negotiated in PTAs (see e.g. TTIP).
287
                                                 
286 Horn and Mavroidis (eds) (n 1) 61. 
287 In TTIP negotiations (n 2), the EU is actively seeking access to US shale gas supplies, see EU Initial 










After discussing restrictive practices in energy trade and their compatibility with the WTO by 
looking into the example of the OPEC cartel, this chapter will explore another crucial and 
challenge to WTO law and energy regulation: the regulation of subsidies in WTO law and 
implications for fossil fuels and renewables. Subsidy rules are especially relevant for energy 
in the broadest sense, not in the least because the sector is heavily subsidized. The dilemma is 
that on the one hand, subsidies on clean energy production and consumption are needed to 
correct market failures and to promote legitimate policy goals such as contributing to 
sustainable development through the scale up of clean energy, including expanding its trade.
1
 
However, the nature and the design of clean energy subsidies makes them sensitive to WTO 
dispute settlement. On the other hand, much more harmful subsidies on fossil fuels are 
omnipresent yet often escape the rules of the multilateral trading system, for reasons that will 
be explained in this chapter.
2
 This results in a paradoxical situation where the WTO legal 
framework as it stands now de facto favours production and consumption of non-renewable 
energy, but makes it much more difficult for governments to promote the production of clean 
energy. One reason for this is that clean subsidies are easier to distinguish because of their 
specific nature, making them actionable under the SCM Agreement.
3
 This status quo is 
entirely contrary to the type of policies we should be promoting in view of combatting 
                                                 
1 See e.g. L Rubini, ‘Rethinking International Subsidies Disciplines: Rationale and Possible Avenues for 
Reform’ The E15 Initiative Overview Paper, November 2015, <e15initiative.org> 8; Rubini writes: ‘Among the 
various obstacles to green energy and its competiveness, the existence of significant support to conventional 
fossil fuel energy (both in terms of subsidies to production and consumption) cannot be overlooked. At the same 
time, often thanks to public support, green technologies are developing extremely fast. As a result, some types of 
clean energy, such as solar, are almost on a par with conventional energy. This means that some degree of 
differentiation is needed in any new disciplines providing for exemptions to subsidies (that is, certain sources 
need more/ less protection than others).’   
2 Ibid. 
3 See Articles 3 and 5 ASCM Agreement: Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. and T 
Meyer, ‘Energy Subsidies and the World Trade Organization’ (2013) Volume 17, Issue 22 ASIL Insights (10 
September 2013) 1; See also in particular on this issue H Birhanu Asmelash, ‘Energy Subsidies and WTO 
Dispute Settlement: Why Only Renewable Energy Subsidies Are Challenged’ (2015) 18 Journal of International 
Economic Law 261.  
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climate change and promoting sustainable development, and touches upon the dilemma that 
the SCM Agreement does not give room to the policy choices that may lay behind certain 
subsidies.
4
 While it seems very difficult to tackle fossil fuel subsidies in the WTO context at 
present, to meet their clean energy targets, governments should at least be able to legitimately 
promote clean and renewable energy policies. Against this background, the current state of 
WTO subsidies disciplines is unsustainable and inefficient.  
 
This chapter will expose this discrepancy by looking into the legal and economic rationales 
of WTO subsidy rules and their application to energy. It will especially focus on explaining 
the difference in nature between fossil fuel and clean energy subsidies and how this impacts 
their treatment under subsidy disciplines. The chapter will also give some possible scenarios 
to solve this ensuing paradox. Section 7.2 will briefly discuss the economic effects of 
subsidies and rationale of subsidy disciplines in the WTO, after which it will explain their 
legal coverage. Section 7.3 will subsequently zoom in on fossil fuel and renewable subsidies 
to understand where the crux of of the matter lies that leads to the policy paradox. By way of 
illustration, Section 7.4 will discuss the need to balance policy goals and legal constraints, in 
addition to offering some suggestions for improvement. The conclusion will recap the 
findings in this chapter.   
 
7.2. Law and Economics of Subsidies Disciplines in the WTO  
7.2.1. Understanding the Economic Effect of a Subsidy 
 
To comprehend the role of subsidies in WTO law and their impact on energy, we must first 
understand subsidies as an economic concept. How do we define subsidies? It figures that 
there is in fact a great indeterminacy in this notion. Some may see subsidies synonymous to a 
government transfer of money to a private entity.
5
 Others may consider it the provision of a 
good or a service at a price below the what the private entity would normally have to pay.
6
 Or 
alternatively, it may be a government policy that favours the competitive position of certain 
private entities (such as through government procurement).
7
 However, considering the wide 
                                                 
4 COP21 Paris Agreement: United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ (12 December 2015). 
5 AO Sykes, ‘The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ (2003) 186 Chicago 





array of policies the government is involved in, it is by no means the case that such behaviour 
always necessarily results in a subsidy.
8
 For economists, therefore, the easiest way to identify 
a subsidy is to look at the hypothetical market equilibrium without government presence.
9
 
For instance, when looking at abstract general competitions models, government involvement 
is completely absent. But when governmental policies enter into the equation through either 
expenditure or tax policies, we see that this affects equilibrium prices and output.
10
 This 
means that those activities that are taxed will result in a lower output and thus will be 
discouraged, while activities for which net returns will grow are said to be subsidized.
11
 
However, due to the theoretical nature of these models it is difficult to apply them in practice. 
One thing that does follow from the above is that taxes and subsidies somehow cohere. In 
fact, we can say that in economics, a subsidy has the same effect as a tax, but in an inverted 
manner.
12




In absence of other clear and practically applicable benchmarks helping us define what 
subsidies are precisely, it is possible to utilize three other options helping us to discern them. 
The first option is to look at governmental programs separately, and simply look whether this 
program confers a benefit to a private entity.
14
 Another way to define a subsidy is to look 
how narrow certain programs are applied. While generally applicable taxes tend to affect 
enterprises equally, targeted programs may be set up in a way so as to encourage production 
in a certain industry.
15
 Finally, one can compare government activities and their impact on 
private entities by looking at comparable activities and their impacts elsewhere.
16
 
Nevertheless, none of these approaches are conclusive and all have their own deficiencies. 
The first proves to be too simplistic, while the second builds on the presumption that 
generally applicable programmes have neutral impact as opposed to targeted programmes.
17
 
The third alternative is problematic for obvious reasons; it proves hard to compare countries 
and the reasons for the fact that a programmes exist in one country but not another.  
                                                 
8 Sykes (n 5) 3. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 On taxes, see RS Pindyck and DL Rubinfeld, Microeconomics – 8th Edn (Pearson, 2013) 345; Both 
subsidies and taxes as forms of assistance involve financial transfer by the government. 
13 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 12) 348. 
14 Ibid. 






All in all, it figures that it is not easy to define a subsidy. Nonetheless, we can agree to 
generally characterize it as a direct or indirect government transfer of funds to an entity in the 
private sector in order to keep the price of the commodity or the service in question low.
18
 
Governments can use subsidies in their industrial policies, to boost a certain region, or to 
incentivise the production and consumption of a certain product, thereby increasing its 
market share.
19
 Instead of raising the price of a good, whereby the buyer and the seller share 
the cost of the tax, a subsidy actually decreases the price of a good, benefitting both the buyer 
and the seller (initially).
20
 Through a subsidy, the seller’s price of a good beats the buyer’s 
price: it is lower than the buyer expected it to be based on the demand and supply curve 
before the subsidy.
21
 The difference between the seller’s actual price and the expected price 
of the buyer is the amount of the subsidy. By means of this subsidy, the production and the 
consumption of the good will thus increase. This is illustrated in the figure below:  
 
                                                 
18 WTO, World Trade Report 2006, Exploring the Links Between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO (WTO, 
Geneva 2006) 47; This is a purely economic, but not legal definition. Legally speaking it was not an easy task to 
agree on the definition of a subsidy. See also generally, L Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid – 
WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (OUP, Oxford 2010); Note also, that the SCM Agreement is 
generally understood to apply to goods only not to apply to services.  
19 J Bohanes, WTO Dispute Settlement and Industrial Policy – The E15 Initiative, Think Piece (ICTSD and 
WEF, Geneva 2015). 
20 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 12) 345. 








Figure 1 explains the effect of a subsidy. The ‘pre-subsidy’ market price in Country A for a 
given good is P0 (in case the elasticity of supply and demand are roughly equal). Ps is the 
price that sellers receive and Pb is price that buyers pay after the subsidy. As we can see, the 
supply of the good will increase and the price will decrease. The amount of the subsidy is Ps 
minus Pb. Taking the scenario where the price elasticity of demand and supply is roughly the 
same, the benefits of the subsidy for the buyer and the seller are also equal.
22
 This means that 
the seller can sell the good at a lower price, but will be compensated for this by means of the 
subsidy. And, the buyer pays a lower price for the good than would be the case without the 
subsidy in place. 
So far, we have only talked about ‘benefits’ of the subsidy in the economic sense (both the 
seller and the buyer in the model benefit from the subsidy on the good in question). What 
then, are the adverse effects of a subsidy?  
                                                 
22 This would change if the price elasticity of demand would change: in case the demand curve is inelastic, the 
sellers would benefit most from the subsidy. Vice versa, if the supply curve is inelastic, the buyers benefit the 
most, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 12) 348. 
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The reality is that someone has to pay for the subsidy. In this model, it is clear that the 
government of Country A finances the subsidization. But that is not the end of the story. 
Because the government uses tax revenues to finance the subsidies it applies. As a result, it is 
therefore the taxpayers themselves that finance the subsidy in the end (and, the buyers and 
sellers in this case are taxpayers as well). It follows that although it initially seems that 
subsidies bring benefits to buyers and sellers alike, in practice, they themselves are financing 
the subsidy indirectly, without necessarily being aware of it. 
 
7.2.2. Subsidies in International Trade – Rationale of the Disciplines in the WTO 
 
The previous section discussed the effect of a subsidy within the context of one country. How 
do subsidies affect international trade? The starting assumption is that a country generally 
should set its internal policies, whose effects are confined within their borders, as it pleases.
23
 
However, a lot of policies, whether domestic or international, do affect foreign consumers as 
well as corporations abroad.
24
 One important reason to have disciplines in WTO law on 
subsidies is that without such rules, governments may not take into account these negative 
externalities abroad when drafting their internal policies. Mavroidis argues that policies that 
do not take note of these adverse effects are inefficient on the larger scale in the end, because 
the better option would be to adopt agreements that all governments globally would agree 
to.
25
 On the other hand, while it is true that they can displace efficient producers, subsidies 
also expand trade. If there is no predation, then, should subsidies still be tackled? In other 
words, what kind of negative externalities can subsidies have in international trade?  
As we have seen above, governments usually subsidize with the goal to make a certain 
product cheaper and increase its quantity on the market. This in and of itself should not 
decrease the aggregate welfare of an importing country, quite to the contrary, provided that 
the markets in question are competitive and well-functioning.
26
 However, perfectly 
competitive markets are more often than not confined to economist’s models than the 
everyday reality of the multilateral trading system. 
                                                 
23 PC Mavroidis, Trade in Goods – 2nd Edition (OUP, Oxford 2012) 523; note however, that internal policies 
may nevertheless affect investments of foreign companies.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid; Also see H Horn and PC Mavroidis (eds), Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law (CUP, 
Cambridge 2013) 58. 
 
 211 
For instance, if Country A starts applying a subsidy to a product that competes with an 
imported product from Country B, Country A can undermine its market access commitments 
this way.
27
 The welfare in Country B, that imports the product, could be reduced if it cannot 
compete with the subsidized product of Country A.
28
 Additionally, subsidies given to 
exporters in a third country can result in another country losing its market and having to 
divert its trade away to another market.
29
  
It follows that the effects of a subsidy can be ambiguous: In some cases, a subsidy can 
increase the aggregate welfare of a country, while in others, it may cause harm to its industry. 
The negotiators of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) 
wanted to mitigate the effects of the latter (harm caused to this industry). It is precisely 
because of this that the injury to the foreign producer is central to the disciplines in the 
Agreement, and not inflicting harm on the aggregate welfare of another country in general.
30
 
By means of the ASCM, WTO Members accordingly discourage certain policies that would 
harm competing producer interests in importing countries (one of the underlying reasons for 
this is that consumers are not heard in WTO regulation).
31
 The underlying thought of 
Countervailing Duties (CVD), is then to offset the effect of the subsidy and restore the 
competitive relationship as it was prior to the subsidy.
32
 In this sense, the objective of the 
ASCM is very similar to that of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).
33
  
In the eyes of economists, the objective of the ASCM may not be optimal, since they 
generally prefer to take the aggregate welfare as the starting point.
34
 As explained above, in a 
model where perfect competition exists, governmental subsidies in fact subsidize foreign 
consumers. The lower prices caused by that subsidization abroad, will generally lead to lower 
                                                 
27 World Trade Report 2006 (n 18) 47. 
28 Mavroidis (n 24) 524. 
29 World Trade Report 2006 (n 18) 47. 
30 Part V SCM Agreement (n 3) and Mavroidis (n 24) 524. 
31  This is e.g. reflected in the text of Articles 12.9, 14, 15.1 and 19 of the SCM Agreement (n 3); See also 
Mavroidis (n 24) 525. Mavroidis explains that in the sense of political economy, countries do not always set 
their policy with aggregate economic welfare in mind. Rather, policies are often a compromise of competing 
interests, some receiving more weight than others (e.g. governments give in to political pressure and tend to give 
more weight to producer interests rather than consumer welfare in their trade policy.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Agreement on Anti-Dumping: Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 
34 Mavroidis (n 24) 525. 
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prices for the domestic products as well.
35
 But, to reiterate, perfect competition is hardly ever 
achieved and the reality is that governments have a variety of legitimate reasons to 




Apart from subsidies that simply help producers, there are subsidies that contribute to wider 
societal interests. These are the types of subsidies that typically correct market failures and 
negative externalities, such as the need to invest in cleaner energies to mitigate climate 
change.
37
 In that instance, subsidies could be seen as correcting for the market failure 
indicating a slow development of a green economy.
38
 It is here that we touch upon the crux of 
the matter with regard to (clean) energy to be discussed further in the chapter: The rationale 
of a subsidy actually matters, although the SCM Agreement does not take this into account at 
present.
39
 It is unclear why the ASCM does not distinguish between different types of 
subsidies and what the subsidy in question is meant to address. Perhaps this touches upon the 
debate to what extent the WTO should be involved in matters that go beyond trade, such as 
national and industrial policy making.  
Another issue is that from the WTO rules as they stand now, it is not always easy  to 
demonstrate whether or not a subsidy has actually been granted.
40
 It may be simply because 
of the sophisticated nature of a particular scheme that confers benefit. While a subsidy may 
have been granted in the broad economic sense discussed in Section 7.2, it does not have to 
necessarily qualify as such in the legal sense of the SCM Agreement (e.g. it may lack the 
necessary specificity within the meaning of Article 2). 
7.2.3. Regulation of Subsidies in WTO Law: An Overview 
 
GATT Article XVI on subsidies was the predecessor to the ASCM. What this article, 
amongst others, was missing, however, is one of the fundamentals needed to deal with the 
discipline effectively in WTO law: a definition of what constitutes a subsidy. The ASCM 
brought improvement in this by incorporating definitions in Part I.
41
  
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid, 526. 
37 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (n 12) 667 ff. 
38 Rubini (n 1) 8. 
39 Mavroidis (n 24) 526. 
40 Ibid, 527. 




Article 1.1(a) (1) ASCM defines a subsidy as (a) a contribution by a government, (b) through 
which a benefit is conferred. Article 2 of the SCM Agreement adds one more crucial element 
to this definition: the benefit must be conferred to a specific recipient.
42
 After first explaining 
the categories of subsidies in the ASCM, each of these conditions will be briefly laid out 
below.  
 
7.2.3.1. Prohibited, Actionable and Non-Actionable Subsidies 
Not all subsidies are illegal in the WTO context and a distinction is made between prohibited 
and actionable subsidies. Part II of the ASCM in Article 3 lists prohibited subsidies that a 
Member should refrain from altogether. These are subsidies contingent on export (Article 3.1 
(a) SCM) and local content requirements (LCRs) (Article 3.1 (b) SCM). Next, Part III lists 
actionable subsidies. These are allowed, but ‘no Member should cause…adverse effects to the 
interests of another Member’.
43
 Thus, if an actionable subsidy causes harm to a Member’s 
industry, the Member in question may take action against it. Members have two methods to 
seek recourse to prohibited and actionable subsidies: they can impose Countervailing Duties 
(CVDs) or they can initiate a dispute at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
44
  
7.2.4. Definition of a Subsidy in the SCM Agreement 
 
After discussing the different categories of subsidies in in the SCM Agreement, this section 
will briefly explain in what cases a certain activity is legally considered to fit into the 
definition of a subsidy in the sense of the SCM Agreement.  
 
7.2.4.1. Contribution by a Government 
Article 1.1(a)(1) sets out an exhaustive list of conditions under which a governmental support 
scheme is considered a financial contribution. The term ‘government’ here entails a 
governmental public body, and includes its regional and local authorities, as well as state-
owned enterprises.
45
  The Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV confirmed that this 
list of forms of financial contributions is exhaustive but at the same time wide-ranging and 
                                                 
42 Article 1 and 2 SCM Agreement (n 3) and Mavroidis (n 23) 532. 
43 Article 5 SCM Agreement (n 3). 
44 SCM Agreement (n 3) (Part V – Countervailing Measures) 
45 P van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – 2nd Edition (CUP, Cambridge 
2008) 758.  
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includes measures such as loans and grants, government revenues that are otherwise due 




7.2.4.2. Benefit to the Recipient 
To qualify as a subsidy, the financial contribution must confer a benefit (Article 1.1 (b) 
ASCM). Demonstrating that a benefit has been conferred is not always a straightforward 
exercise. For instance, it goes without saying that may be easier to determine that a direct 
transfer of a sum of money confers a benefit, as opposed a scenario in which a government 
purchases a good, or a guarantees a set  price for the good produced.
47
 In Canada—Measures 
Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, the AB was of the opinion that generally, to assess 
whether a benefit was conferred, one would have to look whether the financial contribution 
left the recipient better off than it would have been without the contribution.
48
 Another 
benchmark may be to look at Article 14 of ASCM, which deals with calculation of the 
subsidy.
49
 In what is known as the private investor test, the article explains that the term 
benefit refers to ‘benefit to the recipient’, using the market or private investors to help 
determine the amount and existence of the benefit.
50
 For instance, if the government provides 
equity capital, it shall not be considered to confer a benefit, lest the investment decision in 
question can be considered to be incompatible with usual investment practices of private 





To qualify as a subsidy within the meaning of the ASCM, the subsidy in question moreover 
has to be deemed specific pursuant to Article 2 of the Agreement.
52
 The thought behind this 
requirement was that only specific financial contributions can lead to trade distortions 
through inefficient resource allocation.
53
 As the Panel in US – Upland Cotton put it, a subsidy 
is not specific if it is ‘sufficiently broadly available throughout an economy as not to benefit 
                                                 
46 WTO, Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571, 
para 52. 
47 Asmelash (n 3) 272. 
48 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted 20 
August 1999, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, p. 1443, para 157. 
49 Article 14 SCM Agreement (n 3). 
50 PC Mavroidis, PA Messerlin, JM Wauters, The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in the WTO 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2008) 325. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Article 2 SCM Agreement (n 3). 
53 Mavroidis (n 23) 549. 
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a particular limited group of producers of certain products.’
54
 The idea is that if a subsidy is 
available to all producers in the country, there is not one producer or group of producers that 




Schemes have to either be de jure or de facto specific to an enterprise (Article 2.1 (a) SCM), 
industry (Article 2.1 (b) SCM) or particular region (Article 2.2 SCM), to qualify as a 
subsidy.
56
 With regard to prohibited subsides in Part II (contingent on export and LCRs), the 
specificity requirement does not have to be met: Article 2.3 sets out that these subsidies are 




Subsidies can be paid to consumers and to producers.
58
 Note though, that the dividing line is 
not always clear as producers can be simultaneously consumers. Nevertheless, generally 
speaking, the first type consists of intermediate (firms) and final consumers (households). 
The second type subsidizes the producers of a certain product.
59
 The subsidy disciplines of 
the WTO are relevant for both. It is important to keep in mind, however, that it is overall 
much easier to establish specificity in production subsidies than in consumer subsidies.
60
 The 
reason for this is that the latter is often more general in nature. The distinction between 
producer and consumer subsidies and their respective specificity has far-reaching legal 





7.3. Exploring the Subsidy Paradox in WTO Law: Fossil Fuels versus Clean Energy 
 
                                                 
54 Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, Add.1 to Add.3 and Corr.1, 
adopted 21 March 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS267/AB/R, DSR 2005:II, p. 299, para 
7.1142 
55 Mavroidis (n 23) 549. 
56 Article 2.1 SCM Agreement (n 3). 
57 Article 2.3 SCM Agreement (n 3); Mavroidis (n 23) 549. 
58 B Clements, D Coady, S Fabrizio, S Gupta, T Alleyne and C Sdralevich (eds), Energy Subsidy Reform – 
Lessons and Implications (International Monetary Fund, Washington 2013) 1,2. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Asmelash (n 3) page 273. 
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7.3.1. Relevance of WTO Subsidy Rules for Energy 
 
The energy sector, whether based on fossil fuels or renewables, is one of the most heavily 
subsidized sectors in the world.
61
 This can be explained by the fact that the energy sector is 
often capital intensive and closely connected to the industrial policy of a state, whether based 
on fossil fuels, or, to the contrary, to promote alternative energies to gain ground (e.g. by 
means of feed-in tariffs). Because of the wide presence of subsidies in the sector, WTO rules 
on subsidies automatically become relevant to it: The rules of the ASCM influence and bind 
the choices of the government with respect to their industrial and other policies. Note, 
however, that the SCM Agreement is generally understood to only apply to goods – this is 





The previous section explained the economic effect of subsidies, their rationale and 
regulation in WTO law and relevance for the energy sector. This section will explain how the 
nature of energy subsidies and WTO law at present leads to a paradox, as a result of which it 
is difficult to tackle fossil fuel subsidies and equally difficult to incentivize clean energy in 
WTO law. It will discuss both types of subsidies and their treatment under the SCM 
Agreement. 
 
As alluded to above, energy subsidies can be broadly divided into producer and consumer 
subsidies.
63
 The first type of energy subsidies concern intermediate (firms) and final 
consumers (households). One could think of e.g. cheaper inputs for energy intensive 
industries, or lower energy bills for household consumers due to subsidized energy. The 
second type of subsidizes the producers of fuel products, coal, natural gas, and electricity.
64
 
Feed in tariffs (FITs) to stimulate the scale up of renewables in the energy mix, are also an 
example of producer subsidies. 
 
Overall, specificity in producer subsidies is easier to distinguish: Clean and renewable energy 
programs (such as feed in tariffs), generally constitute subsidies in the form of regional or 
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62 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2. 




national programmes to stimulate the production of clean energy and are therefore more 
clearly defined as specific.
65
 Fossil fuel subsidies, to the contrary, are often subsidies to 
consumers which are moreover available throughout the whole economy, making it harder to 




7.3.2. The Case of Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Harmful but Difficult to Tackle in WTO Law 
 
 
7.3.2.1.  Understanding Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
Fossil fuel subsidies is an overarching term used for subsidies that are granted by the 
government towards the production and consumption of energy from fossil fuels.
67
 There are 
two broad categories of such subsidies: those that are targeted at reducing the price for 
domestic consumers and those that aim at increasing domestic supplies.
68
 Consumer 
subsidies are those subsidies that occur when the prices paid by consumers (including firms 
and households), are below the costs for supply, including the costs for transport and 
distribution of energy.
69
 And, vice versa, producer subsidies occur when the prices for energy 
supply are above this level.
70
 When energy is traded internationally, such as petroleum, the 
supply costs is based on the international price.
71
 The two categories of consumer and 
producers subsidies are connected, however, for reasons of the elasticity of consumption, and 
it may de difficult to separate them in practice. Regarding consumer subsidies, these can 
further be divided in ‘pre-tax’ and ‘post-tax’ subsidies.
72
 The first one occurs when the price 
paid by the household or firm is below the actual costs for distribution and supply, while the 
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latter occurs when the taxes paid for is below their efficient level.
73
 It is estimated that fossil 




The actual ways in which fossil fuels subsidies are instituted remain opaque and unclear, not 
in the least because there is no international standardized system monitoring them, and this is 
one of the biggest problem in addressing such subsidies comprehensively.
75
 The situation is 
such that even in data-rich countries, a lot of disagreement exists as to how much a particular 
energy sector is subsidized and how this is calculated, but their estimated amount is vast. For 
instance, in the US, they amounted to around $ 600 billion in the year 2011.
76
 In countries 
that lack clear data, it is even more challenging to discern the nature and amount of such 
subsidies. Sometimes, the only available means of measurement is to look at energy prices, 
e.g. if there are strikingly low energy prices for consumers (i.e. far below the international 
market price).
77
 Subsidies on fossil fuels are more often consumer subsidies (generally 





The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2013 recognized the problem of measurability and 
lack of clear data on fossil fuel subsidies and undertook an extensive study on energy subsidy 
reform.
79
 In its endeavour to map fossil fuel subsidies, it became clear that pre-tax consumer 
subsidies on fossil fuels are mostly concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Emerging and Developing Asia and Central and Eastern Europe (see Figure 2 below).
80
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Figure 2: Total estimate of pre-tax fossil fuel consumer subsidies per region (Source: IMF, 
Energy Subsidy Reform – Lessons and Implications) 
 
Aside from having negative externalities for the environment, since fossil fuel subsidies 
encourage wasteful consumption, they can additionally greatly affect the terms of 
international trade.
 81
 Fossil fuels subsidies impact the energy industries themselves and the 
the industries that use energy as an immediate input (one can especially think of heavy 




Energy dual pricing is a widely utilized form of fossil fuel subsidy that illustrates this well. It 
has been subject of much opposition and debate, not in the least by the EU and the US.
83
 
Dual pricing is the practice whereby governments of resource-rich countries sell their energy 
abroad at much higher prices than domestically. They can do so, because they often have a 
monopoly on the resource in questions (such is the case with OPEC Members, see on this 
issue Chapter 6).
84
 In international energy trade, dual pricing policies are often instituted by 
means of export taxes (not regulated in WTO law). It can be said that through energy dual 
pricing, household consumers in the exporting countries are indirectly subsidized, at least in 
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the economic sense, as they pay a lower overall price for their energy. And intermediate 
consumers (firms) are subsidized, too, since they have lower input prices for their 
industries.
85
 For this reason, it comes as no surprise that a governmentally instituted dual 
pricing programme could be seen as an equivalent to the provision of goods or services under 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) ASCM.
86
  For instance, dual pricing schemes have led to capital 
intensive investments in the Saudi petrochemical sector.
87
 This is all good and well for the 
country applying such schemes. However, there are negative externalities for industries of 
other WTO Members: it affects the competitive balance between energy intensive industries 




Nevertheless, it is questionable if fossil fuel subsidies in the form of dual pricing policies 
would be deemed to fit the definition of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) ASCM in practice. In the WTO 
US – Export Restraints case, dual pricing policies, although not on fossil fuels, were 
discussed before a WTO Panel.
89
 Canada challenged the United States’ approach that treated 
its export restraints as ‘financial contributions’ in countervailing duty investigations to 
suspected subsidized imports.
90
 The US treated these restraints as financial contributions in 
the sense of government entrusted or directed provision of goods by a private body in the 
sense of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) SCM.  Yet the Panel disagreed with the US and concluded that 
the treatment of export restraints as a financial contribution is inconsistent with Article 1.1(a) 
of the SCM Agreement and cannot qualify as a financial contribution in the sense of the 
SCM.
91
 The Panel did emphasize, however, that its findings were limited to this particular 
instance only.
92
 This therefore does not exclude that a Panel may judge differently if the 
question on dual energy pricing policies and fossil fuels arises before it.   
 
Additionally, it begs the questions whether cheaper inputs through dual pricing always confer 
a ‘benefit’ in the sense of Article 14(d) ASCM.
93
 This Article prescribes that in order to 
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confer a benefit, the good in question has to be provided at a ‘less than adequate 
remuneration’. In such instances, one has to look at the prevailing market conditions to 
determine the adequate remuneration for a good. The problem with this approach is that in 
many of the countries where dual pricing policies are implemented, the government often is 
the predominant provider of the good. Consequently, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, 
to assess what the objective market conditions would be. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for 
instance, it is the state owned Saudi Aramco company that is in control of fossil fuel 
extraction and trade.
94
 In addition, the standing timber at the centre of the Canada – Softwood 
Lumber IV dispute was supplied chiefly by the provincial governments.
95
 In these cases, the 
WTO DSB might have to look into practices in other markets in order to be able to assess 
whether a benefit was conferred.
96
 Last but not least, such schemes may be the necessary 
‘specificity’ to qualify as a subsidy, something that is inherent to fossil fuel subsidies as a 
whole and that will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
We can conclude that fossil fuel subsidies are evidently harmful for the environment, while 
additionally having a distorting effect on international trade. That being said, no fossil fuel 
subsidy disputes have been brought in the WTO up to date, owing perhaps to political 
reasons and the unspecific nature of such schemes.
97
 Nevertheless, as mentioned above EU 
and the US have opposed such practices for a long time, but eventually failed to have dual 
pricing eliminated completely in their Accession Protocol negotiations with both Saudi 
Arabia and Russia.
98
 While Saudi-Arabia eventually stated in its Accession Protocol that it 
would not sell energy below the world price domestically, but this does not necessarily imply 
the abolishment of energy dual pricing policies as such.
99
 Countries that utilize energy dual 
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pricing themselves usually justify these policies by using the argument that it is a form of 




Interestingly enough, it should be mentioned here, that negotiators did attempt to address dual 
pricing programs in the early 1990s. A draft provision dealing with dual price policies 
dealing with inputs supplied by the government was included in early negotiations of the 
SCM Agreement.
101
 The provision, that obviously did not make it into the final version, read 
as follows: 
 
‘When the government is the sole provider or purchaser of the good or service in 
question, the provision or purchase of such good or service shall not be considered as 
conferring a benefit, unless the government discriminates among users or providers 
of the good or service. Discrimination shall not include differences in treatment 





7.3.2.2. Fossil Fuel Subsidies and the SCM: Lack of Specificity 
 
The previous sections discussed various types of subsidies and the rationale of the ASCM. It 
explained their distinction in consumer and producer subsidies, and the general versus 
specific nature of each. It also explained that the ASCM at its core is concerned with 
mitigating injury to the producer in international trade, and not with the policy rationales 
behind certain types of subsidies.  
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The major problem concerning fossil fuels subsidies is that, no matter how trade-distortive 
they may be, they usually confer a general benefit to a country (in terms of greater income 
from sales of energy for a higher price abroad, i.e. increased aggregate welfare), rather than 
being a specific subsidy in the sense of Article 1.1 and 2 ASCM.
103
  While fossil fuel 
subsidies may constitute a subsidy in the purely economic sense, this type of behaviour is 
difficult to place in the definition of a subsidy as it stands in WTO law at present, as it would 
likely fall short of the specificity requirement.
104
 Because of their nature, fossil fuel subsidies 
tend not to be ‘specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries’ 
within the meaning of Article 2.1 SCM.
105
 The reason for this is that the revenues from fossil 
fuel subsidies, if maintained on governmental level, are usually collected by the state and 
used for boosting their general budget, rather than using the returns for specific, targeted 
programmes. Even if fossil fuel subsidies may be de facto subsidies through the provision of 
discounted goods, this would not necessarily result in a de jure specific subsidy, because in 
most cases, ‘the low-priced product will be generally available within the economy of the 




Article 2.1(c) does, however, mention four factors that can be taken into consideration when 
assessing whether a de jure non-specific subsidy may nevertheless be de facto specific. These 
are:  
a) the use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises;  
b) the predominant use of such a programme by certain enterprises;  
c) the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises; and 
d) the manner in which discretion has been exercised by a granting authority in the 
decision to allow a subsidy. 
107
 
Whether or not certain fossil fuel subsidies would fit into these factors would have to be 
assessed on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that revenues from e.g. dual 
pricing programs and the ways in which they are channelled into the national budget, and in 
turn spent by the state, are still too general to comply with any of the factors set out in Article 
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For fossil fuel subsidy schemes to fall within the definition of a subsidy in the sense of the 
ASCM, one crucial legal element is missing in current WTO subsidies regulation: There is no 
provision in the Agreement that disciplines the transfer between consumers and producers 
through overall government policies that raise or lower the price of a product compared to 
what it would have been in the absence of the subsidy.
108
 Such transfers would generally be 
based on an import/export tariff or other trade barriers.
109
 In the case of energy dual pricing, 
for instance, an export tax on crude petroleum consequently can drive the price of the 
international market up. The government will collect the tax and redistribute it, thereby 
benefitting domestic producers and consumers.
110
 Whatever the reasons for not including 
these types of transfers into the ASCM may have been, the outcomes for fossil fuel subsidies 
are that it is very problematic to tackle them under current subsidies disciplines. Therefore, 
the likelihood that a Member would challenge such subsidies in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System is minimal. 
 
Instead of the ASCM providing for any legal provisions for this particular type of transfer 
trough overall governmental policies, the agreement focuses on subsidization in other forms. 
One reason for this is that you cannot show specificity in these instances, without having to 
include any form of governmental income support in it. As we see, this missing element 
would come very close the to concept of contributing to the aggregate welfare of a country 
which for several reasons is not at the heart of the SCM, as discussed in Section 7.2. If this 
element would have been added to WTO subsidy disciplines, however, the result might have 
caused an undesirable externality. It could lead to Members initiating subsidy disputes 
against one another on the basis of very general governmental policies that do not target one 
industry or recipient in particular. These would not only lack merit, they would be harmful 
for the state of the multilateral trading system as such. It will be nearly impossible to redesign 
the ASCM in a way that would include fossil fuel subsidies in its scope, yet ensure that 
general governmental policies do not fall within this definition. In conclusion, it proves to be 
hard to fit fossil fuel subsidies into Article 1.1 and 2 of the ASCM, with foregoing any 
unwanted consequences.  
                                                 






Former WTO DG Pascal Lamy’s remarked on fossil fuel subsidies that: ‘discussion on the 
reform of fossil-fuel subsidies has largely bypassed the WTO. This is a missed 
opportunity.’
111
 While this quote summarizes the state of affairs of WTO law and fossil fuel 
subsidy disciplines accurately, we have concluded that it proves to be extremely difficult to 
deal with fossil fuel subsidies in the multilateral trading system comprehensively. It also 
becomes clear that including disciplines in WTO law that would tackle fossil fuel subsidies is 
accompanied by significant negative externalities with regard to other governmental policies, 
which will be very hard to exclude when widening the definition of a subsidy in WTO law. 
The question thus is whether it is up to the WTO system to tackle fossil fuel subsidies by 
means of the ASCM in the first place. It may be more effective to allow clean energy 
subsidies instead, as will become clear from the following sections. 
 
7.3.3. Clean Energy Subsidies: Legitimate but Sensitive to WTO Dispute Settlement 
 
7.3.3.1.  Forms of Subsidies for Clean and Renewable Energies 
Due to their policy objectives, clean energy subsidies enjoy broad support from around the 
world. Their main goal is to mitigate climate change caused by CO2 emissions, connected to 
fossil fuel combustion for electricity generation and heat production.
112
 This consensus about 
the need to promote universal access to sustainable energy, especially in developing 
countries, through the deployment of renewable energy, was confirmed in the Preamble to the 




In this section we will briefly set out the forms in which such subsidies arise. We have seen 
that fossil fuel subsidies usually come in the form of pre-tax consumer subsidies. The 
opposite is true when in comes to subsidies for clean energies. Producer, as opposed to 
consumer subsidies are much more common to support their scale up.
 114
 Since the share of 
clean energies in the overall energy market is growing but still small, governments – under 
pressure to meet their climate targets – are often eager to design support schemes for the 
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production of clean energies due to their positive effects on lowering green house 
emissions.
115
 One thing that becomes clear with respect to renewable energy generation, is 
that without government intervention, these markets for clean energy would not even exist. 
 
An important element with regard to clean energy subsidies is that the government through 
its policies may thus be seen as ‘creating’ the market for renewable energy in the first place. 
It can be tricky to determine the amount of the subsidy and find the proper ‘market 
benchmark’ to test against, if that particular market was non-existent if it was not for 
governmental involvement. This was at issue in the Canada-Renewable Energy/Feed in 
Tariff case.
116
 According to the AB in that case, a distinction should be made between 
instances where the government intervenes in an existing market and when the government 
actually creates a market through its interventions.
117
 
From an economic perspective, many subsidies for clean energy are set up as investment 
subsidies to expand renewable energy capacity.
118
 They usually come in a variety of forms 
such as Feed in Tariffs (FITs), power purchase agreements, capital grants and soft loans, 
favourable tax treatment, and funding for Research and Development.
119
 In the US, a clear 
example of a renewable energy investment subsidy is the Federal Production Tax Credit, 
which gives a 2.3 cent incentive per kilowatt-hour for the first 10 years of the operation of a 
renewable energy facility.
120
 Then there are renewable portfolio standards, which subsidize 
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clean energy implicitly in the form of green certificate values, through the mandate to buy a 




The FIT is arguably the most popular financing mechanism at present.
122
 Through a FIT, the 
government guarantees to pay a certain set (above-market) price per kilowatt-hour to the 
producers of renewable energy ‘to feed it into the national energy grid’. FITs are targeted at 
future investments through offering new producers of clean energy long-term contracts for 
this elevated price.
123
 In order to make a FIT programme effective, prices have to be set high 
and stable enough so as to provide enough incentives for those investments. In turn, suppliers 
of electricity are then required to buy electricity generated from these clean energy sources. 
These programmes may be designed in a way that the amount of the subsidy gradually 
decreases over the years, as the renewable energy in question becomes more profitable and 
gains more market share in the economy.
124
 Also, FIT subsidies may or may not be 
transferred by the government directly, or borne by the consumers by an add-on to the energy 
their bill. 
 
There are several reasons why FIT programmes have been a successful tool in the scale up of 
clean energy. First of all, these programmes usually have a long time frame and are therefore 
accompanied by long-term price guarantees, meaning that they provide a lot of stability for 
investors.
125
 Another advantage is that the programme design of feed-in tariff schemes is 
often flexible and therefore could and should be adapted the economics needs of the country 
in question, as well as to the changing market conditions and the advances in technology.
126
 
Additionally, feed in tariffs may be beneficial for the development of local production of 
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 However, this is potentially a particularly sensitive element of feed-in tariff 
policies and largely depended on how they are designed. Feed-in tariff programmes may in 
no way include local content requirements as they are prohibited under the ASCM by means 




Problematic local content requirements were one of the central issues in the WTO Canada-
Renewable Energy/Feed-In Tariffs case.
129
 In that case, the Canadian Province of Ontario 
instituted a FIT Programme implemented by the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) in 2009. In 
its rules, the OPA in Article 2.1 stated that ‘the FIT Contract will require that wind-power 
Projects and solar Projects achieve a Minimum Required Domestic Content Level’.
130
 The 
law demanded that a minimum of component parts and services from producers in Ontario. It 
is interesting to note that while Canada the challenged in the WTO, it was thus a regional, 
and not national, policy that was challenged here. Also, the involvement of the Ontario 
province was extensive, meaning for instance hat the Ontario Power Generation was 
responsible the majority supply of energy generation. Additionally, Ontario almost 
completely owned the high voltage transmission system, as well as the Independent 
Electricity System Operator. Through the its FIT programme, Ontario not only wanted to 
replace coal by cleaner options through adding wind and solar energy to the mix, but 
simultaneously intended to provide incentives to enable new green industries and investments 
in the production of clean energy technologies.
131
 To this end, Ontario did not limit itself in 
utilizing a FIT scheme only, but added another policy instrument to the mix, the local content 
requirement (LCR).
132
  The EU and Japan, the Members that challenged Canada in the before 
a WTO panel in this instance, did not directly attack the FIT scheme as a violation of Article 
5 ASCM (Actionable Subsidies). Instead, they targeted they claim against Canada on the 
basis of discrimination due to the LCR in the OPA Rules, invoking Article 2.1 TRIMS 
(which is by nature inconsistent with GATT III:4). There was also a stand-alone claim on the 
basis of Article III:4, as well as claim of violation of Article 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the ASCM.
133
 
                                                 
127 UNEP-WTO Report (n 126) 115. 
128 Article 3.1 (b) SCM Agreement (n 3) and Article 2.1 TRIMS Agreement TRIMS Agreement: Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186. 
129 Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (n 116). 
130 Ontario Feed-In Tariff Program Rules, Version 1.3.2, 29 October, 2010, Section 6.4(a). 





It is important to note that the last allegation was dependent on whether the FIT scheme as a 
whole could qualify as a subsidy in the first place. This particular issue will be elaborated 
upon in the next section. With respect to the LCR, however, the AB decided that Canada’s 
LCR was indeed a domestic requirement in the sense of Article 2.1 TRIMS and thus 
automatically a violation of GATT Article III:4.
134
 This goes on to show that while FIT 
Programmes may qualify as actionable subsidies in the sense of Article 5 ASCM, they 
become especially problematic if a LCR element is involved. This does not mean that WTO 
Members, whilst knowing that LCRs contrary to WTO law, shy away from them. There are 




There are also examples of more successful feed-in tariffs policies.  In Germany, for instance, 
the government has issued a purchase obligation for all electricity network operators to buy 
energy from renewable sources at a minimum price. In that instance, the costs for the 
programme are divided between electricity supply undertakings, buying clean energy, and 
private electricity network operators.
136
  The network operators additionally manage the 
implementation of the of the FIT programme by means of supplier contracts.
137
 As opposed 
to the Canadian example, the government, rather then being directly connected to the 
generation and supply of energy itself, has a mere regulatory role in Germany’s case. 
 
 
7.3.3.2. Clean Energy Subsidies and the SCM: Specificity and No Recourse to Exceptions 
Feed in Tariffs thus are often actionable subsidies, but a lot depends on how the schemes are 
designed and how big the chances are that they will harm a foreign industry through their 
existence. Nevertheless, they can have cross-border effects, especially when the subsidized 
energy is traded abroad over a grid, or when it has to compete domestically with imported 
energy. And it becomes much more problematic when governments have LCRs in their 
domestic FIT schemes, as WTO case law has pointed out in the Canada – Renewable Energy 
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program case.
138
 Quite obviously, LCRs in FIT schemes would be 
                                                 
134 AB in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (n 116) para 5.33. 
135 Fischer and Charnovitz (n 118) 4 and OECD Joint Working Party on Trade and Environment, Domestic 
Incentive Measures for Renewable Energy with Possible Trade Implications (OECD, Paris 2011) 46. 
136 M Wilke, Feed-In Tariffs for Renewable Energy and WTO Subsidy Rules – An Initial Legal Review 
(International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva 2011) 6. 
137 Ibid.  
138 Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (n 116) paras 5.78-79. 
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considered TRIMS, prohibited subsidies in the sense of Article 3.1(b) SCM per se and lead to 




While subsidies for clean energy have thus generally proven to be a successful policy tool, 
the problem is that because of their nature, such subsidies are easy targets for WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. The reason for this is that clean energy subsidy programmes are often 
designed as specific governmental policies, making it easy to fit them into the specificity 
definition in Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.
140
 Therefore, these programmes have a large 
chance of being actionable subsidies in the sense of Article 5 ASCM.
141
 Moreover, when a 
local content requirement is added to the mix, they will fall into the category of prohibited 
subsidies set out in Article 3 ASCM instantly. This would have arguably have been the case 
if the AB in the Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program, did not 
resort to legal acrobatics to avoid deciding that the measures at issue constituted a subsidy. 




Under the current rules, governments wanting to put in place such schemes thus only have 
one hope left in case such subsidies are indeed deemed actionable under the SCM. They trust 
that they will not cause injury to another Member. And in case they do, that Member will 
abstain from taking action against them in WTO dispute settlement. The problem is, 
however, that actionable subsidies (provided that they are not contingent on export or 
containing LCRs), may be the only legally available policy instruments for governments to 
promote the production and increase the market share clean energy at present.  
 
 
7.4. Energy Subsidies in the WTO: Balancing Policy Goals and Legal Constraints 
 
Because of the nature of subsidies on fossil fuels versus those on renewables, the disciplines 
of the SCM Agreement make it much easier to initiate disputes against renewable energy 
subsidies, while addressing fossil fuel subsidies in the WTO system is much more difficult, 
                                                 
139 See A Cosbey and L Rubini, Does It FIT? An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Renewable Energy 
Measures and of the Implications of the Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT Disputes (The E15 Initiative, Think 
Piece (ICTSD and WEF, Geneva 2013). 
140 Article 2 SCM Agreement (n 3). 
141 Article 5 SCM Agreement (n 3). 
142 Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (n 116) para 5.246. 
 
 231 
The situation as it currently stands thus leads to the following paradox: Members are unlikely 
to challenge harmful and trade distorting fossil fuel subsidies in the WTO, because of their 
presumed lack to meet in the specificity requirement under Article 2 of the ASCM. Clean and 
renewable energy subsidies, by way of their design, are much more ‘sensitive’ so to say, to 
being subject of a trade dispute in the DSS. And the evidence is there: A whole string of 
clean energy subsidy disputes is been litigated in the WTO, while no such disputed have 
taken place against fossil fuel subsidies.  
 
Another negative externality is that renewable energy policies are often instituted on regional 
and local, and not on national level (as was indeed the case in Canada-Renewable Energy).
143
  
Because of this, national governments, while responsible for the actions of regional 
governments, may not always be able to oversee the design of regional subsidy 
programmes.
144
 Consequently, climate friendly subsidies are also at a greater risk of being 
targeted at the WTO for this reason, as local policymakers may be less aware of the design of 
WTO rules. This is stark contrast with fossil fuel policies, which are often national policies 
and thereby inevitably drafted with more awareness of WTO disciplines. 
 
This is paradoxical and runs contrary to what would favour the successful implementations of 
policies for the promotion of sustainable development. We have arrived in an age where even 
the most sceptic nations have agreed that fossil fuel subsidies have to be fazed out, and we 
have to transition into an era of cleaner energy production and consumption. However, the 
the SCM Agreement as is stands now, makes it very difficult to act accordingly, and it fact 
incentives the opposite behaviour (i.e. leaving fossil fuels untouched while making clean 
energy subsidies more sensitive to dispute settlement). This paradox is caused by two 
important elements in WTO subsidy disciplines as they stand now: 1) the lack of specificity 
in fossil fuel subsidies pursuant to Article 2 ASCM, a condition that needs to be met to make 
subsidies in question actionable, and 2) The opposite given that subsidies on renewable 
energy are often producers subsidies and specific per se, coupled with the absence of the 
possibility to make them non-actionable or available to an exception (non-existent in the 
SCM). 
 
                                                 




Originally, a third type of non-actionable subsidies was taken up in Part IV (Article 8 
SCM).
145
 Article 8 ASCM actually did take into account certain legitimate policy goals for 
subsidization and they were deemed non-actionable of the basis of this article, even if they 
caused harm to another Member’s industry. Thus, there was an attempt to take into account 
the underlying reasons for subsidization in the Agreement somehow. It concerned three types 
of subsidies: 
1)  those for research and development (Article 8.2(a) ASCM); 
2)  regional aid within the territory of a Member (Article 8.2(b) ASCM) and; 
3)  last but not least, environmental subsidies (‘assistance to promote adaptation of 
existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or 





The category of environmental subsidies was and remains especially relevant for the scale up 
in clean and renewable energies, as one could easily see how such subsidies would fit into 
this category. The problem is that the non-actionable subsidies in Part IV were to last for an 
initial period of five years only and subject to renewal.
147
 Due to a lack of agreement on that 
renewal,  these subsidies ceased to exist as of 2000.
148
 The result is that environmental 
subsidies that originally fell in this non-actionable category are today either actionable or 
prohibited subsidies in the sense of the SCM. This is much to the discontent of many 
proponents of such subsidies in the context of climate change mitigation.
149
 Both Rubini and 
Howse, for instance, argue that in case non-actionable subsidies will not be reinstated in the 
                                                 
145 Article 8 (expired) SCM Agreement (n 3). 
146 Article 8.2(c) (expired) SCM Agreement (n 3): 
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the following subsidies shall be non-actionable:  
(c)       assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by 
law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms, provided that the 
assistance: 
(i)        is a one-time non-recurring measure; and 
(ii)        is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and 
(iii)        does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be fully borne 
by firms; and 
(iv)        is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm’s planned reduction of nuisances and pollution, and 
does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and 
(v)        is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production processes.’ 
147 Mavroidis (n 23) 566. 
148 Pursuant to Article 31 SCM Agreement (n 3); Mavroidis (n 23) 566. 
149 See notably Rubini (n 18) and R Howse, Climate Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO Legal Framework: A 
Policy Analysis (IISD, Geneva 2010). 
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SCM, GATT Article XX Exceptions should be available to justify them, although this 




While this scenario would offer an alternative solution in case Article 8 SCM is not 
reinstated, there are also opponents to this view. Mavroidis, for instance, is of the opinion that 
the whole idea of Article 8 SCM was that no recourse to GATT Article XX exceptions would 
be necessary.
151
 In his view, this was the underlying reason for negotiating the Article 8 SCM 
in the first place.
152
 Although there is a certain overlap between the list between GATT 
Article XX  and Article 8 SCM (‘green’ subsidies could be placed under subparagraphs (b) 
and (g)), ASCM negotiating history indicates that the idea was the deal with ‘green’ subsidies 
in a self-contained manner in the ASCM context.
153
 Moreover, Mavroidis argues that if 
Article XX exceptions the the SCM Agreement would be allowed, such exceptions would not 
meet the chapeau of the the Article, since the chapeau calls for absence of discrimination.
154
 
To add to this, nowhere does the SCM establish a link with the GATT and not one panel has 
accepted this view so far. 
 
Nevertheless, the frustration of those who advocate in favour of reinstating the expired 
Article 8 SCM or alternatively seek recourse in GATT Article XX Exceptions can be 
understood from looking at the initial problem that the SCM Agreement does not look into 




Without a doubt, it there can be a fine line between furthering justified policy goals and 
maintaining a similar measure which constitutes disguised protectionism.
156
 Nevertheless, 
governments should have options available to them to subsidize clean energy, without 
                                                 
150 Ibid. However, Mavroidis (n 23) 365 is of the opinion that this would be complicated. 
151 See Mavroidis (n 23) 365 ff, arguing that allowing GATT Article XX to function as an exception tot eh 
SCM Agreement would put into question the idea of establishing a so-called ‘trichotomy’ between prohibited, 
actionable and non-actionable subsidies.  
152 See PC Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade – Volume 1: The GATT (The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England 2015) 476-477. 
153 See Mavroidis (n 23) 365 ff, 
154 Ibid. 
155 PC Mavroidis, G Bermann and M Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization – Documents, Cases and 
Analysis (WEST Publishing, New York 2010) 567. 
156 D Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-Balancing Policy Space and 
Legal Constraints (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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running a risk of being challenged for this purpose only.
157
 It seems very difficult to address 
fossil fuel subsidies in the multilateral trading system at present, but vice versa, action could 




This chapter unveiled the energy subsidy paradox in international trade law. First, the chapter 
discussed economic concept of a subsidy. It proceeded with investigating the rationale of 
subsidies disciplines in the WTO and explained the functioning of the SCM Agreement. 
Then, the chapter turned to explaining the subsidies paradox. Fossil fuel subsidies escape the 
disciplines of the SCM Agreement, while renewable energy subsidies are an easy target in 
WTO disputes because of their specific nature.  
 
While it is very difficult to tackle fossil fuel subsidies in WTO law at present, there should 
be, at minimum, avenues in WTO law to legitimize subsidies for clean energy. First and 
foremost, it is crucial to reinstate the expired Article 8 of the SCM Agreement. While this is 
easier said then done, the WTO Membership should look beyond direct obstacles and remind 
themselves what they committed to in the Paris Agreement in late 2015.
158
 In absence of this, 
the applicability of GATT Article XX defences and their applicability to the ASCM should 
be tested in dispute settlement.
                                                 
157 See on this notably T Moerenhout and L Casier, WTO Members, Not the Appellate Body, Need to Clarify 
Boundaries in Renewable Energy Support (IISD, Geneva 2013). 









Part I of this thesis discussed the history and regulation of energy in the multilateral trading 
system, from GATT 1947 to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations 
(TTIP) today.
1
 In Part II of this thesis, we focused on three challenges with respect to 
international trade law and energy regulation: the relationship between the WTO and the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), restrictive practices as maintained by OPEC and the subsidies 
paradox. This part will attempt to take the foregoing a step further, by looking into what we 
can distil from developments from the WTO’s establishment in 1995 onward. It will suggest 
some avenues for enhanced energy governance. This means exploring how the system can 
regulate pressing energy matters more comprehensively and efficiently. This concluding 
chapter will explore this question at three levels. First of all, it will discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of the WTO as a forum to tackle energy issues more proactively in Section 
8.2. Section 8.3 will continue by looking into the possible scenarios for interaction between 
the WTO and the ECT in this capacity. Finally, Section 8.4 of the chapter will inescapably go 
beyond these two institutions and look into the alternative route of bilateral, regional and 
sector specific options for pushing the energy governance agenda forward.  
 
 
8.2. Enhanced Global Energy Governance: Is the WTO the Right Forum?  
 
Looking at the discussion in foregoing chapters of this thesis on the problematic relationship 
the WTO has had and continues to have with energy, one might ask: Is the WTO the right 
forum to tackle pressing global energy issues more proactively? If energy, and fossil fuel 
                                                 
1 GATT 1947: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 and European Commission, DG Trade, ‘In focus: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/index_en.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016) and United States 




trade in particular, is such a sensitive topic why should the WTO be given a bigger role to 
play in the global governance of energy trade?  
 
Here, there are three possible scenarios. One radical approach would be to abandon such 
ambitions altogether by completely excluding energy from the WTO coverage. Admittedly, 
this would not be an easy task, since we have concluded that energy is covered, disputes have 
been brought and some intermediate solutions have already been found. The main reasons for 
such a critical stance would be that energy trade is a delicate geopolitical issue; substantive 
changes and hard commitments by stakeholders involved in international energy trade are 
difficult to reach. Moreover, WTO Agreements were not tailored to deal with the realities of 
energy trade, so why should one try to ‘fit a square peg in a round hole’ at any cost?  
 
Second, one may argue that the situation should be left as is, meaning that big questions 
concerning WTO Agreements and their relationship to energy remain undetermined. Some 
countries might even find the current status quo satisfactory. Vital questions of WTO law and 
energy would only be confronted if a dispute between Members makes its way to the Dispute 
Settlement Body (hereafter DSB) (for instance a legal challenge regarding the consistency of 




The third option is that energy issues would be dealt with more proactively in the WTO. In 
this scenario, by acknowledging that the trading landscape has changed, it would be a 
conscious choice to utilize the WTO as an instrument of bringing clarity into energy trade 
rules by actively tackling problems, identifying gaps in the law and finding the necessary 
answers. This could be accomplished by interpretation, adaptation and elaboration; and 
perhaps specialized agreement on energy trade could be drafted at the WTO. Such efforts 
would not need to be confined to the WTO only, but could happen in cooperation with other 
relevant organisations (such as the Energy Charter Treaty, see on this issue Section 8.3). No 
matter the form of such initiatives, the minimum threshold and starting point for this would 
be to at least accommodate energy as an official topic of discussion in the WTO.  
 
                                                 
2 EU (and its Member States) – Energy Sector: European Union and Its Members States – Certain Measures 
Relating to the Energy Sector, WT/DS476 (Panel Established 20 July 2015). 
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Even if the WTO and its Agreements are not geared towards energy, the institutional 
machinery of the WTO offers a promising platform for future energy trade architecture. The 
reasons for this are manifold and will be briefly explained in this section. They include: the 
subject matter of the WTO, wide membership to the Organization, its negotiation and trade 
policy review functions, dispute settlement system, and involvement with issues inseparably 
linked to energy, such as environment, climate change and sustainable development. 
Nevertheless, there are also considerable drawback promoting more active energy regulation 
in the WTO, not in the least for reasons that the WTO itself is in crisis, due to the failure to 
complete the Doha Round.
3
 An additional challenge the WTO is facing is proliferation of 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements, not in the least the upcoming megaregionals such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP).
4
 This section will therefore set out the advantages as well as some disadvantages in 
making the WTO more proactive in energy regulation.  
8.2.1. More Proactive Energy Regulation in the WTO? 
 
8.2.1.1. Subject Matter of the WTO 
When thinking of structuring the bargaining of comprehensive energy policies around 
intergovernmental organizations, those that have an economic rather than environmental 
focus may be more likely to succeed.
5
 A reason for this is that economic institutions may 
function better, as they tend to have lower transaction costs in terms of decision-making and 
compelling compliance.
6
 An example of this is the degree of success in implementing the 
goals of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which 




                                                 
3 See WTO, The Doha Round on <www.wto.org> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
4 See supra note 1 and United States Trade Representative, the Trans-Pacific Partnership <https://ustr.gov/tpp/> 
(accessed 27 March 2016). 
5 TL Meyer, ‘The Architecture of International Energy Governance’ (2013) 106 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 5. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See e.g. generally X Wang and G Wiser, ‘The Implementation and Compliance Regimes under the Climate 
Change Convention and it Kyoto Protocol’ (2002) 11 The Review of European Comparative & International 
Environmental Law 181. 
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The WTO clearly has an economic focus as it governs the trade relations amongst its 
Members.
8
 Simply put, it is an organization that administers trade rules, a specialized dispute 
settlement system and provides an institutional forum for trade negotiations and addressing 
various trade-related issues. The subject matter of the WTO is to regulate the trade in goods 
(by means of the GATT), services (by means of the GATS), implement other trade 
agreements and results of previous negotiation rounds.
9
 The objective of the WTO is to 
promote free trade by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers and eliminating discriminatory 
treatment in international trade relations.
10
In accordance with the preamble to the Marrakesh 
Agreement, it does so by ‘[…] allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment […].
11
 Notably, the preamble does not say reducing import tariffs 
only but refers instead to curtailing tariffs, trade barriers and discriminatory treatment overall. 
It could be thus interpreted as in principle including export tariffs as well in that they are 
generally perceived to pose a bigger obstacle in energy trade than import tariffs. 
 
It is clear that energy already falls within the WTO’s remit, either because energy products 
are taken up in Members’ GATT Article II Schedules and energy services are being 
negotiated in the Doha Round or because disputes concerning energy are already being 
settled in the system. The WTO estimates that at least 18 per cent of intra WTO-trade 
involves energy goods such as fossil fuels.
12
 Energy most of the time is either a good (energy 
products such as crude petroleum or natural gas) or a service (such as the transportation of an 
energy product). Sometimes, it possesses the elements of both.
 13
 One could make the 
straightforward claim that there is in fact no better place to regulate the trade in energy 
between the nations. Considering its objectives, the WTO can have a positive impact on the 
trade of energy commodities and technology in line with the requirements of sustainable 
development and protection of the environment.
14
 Of course, no overly idealistic expectations 
should be based on WTO preambular language. But it is a simple fact that trade in energy has 
                                                 
8 Article II.1 of the WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
9 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement (n 8) and Article II.2. 
10 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement (n 8). 
11 Ibid.  
12 WTO, World Trade Report 2010, Trade in Natural Resources (WTO, Geneva 2010) 54. 
13 See Chapter 3 Section 2 of this book. 
14 R Leal-Arcas and A Filis, ‘The Fragmented Governance of the Global Energy Economy’ (2013) 6 Journal of 
World Energy Law and Business 1, 9. 
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grown larger than it ever was before in human history; it has shifted from a purely national 
level over a century ago to a global matter today. With increasing global trade, and an 
increasing amount of (energy producing, transporting and trading) Members, the chance of 
disputes is likely to grow even more, and these disputes need a forum to be solved in. 
Considering the uneven global distribution of fossil fuels, the WTO can help in a twofold 
manner here: First, it can alleviate disparities in natural endowments by promoting 
smooth(er) international trade flows and allow resources to move from places with excess 
supply to areas that have shortages, thereby preventing friction amongst nations.
15
 Second, 
the Organization can offer a system for effective settlement of conflicts when they arise.  
 
8.2.1.2. Involvement with Closely Related Issues  
Another argument for a greater role of the WTO in the formulation and refinement of 
international rules for set energy may be based on the close linkage between energy and 
several issues already on the WTO agenda. 
 
The WTO’s mandate has gone beyond the traditional aim of promoting free trade to include, 
whilst not as its main objective, promoting sustainable development and protection and 
preservation of the environment.
16
 These issues are inseparably linked to energy in the sense 
that a successful legal framework on energy cannot be built without addressing them, and 
vice versa the resolution of global sustainable development, environment and climate change 
challenges is impossible without energy. Energy in and of itself clearly is not an isolated 
matter.
17
 For instance, the WTO has issued an extensive World Trade Report discussing trade 




Pursuant to 1994 Decision on Trade and Environment, the WTO set up the Committee on 
Trade and Environment.
19
 The objective of this committee is to identify the relationship 
between trade measures and environmental measures.
20
 Moreover, the committee should 
make appropriate recommendations on whether modifications of the multilateral trading 
                                                 
15 World Trade Report 2010 (n 9) 48. 
16 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement (n 8). 
17 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement (n 8); Also generally see on ‘new’ issues on the WTO Agenda S 
Charnovitz, ‘Triangulating the World Trade Organization’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 28. 
18 World Trade Report 2012 (n 12).  
19 WTO, Decision on Trade and Environment. 
20 WTO, Decision on Trade and Environment under (a). 
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system are required, so as to ensure positive interaction between trade and environment, in 
line with sustainable development and avoiding protectionism.
21
 These efforts were 
strengthened in the appropriately named Doha Development Round (DDA 2001-) by 
instructing the negotiations on the elimination of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers on 
environmental goods and services.
22
 The ambition to provide better access to the goods and 
technologies that protect the environment and combat climate change was taken to the next 
level following the 2014 World Economic Forum in Davos, when a group of fourteen WTO 
members (including the European Union, the United States and China) has launched 
negotiations on so-called ‘green goods’, with the objective of producing a plurilateral deal 
eliminating tariffs completely.
23
  By 2016, negotiations for an Environmental Goods 
Agreement (EGA) under the initial  auspices of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), now including all WTO Members, are a reality.
24
 What exactly constitutes 
environmental goods and services is not clear-cut but arguably, wind turbines, solar panels 
and other goods and services, which are closely linked to energy production, could fall in that 
category.
25
 Environmental goods such as solar panels and equipment for biogas plants are 
used in clean energy production and contribute to energy efficiency. Additionally, the issue 
of trade in agricultural goods is important for energy since some biofuels, namely ethanol, are 





The larger debate on climate change also unveils how energy and the environment are 
intertwined and raises important questions regarding the legality of so-called green and 
renewable energy subsidies, as discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. How can such subsidies 
                                                 
21 WTO, Decision on Trade and Environment under (b). 
22 These are several goods that might be included in the category of ‘Environmental goods’. Negotiations on 
environmental goods and services are included on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), under Paragraph 
31(iii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD). They have been discussed for many years in the context of 
the Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTESS), though there is not yet an agreed list 
of environmental products; See 
 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_serv_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016); Doha agenda 
(Paragraph 31(iii) of the DMD): There is no agreed list of environmental products, although some Members 
want to label it under ‘environmental projects’. 
23 European Commission Press Release, 24 January 2014, ‘EU in joint launch of WTO negotiations for green 
goods agreement’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-71_en.htm> and International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), ‘Green goods trade initiative kicks off in Davos’ 
<http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/182795/> (both websites accessed 27 March 2016). 
24 See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ‘Environmental Goods and Services’ <www.apec.org> (accessed 
27 March 2016). 
25 Ibid. 
26 See Section 3 ‘Classification and Policy Distinctions’ below. 
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be justified under the WTO legal framework in order to legitimately promote clean energy?
27
 
In the Appellate Body (AB) Report in the Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in 
Tariff Program case, the AB did not want to go down a slippery slope and provide decisive 
answers on the matter.
28
 But with a new string of renewable energy disputes waiting to be 
settled in the WTO, it seems that the AB cannot keep evading these issues any longer.  
 
How and where energy interlocks with these closely related issues in the WTO and what the 
consequences of this interconnectedness are should be assessed further. It would be beneficial 
if the WTO merged the environment and energy debates into one, since it is clear that both 





8.2.1.3. Wide Membership to the WTO 
Another reason for greater involvement of the WTO in energy trade is that there is no other 
international organization governing international trade that is as widely acceded to as the 
WTO.
30
 The WTO has one hundred and sixty-one Members at present.
31
 Amongst them are 
major fossil fuel producing, exporting and transporting countries – Angola, Bahrain, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United States and Venezuela.
32
 Other 
major players in the energy field such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan are 
in the process of negotiating accession.
33
 9 out of 13 OPEC Members are already in the 
                                                 
27 See on this issue in particular Chapter 17, ‘Trade and the Environment’ in: M Trebilcock, R Howse and A 
Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade – 4 edn (Routlegde: New York 2013) 691 ff and R Howse and 
Eliason, ‘Domestic and International Strategies to Address Climate Change: An Overview of the WTO Legal 
Issues’ in: T Cottier, O Nartova and SZ Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of 
Climate Change (CUP: Cambridge 2009).  
28 Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program: Appellate Body Reports, Canada – 
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the 
Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, DSR 2013:I, p. 7 and 
Panel Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/R and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and Add.1, adopted 
24 May 2013, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, DSR 2013:I, 
p. 237. 
29 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement (n 8). 
30 See supra Chapter 5 on vast WTO Membership. 
31 See WTO, Members and Observers 







 It is thus evident that major stakeholders in the global energy landscape are full-
fledged participants in the multilateral trade system. This could provide a solid basis for 
successful negotiations between energy producing and exporting Members and energy 
transporting and importing Members.  
 
As pointed out in Chapter 5, the WTO’s wide-ranging membership is in stark contrast with 
the membership of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).
35
 The ECT is a similar agreement, but 
specifically tailored to energy trade and additionally incorporating significant investment 
part. The ECT was born as an alternative to conclude an energy specific agreement within the 
GATT/WTO framework after the Cold War had ended.
36
 The trade provisions of the ECT 
draw largely upon the GATT, but are better adapted to the needs of energy trade, for instance 
by providing extensive definitions of energy products and services and clearly incorporating 
gas pipelines as a means of transport in Article 7 ECT on Transit.
37
 However, despite the fact 
that ECT provisions are designed to deal with energy, the membership of the Energy Charter 
Treaty is far less comprehensive than that of the WTO: merely forty-eight countries have 
ratified the ECT.
38
 Nor have many other major energy producing and exporting countries 
joined the treaty: Canada, Indonesia, the United States, Algeria, Bahrain, China, Kuwait, 
Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela have only 
observer status.
39
 This leads to the conclusion that, although in theory the ECT might be 
better suited for a global energy trade framework, scarce practice and limited membership 
show that it is a somewhat dormant instrument in this respect. The WTO could offer a more 
fruitful ground for cooperation by housing the major players in the field. Even better, if the 
ECT and the WTO bundle their efforts and each bring in their strengths, this could create a 
win-win situation (see infra Section 8.3).  
 
8.2.1.4. Negotiation and Trade Policy Review Function of the WTO 
This point is directly tied to the previous argument of wide membership. One of the foremost 
functions of the WTO is to offer an inclusive platform for trade negotiations between its 
                                                 
34 See OPEC Member Countries <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm> (accessed 27 March 
2016).  
35 The Energy Charter Treaty, 18 April 1998, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100. 
36 Leal-Arcas and Filis (n 14) 24. 
37 Article 7 (10) (b) ECT (n 35). 
38 The Energy Charter Treaty, Members and Observers 






 The WTO itself is the result of negotiations and everything the WTO does is 
based on negotiations: from commitments to lower tariffs and other trade barriers to opening 
up service markets.
41
 The Organization is not in a static mode though, meaning that existing 
agreements can be renegotiated and new agreements can be added. The platform offered by 
the WTO can be beneficial for energy negotiations aimed for example at lowering barriers in 
energy trade or concluding a plurilateral agreement on energy. Such agreements usually have 
a narrower group of signatories and are sector specific.
42
 Hard commitments in the energy 
field might be difficult to reach (at least at the initial stages), but weaker commitments at the 
outset might better than no commitments at all – they leastwise have the potential to 
crystalize into something stronger in the long term.  
 
Moreover, the WTO offers a Trade Policy Review mechanism, to monitor the observance by 
the Members of the undertaken commitments. First of all, Members have to notify the WTO 
and their trade partners of the policies and laws they agreed upon.
43
 Apart from that, the 
WTO itself conducts regular reviews of countries’ trade policies. The objective of this is to 
increase transparency and to better understand countries trade policies, to improve public and 
intergovernmental debate on these issues and to better enable a multilateral assessment of the 
effects of the policies of the WTO.
44
 This function could be put into a greater use when 
multilateral energy trade discussions are held with a particular emphasis on an increased 
transparency. 
 
8.2.1.5. WTO Dispute Settlement System 
An additional advantage of the institutional function of the WTO is the Dispute Settlement 
System, governed by the rules of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
45
 Article 3.2 
of the DSU designates the dispute settlement mechanism a central element in providing 
                                                 
40 Article III.2 Marrakesh Agreement (n 8). 
41 See WTO, Understanding the WTO – What We Do  
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
42 See Annex 4 to the Marrakesh Agreement (n 8); Additionally, see WTO, Plurilaterals – of Minority Interest 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
43 Article III.4 (Functions of the WTO) and Annex 3 to the Marrakesh Agreement (n 8) (Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism). 
44 Annex 3 under (a) Objectives and Annex 3 to the Marrakesh Agreement (n 8) (Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism). 
45 Article III.3 of the Marrakesh Agreement (n 8) and DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). 
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security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.
46
 Members to the WTO must 
settle any trade dispute, including the disputes on energy trade, in this exclusive forum. What 
this means in practice is that Members are in effect precluded from settling their trade 
disputes elsewhere. The function of this is twofold: it provides Members with a multilateral 
setting for the settlement of their disputes to the exclusion of any other and at the same time 
and prevents them from having recourse to unilateral determinations of a breach of WTO 
law.
47
 Even though the functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system is not free of 
criticism, with around four hundred seventy-five cases settled in the nearly twenty years of 
the WTO’s existence, it is clearly one of the WTO’s success stories.
48
 As mentioned early in 
this chapter, the WTO has already witnessed several disputes relevant for energy. 
 
Canada – Renewable Energy makes a good for the urgent need of action on the WTO’s 
treatment of energy, and the implications of WTO subsidies disciplines for renewable energy 
in particular. In this instance, the Panel and the AB had to resort to what some call ‘legal 
acrobatics’ in order to avoid finding that a scheme aimed at promoting a public good – the 




Here, a parallel can be drawn yet again with the functioning of Energy Charter Treaty. 









                                                 
46 Article 3.2 DSU (n 45). 
47  WTO, In US — Section 301 Trade Act, Panel Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporations", WT/DS108/R, adopted 20 March 2000, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS108/AB/R, DSR 2000:IV, p. 1675,  the Panel held that Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes “a general 
duty of a dual nature”: ‘“Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a 
general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set 
out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to 
have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system 
of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution 
clause’, is an important new element of Members’ rights and obligations under the DSU.’ 
48 Generally, see D McRae, ‘What is the Future of the WTO Dispute Settlement?’ (2004) 7 Journal of 
International Economic Law 3 and WTO, Chronological list of Disputes Cases 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
49 See A Cosbey and PC Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and 
Renewable Energy: the Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) EUI Working Paper 
RSCAS 2014/17, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Global Governance Programme-82, 9. 
50 Article 27 ECT (n 35) (Settlement of Disputes between Contracting Parties). 
51 Article 26 ECT (n 35) (Settlement of Disputes between an Investor and a Contracting Party). 
52 Article 7.7 ECT (n 35) (Transit). 
53 Article 29 (Interim Provisions on Trade-related Matters) and Annex D (Interim Provisions for Trade Dispute 
Settlement) ECT (n 35); Note that the mechanism for settling trade disputes between Energy Charter member 






 dispute settlement, only Investor-State dispute settlement has 
been used in the ECT system so far.
55
 The Energy Trade dispute settlement mechanism 
between Energy Charter member countries follows the WTO dispute settlement model 
closely – provided that at least one of them is not a WTO member – but it has been left 
completely untested.
56
 This paradoxically proves that the WTO, even in absence of 
specialized rules on energy, has in fact been more active and effective in resolving energy 
trade disputes than the ECT and yet again confirms the rather dormant nature of the ECT in 
this respect.
57
 It shows that the WTO can be, and should continue to be, an appropriate forum 
for settling disputes in the realm of energy. 
 
8.2.2. Obstacles to More Proactive Energy Regulation in the WTO 
 
While the section above offered a broad pallet of arguments in favour of a more active WTO 
with respect to enhancing energy regulation, there are also counterarguments that cannot be 
left untouched. Their nature is twofold. The first one is (predictably) due to the general 
standstill of the WTO at present. The second goes back to the politically sensitive nature of 
energy trade. 
 
The general introduction to this thesis already alluded to the fact that there are many 
challenges the multilateral trading system is facing at present. The failure to conclude the 
Doha round (ongoing for 15 years), is perhaps the most obvious, but not the only expression 
of this impasse.
58
 Whether or not Doha it will ever be concluded remains unclear, but aside 
from that there are other matters that need to be addressed.  
 
Since the establishment of the WTO, the world has changed significantly, not only in the 
geopolitical sense, but also in the way we trade. Countries that have joined the multilateral 
trading system only later, have turned into major trading partners whose interests cannot be 
overlooked (such as China and Russia). Additionally, we are shifting away from 
                                                 
54 Articles 6 (Competition) and 19 (Environmental Aspects) ECT (n 35). 
55 The Energy Charter Treaty, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases 
<http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
56 See supra Chapter 5 on the ECT and trade disputes. 
57 Although, energy trade disputes in the WTO have not been without problems themselves, when we for 
instance look at the result of the Canada renewable energy case law (n 28). 
58 B Hoekman and PC Mavroids, ‘WTO ‘à la carte’ or ‘menu du jour’? Assessing the Case for More 
Plurilateral Agreements’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 319. 
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straightforward goods and services trade, and venturing into the more complex setting of 
global value chains, which todays is more profound than ever because of globalization.  
 
Aside from this changing paradigm, Van den Bossche mentions other pressing issues that 
need to be addressed in the WTO context. These are amongst others (1) the further 
liberalization of goods and services trade, going beyond tariffs, including non-tariff barriers; 
(2) the further development of the dispute settlement system; (3) the relationship between 
trade and climate change (energy inevitably comes into play here); (4) the relationship 
between trade and labour standards; (5) the relationship between trade and food security; (6) 
the further integration of developing countries into the WTO system; and, (7) the expansion 
of the WTO’s mandate in the areas of investment, currency policy, and, last but not least, 
energy.
59
 And, all these challenges together contributed to generating yet another one: the 





If – apart from the fact that the WTO is in a gridlock due to the failure to conclude Doha –  
there are so many trials and tribulations facing the multilateral trading system at present, and 
if one cannot agree on matter already being discussed actively in the WTO, why then add 
even more contentious issues onto an overly full plate? Maybe the WTO should stick to its 
last and tackle first things first? This is a valid argument that has to be taken into account.  
Yet, if one would think this way, no new matters would be addressed at all ‘until the time is 
right’. And the fact of the matter is, that the timing is never quite right.  
 
The second argument is connected to the politically sensitive nature of energy discussions in 
general. We have seen that energy was a topic that was largely avoided to begin with. We 
have also seen that some energy issues did become a topic of discussing in the WTO, it has 
been hard to reach consensus. For instances, issues such as energy dual pricing have been 
addressed and opposed by Members in the WTO context, but have not yielded any results.
61
 
To add to this, energy has not been embraced at the official level in the WTO up until now. 
                                                 
59 P van den Bossche and W Zdouc, Law and Policy of the World Trade – Texts, Cases and Materials – 3rd 
Edn (CUP, Cambridge 2013) 1018-1019; R Meléndez-Ortiz, C Bellmann and M Rodriguez Mendoza (eds), The 
Future and the WTO: Confronting the Challenges (ICTSD, Geneva 2012) and WTO, World Trade Report 2013 
- Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade over the Next Decades (WTO, Geneva 2013).   
60 Hoekman and Mavroids (n 58). 
61 See supra Chapter 7 on the subsidies paradox. 
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One could therefore simply conclude that there is no political willingness on the side of the 
Members to do so.  
 
This, as well, is a valid argument against the WTO taking on energy regulation more 
proactively. That this reluctant stance will be the status quo forever is highly unlikely, 
though. First of all, the WTO’s Membership has changed drastically and now includes most 
major energy producers and exporters. They will want to have a say on these matters, and 
vice versa, energy importers seek concessions on their side as well. This automatically means 
that the likeliness that an increasing number of energy dispute will be brought in the WTO 
will grow, which is already de facto happening as we speak.
62
 What is more, the energy 
trading landscape is changing: renewables are slowly outcompeting fossil fuels and the 
latter’s prices are at an historic low. This may mean that we are entering a new era where 
fossil fuels will no longer receive a ‘special treatment’ in the WTO context (e.g. Members 
losing their market power regarding the export of fossil fuels), and may have to compete with 
other energy goods on the market. In conclusion, there is no doubt that energy issues will 
thus keep on knocking on the WTO’s door. The least thing the WTO could do is to include 
energy matters on the official agenda. In fact, half of the work is already done, when looking 
at the Energy Charter Treaty with its rules on energy. If the WTO would cooperate actively 
with the ECT, preferably under the umbrella of the WTO, a true synergy with respect to 
global energy governance may be the result (as will be advocated in Section 8.3 below).  
  
As we can see, although the abovementioned counterarguments have to be taken into 
account, arguments in favour of the WTO as an active forum outnumber the 
counterarguments. The subject matter of the WTO, its involvement with closely related 
issues, its wide Membership, the trade policy review and dispute settlement mechanisms, 
they all lay a solid basis for a more proactive stance on pressing issues in general, and energy 
regulation more specifically. Not in the least because the hope remains that the WTO will 
become relevant again. Actually, by taking on 21
st
 century issues more proactively, the WTO 
could actually reinvent itself.   
 
                                                 
62 See for instance European Union and Its Members States – Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector, 




8.2.3. A Plurilateral Framework on Energy in the WTO? 
 
Now that we have set out the arguments for and against the WTO as a forum for more active 
energy regulation, there is one more thing that has to be discussed in this context. 
 
Some (especially Cottier et al.) propose that the right way to go about energy challenges in 
the WTO is to seek comprehensive energy negotiations in the forum.
63
 Much as the Uruguay 
Round produced an agreement on agriculture, in their view, the ultimate aim would be to 
negotiate a Framework Agreement on Energy in the WTO.
64
 Such Agreements are allowed 
under Article II.3 of the WTO Agreement.
65
 They enable a sub-set of the WTO Membership 
to agree on disciplines that are of interest to the signatories only. Currently, there are only 





The author is of the opinion that comprehensive negotiations on energy and a Framework 
Agreement could be of benefit to those members interested. Moreover, they are one way to 
go about attracting the necessary attention to energy issues in the WTO. Therefore, a 
plurilateral framework agreement on energy would definitely be a preferred option. Such a 
possibility would allow Members to address all pertinent issues in a complete way. 
Nevertheless, we have also seen from the foregoing section that there are many issues that 
have prevented Members and the WTO from materializing such initiatives up to date. And 
getting to the stage of comprehensive negotiations, not to mention negotiations towards a 
Framework Agreement, may be a difficult and lengthy process. For instance, all Members, 
even those that do not participate in the plurilateral, have to adopt such an agreement by 
consensus, as set out in Article X.9 of the WTO Agreement.
67
 The challenge that this poses is 
that any WTO Member can say no to the final text being proposed to them, meaning that 
                                                 
63 T Cottier, G Malumfashi, S Matteotti-Berkutova, O Nartova, J de Sepibus and SZ Bigdeli, ‘Energy in WTO 
Law and Policy’ in T Cottier and P Delimatsis (eds), The Prospects of International Trade Regulation – From 
Fragmentation to Coherence (CUP, Cambridge 2011) 220 ff.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Article II.3 WTO Agreement (n 8).  
66 There were additionally plurilaterals on beef and dairy which were terminated in 1997. 
67 Article X.9 WTO Agreement (n 8). 
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Because of some of these difficulties set out in the previous section, it may therefore be wiser 
and more realistic to start with milder forms of discussing energy matters in the WTO, e.g 
through thematic cooperation, and seeing a potential Framework Agreement as just one of the 
possible options to deal with energy in the WTO more comprehensively.  The following 
sections will give some additional, but not incompatible alternatives to concluding a 
Framework Agreement on energy in the WTO. These are especially geared towards working 
more closely with the Energy Charter Secretariat and potentially setting up a joint WTO/ECT 
Committee or Working Group on Energy Trade and Transit in that context. 
  
Another option is to reach out to other relevant international organisations dealing with 
energy. One especially valid suggestion that Cottier et al lay out is that comprehensive 
negotiations would offer a good opportunity to defining authoritatively the relationship of the 




Cooperation and coordination with other relevant organizations involved in energy issues is 
certainly a good idea and unavoidable in the long run. But instead of seeing comprehensive 
energy negotiations as a means through which to solidify relations with other organizations, 
the opposite way of going about it may bear more fruit. Rather, it would seem more helpful to 
start working with these organizations in more informal settings first, by e.g. holding 
thematic workshop and consultations. This way, one could explore where there is common 
ground and solutions could be found, before even venturing into more energy comprehensive 
negotiations on the official level, if that would be considered an option at all.
70
 While easier 
for more informal was of interaction and discussion to solidify into something more concrete 
overtime, the risk of the opposite (i.e. taking things to the official level right away) is that 
Members risk running into obstacles and differences, rather than finding common ground. 
While it is certain that energy should be included on the official level at the WTO, it is 
perhaps safer to careful explore in what shape and form first.  
                                                 
68 See on this in particular Hoekman, PC Mavroidis (n 58). 
69 Cottier et al (n 63). 
70 N Lamp, ‘The Receding Horizon of Informality in WTO Meetings’, (2015) Queen’s University Faculty of 




To conclude, the author proposes three possible options of ensuring energy finds its way on 
the WTO agenda, all of which can hopefully lead to finding some solutions, and could, but do 
not necessarily have to, lead to a Framework Agreement on Energy. These are (1) discussing 
energy issues actively in the WTO, at the initiative of the WTO and its Members itself; (2) 
closer cooperation, coordination and potential integration on energy issues with the ECT, and 
the possibility of creating joint Working Groups or Committees on topics of common 
interest, and (3) reaching out in an informal way to other relevant IOs, such as the UNECE, 
UNFCCC, OPEC, etc, by for instance organizing workshops on topics of common interest, 




8.3. A WTO – Energy Charter Treaty Synergy? Competition, Integration and Complementarity as 
Possible Scenarios for Future Interaction 
 
The previous section weighed the advantages against the disadvantages of the WTO as a 
forum for international energy regulation. It came to the conclusion that the WTO could offer 
a good platform for elaborating on energy trade regulation more actively. This does not mean 
however, (provided that the political willingness is there) this should be a sole exercise by the 
WTO and its Members alone. Quite to the contrary, the WTO and the ECT should reap the 
benefits from cooperating more closely on matters of common interest, thereby creating a 
synergy on enhanced energy regulation along the way.  
From Chapter 5 we learned that parallel applicability causes some tension between the WTO 
and ECT. But how can these institutions best manage the unsolved discrepancies stemming 
from overlap in substance and procedure? This largely depends on the course both treaty-
regimes aim to take in the future. Not only in view of the interaction amongst themselves, but 
more importantly, with regard to strengthening global energy trade governance, through 
which the WTO and the ECT can both actively contribute to promoting sustainable 
development and climate change mitigation.  
This section will discuss the dynamic nexus between the treaties as it has developed over 
time, but more importantly, also explore three potential scenarios for their relationship and 
place in the future. One thing is clear, however: No matter what path forward the regimes 
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decide to take, it should happen against the background of greater cooperation and 
coordination to minimize governance gaps and duplication.  
 
8.3.1. The Dynamic WTO–ECT Nexus over Time 
 
After examining overlap and potential tension between the two regimes in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis, the question remains: What is the actual nature of the nexus between the two treaties?  
 
The original objective of the ECT initiative in 1994 was to function as a ‘stepping-stone’ for 
WTO accession. Furthermore, the treaty regimes are connected in substance through Article 
4 and 29 ECT. But it seems difficult to put a conclusive label on the relationship between the 
two treaties.
71
 Nevertheless, in order to set out possible future scenarios of cooperation, we 
must understand their relationship. 
 
Undoubtedly, the WTO offers a ‘general’ trade regime, and the ECT a ‘specialized’ energy 
treaty.
72
 Yet, to label the ECT as merely a lex specialis (meaning a treaty of a specific subject 
matter that overrides the more general rule) to the WTO would not do justice to either the 
WTO or the ECT, for each institution possesses vital elements that the other does not: The 
WTO regulates trade in virtually all goods and services, and the ECT deals extensively with 
investment in addition to trade. Substantially, the ECT’s trade provisions lean heavily on 
WTO rules, but they also provide an elaboration (“WTO-plus” effect of the ECT) on them in 
certain instances, for example as discussed in Article 7 ECT on transit.  
 
Nevertheless, the past two decades of developments in the field and changes in Membership 
have far-reaching implications for the significance of certain parts of the ETC legal 
framework. 
What stands out in particular in this respect is the fading relevance of the ECT provisions on 
energy trade. In Chapter 5 we discussed how the trade provisions of the ECT are only 
applicable between non-WTO Members who are Party to the ECT.
73
 Because of the large 
                                                 
71 See Article 4 ECT (n 35) ‘Non-derogation from GATT and Related Instruments’ and Article 29 ‘Transitional 
Arrangements’. 
72 D Azaria, ‘Energy Transit under the Energy Charter Treaty and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ 
(2009) 27 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 559, 594. 
73 Supra Chapter 5, section 5.2.1. 
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number of accessions to the WTO, this means that these trade rules are merely applicable 
between a handful of ECT Parties by 2016 (as opposed to 1998): Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
74
 With the exception of 
Turkmenistan, all these countries are WTO Observers and currently in the process of 
acceding to the WTO. Between all other ECT Parties who already are WTO Members, and 
even between these ECT/WTO Members and non-WTO ECT Parties, GATT rules apply, 
with the abovementioned exceptions.
75
 What is the added value of the trade provisions of the 
ECT once all WTO Observers who are ECT Parties have acceded to the Organization? Will 
they lose their relevance, with the exception of the ‘WTO-plus’ style provisions such as 
Article 7 ECT on Transit? If that is the case, will the trade provisions of the ECT still have a 
legitimate purpose? This remains to be seen.  
 
This does not take away from the importance of the ETC as whole, and the more begs the 
question how to reinvent itself, including its relationship to the WTO.  
In that sense, perhaps the only way to construct the nexus between the WTO and the ECT is 
to accept that it has transformed from what it was in the beginning, and might change again 
in the future. In this context it is helpful to view both regimes as a product of their time and 
place and assess the transformation that has taken place since their inception. In the author’s 
view, it is worth discussing three types of nexuses that mark the relationship between the 
WTO and the ECT in this respect: competition, integration and complementarity. While the 
first one is unproductive and untenable for the future, the latter two offer different – yet not 
mutually exclusive – avenues for successful interaction.  
 
8.3.2. The Unproductive Scenario: Competition  
 
While it was clear from the outset of the WTO’s establishment in 1995 that the multilateral 
trading system would be an undertaking for the long-term, the feasibility of the same 
ambitions by the ECT were questioned by some from the start. Already in April 1996, even 
before the entry into force of the ECT, Thomas Waelde expressed his concern about the 
future success of the ECT in the preface of his edited volume on the Energy Charter:  
                                                 
74 See supra Chapter 5 Table I, Figure 2 ‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap (2015)’ as opposed to 
Figure 1 ‘WTO/ECT Membership Status and Overlap (1998)’; Left out are the ECT countries who apply the 
ECT provisionally, or have applied it provisionally in the past: Russia, Belarus, Australia, Iceland and Norway. 




“There is serious competition [to the potential of the ECT; author], mainly from the 
European Union’s further integration and association strategies eastwards, but also 
from the US, the expansion of the GATT/WTO, the International Energy Agency and 
a talked-about global investment code. Perhaps these forces will overshadow and 




Waelde saw the relationship between the WTO and the ECT thus as one of competition and 
threat rather than anything else. This is remarkable, since from the inception of the ECT 
regime one of the main objectives of the treaty was to acquaint non-WTO countries with the 
rules of the multilateral trading system. It is therefore unclear why Waelde saw the WTO as 
danger to the ECT, rather than as an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: 1) 
familiarising new countries with the WTO through the ECT, and, 2) and, vice versa, 
introducing WTO-type laws to the energy sector in a comprehensive manner. This view is 
especially surprising when we take into account that the WTO was only marginally interested 
in actively engaging in energy issues at the time.  
 
For these reasons, it seems unconstructive and undesirable to view the relationship between 
the WTO and the ECT this way, neither in hindsight nor when looking ahead. In fact, to be in 
competition is something the treaties can simple not afford when thinking of a modern and 
effective energy trade governance architecture: it would unnecessarily duplicate the work, 
moreover with doubtful results. Competition as a basis underlying their relationship would 
therefore be a missed opportunity and an unproductive way forward. Rather, the treaties 
would benefit much more recognising the unique potential each regime possess and drawing 
out their strengths to reach wider common objectives. 
 
8.3.3. Productive Scenario I: (Partial) Integration  
 
Instead of competition, it seems more fruitful to identify the historical nexus between the 
WTO and the ECT as one of (partial) integration on the side of the ECT. At the time of 
inception of the latter, the nexus of integration was the objective to introduce former socialist 
countries to the global trading system of the WTO through the Treaty. Surely, the practical 
                                                 
76 Thomas W Waelde, ‘Editor’s Preface’ in: TW Waelde (ed), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West 
Gateway to Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law, London 1996) xxi. 
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difficulties of this expressed themselves in competing competence and parallel applicability, 
although this was partially mitigated by the rules of conflict issued by the Energy Charter 
Secretariat.  
 
In the same vain, the nexus of a “second phase”–type of integration between the WTO and 
ECT seems a much more promising one, especially when looking ahead. Two decades have 
brought vast changes in membership to both treaties, not to mention the trading landscape 
they operate in. When the WTO and the ECT were established, renewable energy found itself 
merely on the fringe of the energy debate. By 2016, however, this view is outdated. A shift 
has occurred: In view of sustainable development and climate change mitigation, clean 
energy technologies are claiming their much deserved place on centre stage.  
 
In this proposed second phase integration, the two regimes should not shy away from 
reassessing the situation and taking steps towards regulatory reform where needed. This 
could mean crossing out those parts where the treaties are in duplication and collaborating 
where they can both contribute to a common goal. One should for e.g critically assess the 
remaining relevance of the trade provisions of the ECT, if most ECT Parties have joined the 
WTO (which they have). Maybe only the trade Articles of the ECT that incorporate extra 
obligations, such as Article 7 ECT on Transit, should remain, though it should be carefully 
considered in what form. 
 
But apart from preventing duplication, integration between the regimes should go even a step 
further towards a truly fruitful cooperation. It is here that the WTO and the ECT should join 
efforts in tackling issues of common interest. Energy trade and transit will remain pertinent 
issues that are in need of further clarification sooner rather than later. Enhanced energy 
governance in view of promoting sustainable development should be in everybody’s interest, 
as well.  
 
To reap the maximum benefits of its contribution in enhanced energy regulation, the WTO 
should involve the ECT in this endeavour. The WTO and ECT made a careful step in the 
direction of increased cooperation and coordination by organising a common conference at 
the WTO Headquarters in Geneva in 2013. The event concentrated on legal challenges 
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concerning energy in the WTO, the ECT and the interaction of the legal instruments.
77
 This is 
just the beginning of what predictably will be a long journey if both institutions aspire to take 
trade and regulation of the energy sector seriously. More effort is needed to realize the gains 
from cooperation between the WTO and the ECT.  
 
Therefore, a logical next step would be to solidify the collaboration between the WTO and 
the ECT. For instance, a joint WTO/ECT Working Group on Energy Trade and Transit could 
be established, to elaborate on pressing issues of common interest. These issues could range 
from harmonizing WTO and ECT concepts and policies on energy trade, to venturing into 
crucial new areas such as addressing clean energy trade more comprehensively. Last but not 
least, such a platform could function as an accelerator for parties to try and find common 
ground on more politically sensitive issues, e.g. such as defining the relationship between gas 
transport and transit obligations under both treaties and the imbalance between subsidies on 
fossil fuels and renewables. 
 
The WTO offers a broad membership, which includes most major energy producing and 
exporting countries, something the ECT lacks. The WTO also offers a forum for trade 
negotiations and an avenue for reflecting on market access gains (reflected in Members’ 
schedules of bound tariff concessions. The ECT, on the other hand, has offered a constructive 
platform for energy trade and transit discussions in addition to offering an Investor-State 
dispute resolution mechanism. These elements have been (largely) absent from the WTO so 
far. Combining these two elements into one joint exercise would benefit both treaty-regimes, 
not to mention the Members they each represent, while working towards common goals 
while preventing overlap along the way.   
 
8.3.4. Productive Scenario II: Complementarity in Global Energy Governance 
 
The second productive scenario builds on this idea but places it in the bigger picture of global 
energy governance. Because another, not mutually exclusive, way to see the nexus between 
                                                 
77 WTO, WTO News, ‘Lamy Calls for Dialogue on Trade in Energy in WTO’  
<http://wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl279_e.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016) and Energy Charter 
Secretariat, ‘Workshop on the Role of Intergovernmental Agreements in Energy Policy - 29 April 2013’ 




the ECT and the WTO is one of complementarity. This means that the WTO and the ECT can 
each contribute to strengthening energy architecture in their own way. Global energy 
governance generally revolves around the five main pillars of 1) Trade; 2) Energy security; 3) 




Up until now, a plethora of different regimes have largely dealt with these five main elements 
of energy governance separately. Aside from the WTO and the ECT, one could for instance 
think of the UN Sustainable Energy for All initiative, and the International Energy Agency’s 
(IEA) engagement with energy security. However, all five pillars are obviously interlinked 
and not hermetically closed off fields. A more coherent and comprehensive energy 
governance architecture, which would take into account all these aspects, would undoubtedly 
play a pertinent role in contributing to sustainable development, including climate change 
mitigation. The pressing environmental and energy challenges we are facing now are only 
likely to grow and it becomes clear that a more holistic approach to energy regulation is 
inevitable.  
 
In the complementarity scenario, the WTO and the ECT, apart from other treaty regimes and 
mechanisms, each would do their part in actively adding to a more coherent system of global 
energy and environmental resources management. The WTO’s emphasis obviously is on 
trade. The ECT, on the other hand, has been the central to the investment pillar of energy 
governance, due to its investment protection and dispute resolution capacities. Apart from 
that, it also fulfils an active role in energy transit negotiations. The ECT is thus 
complementary in energy governance to the WTO where it deals with energy investment and 
energy transit, valuable elements in which the WTO falls short, and vice versa.  
 
However, when thinking of a holistic approach, e.g. in the form of a multilateral and multi-
stakeholder instrument covering the whole spectrum of energy regulation, one has to make 
sure that the additional elements of energy governance (climate change mitigation and energy 
security) are sufficiently covered as well.  It is important to address both non-renewable and 
renewable energy governance, as gains for sustainable development lie in better regulation of 
both. Because certain features of the WTO and the ECT that are not sufficiently elaborated 
on at present, would easily link to other pillars and instruments of energy governance. An 
                                                 
78 Leal-Arcas and Filis (n 14) 19. 
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example connecting energy and climate change mitigation is the ECT Protocol on Energy 
Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA).  The provisions of the PEEREA 
are mostly soft in nature, providing signatories with a menu of good practices on energy 
efficiency and environmental policies. But one could undoubtedly see how bridges could be 
built to link the fundamentals set out in this Protocol to work in other relevant fora, such as 
the UN Sustainable Energy for All initiative and a potential future Environmental Goods 
Agreement. Some of the best practices set out in the PEEREA could be solidified into harder 
commitments in the field of climate change mitigation.  
 
But it is only through cooperation and coordination that the true potential of contributing to 
sustainable development through better energy governance is unlocked, an ‘energy synergy’ 
is created, so to say. If the objective is to create a holistic framework with solid rules for 
energy governance, covering all of the five main pillars, such efforts have to cut across the 
various regimes. A multifaceted framework for energy governance could take place under the 
WTO or ECT umbrella, but not necessarily so. 
 
8.4. The Alternative Route: Innovating Energy Regulation through Bilateral, Regional and Sector 
Specific Developments  
In the optimal scenario, the WTO and the ECT and their Members should actively contribute 
to improving the international legal framework for energy regulation. The options of (partial) 
integration and complementarity in global energy governance discussed in the previous 
section are two possible, but not mutually exclusive paths forward for the ECT and the WTO. 
They can take place in parallel and should moreover take into account the recent 
developments discussed in this section. 
 
However, in case the WTO and the ECT remain in a stalemate with respect to innovating 
themselves and cooperating with one another, one has to rely on an alternative route to push 
the energy governance agenda forward:  Chapter 4 of this thesis pointed to the unstoppable 
process of crystallization of new rules in energy regulation by means of commitments in 
Accession Protocols and Preferential Trade Agreements.  
 
This need for a new approach incorporating one or more pillars of energy governance is 
materializing through this new generation of agreements that have recently been concluded or 
are currently being negotiated. There are two relevant developments that have to be discussed 
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in this respect. The first is the proliferation of bilateral and regional initiatives. The second 
development is the emergence of sector specific agreements. Both incorporate a more all-
inclusive approach to energy governance one way or another and will briefly be touched 
upon here. 
 
We should see the future complementarity between the WTO and the ECT (and other 
relevant energy governance for a such as the UN) in light of these developments. One should 
avoid thinking in “either/or” terms, but rather accept that different processes of integration 
and complementarity may take place in parallel. The focus should be on how these platforms 
can each contribute to strengthening global energy governance and where they can bundle 
their powers in order to reach bigger objectives. 
 
8.4.1. Bilateral and Regional Developments: New Energy Rules in Preferential Trade 
Agreements 
 
Regarding developments on the bilateral level, one can think of the sustainable development 
chapters with a renewable energy focus that the EU has been including in its FTAs as 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this book.
79
 A good example of this is the recently concluded EU-
Singapore FTA dealing with both trade and investment, which contains a chapter on ‘Non-
Tariff Barriers to Trade and Investment in Renewable Energy Generation’, Article 7.1 
reflects the spirit of the chapter well:  
 
‘In line with global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Parties share the 
objective of promoting, developing and increasing the generation of energy from 





Instead of viewing the objectives of promoting trade and investment flows and environmental 
protection, including renewable energy promotion as irreconcilable, the provisions of the 
chapters do the opposite. The effort of reducing greenhouse gas emissions is directly linked 
to the scale up in renewable energy generation through facilitating trade and investment flows 
here. This shows us that these objectives can be perfectly united into one instrument and 
                                                 
79 See supra Chapter 4. 
80 See Chapter 7 ‘Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade and Investment in Renewable Energy Generation’ of the EU-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement concluded on 17 October 2014. 
 
 259 
cover more than just one pillar of energy governance. Better yet: they form a synergy in 
pursuing both trade, investment and sustainable development objectives and strengthening all 
simultaneously.  
 
The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) also includes 
chapters on Trade and Sustainable Development and Trade and Environment.
81
 These 
chapters emphasize the need for more cooperation in these fields and commit parties to 
facilitate trade and investment in environmental goods and services.
82
 In particular, CETA 
encourages to remove obstacles to trade and investment regarding goods and services of 





We witness similar developments in mega-regional initiatives such as the ongoing Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations and the recently concluded 
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). The EU in its initial position paper on Trade and Sustainable 
Development in the TTIP context emphasized the contribution that trade can make to 
sustainable development.
84
 The EU sees the TTIP as offering ‘a comprehensive and 
ambitious approach to trade and sustainable issues’.
85
 As has become practice by now, the 
EU therefore also aims to add a Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapter into the 
TTIP, focussing on labour and environmental aspects, including climate change and their 
inter-linkages.
86
 It aims to reflect parties’ commitments as set out in international investment 
agreements, such as the UNFCCC and agencies such as UNEP.
87
 To contribute to sustainable 
development through trade and investment, the negotiations of the TSD chapter are therefore 
focusing on 1) environmental goods and services and climate-friendly technologies; 2) the 
use of sustainability assurance schemes and; 3) corporate social responsibility practices.
88
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<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/index_de.htm> (accessed 27 March 2016).  
82 CETA Chapter XX, Article 3 and 5; Article X.12 and X.9.  
83 CETA Chapter XX, Art X.9 [2]. 
84 See EU–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, ‘Trade and Sustainable Development – Initial 
EU Position Paper, 1 [3], available through 
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86 Ibid [5]. 
87 Ibid [8]. 
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and describes the European Union's general approach on "Trade and Sustainable Development" in the TTIP 




Last but not least, the focus of a potential TSD chapter should be on the sustainable use and 
management of natural resources.  
 
8.4.2. Sector Specific Developments in Energy and Environmental Regulation 
 
Apart from bilateral and multilateral trade and investment treaties containing chapters and 
provisions that deal with energy governance in a more holistic manner, there are also sector 
specific developments that point in this direction. When thinking of the Energy Charter 
Treaty and the WTO and their complimentary contribution to strengthening energy 
governance through increased cooperation and/or a potential agreement, the sector specific 
developments considered in this section cannot go unnoticed. 
 
 
8.4.2.1. The Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (SETA) Initiative 
One of the proposals exemplary in this respect is the ICTSD initiative to conclude a 
Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (SETA).
89
 The initiative suggests concluding an 
agreement on energy trade and sustainable development and could set a standard for what a 
more holistic energy governance agreement could look like. There are many possible forms 
the SETA agreement could take. One of the options is a plurilateral-type of agreement, to 
which like-minded countries could accede. It could exist under the WTO umbrella, but for 
instance also in the broader Energy Charter Treaty framework, where it could conceivably be 
placed under the newly established International Energy Charter Initiative, which especially 
wishes to focus on sustainable development. Alternatively, it could be a standalone 
agreement.  
 
But, better yet, if a more holistic energy agreement such as the SETA would materialize, why 
not turn it into a joint international organization initiative (for example, WTO-ECT-UN)? 
This way, all vital pillars of energy governance could be covered. An agreement which is not 
necessarily placed under the umbrella either of these organizations would be an advantage, 
fostering much needed cooperation on these issues between them. This could lead to a more 
                                                                                                                                                       
public on 7 January 2015, pages 5-7, available through  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153024.pdf> (accessed 27 October 2016). 
89 See ICTSD, Fostering Low Carbon Growth: The Case for a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement by the 
ICTSD, Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy (ICTSD, Geneva 2011). 
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multifaceted and better coordinated instrument covering all the energy pillars of energy 
governance (trade, investment, climate change mitigation, energy security and transit). The 
result could be a synergy of a more efficiently regulated energy sector, combined with 
contributing to sustainable development and climate change mitigation.   
 
Since a project of this kind will inevitably be ambitious and complex, a bottom-up approach 
may be the most realistic way forward. Rather than coming from the highest levels, the 
starting point for such a joint initiative should be through informal meetings. We can observe 
that attempts to formalize negotiations, e.g. in the WTO level, consistently spawn new forms 
of informality that may be more effective, for instance because they do not necessarily 
require the adoption of an official agenda. Informal meetings can provide opportunities for 
more productive interventions, alliances, and performances that are precluded in more formal 
settings.
90
 Such informal meetings on a holistic energy governance approach could e.g. take 
the shape of consultations between the chairpersons of relevant divisions in each 
organization, cross-organizational ‘informal chats’ , or on annual conferences, all themed 
around the contents of the SETA initiative.  
 
8.4.2.2. The Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) and APEC Initiatives 
Other related developments that are important in this respect are the on-going negotiations to 
liberalize environmental goods in the form of an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA). As is 
well known, a large part of the environmental goods on the negotiating table (such as solar panels) 
are goods which directly relevant for the scale up of renewable energies. In this respect, what is 
also worth mentioning are the activities of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
countries. Although a voluntary initiative only, they include, inter alia, an Energy Working Group 
(EWG) and an Energy Trade and Investment Task Force (ETITF), where stakeholders from 
various APEC members cooperate and coordinate their policies. 
 
8.4.2.3. The International Energy Charter (IEC) 
Last but not least on the list of these more comprehensive approaches to energy governance is 
the new 2015 International Energy Charter (IEC). Interestingly, this is a product from the 
Energy Charter Secretariat itself, indicating that the ECT has realized this pressing need for a 




new and updated approach to current energy rules. While the WTO may house more major 
energy players amongst its Members, the ECT may be a step ahead of the WTO in that it is 
being more proactive in this respect. This is one more argument in favour of the ECT and the 
WTO to bundle their powers in pursuing common objectives. 
 
In short, the IEC is a political declaration on global cooperation in the field of energy which 
was issued in the course of 2015 and negotiated under the auspices of the Energy Charter 
Secretariat in The Hague.
91
 While this declaration is a soft law instrument and has no legal 
validity, it is a positive sign that ECT members, signatories as well as non-signatories 
gathered around the table to discuss global energy challenges ahead. Its purpose was to 
produce an updated document to the founding document of the ECT, the European Energy 
Charter, concluded in 1991.
92
 The concept of the International Energy Charter 
 
‘[…] aims at enhancing international cooperation in order to meet common 
challenges related to energy at national, regional and international levels, including 




Additionally, the document hints to more cooperation and coordination between multilateral 
agreements in the field of energy, a message that has been reiterated throughout this brief. Its 
signatories have agreed to foster synergies among energy-related multilateral fora and stated 
that they are willing to take full advantage of the expertise of existing international 
organisations in the energy field.
94
 More importantly, regarding cooperation between the 
ECT and WTO, the Signatories to the 2015 Charter aim to ensure the development of trade in 
energy is consistent ‘[…] with major multilateral agreements such as the WTO Agreement 
and its related instruments […]’.
95
 These goals should be achieved by means of, for instance, 
guaranteeing an open and competitive market for energy products, materials, equipment and 




                                                 
91 See International Energy Charter, ‘Agreed text for adoption in The Hague at the Ministerial Conference on 
the IEC on 20 May 2015’ available through the Energy Charter Treaty website 
<http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/IEC_EN.pdf> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
92 The 1991 Energy Charter, also known as the European Energy Charter, was the founding document for the 
Energy Charter Treaty and provides the political foundation for the Charter process.  
93 See Preamble to the text of the 2015 Charter (n 91). 
94 Ibid. 





One pressing issue that is not fully covered by either the WTO, ECT nor RTAs that could be 
fit into a modern energy governance framework as proposed by the IEC would be the 
(im)balance between fossil fuel subsidies and clean energy subsidies. An up-to-date approach 
has to abandon the outdated notions of eternal fossil fuel dominance to an approach that gives 




This chapter has first made the case for greater involvement of the WTO in regulating energy 
trade – despite the fact that the Organization has had a historically troublesome relationship 
with it. Despite the passive state of the Organization at present, the WTO nevertheless is a 
more suited forum than it might seem at first glance. Its subject matter, as well as vast 
membership, negotiation and Trade Policy Review functions, enhanced by the dispute 
settlement mechanism, have the capacity to provide a promising institutional platform for 
regulating international energy trade, even in comparison to the specialized Energy Charter 
Treaty. Not to mention that the WTO, consciously or not, has already been confronted with 
energy issues raised by the disputes brought before the DSB. 
 
From the negotiation perspective, an additional advantage is that the WTO has for some time 
been involved in the matters closely related to energy such as environment, (sustainable) 
development, natural resources and agriculture. What is lacking at present in order to begin 
materializing the potential of the WTO in the energy field is the embracement of energy at 
the official level in the policy discussions; also, the technical expertise needed to navigate 




However, efforts for a more efficient system of global energy regulation should not be 
limited to the WTO alone. The chapter advocated in particular for increased cooperation and 
coordination with the Energy Charter Treaty. Is discussed three modes of interaction: the 
unproductive scenario of competition between the two treaty-regimes, and the more fruitful 
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and What Can Be Done’ (2012) 5 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 325, 342. 
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options of (partial) integration and complementarity.  Together, the treaty regimes can foster 
a synergy and work towards solutions. 
 
If such efforts are absent or fail, enhanced energy regulation will inevitably by advanced 
through bilateral, regional and sector specific means. We have seen advanced provisions in 
bilateral EU Free Trade Agreements (e.g. the EU-Singapore FTA, and the EU-Ukraine FTA) 
and energy discussion are also central to Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) negotiations.
98
 Last but not least, sectoral initiatives such as the International Energy 
Charter attempt that to tackle today’s energy challenges, may harden into more solid 
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